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Abstract	
This thesis argues that ‘democracy’ can better be understood in terms of a 
conceptual diarchy of ‘isonomia’ (equal political rights) and ‘isegoria’ (equal speech 
rights), rather than the conventional diarchy of ‘will’ and ‘opinion’ that originated in 
the era of absolute monarchy. As the proposed diarchy has its origin in classical 
Greece, the thesis starts with a brief overview of the institutional changes in sixth-, 
fifth- and fourth-century Athenian democracy that implemented the distinction in 
different ways, and examines some of its dysfunctions. The particular aspect of 
Athenian democracy under focus is sortition – the random selection of citizens for 
public office – viewed in antiquity as democratic, whereas election was viewed as 
an aristocratic or oligarchic selection mechanism. The thesis takes issue with 
Bernard Manin’s claim that the ‘triumph of election’ was on account of the natural 
right theory of consent, arguing that sortition-based proxy representation is a better 
way of indicating (hypothetical) consent than preference election. 
The thesis then seeks to clarify the concept(s) of representation – essential to the 
implementation of the democratic diarchy in modern large-scale societies – and to 
study how the diarchy has been reincarnated in modern representative 
democracies, along with an examination of the pathologies thereof. Consideration 
is given as to what the deliberative style of assemblies selected by lot should be, 
alongside evaluation of the epistemic potential of cognitive diversity and the 
‘wisdom of crowds’. Given the need for both isonomia and isegoria to assume a 
representative form in large modern states, Michael Saward’s Representative 
Claim is adopted as a theoretical model to extend the reach of political 
representation beyond elections. 
The thesis concludes with tentative proposals as to how the fourth-century reforms 
(delegation of the final lawmaking decision to randomly-selected nomothetic 
courts) might be used as a template for modern institutions to resolve some of the 
problems of mass democracy.
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Introduction	
Since the time of the birth of representative government at the end of the 
eighteenth century many claims have been made regarding the ‘crisis of 
democracy’. Most of the jeremiads were written in the wake of an extension to the 
franchise, and echoed Henry Ireton’s argument at the Putney Debates (1647) that 
‘no man hath a right to an interest or share in the disposing of the affairs of the 
kingdom . . . that hath not a permanent fixed interest in this kingdom’. In the UK, 
conservative liberals such as Henry Maine and Walter Bagehot were deeply 
sceptical that parliamentary government could survive Disraeli’s extension of the 
franchise to include the majority of working men, and the resultant shift of the 
effective locus of decision making from the parliamentary chamber to the electoral 
hustings. 
However the turn of the twenty-first century has witnessed unprecedented 
disapproval with the entire political class, and a dramatic collapse in membership 
of political parties, right across the developed world, leading to claims that ‘the age 
of party democracy has passed’ (Mair, 2013, p. 1).1 In the UK the Royal Society for 
the Protection of Birds now has more than twice as many members as the three 
main political parties combined and politicians are now even more distrusted than 
estate agents, bankers and journalists (MORI, 2013). As Matthew Arnold’s Dover 
Beach (1867) catalogued the ‘long, withdrawing roar’ of the sea of religious faith, 
the long-term consequence of the Reform Act of the same year was to undermine 
voters’ faith in, and deference to, the political establishment. This is a consequence 
of the paradox at the heart of representative democracy – voters expect politicians 
both to pander to their wishes and at the same time to exercise strong leadership, 
giving rise to the (probably apocryphal) remark of the nineteenth-century French 
socialist politician Alexandre Ledru-Rollin: ‘there go the people, I must follow them 
for I am their leader’. 
                                            
1 Particularly worrying in the light of E.E. Schattschneider’s claim that ‘modern democracy 
is unthinkable save in terms of parties’. (Schattschneider, 1942, p. 1) 
8 
The current malaise has led to the growth of the so-called anti-politician, the 
‘outsider’, who makes the (dubious) claim not to be a member of the ‘political class’ 
– Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, Beppe Grillo and Marine Le Pen being obvious 
examples. The close vote in the Scottish referendum of September 2014 was as 
much a rejection of the political class as it was a rational appraisal of the case for 
independence, and similar observations apply to the Brexit referendum and the US 
presidential election and Italian referenda of 2016. 
The phenomenon of the anti-politician is a reaction to the perception that voters 
and members of the ‘political class’ have little in common. In her 1967 monograph 
The Concept of Representation, Hanna Pitkin argued that there are two primary 
aspects to political representation – ‘descriptive’ and ‘active’. Descriptive 
representation is based on a resemblance between rulers and the ruled – a 
democratic legislature should be a ‘portrait in miniature’ of the population that it 
seeks to represent (Adams, 1951). Surely a group of people that, in Bill Clinton’s 
words, ‘looks like America’, will be more likely to act in the interests of America 
than a group of rich, white, male lawyers, who are beholden to equally rich ‘n 
powerful lobbyists? This has led an anti-politician like Farage to deliberately 
cultivate a ‘blokeish’ image, seeking to reassure voters that he is no different from 
them. But one man cannot ‘describe’ the whole electorate and the anti-politician is 
confusing descriptive representation with Pitkin’s ‘active’ variant, whereby 
politicians seek to realize their constituents’ interests. When you hire a lawyer (or 
go to your doctor) the last thing on your mind is whether or not they resemble you, 
so anti-politicians are conflating these two very different forms of political 
representation. Chapter 4 of this thesis argues that each form requires a different 
appointment mechanism, with election reserved for the active representation of 
interests. But if descriptive representation is deemed important to democratic 
politics then final legislative judgment should be in the hands of a large jury 
selected by lot – the only way to create a statistically-representative microcosm of 
the whole citizen body. 
The popular protest against the political establishment might be taken as 
confirmation of the ‘ruling class’ thesis which claims that kratos (power) has always 
been in the hands of the aristoi rather than the demos – modern governance is 
oligarchy dressed up as democracy. This perspective results from the work of the 
‘New Machiavellians’ (Burnham, 1943):  Robert Michels’ Political Parties: A 
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Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (Michels, 
1966 [1911]), Gaetano Mosca’s The Ruling Class (Mosca, 1939) and Vilfredo 
Pareto’s The Rise and Fall of Elites (Pareto, 1979 [1920]).2 Joseph Schumpeter’s 
theory of elite rotation (Schumpeter, 1996 [1942]) was the best justification liberal 
theorists could offer at a time when democracy itself was under challenge. Mosca 
outlined the ruling class thesis as follows: 
[T]he ruling class or, rather, those who hold and exercise the public 
power, will always be a minority, and below them we find a numerous 
class of persons who do never, in any real sense, participate in 
government but merely  submit to it: these may be called the ruled 
class. (Mosca, 1925, p. 16, cited in Meisel 1962, pp. 32-3) 
These classic texts, which should be read in the context of the early twentieth-
century dalliance with fascism and communism, were challenged by a new 
generation of economists and political scientists during and after the Second World 
War. According to Karl Mannheim’s Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, 
the diffuse and mobile nature of modern society makes the formation of 
(hegemonic) elites enormously difficult – the elites end up cancelling each other 
out (Mannheim, 1940). Mannheim’s thesis was broadly confirmed by Robert Dahl’s 
study of power structures in New Haven, Connecticut, in which he argued that 
modern ‘democracies’ would be better described as a form of polyarchy rather than 
oligarchy. (Dahl, 1961) 
The advent of ‘populistic’ political parties supposedly transferred power from elites 
to voters – Anthony Downs’s (1957) exposition of Harold Hotelling’s ‘median voter 
theorem’ (demonstrated mathematically by Duncan Black), states that ‘two vote-
seeking parties will both take the same position, at the centre of the distribution of 
                                            
2 Earlier examples of the ruling class thesis include the works of Karl Marx; later 
(contextualized) examples include C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite (1956) and Anthony 
Sampson’s Anatomy of Britain (1962), both studies of the shadowy 
military/corporate/financial elites that were pulling the strings of the elected leaders 
nominally in power in the US and Britain – the ‘invisible government’ behind the ‘ostensible 
government’ (Rosenblum, 2008, p. 14). 
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voters’ most-preferred positions’ (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 4 (m/s)). Although the 
median voter theorem was the product of rational-choice economics (politicians are 
vote maximisers and voters are preference seekers), it was anticipated by 
Tocqueville in Democracy in America and critiqued as ‘populistic’ democracy by 
Dahl (Dahl, 2006 (Ch. 2)). 
However the median-voter theorem provides little solace for those who seek to 
defend an epistemically substantive (as opposed to purely procedural) theory of 
democracy. Even if it is the case that policy outcomes accurately reflect median 
preferences,3 such preferences tend to be singularly poorly informed (Zaller, 1992). 
Philip Converse, after a careful study of mass belief systems, concluded that large 
portions of the electorate ‘simply do not have meaningful beliefs, even on issues 
that have formed the basis for intense political controversy among elites for 
substantial periods of time’ (Converse, 1964, p. 245).4 ‘Lack of strong opinions, 
resulting in almost random responses, is one way of explaining the attitudinal and 
ideological inconsistencies identified in the survey-based evidence’ (Femia, 2009, 
p. 70). So even if, pace Mosca and the ruling-classs theorists, the demos does 
have kratos, democracy is beginning to look like a poor way of making political 
decisions with good outcomes. 
In addition to the median-voter theorem, Anthony Downs is also known for his 
theory of ‘rational ignorance’ – an attempt to explain why mass public opinion is so 
poorly informed. An elector in a mass democracy has no reason to study the 
issues in depth because her individual vote has, in effect, no causal efficacy at all 
(Downs, 1957). The power of the individual voter to influence the outcome of 
elections is minimal: in modern democracies the extension of the suffrage cannot 
in the end empower individuals because once the democratic ‘cake’ has grown 
past a critical size each voter’s slice becomes so small as to be causally irrelevant.  
                                            
3 A claim that is open to dispute – for arguments against the median-voter theorem, see 
Gilens and Page (2014). 
4 For a detailed refutation of the vox populi, vox dei argument, see Green (2010). 
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The original demokratia of fifth-century Athens, when all substantive decisions 
were taken directly by the general assembly which all citizens were entitled to 
attend (actual attendance levels running into the several thousands), suffered from 
its own version of rational ignorance. Decisions were taken by a mass show of 
hands after cursory deliberation and were often poorly considered and erratic – the 
assembly on occasion reversing decisions on successive days. So in the fourth 
century the Athenians opted to delegate the lawmaking function to nomothetai 
(legislative courts). The nomothetai followed the competitive advocacy model of 
the People’s Courts (dikasteria) and the decision function was devolved to large 
(typically 501-1501) randomly-selected juries, who listened to the adversarial 
debate and then determined the outcome via voting. Random selection by lot (a 
procedure known as sortition) was viewed by Aristotle as the essence of Athenian 
democracy – enabling all citizens to rule and be ruled in turn – and was used for 
the selection of most magistrates, but the focus of this thesis is on the use of 
sortition for legislative juries. Hansen (1991) attributes the comparative stability of 
the restored demokratia to the switch from assembly rule to considered decision-
making by legislative juries. 
Given the parallel between poorly-informed electoral choice and unreformed 
Athenian direct democracy, this thesis argues that democratic governance might 
well benefit from a modern-day reincarnation of the nomothetai. If trial by jury (a 
Greek innovation) is the best way of determining the truth in the law courts then 
why not take another leaf from the Athenians’ book and institute the trial of 
legislative proposals in the High Court of Parliament, with the outcome determined 
by a statistically-representative sample of the citizen body? As in classical-era 
Athens the arguments for and against the proposed law would be made by 
members of the political class (in the modern case both elected members and 
expert advocates), but the debate would be judged, and the ‘verdict’ determined, 
by randomly-selected members of the public (the distinction between advocates 
and judges is fleshed out in Chapter 4). Whether or not ordinary members of the 
public have the necessary cognitive skills to make such decisions is discussed in 
Chapter 6, but at least allotted legislators would be required to listen to the debate 
– at present the (UK) parliamentary green benches are largely empty (except 
during Prime Minister’s Question Time) and members only appear when the 
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division bell rings, before being herded through the appropriate lobby by the party 
whips. 
Not only would such an innovation benefit from the historical precedent of the 
cradle of democracy,5 but the underlying methodology has been tested and refined 
by a social science research programme that has been running for more than two 
decades. James Fishkin’s experiments in Deliberative Polling have confirmed the 
view of the ancient democrats that although ‘the best counsellors [are] the wise, 
none can hear and decide so well as the many’ (Thuc. 6.39; c.f. Plato, Protagoras, 
322d-323d). Fishkin has demonstrated that a randomly-selected group of several 
hundred persons is able to make sensible decisions on issues ranging from the 
massive expansion of wind power in Texas and the building of sewage treatment 
plants in China to the crafting of budgetary priorities in Italy. More importantly, the 
selection methodology gives the organisers the confidence to claim that the 
representative microcosm  
offers a picture of what everyone would think under good conditions. 
In theory if everyone deliberated, the conclusions would not be much 
different. So the microcosm offers a proxy for the much more 
ambitious scenario of what would happen if everyone discussed the 
issues and weighed competing arguments under similarly favourable 
conditions. (Fishkin, 2009, p. 194) 
The experiments are the product of Fishkin’s Center for Deliberative Democracy at 
Stanford University but the tightly-constrained form of deliberation that he 
champions has been compared unfavourably with the rich face-to-face exchange 
preferred by Habermasian deliberative democrats. Chapter 5 fleshes out the 
contrast between Habermasian and Fishkinian deliberation and concludes that the 
silent form of deliberation favoured by Fishkin, in which the deliberative jury’s role 
                                            
5 As an exercise in conceptual analysis and political sociology, this thesis does not seek to 
evaluate John Keane’s historical claim that the original cradle of democracy was the small 
settlements of Asia Minor. (Keane, 2010) 
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is primarily to ‘weigh’ competing arguments is the only one that is compatible with 
the need to maintain accurate statistical representation. 
Fishkin’s Deliberative Polls have, with the exception of one undertaken in the 
Zegou province of the People’s Republic of China, always been for information or 
advice only, but Ian Budge has suggested that they could in fact have a formal role 
to play in the political process: 
Suppose actual powers of policy decision were given to random 
samples of citizens who after an extended conference were polled to 
decide between proposals on each issue, which were then put into 
effect. This would be one way of installing a deliberative democracy. 
Randomness of selection would ensure representativeness of panels, 
so every citizen would have an equal chance to participate. University-
style seminars and lectures by experts would ensure due 
consideration was being given to all arguments. In this way 
deliberation would be focused and made effective, and would produce 
better policy – or at least the policy which would be preferred by most 
of the population if they gave it thought. Sampling in this way also 
guards against a common criticism of deliberative proposals – that 
they would take up too much time, that citizens are ill-informed, etc. 
Having decisions made by sub-sets of citizens who will be informed 
takes care of this. (Budge, 2000, p. 201)6 
The governance of large modern states is, inevitably, representative, and the 
starting point of any consideration is generally the analytic distinctions made in 
Hanna Pitkin’s seminal 1967 monograph The Concept of Representation.  This 
thesis argues that the ‘descriptive’ variant provided by sortition could only ever be 
one element in a representative democracy and that the ‘active’ variant 
                                            
6 The notion of ‘giving representative samples of ordinary citizens the power to decide 
policy issues’ is also one of the principles gleaned by Daniela Cammack from her exercise 
in ‘rethinking Athenian democracy’. (Cammack, 2012, p. 131) 
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presupposes the ongoing need for election. Unlike some sortition proposals, this 
thesis argues for a ‘mixed’ system of government as outlined in Chapter 8.4. 
The literature on sortition is in the pre-paradigm state and the goal of this thesis is 
to introduce some conceptual clarity – the primary intention being to map out the 
terrain in a comprehensive manner that might be helpful for future researchers. 
However, as sortition has been part of the machinery of governance in antiquity 
and is deemed to have potential to improve the working of modern democratic 
states, this requires the evaluation of a wider literature, including classical philology, 
the history of political thought, deliberative and epistemic democracy, political 
sociology, statistical theory, psephology and media studies. As a consequence this 
is a longer and much more general dissertation than is the norm – Chapter 7 alone 
might well be a subject for a freestanding PhD. Whilst the conceptual project is 
(hopefully) comprehensive, the evaluation of this additional literature is, of 
necessity, less so – if the conceptual distinctions are sound then it will be up to 
subject specialists in these additional fields to apply the concepts to their own 
literature. 
Most Kleroterians7 or ‘sortinistas’ (Stone, 2017) and advocates of minipublics, elide 
or ignore Pitkin’s distinction between descriptive and active representation, 
whereas mainstream (Habermasian) deliberative democrats are so focused on the 
quest for the ‘ideal speech situation’ that issues of representativity are glossed over 
(see Chapter 5). ‘Real democracy’, according to its deliberative advocates, has 
nothing to do with the aggregation of (bourgeois) preferences and (self)-interests, 
the goal is social solidarity. As the means employed to establish real democracy is 
the (transcendental) principle of discursive rationality (‘universal reason’), it doesn’t 
matter too much which citizens get to participate (so long as historically 
disadvantaged subaltern voices are well represented). (Bohman, 1996, p. 191) 
Whether for reasons of incremental pragmatism (O'Leary, 2006; Van Reybrouck, 
2013), or just hedging their bets (Callenbach and Phillips, 2008), most Kleroterians 
                                            
7 A lively community of sortition advocates (both academics and activists) who trade insults 
on the ‘Equality by Lot’ discussion site: www.equalitybylot.wordpress.com 
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are prepared to countenance a bicameral system – one elected house and one 
allotted house – but there is no serious attempt to anticipate and resolve the 
inevitable conflict between the two. British political experience would indicate that 
the elected house will always trump the decisions of a house selected by any 
alternative procedure (heredity, appointment, sticking pins in the phone book, etc.). 
More importantly there is no attempt to distinguish between the different aspects of 
the legislative process (policy proposal and advocacy, revision and final legislative 
judgment) or to discuss the very different roles that election and sortition might play 
in each of these functions. This problem is addressed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, 
based on an important (and largely overlooked) distinction made by James 
Madison in Federalist 10 between advocacy and judgment and the corrupting 
effect of combining both functions in a single ‘body of men’. James Harrington’s 
Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) provides a template for how this distinction 
might be implemented in the design of political institutions. 
I.1  The democratic diarchy 
Although we are accustomed to think of Athenian democracy in terms of the power 
(kratos) of the ordinary people (demos), and associate its birth with the 507 BC 
constitution of Cleisthenes, there is no evidence for the use of the word demokratia 
before the reforms of Ephialtes (462/1). Earlier sources used other terms, in 
particular two very different forms of equal rights, isonomia and isegoria. Isonomia 
– normally translated as ‘equal political rights’ – referred (inter alia) to the right of all 
male citizens to serve as a juror or magistrate and attend and vote at the assembly, 
where each vote carried the same numerical weight, irrespective of wealth, birth or 
connection. Assembly decisions were simple majorities, and the principle applied 
both to the verdict of the dikasteria (people’s courts) and nomothetai (fourth-
century legislative panels). In this respect isonomia translates as (numerical) 
equality of outcome, or natural equality (Hansen, 1999, p. 83).8  
                                            
8 In addition to the equal right to determine new laws, isonomia required that the law was 
implied impartially to all citizens, regardless of wealth, birth and social status. No Athenian 
citizen could be condemned without trial by jury (apart from thieves caught in the act, and 
who confessed to their crime). 
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However isonomia – in the sense of majority voting (or loudness of shouting) – was 
also the decision rule of the Spartan apella9 and the Roman comitia. What made 
Athens democratic, rather than oligarchic, was the combination of isonomia and 
isegoria (equal speech) – the equal right to advise citizens in the assembly – in 
Sparta and Rome this right was restricted to the nobility and the magistrates. 
Isegoria was a form of equality available to ton Athenaion ho boulomenos hois 
exestin (‘he of the Athenians who wishes from amongst those who may’). In 
practice only a tiny minority of citizens – mostly the self-appointed political class 
(rhetores)10 – availed themselves of this form of equal liberty, so isegoria bears a 
close affinity to the modern concept of (formal) equality of opportunity (Hansen, 
1999, p. 83).  
Nadia Urbinati constructed her 2014 book Democracy Disfigured around a similar 
diarchy – in her case between sovereign will [isonomia] and opinion [isegoria]. 
‘[T]he diarchy of “votes” and “opinion” is thus the key to appreciate democracy as a 
government that pivots on equal freedom’ (ibid., pp. 14-15). 
As this thesis is a work in political theory (leading to tentative institutional 
proposals) rather than an exercise in Classical-era philology, Chapter 2, on the 
Athenian polis, only offers a brief outline of the extensive literature on the 
isegoria/isonomia debate. My motive for revisiting the classical literature – apart 
from the fact that the Athenian demokratia was a fully functioning system of 
government that lasted for two centuries – is an attempt to avoid certain linguistic 
confusions in Urbinati’s book (discussed at length in Chapter 1). The same 
problem is to be found in Bernard Manin’s Principles of Representative 
Government in which he refers to isonomia (the will of ‘Parliament as a whole’) as 
the ‘higher will’; and isegoria (as expressed in the streets, in petitions and in the 
columns of the press’) as the ‘lower will’ (Manin, 1997, p. 205). The Athenians 
                                            
9 The apella simply accepted or rejected the proposals submitted to it. In later times the 
actual debate was almost, if not wholly, confined to the kings, elders, ephors and perhaps 
the other magistrates. 
10 Although the ‘Old Oligarch’ begged to differ, claiming that ‘any wretch who wants to can 
stand up and obtain what is good for him and the likes of himself’, thereby ‘allowing even 
the worst people to speak’. (Pseudo-Xonophon, Constitution of the Athenians, 6) 
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would not have approved of this hierarchy of wills, believing that both forms of 
democratic freedom were equally important.  
It is rare, however, to encounter the isonomia/isegoria distinction outside classical 
history and philology – they have not been appropriated by modern political 
theorists, hence my claim that they are uncorrupted by (modern) association. My 
role model in abjuring vernacular speech distinctions like ‘will’ and ‘opinion’ in 
favour of archaic neologisms (sic) is Michael Oakeshott, who adopted the Latin 
diarchy of universitas and societas as monikers for his two modes of civil 
association (Oakeshott, 1975). As his concerns were philosophical, rather than 
historical, it suited his purpose to use archaic terms (from Roman private law) that 
he purloined for his own purposes, as they were uncontaminated by modern 
linguistic associations. Oakeshott was a skilled historian, but his goal was 
philosophical – the formulation of a theoretical typology that was extrapolated from 
an empirical base (early-modern European political experience), rather than 
deduced from an abstract thought experiment. This is my primary reason for 
reverting to the original Greek terms, albeit at the risk of accusations of 
anachronism and grave-robbing from classical philologists, contextualists in the 
history of political thought and other historicists. Like Oakeshott, my concerns are 
old-fashioned – namely the timeless and universal philosophical principles 
underlying my chosen concepts, as opposed to their concrete historical 
incarnations (or speculations on the intentions of the historical authors that utilised 
them, or the development of political languages).  
I.1.1  A note on style 
In order to differentiate between the classical/historical and general/philosophical 
use of the isonomia/isegoria diarchy, italics have been reserved for the former only, 
thus ‘fifth-century isonomia’ but ‘representative isegoria’. Although the modern 
appropriation is derived from the original Greek, no exact correspondence is 
claimed, especially as the use of the concepts changed over the course of the 
classical period. 
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I.2  Argumentative structure of the thesis 
1. Clarification of the conceptual distinction between isonomia and isegoria 
at the heart of the democratic diarchy. 
2. Brief overview of the institutional changes in sixth-, fifth- and fourth-
century Athenian democracy that implemented the distinction in different 
ways, and examination of its pathologies. 
3. Clarification of the concept(s) of representation – essential to the 
implementation of the democratic diarchy in modern large-scale 
societies. 
4. Study of how the democratic diarchy has been reincarnated in modern 
representative democracies, and examination of its pathologies. 
5. Speculation on how the fourth-century reforms (delegation of the final 
lawmaking decision to randomly-selected nomothetic courts) might be 
used as a template for modern institutions to resolve some of these 
pathologies. 
The approach of the (empirically-grounded) political theorist is to ‘adumbrate the 
idea after the fact’ (Finley, 1991, p. 58), to build a typology from the available data 
and then, like Aristotle, to use the resulting conceptual distinctions as a tool for 
understanding and classifying actual constitutions (Leroi, 2014). As a moral 
philosopher Aristotle then went on to outline notions of the ‘best’ constitution (in 
both ideal and realistic forms). This thesis is an exercise in Aristotelian political 
theory (as opposed to the ‘ideal’ normative variant).11  
I.3  Chapter Overview 
Chapter 1, The Democratic Diarchy, establishes a foundation for the conceptual 
framework of the thesis in Nadia Urbinati’s distinction between ‘opinion’ and 
political ‘will’ (Urbinati, 2014). However, the thesis takes issue with Urbinati’s 
decision to conflate opinion and judgment, arguing instead that the latter is an 
                                            
11 Michael Saward’s study The Representative Claim (2010) adopts a similar policy of 
bracketing the normative evaluation until the end. 
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indispensible aspect of political will, rather than a synonym for opinion. An 
alternative foundation is located in the Athenian proto-democratic distinction 
between isonomia and isegoria, and the remainder of the chapter constructs an 
innovative typology based on the classical nomenclature.  
Chapter 2, The Origin of the Diarchy: The Athenian Polis, temporarily brackets 
out the distinction between historically-derived concepts and concrete historical 
practice by examining the development of isonomia and isegoria over three 
centuries, along with the link between conceptual and institutional change. The 
chapter introduces the idea of the sortition-based representative isonomia of the 
fourth-century legislative court as a template for modern political practice. 
Chapter 3, The Triumph of Election: Natural Right or Wrong, opens with Jane 
Mansbridge’s claim that ‘legitimate coercion is the fundamental problem of 
governance’. This being the case, obtaining the consent of the governed is 
essential to the ‘perceived legitimacy’ of democracies. The chapter examines 
Bernard Manin’s argument that sortition was superseded by election on account of 
the natural right theory of consent and concludes that James Fishkin’s model of 
sortive ‘consent-by-proxy’ is more coherent than the ‘tacit’ and ‘implicit’ consent 
supposedly demonstrated by electoral approximation. 
Chapter 4, The Diarchy Reborn: The Representative Republic, examines in 
depth the concept(s) of representation in the work of Hanna Pitkin and other 
theorists and suggests a correspondence between the two concepts relevant to 
political representation (‘descriptive’ and ‘substantive’ representation) and the two 
elements of the democratic diarchy (isonomia and isegoria). Madison’s categorical 
distinction between judgment and advocacy in Federalist 10 is employed as an 
additional argument against Urbinati’s equation of judgment and opinion.  
Chapter 5, Isonomia: The Deliberative Microcosm, examines the competing 
‘Germanic’ and ‘Latinate’ models of deliberative democracy and concludes that 
only the latter variant adequately respects the isegoria/isonomia distinction. Owing 
to its focus on the ‘ideal speech situation’, Germanic-style deliberation undermines 
the statistically-representative function of randomly-selected bodies, hence the 
reliance of this thesis on the competing ‘Latinate’ model of silent deliberation within, 
as demonstrated by the plenary element of James Fishkin’s experiments in 
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Deliberative Polling, in which deliberators do little more than ‘weigh’ the arguments 
of competing advocates. 
Chapter 6, Epistemic Democracy and the Wisdom of Crowds, draws a 
categorical distinction between the epistemic benefits of ‘cognitive diversity’ and 
the aggregate judgment demonstrated by the ‘wisdom of crowds’ literature. The 
chapter argues that the former – which can best be achieved by crowd-sourcing, 
knowledge/information markets and citizen initiatives – is an aspect of isegoria, 
whereas the latter is the appropriate mechanism for the aggregate judgment 
(representative isonomia) of a large randomly-selected group. The maintenance of 
this distinction is essential in order to counter Urbinati’s claim that ‘epistocracy’ is 
one of the recent ‘pathologies’ of democracy.  
Chapter 7, Isegoria: The Representative Claim, develops Lisa Disch’s (Disch, 
2014) argument that for reasons of democratic legitimacy, Michael Saward’s 
‘representative claim’ model should apply purely to the isegoria side of the 
democratic diarchy. Election, direct-democratic initiative and a competitive media 
marketplace are examined as complementary ways of establishing isegoria in 
large-scale modern democracies. 
Chapter 8, From Theory to Praxis, moves beyond the realm of political theory by 
outlining some possible mechanisms through which the combination of isegoria 
and isonomia outlined in this thesis might be realized in modern institutions. The 
requirements of political stability, fiscal probity and long-term national interests 
suggest that the increase in popular sovereignty (by proxy) introduced by 
randomly-selected legislative courts would need to be counterbalanced by an 
increase in the skills, stable tenure and accountability of government executives 
and advocates appointed by other means; otherwise the ship of state might well be 
put at risk by navigators ‘elected by bean’. This would involve a reversion from 
‘popular sovereignty’ to the ancient ideal of the mixed constitution. 
Appendix I, The Brexit Lottery, reproduces an article I published in April 2016, 
arguing for a sortition-based alternative to the forthcoming Brexit referendum. 
Appendix II, The Blind Break and the Invisible Hand, reviews the rapidly growing 
literature on the political potential of sortition and concludes that the literature on 
the prophylactic (‘blind break’), and descriptive representation functions of sortition 
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have very little in common. The neologism stochation is suggested as an 
appropriate term for the latter, as the ‘blind break’ (Dowlen, 2008) instituted by the 
‘lottery principle’ (Stone, 2011) is entirely different from the ‘invisible hand’ revealed 
by the law of large numbers (LLN). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. 	The	Democratic	Diarchy	
The central argument of this thesis is that the concept of ‘democracy’ is in fact an 
amalgam of two egalitarian norms1 that originated in Greece in the classical era – 
equal speech (isegoria) and equal share in determining the political will 
(isonomia).2 The thesis also argues that the contemporary ‘crisis of democracy’ is 
caused by the conflation of these two norms and that a resolution of the crisis will 
require the adoption of some 4th-century Athenian practices – in particular 
representative isonomia by means of large randomly-selected juries. The focus of 
this chapter is primarily conceptual and normative, but also involves a critical 
evaluation of Habermas’s study of the historical development of the public sphere. 
This is on account of its key role in the establishment of the existing theoretical 
paradigm, that presents the conceptual diarchy in terms of ‘will’ and (public) 
‘opinion’. In my conclusion I will argue that the classical Athenian diarchy, whilst 
sharing many features of Habermas’s model, has more democratic potential than 
one ultimately derived from the era of absolute monarchy. 
Nadia Urbinati constructed her 2014 book Democracy Disfigured around the 
Habermasian diarchy (‘will’ and ‘opinion’), claiming that these two aspects of the 
democratic diarchy ‘are different, and should remain distinct’ (Urbinati, 2014, p. 2). 
As her book is the best recent presentation of the diarchy and as its focus is 
conceptual rather than historical, this chapter draws heavily on her analysis: 
[T]he diarchy of ‘votes’ and ‘opinion’ is the key to appreciate 
democracy as a government that pivots on equal freedom (ibid., pp. 
14-15).  
                                            
1 Consideration of the epistemic benefits of democracy is postponed to Chapter 6. 
2 For justification of the rendering of isonomia as ‘equal share in determining the political 
will’ see Chapter 2. 
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The former variety of freedom is an example of equality of outcome (assuming 
majoritarian norms), whereas the latter is an example of equal opportunity, as ‘the 
formal equality that makes us citizens does not equalize the [differential] power that 
speech gives us to influence each other’ (ibid., p. 25): 
Citizens’ right to an equal share in determining the political will (one 
person, one vote) ought to go together with citizens’ equal opportunity 
. . . to form, express, voice and give their ideas public weight and 
influence. (pp. 228-9, my emphasis) 
The present thesis respects Urbinati’s diarchy, which draws heavily on Jürgen 
Habermas’s Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,3 where ‘Habermas 
makes a distinction between opinion-formation in the public sphere and will-
formation in formal political institutions’ (Eriksen and Weigard, 2003, p. 125). 
However, as I hope to demonstrate in this chapter, exactly which side of the 
dividing line between ‘will’ and ‘opinion’ political judgment is located has very 
different entailments for the political institutions required to put the conceptual 
diarchy into practice. 
Democracy is ‘government by means of opinion’ (Urbinati, 2014, p. 2), and equal 
political speech rights should be afforded to any citizen who wishes to exercise it. 
At the same time she insists on the primacy of democratic proceduralism (every 
vote has equal weight) and defends it against those who seek to privilege 
epistemic and other non-political goals, by arguing that ‘a commitment to “truth” in 
politics makes consent redundant’ (ibid., p. 10). ‘Will’, in Urbinati’s model ‘stands 
for procedures, rules and institutions . . . authoritative decisions that obligate all the 
subjects equally’. (p. 22, emphasis in original). ‘Citizens’ equal rights to an equal 
share in determining the political will translates as one-person-one-vote’ (p. 28); 
‘The normative value of democratic proceduralism is its impeccable ability to rely 
upon and reproduce equal liberty’ (p. 58).  
                                            
3 The common ground between Urbinati and Habermas is limited to this early (1962) book. 
Habermas’s later work on deliberative democracy is viewed by Urbinati as a major 
contributor to the ‘epistemic pathology’ that is currently undermining democratic 
proceduralism. 
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According to Rousseau, popular participation in determining the sovereign will is 
crucial, because: 
if citizens obey laws that they do not make directly, the system in 
which they live is not political, although they may call it so, because 
the autonomy of the sovereign will is the substance that makes for a 
body politic. (ibid., p. 1) 
Opinion, on the other hand, is an equally important component of the democratic 
diarchy: 
A democracy without public opinion is a contradiction in terms. Insofar 
as public opinion can arise only where intellectual freedom, freedom of 
speech, press, and religion, are guaranteed, democracy coincides 
with political – though not necessarily economic – liberalism. (Kelsen, 
1999 [1945], pp. 287-288) 
Democratic Athens ‘was conceived as a politeia en logois (a polis based on 
speech) and its citizens were defined as hoi boulomenoi (“whoever wishes to do 
so”,4 i.e. to address the assembly). The electoral transformation of modern 
democracy did not change this principle’ (Urbinati, 2014, p. 20), but geographical 
and demographic considerations presuppose some sort of representative 
mechanism for isegoria.5 Aristotle held that a viable polis was self-sufficient, but 
could stretch no further than those capable of hearing the herald’s cry;6 Mill argued, 
however, that modern (print) media would enable an extended virtual forum of 
opinions by including issues of popular concern in the public arena: ‘the newspaper 
press, the real equivalent, though not in all respects an adequate one, of the Pnyx 
and the Forum’ (Mill, 1991, p. 210). And more recently: 
                                            
4 Lit: ‘those who are willing’. 
5 Chapter 7 is devoted to unpacking the notion of representative isegoria. 
6 ‘Who can be the general of such a vast state, or who the herald, unless he have the voice 
of a Stentor?’ (Arist., Pol., 1326b6) 
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Thanks to broadcasting, the whole world might become in some 
sense a public meeting. . . . And long before radio was invented, 
skillful reporting and a cheap Press had done something of the same 
thing. (Lindsay, 1930, p. 24) 
In an earlier work, Urbinati acknowledged the origin of the will/opinion diarchy in 
classical Athenian political thought: 
Applying the two kinds of equality practiced in Athens to 
representative democracy suggests that isonomia regulates the 
distribution of suffrage [will] and isegoria the distribution of voice 
[opinion]. (Urbinati, 2006, p. 40) 
Urbinati views the two forms of equality from a classical perspective:7 isonomia 
presupposes ‘numerical’ equality (all votes carry equal weight, and are blind to 
inequalities of wealth, status and influence). Isegoria, however, presupposes 
‘proportional’ equality: 
[R]epresentation is a political process that operates in the domain of 
proportional equality because it is a means by which differences seek 
public visibility and advocacy . . . all ideas should have a chance to be 
represented, not only those that get the majority of the votes. (ibid) 
While in the modern context this is a justification for proportional representation 
and discursive democracy, the Athenian notion of proportional representation, 
particularly the Platonic version, is more concerned with the ‘merit’ of the person(s) 
proposing the ideas.8  
But who is to judge which opinions deserve representation (assuming we are not 
going to leave it, like Plato, to the judgment of Zeus)? Where this thesis parts 
company with Urbinati is over her (tautological) insistence that judgment is 
synonymous with opinion: ‘It is important that I make clear from the start that I use 
                                            
7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1130b-1132b; cf. Plato, Laws, VI.757b-c. 
8 See Chapter 7.1. 
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the words “opinion” and “political judgment” interchangeably’ (ibid., p. 22). But can 
this be an appropriate use of the word ‘judgment’? Whilst it’s clearly valid in the 
colloquial sense of ‘in my judgment’ (synonymous with ‘in my opinion’), the primary 
use of the term judgment is derived from juridical practice – ‘the evaluation of 
evidence to make a decision’. The derivation from the Latin iudico (‘to pass 
judgment’), via the old French jugement, is another reason to privilege the juridical 
meaning over the colloquial use. The Latin stem of the word judgment – ius (‘that 
which is binding’) – has nothing in common with opinionem (‘opinion, conjecture, 
fancy, belief, what one thinks’). Everyone in a democracy should be entitled to 
freely express their opinion and seek to influence the opinions of others, but the 
role of judgment is to evaluate the merits of competing opinions, so political 
judgment is clearly an equal share in determining which opinions we should be 
bound by [isonomia]. The role of the judge (or jury) is to deliberate by weighing the 
evidence/opinions and to decide which are the most persuasive – the term 
deliberation being derived from the Latin liber (weight). The context (the making of 
laws – directly or via the selection of political representatives) would suggest that 
the juridical meaning should trump the colloquial and that judgment should be 
assigned to the sovereign will element of the democratic diarchy. Note that my 
objection is not to the will/opinion diarchy per se, merely to Urbinati’s decision to 
attribute judgment to the latter function. 
Elsewhere, however, she appears to contradict herself when she equates 
judgment with isonomia by acknowledging that candidates ‘become objects of 
judgment on the part of the voter’ (p. 26); ‘the right to vote in a modern democratic 
sense, which stresses the judgment of each citizen in the act of making a decision’ 
(p. 178); voters ‘predict how the candidates will behave and judge them 
accordingly’ (p. 179); ‘the authoritative will of the people must follow rules and 
procedures that are meant to respect or reflect individual judgment’ (p. 192); ‘when 
people used to vote for parties with a platform they exercised their judgment on 
future politics’ (p. 216). She also appears to agree with Rousseau’s distinction 
between two forms of judgment: people ‘can make good judgments in the general 
interest’ when they determine the sovereign will in the assembly but ‘somebody 
has to call to their attention the need for a specific law or policy because “it is in this 
judgment that they [the people] make mistakes”’ (ibid., p. 42). Rousseau, in his 
admiration for Sparta, denied that the latter form of judgment should be available to 
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all (it should be restricted to delegated government officers). Given these multiple 
and conflicting meanings of the word judgment, it’s hard to see how it can be a 
useful part of a rigorous conceptual model, hence my preference for the original 
Athenian diarchy (isonomia and isegoria).9 
Granted that most voters ‘simply do not have meaningful beliefs [opinions], even 
on issues that have formed the basis for intense political controversy among elites’ 
(Converse, 1964, p. 245), nevertheless voting is an act of judgment, albeit often a 
poorly-informed one. This remains true, irrespective of whether voters are 
registering a choice between policy options (by judging policy proposals in a 
manifesto or voting in a referendum), rushing to Rousseau’s assembly to 
determine the general will, evaluating a ‘representative claim’ (Saward, 2010) or 
merely, like the audience in Pop Idol or Strictly Come Dancing, participating in the 
political beauty contest that is dignified by the term ‘audience democracy’ (Manin, 
1997, pp. 218-234). The epistemic merit (if any) of the judgment (addressed in 
Chapter 6, below) is orthogonal to its isonomic status (all votes in elections10 or 
Pop Idol count the same). 
Opinion has entirely analogue properties – not only are there a multitude of 
different opinions but the individuals holding them may be located on a spectrum 
from the ‘highly opinionated’ to the indifferent Gallic shrug (‘comme ci comme ça’). 
Poltical will/judgment, by contrast, is a binary (digital) function – legislative 
proposals ultimately have to be reduced to a simple up/down vote. This requires 
the form of judgment that Aristotle called phronesis and Kant die Urteilskraft: 
                                            
9 This thesis does not adopt the methodology of ‘ordinary language’ political philosophers 
like Hanna Pitkin who have described their task as ‘attending carefully to the way in which 
we ordinarily use words’ (Pitkin, 1967, p. 6). The approach of this thesis is the opposite in 
that ‘new’ and unfamiliar concepts (that have an ancient provenance) are introduced to 
clarify analytic distinctions that are confused by vernacular words like ‘will’ and ‘opinion’. 
Despite Pitkin’s claim that, if she had read Wittgenstein, ‘it would be a different [better?] 
book’ (ibid., pp. 254-5, n. 14), the introduction of a family resemblance of linguistic usage 
would have further obfuscated the confusion. See Introduction, p. 17, above for Michael 
Oakeshott’s similar reasons for adopting the Latin terms societas and universitas for his 
diarchical model of the modes of political association. 
10 This is only true of PR-based electoral systems, as under single-member plurality 
(FPTP) systems opposition votes in ‘safe’ seats are effectively worthless. 
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the particular quality of human reason which is based neither on 
intelligence nor moral virtue, and which makes it possible to make up 
one’s mind about particular cases where there are no given answers 
as to what is correct. (Eriksen and Weigard, p. 122) 
Urbinati’s attempt to separate judgment from sovereign will deprives the latter of all 
epistemic value; and conflates the notion of will and willfulness (in the pejorative 
sense of acting on impulse, as opposed to considered judgment) – itself a 
reflection of the pre-modern distinction between the voluntas (will) of the prince and 
the ratio of public deliberation (Habermas, 1992, p.  53).  
To Urbinati, however, ‘the identification of judgment in the juristic mode with 
political judgment is among the most relevant signs of the epistemic infiltration of 
democratic proceduralism’ (Urbinati, 2014, p. 86). However, when a voter enters a 
judgment on a political candidate (or a question in a referendum) there is no 
obvious way to determine if this is an epistemic act (determining the general good) 
or simply registering a personal preference (act of will). In all probability it will be a 
combination of the two – the voter will indeed be influenced by her personal 
interests in voting in a certain way but will also consider the epistemic plausibility of 
the representative claim being evaluated. One of the problems with the 
Rousseauian project is the reification of a purely analytical distinction (between the 
volonté générale and the volonté de tous).11 In practice voters will exercise their 
isonomia in judging what is in their own interest and in the general interest. As 
such a vote is a judgment expressed through the medium of an act of will. 
Although, as in classical-era Athens, only a tiny number of citizens may choose to 
exercise their equal speech rights (isegoria), all citizens register their judgment 
when they contribute to the determination of the sovereign will in the polling booth 
(isonomia). The act of judgment is metaphorically equivalent to the act of 
measurement that collapses the quantum-mechanical wave function, via which 
a superposition of several eigenstates [opinions] appears to reduce to a single 
                                            
11 As Samuel Freeman has pointed out, assessing one’s interests is not necessarily 
opposed to making judgments in the general interest. (Freeman, 2000, p. 375) 
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eigenstate [will] via the act of measurement [judging/voting]. If this is true then 
judgment is synonymous with will, not opinion.  
Urbinati denies the relevance of the juridical mode of judgment to politics on 
account of its epistemic character (the role of a trial jury being to uncover matters 
of fact): 
The identification of judgment in the juristic model with political 
judgment is among the most relevant signs of the epistemic infiltration 
of democratic proceduralism. (Urbinati, 2014, p. 86) 
This claim, however ignores the historical fact that final legislative judgment in the 
mature (fourth-century) Athenian democracy was transferred from the assembly to 
large randomly-selected legislative courts (nomothetai). Although this was partly on 
account of epistemic considerations (legislative decisions in the assembly were 
often hurried and poorly considered) it was primarily done for administrative 
convenience. It would not, however, have occurred to Athenians that this ‘juristic 
turn’ in any way undermined democratic proceduralism, as the informed judgment 
of the legislative jury was held to represent the will of the whole citizen body. The 
fact that the references in the primary literature to the establishment of the 
nomothetai are few and far between supports the view that the delegation of 
legislative decisions to large randomly-selected juries was not viewed as in any 
way undermining the sovereignty of the demos. This being the case, the 
deliberative judgment of the fourth-century Athenian legislative courts is the 
template for the modern proposal outlined in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
1.1  Structural transformations and the creation of public opinion 
The pre-modern source of the will/opinion diarchy can be found in Jean Bodin and 
Robert Filmer’s categorical distinction between the sovereign act of promulgation 
(the prerogative of the prince) and the deliberative advice of the sovereign’s 
‘counselors’ that preceded it (Bodin, 1992, p. 23; Filmer, 1991, p. 47). Although the 
wise prince will listen to the opinions of his advisors, he is not bound by them, and 
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the implementation of the law by royal promulgation is his sole prerogative. The 
counselors offer their deliberative judgments (opinions), but the ultimate act of law 
is the sovereign judgment of the prince.12 This ambiguity of the term ‘judgment’ 
(deliberative and judicial) is the reason for my preference for the original Athenian 
diarchy. To the Athenians, sovereignty (in the assembly and the legislative courts) 
was a matter of democratic judgment (isonomia) between the conflicting opinions 
of the rhetores and demagogoi, exercising their isegoria rights. Urbinati’s claim that 
‘only in direct democracy are opinions identical with will because they translate 
immediately into decisions’ (Urbinati, 2014, p. 26) omits the crucial fact that the 
vote over individual policies in a direct democracy is also an act of judgment – 
choosing between conflicting advice/opinions on an issue-by-issue basis. As she 
rightly points out, the ‘miraculous’ transformation of violence into democracy – 
anticipating (and thereby pre-empting) the probable outcome of a fight by counting 
the strong arms in the opposing armies – is because ‘the weight of votes exceeds 
that of the numbers [as] . . . candidates become objects of judgment on the part of 
the voters’ (ibid., pp. 25-6). Once the secret vote was established, members of rival 
groups could even vote for each other’s leaders without being accused of 
treachery.  
Urbinati’s case for democracy as government by opinion is indebted to Jürgen 
Habermas’s Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, and this section draws 
heavily on Habermas’s analysis of the historical record. The pre-democratic notion 
of representation (‘representative publicity’) amounted to the king or lord 
representing himself before an audience of spectators. The king was the only 
‘public’ person and the sovereign will was his alone; the king merely displayed his 
power and there was no public discussion, as there was no ‘public’ in the modern 
sense (Habermas, 1992, p. 7). Representation was not about political 
communication, but the display of social status – the full expression of this doctrine 
being Louis XIV’s ‘L’État c'est moi’. (ibid., p. 10) 
                                            
12 This was the reason for President Harry S. Truman’s legendary preference for one-
armed economic advisers: ‘on the one hand this, on the other hand . . .’. But it’s the 
judgment of the president that matters in the end, because ‘the buck stops here’. 
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The growth of the capitalist mode of production (which extended economic 
production beyond the household) was crucial in the creation of the ‘public’ sphere: 
‘modern economics was no longer oriented to the oikos; the market had replaced 
the household, and it became “commercial economics”’ (Habermas, 1992, p. 20). 
Hannah Arendt likewise refers to this ‘private sphere of society that has become 
publicly relevant’ when she contrasts the modern public/private relationship to the 
ancient and medieval (Arendt, 1958, p. 46). 
Another crucial factor in the development of the public sphere was the ‘traffic in 
commodities and news created by early capitalist long-distance trade’ (Habermas, 
1992, p. 15). The traffic in news was the result of commercial imperatives – 
merchants needing information about ships, the weather and the political situation 
in countries they were trading in. As this need became more widespread, news 
reached a general audience: 
The traffic in news developed not only in connection with the needs of 
commerce; the news itself became a commodity. Commercial news 
reporting was therefore subject to the laws of the same market to 
whose rise it owed its existence in the first place. It is no accident that 
the printed journals often developed out of the same bureaus of 
correspondence that already handled hand-written newsletters. 
(Habermas, 1992, p. 21).  
This was the origin of a critical, debating press – an essential step in the creation of 
public opinion – that facilitated the transition from the ‘speech of power’ 
(representative publicity) to the ‘power of speech’ (Lefort, 1988, p. 38). The new 
journals were also appropriated by government agencies in order to communicate 
royal decrees to their subjects (or at least those who could read), thereby creating 
a divide between the literate ‘public’ and the ‘private’ common man. 
According to (Habermas, 1992), this new public sphere was ‘bourgeois’ in nature, 
its immediate historical origins being the coffee houses and commercial exchanges 
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of eighteenth-century England along with the salons of France.13 The original 
Greek categories public (polis) and private (oikos) only assumed their modern 
meaning with the onset of capitalism, when economic production moved beyond 
the household and manorial fief – the noun Öfftenlichkeit (public sphere) being 
rarely used in Germany before the nineteenth century (Habermas, 1992, pp. 2-3).  
The political public sphere had its origins in discussions based around artistic and 
literary journals and periodicals – as early as the seventeenth century periodicals 
existed which mixed criticism with news. Although the critical tradition was largely 
literary in origin (literarische Öffentlichkeit), it soon morphed into political criticism, 
and journals that at one time merely communicated government edicts to the 
‘public’ began to bite the hand that fed them. The public sphere 
was now casting itself loose as a forum in which the private people, 
come together to form a public, readied themselves to compel public 
authority to legitimate itself before public opinion. The publicum 
developed into the public, the subjectum into the [reasoning] subject, 
the receiver of regulations from above into the ruling authorities’ 
adversary. (Habermas, 1992, p. 26) 
Habermas claims that the ‘fourth estate’ – an independent field of political criticism 
– was ushered in by the publication in 1726 of Bolingbroke’s The Craftsman, 
founded in opposition to Whig cabinet rule. (Habermas, 1992, p. 60) 
Seeing as participation required significant leisure time and education (owing to the 
discussion of art and literature), participation was effectively limited to wealthy 
property owners:14  
                                            
13 At the beginning of the 18th century London had approximately 3,000 coffee houses 
(Habermas, 1992, p. 32), and towards the end of the century, Germany had approximately 
270 literary societies. 
14 This provides another parallel between early-modern capitalism and the Greek public 
sphere – most Greek citizens with the free time to participate actively in public life were 
slave owners, the difference being that in Greek democracies the citizens who participated 
in lexis (discussion) in the agora (market place) also constituted the sovereign law-maker 
in the ecclesia (assembly). Not so in early-modern states, where political participation was 
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the public  . . . was the bourgeois reading public of the eighteenth 
century. This public remained rooted in the world of letters even as it 
assumed political functions; education was the one criterion for 
admission – property ownership the other. (Habermas, 1992, p. 85) 
This was on account of the Kantian argument that a free citizen must be his own 
master – anyone who worked for wages was the servant of another man. A man 
without property was not a citizen, but could become one some day (Habermas, 
1992, p. 111). However success in the public sphere depends on the right 
arguments, not social status: 
Through public discussion and reasoning different views on political 
questions may be subjected to criticism, and the public sphere is 
hence a necessary channel for establishing democratic legitimacy. 
(Eriksen and Weigard, 2003, p. 8) 
‘Public opinion’ and the culture of rational-critical debate had its origins in the 
bourgeois reading public and the goal was the preservation of the interests15 of the 
capitalist social class by constraining the illegitimate use of power by the state – 
thereby developing the diarchy of the (royal) will and public opinion. Much of the 
political debate was on the topic of absolute sovereignty and the need to temper 
royal voluntas with public ratio: 
A political consciousness developed in the public sphere of civil 
society which, in opposition to absolute sovereignty, articulated the 
concept of and demand for general and abstract laws [as opposed to 
sovereign decrees] and which ultimately come to assert itself (i.e. 
                                                                                                                                
 
limited to the exchange of opinions (Habermas, 1992, p. 3), hence the distinction between 
will and opinion (which would not have made sense in a Greek democracy). 
15 Although there is a strong connection between the public sphere and the Hegelian 
notion of civil society as the realm of production and exchange, it does include other 
institutions, the important distinction being independence from state bureaucracy. 
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public opinion) as the only legitimate source of this law.16 (Habermas, 
1992, p. 54) 
The public sphere should not be seen as existing prior to or 
independent of decision-making agencies but as emerging in 
opposition to them . . . This view of the emergence of the public 
sphere is based on the contention that the state originated, more or 
less, through war or brute force. Only subsequently was state 
authority democratized, i.e. subjected to the rule of law. First came the 
state, then came democracy. Collective identity has to be made rather 
than merely discovered. (Eriksen, 2000, p. 58) 
A key factor in the development of the independent public sphere in Britain was the 
ending of most forms of censorship by the lapsing of the licensing act in 1695 – 
‘compared to the press in other European states, the British press enjoyed unique 
liberties’. (ibid., p. 59) 
The evolution of parliamentary democracy in Britain (partly a product of contingent 
factors resulting from the Hanoverian succession) meant that during the eighteenth 
century the king’s predominately aristocratic advisors assumed the (quasi-
independent) status of ministers of state, including a ‘prime’ minister, so the ‘will’ 
element of the democratic diarchy became an amalgam of royal and aristocratic 
will. The limited franchise of eighteenth-century democracy meant that the 
bourgeoisie were still largely excluded from political life – as the House of Lords 
was still the dominant power – hence the continuing divide between 
(royal/aristocratic) sovereign will and (bourgeois) public opinion. The sovereign 
was required to legitimise itself before the critical judgment of the rational-critical 
public, but few among the critics had the vote (the power to convert judgment into 
political will), hence Habermas and Urbinati’s positioning of judgment in the 
(impotent) field of opinion. The sovereign state, however, was put in touch with the 
                                            
16 The parallel between this and the fourth-century (Athenian) call to return to the patrios 
politeia – characterized by the rule of law rather than the rule of men – will be explored in 
the next chapter. 
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needs of society through the medium of public opinion (and, as before, the wise 
prince listened to his counsellors). 
The ‘public’ was divided between the small number who used their 
reason/judgment critically and the even smaller number who could express their 
political will by voting or sitting in parliament (the vast number of ‘private’ men 
being excluded from both). But that was all set to change with the rapid expansion 
of the franchise (and educational opportunity and wealth redistribution) during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, making Habermas and Urbinati’s ongoing 
separation between will and judgment something of an eighteenth-century 
anachronism. The Great Reform Act of 1832 enfranchised the majority of the 
(male) bourgeoisie (holders of property worth the substantial (at the time) sum of 
£10 p.a.), removing the gap between judgment and will amongst the newly 
enfranchised. This development led to Marx’s claim that ‘the executive of the 
modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie’ (Marx & Engels, 2004, Chapter 1). From that point on, the 
parliamentary state was an organ of bourgeois will, not just a target of its critical 
comments.  
The bourgeois constitutional state (as theorised by Carl Schmitt) was an attempt to 
reconcile political will and reasoned judgment via the medium of general laws: ‘Law 
is not the will of one or of many persons, but something generally reasonable; not 
voluntas, but rather ratio’ (Schmitt, 2008, p. 182). The law involves a hybrid of 
reason/opinion (which formulates/justifies the law) and will (which enforces it) so 
the constitutional state seeks to bring together the two elements of the democratic 
diarchy, but in a slightly different way: 
The distinction between legislative and executive power was modelled 
on the contrast between norm and action, between reason ordering 
and will acting. (Habermas, 1992, p. 82) 
Hobbes’s auctoritas facit legem was replaced by veritas non auctoritas facit legem 
(truth, not authority makes the law). Reason contains power. (Habermas, 1992, p. 
53). ‘Public debate was supposed to transform voluntas into a ratio that in the 
public competition of private arguments came into being as the consensus about 
what was practically necessary in the interest of all. (ibid., p. 83) 
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But the contradictions underlying the constitutional state (which was predicated on 
the restriction of the franchise to property owners), led to its rapid demise: ‘The 
general right to vote, the organisation of the Labour movement, and the formation 
of political parties, these factors in reality rendered impossible the idea of politics 
as a discourse between equals’ (Eriksen and Weigard, p. 182). The expansion of 
the franchise led to the public sphere becoming an arena of competing private 
interests and violent conflict (Habermas, 1992, p. 132). Laws passed according to 
public pressure no longer embodied rational consensus: 
The public sphere of social-welfare-state democracies is rather a field 
of competition among conflicting interests, in which organizations 
representing diverse constituencies negotiate and compromise among 
themselves and with government officials, while excluding the public 
from their proceedings. (Habermas, 1992, p. xii) 
Rather than the benign liberal diarchy of public opinion making itself known to 
government via parliamentary discussion, in modern democracies ‘the antagonistic 
political actors always are the parties in their roles as party-in-government and 
party-in-opposition’. (Habermas, 1992, p. 239) 
According to Habermas, the structural transformations of the public sphere 
(resulting primarily from the extension of the franchise beyond the bourgeoisie to 
include the masses)17 led to the relationship between will and public opinion 
reverting to a form of neo-feudalism. Once again politicians represent themselves 
before the voters, a development legitimised by Bernard Manin as the ‘audience 
democracy’ stage of representative government (Manin, 1997, pp. 218-234). 
According to Habermas this amounts to the ‘refeudalisation of the public sphere’: 
At one time publicity had to be gained in opposition to the secret 
politics of the monarchs . . . . Today, on the contrary, publicity is 
                                            
17 Who abjured their historical destiny to seize control of the state (which would, according 
to Marxist theory, have ensured that their will would have became the dominant one), 
preferring instead to go shopping.  
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achieved with the help of the secret politics of interest groups. 
(Habermas 1992, p. 201) 
‘The public sphere in the world of letters was replaced by the pseudo-public or 
sham private world of culture consumption’, and public opinion is now manipulated 
by the media, advertising, culture and PR industries to create a public where none 
exists and to manufacture consensus (Habermas, 1992, p. 160). Modern people 
watch soap operas and ‘reality’ TV rather than talking about newspapers in a 
coffee house.18 Other writers are equally scornful of developments through which 
‘politics turns into a spectator sport’ (Mair, 2013, p. 44), or in Giovanni Sartori’s 
term, the age of ‘video politics’. (Sartori, 2002) 
Urbinati was motivated to write her book by the ‘plebiscitarian disfiguration’ of the 
public sphere in mass democracy, as pointed out by Habermas in 1962 when he 
published the original German edition of his thesis (Strukturwandel der 
Öffentlichkeit). This has come to its nadir with what she refers to as the ‘Berlusconi 
effect’ (Urbinati, 2014, p. 4), whereby a single charismatic figure dominated Italian 
political life for over a decade via his ownership of six national television channels 
(ibid., p. 233).19 This, she claims, is a paradigm example of the ‘privatisation’ of the 
public sphere (ibid., p. 3) and goes on to argue that the best remedy would be the 
sponsorship of ‘public’ media. This is ironic, given the origins of the public sphere in 
the capitalist mode of production and, in particular, the development of the press 
from the commercial needs of merchants and traders for information.20 Her 
solution (an increased role for ‘public’ media) is equally ironic, as her paradigm 
example is the BBC – a monolithic organization that is funded by what is effectively 
                                            
18 Habermas has, along with (Fraser, 1992) more recently described this as the ‘weak’ 
public sphere, by contrast with the ‘strong’ public (parliament), the locus of (representative) 
will-formation and decision making (Habermas, 1996). 
19 In his review of Democracy Disfigured John P. McCormick describes the book as a 
‘political polemic’ brought about by ‘a kind of Berlusconi hangover’. (McCormick, 2015, p. 
170) 
20 For an outline of Habermas’s thesis on the origins of the fourth estate in the ‘traffic in 
commodities and news created by early capitalist long-distance trade’, see p. 32, above. 
Although modern mass media are substantially funded by advertising revenue, 
newspapers and journals originated on a purely subscription model. 
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a poll tax, enforced by the coercive power of the state. Chapter 7.4.1 examines the 
issue of media ownership and the competing claims of market competition and 
‘public’ media for representative isegoria. 
Urbinati’s focus on democracy as opinion/judgment might well be viewed as an 
attempt to reclaim the public sphere from manipulative populism and the other 
forms of neo-feudalist ‘acclamation’ outlined by Habermas. However her parallel 
focus on democratic proceduralism (of political will) is a reaction against taking the 
Habermasian ideal of rational-critical debate to its epistemic conclusion – the 
replacement of doxa by episteme (Urbinati, ibid., p. 5). Although I am sympathetic 
to Urbinati’s overall claim: 
The conceptualization of representative democracy as diarchy makes 
two claims: that ‘will’ and ‘opinion’ are the two powers of sovereign 
citizens, and that they are different and should remain distinct, 
although they are in need of constant communication. (Urbinati, 2014, 
p. 2) 
the argument of this thesis is merely that Urbinati’s goal would be better served by 
the reintegration of judgment and political will (the characteristic of the bourgeois 
constitutional state) by empowering the deliberative judgment of a statistically-
representative microcosm as a proxy for the will of the whole citizen body. Opinion 
and advocacy, however, require an entirely different kind of representative 
mechanism and this is best achieved by Michael Saward’s ‘representative claim’ 
model, as fleshed out in Chapter 7.  
As I argue in Chapter 4, a better modern approximation of the original Athenian 
democratic diarchy is James Madison’s distinction between judgment/will 
(isonomia) and advocacy (isegoria). Urbinati agrees fully with Madison that, unlike 
in the courtroom, ‘the actors who advocate their cause in casting a ballot or voting 
in a representative assembly are the same ones who pass judgment’ (p. 123), but 
ignores Madison’s concerns that the fusion of advocacy and judgment has 
considerable potential to corrupt the political system – ‘a [single] body of men are 
unfit to be both judges and parties [advocates] at the same time’ (Federalist, 10, 8, 
my emphasis). The goal of the practical proposal outlined in Chapter 8 of this 
thesis is not to depoliticize the political process but to preserve the integrity of the 
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diarchy handed down to us from the founders of democracy by keeping the two 
elements – advocacy/opinion/isegoria and judgment/will/isonomia – at arm’s length. 
Modern representative democracy has hopelessly conflated these two elements 
and the goal of this thesis is to reinstate the distinction, both conceptually and 
institutionally. 
Purely on the basis of Urbinati’s own arguments, the isonomia/isegoria distinction 
is a better candidate for the democratic diarchy than will/opinion. Political ‘will’ has 
its origin in the ‘sovereign act of promulgation’ – the sole prerogative of the 
absolute monarch (Urbinati, 2014, p. 248). All Rousseau did was to alter the 
numerical constitution of the sovereign, but he still maintained the emphasis of 
Bodin, Filmer and Hobbes on sovereign will. Isonomia – ‘equal political right’ is, by 
contrast, a thoroughly democratic concept – Herodotus even claiming that it was 
synonymous with demokratia itself (ibid., p. 247, n.12). Given the goal of Urbinati’s 
project (to rectify the ‘disfigurations’ of modern democracy), it would make sense to 
ground the project in concepts with a democratic rather than autocratic provenance. 
To the Athenians the sovereign act of will was simultaneously an act of judgment 
(between the conflicting opinions of those exercising their isegoria rights), so this is 
a better foundation for the diarchy of a democratic state than one based on Bodin 
and Filmer’s absolutist diarchy. As Dario Castiglione puts it in a review of Urbinati’s 
book: 
judgment is more like a faculty, the ability of making considered 
decisions and reaching appropriate conclusions. In this sense it is 
something different from opinion, the latter being a view about 
something . . . thus framing judgment in a democracy may look like a 
different operation from guaranteeing the exercise of opinion – though 
such a guarantee may be an important aspect and presupposition of 
judgment itself. (Castiglione, forthcoming, pp. 5-6 (m/s)) 
Indeed, Urbinati does acknowledge that ‘opinion’ is a thoroughly ambiguous term 
(ibid., p. 35) – at best a ‘gray’ zone (p. 29) – both in its Greek (doxa) and Roman 
(opinio) incarnations. To Plato doxa was a ‘view or belief that falls below the bar of 
philosophical analysis’, open to manipulation by unscrupulous politicians as it was 
a halfway house between emotion and action (ibid.). Democracy reserves no place 
for the authority of epistemic claims – to be of any value (according to Plato), doxa 
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needed to be transformed into episteme. However to Aristotle, opinion was a form 
of verisimilitude (verum similes) – ‘a species of truth in its own right’ and 
‘synonymous with constitutional political order . . . and thus with liberty’ (p.31). The 
ideal city would be ruled by godlike heroes, but given that actual cities are 
composed of ordinary mortals, their very imperfection makes the exchange of 
opinions in the assembly the only way of making decisions that are advantageous 
and just for all (p. 33). Urbinati clearly sides with Aristotle (as she conceives him) 
rather than Plato when evaluating the role of opinion in the political domain.  
Other ambiguities in the term ‘opinion’ became evident in modernity. The English 
and French everyday usage regarded opinio as uncertain and not fully-
demonstrated judgment, and ‘technical and philosophical language, from Plato’s 
doxa to Hegel’s Meinen, corresponded to the term’s meaning in everyday 
language’ (Habermas, 1992, p. 88). Such usage was in the pejorative sense of 
‘common opinion’, ‘vulgar opion’ etc., but another meaning referred more closely to 
judgment, i.e. ‘“reputation” or regard: what one represents in the opinion of others’ 
(ibid., p. 87). Hobbes went on to remove opinion from the public sphere by making 
it synonymous with ‘conscience’ and therefore placing it in the private domain, 
alongside religious belief – Hobbes ‘reduced all acts of believing, judging and 
opining to the same [irrelevant] level’, as Leviathan posited ‘a state based solely 
upon the auctoritas of the prince’ (ibid., p. 90). But, given the emphasis of radical 
Protestantism on the primary status of conscience (religious and otherwise), 
Hobbes’s rhetorical move had the opposite effect from that which the author 
intended: Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding turned Hobbes on his 
head by elevating the ‘Law of Opinion’ to a category of equal rank beside divine 
and state law (Locke, 2014, bk. 2, ch. 28, sec. 11). Nineteenth-century liberals like 
Mill and Tocqueville subsequently came to view public opinion as a coercive force 
– ‘the yoke of public opinion’ – as opposed to the guarantor of reason against force 
in general (Habermas, 1992, p. 133). 
The epistemological status of opinion was just as hotly contested on the other side 
of the English Channel: the philosophes, drawing on Bayle, adopted the original 
pejorative meaning of opinion as ‘a mental condition of uncertainty and 
vacuousness’ but argued that anyone capable of deliberative ratio could shake off 
the oppressive yoke of both public opinion and received wisdom. Rousseau, 
however – the first author to use the term opinion publique in his Discourse on the 
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Arts and Sciences – argued the case for the reliable common sense of the public 
against the corrupting influence of deliberative and ‘rational’ discourse. (Habermas, 
1992, pp. 92-3). Hegel, however, claimed that the great man will ‘despise public 
opinion’ (Hegel, 2010, section 318), and to Marx it was nothing other than false 
consciousness (Habermas, 1992, p. 124).  
Given her project to introduce some analytical clarity into our understanding of the 
democratic diarchy (a goal shared by this thesis), the choice of a concept (opinion) 
with such a rich and confusing history of multiple meanings is unwise. In sharp 
contrast to the contested nature of doxa (opinion), isegoria (equal speech rights) is 
simple and straightforward, both conceptually and institutionally. When not praising 
isonomia, Herodotus and his contemporaries selected isegoria as the essence of 
democracy (ibid., p.62; c.f. Finley, 1973, p. 19), so, purely on the strength of 
Urbinati’s own arguments, isegoria would appear to be a stronger candidate for 
inclusion in the democratic diarchy than a highly contested and ambiguous term 
like opinion. The same is true for the other element in the diarchy (will) – a concept 
that, as she acknowledges, has its origins in the pre-modern theory of absolute 
royal sovereignty – unlike isonomia, a concept with robust democratic provenance. 
1.2  Conclusion 
This thesis agrees with Habermas and Urbinati that democracy can best be 
understood in terms of two distinct elements; however their chosen diarchy of ‘will’ 
and ‘opinion’ is inappropriate for the following reasons: 
1. Political ‘will’ has its origin in the princely voluntas of the pre-modern 
theory of absolute sovereignty and should have no place in the 
vernacular of democracy. 
2. ‘Opinion’ is an imprecise and highly disputed term – Habermas and 
Urbinati between them outlining at least four meanings relevant to 
politics. It is difficult to understand how the adoption of such a vague and 
ambiguous term can bring any conceptual clarity to an already 
misunderstood topic. 
3. From a historical perspective, the working democracy valorized by 
Habermas, in which there was an effective balance between sovereign 
will and the critical public sphere, only functioned for around 100 years, 
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and under a highly restricted franchise. Habermas charted the 
subsequent disintegration of the public sphere – focusing on the 
transformation of culture and the media into a form of consumption under 
the domination of private interests – until the 1960s, and Urbinati’s book 
describes the continuing race to the bottom over the following half 
century. The pathologies that they both deplore are the structural 
consequence of the expansion of the franchise, so it’s hard to see how 
an informed and critical public could be re-established under conditions 
of universal suffrage. John McCormick, indeed, views Urbinati’s project 
as little more than motherhood and apple pie, claiming that it is 
an idealized version of some amalgam of Arendtian pluralism and 
Millian deliberative democracy; a model in which robustly 
representative public opinion emerges from interaction between 
society and government in a way that incorporates all citizens as 
actors and not as mere spectators. I would like to live in such a 
democracy. (McCormick, 2015, p. 171) 
McCormick puzzles as to why Urbinati insists that democratic 
innovations based on the Athenian lottery are impractical (ibid., p. 172) 
and another participant in the same review symposium also 
recommends ‘citizens’ juries, sortition, referendums and veto power 
institutions’ as a way of overcoming the paucity of influence of public 
opinion on the institutional decision-making process (Biba, 2015, p. 
165). Jeffrey Green also draws an (unfavourable) contrast between 
Urbinati’s ‘idealized’ account of liberal democracy and his own ‘realist’ 
approach to contemporary democratic practice. (Green, 2015) 
4. The positioning of judgment on the opinion side of the diarchy reinforces 
the positivistic view of voluntas as the arbitrary and ‘willful’ decree of the 
sovereign. Rather than public ratio merely evaluating and holding to 
account sovereign voluntas (which generally amounts to shutting the 
stable door after the horse has bolted), it would be better for the 
sovereign will to directly represent the considered judgment of the 
people.  
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This thesis takes up the suggestion of Robert Dahl (1989, p. 340) that the 
considered judgment/will of the people could best be revealed by a deliberative 
minipopulus, and rejects Habermas’s claim that this is ‘abstract and somewhat 
utopian’ (Habermas, 1997, p. 317). Admittedly Dahl only devoted three paragraphs 
of his book to sketching an outline of the minipopulus, so my preferred model for 
the development of considered public opinion is the well-developed Deliberative 
Polling (DP) programme. Its principal architect, James Fishkin, studied under Dahl 
at Yale and acknowledges Dahl’s minipopulus as the original inspiration for the 
Deliberative Poll. While Urbinati (mis)understands the DP as an example of the 
‘epistemic’ corruption of democratic proceduralism (Urbinati, 2014, pp. 113-4), 
Habermas castigates Dahl for ignoring the need for ‘rational’ deliberation, by 
concerning himself with ‘sociological’ representation, including such factors as ‘the 
statistical distribution of income, school attendance, and refrigerators’ (ibid., p. 318). 
As demonstrated by his original thesis (1992), Habermas has scant concern for 
representativity – sociological or otherwise – viewing it largely in terms of pre-
modern ‘representative publicity’, and this lead has been followed by the 
Habermasian school of deliberative democracy (whose motto might well be ‘ratio, 
not refrigerators’), as demonstrated in Chapter 5, below. 
The minipopulus and Deliberative Poll draw their inspiration from the randomly-
selected legislative juries of fourth-century Athens, so the Greek diarchy of 
isonomia and isegoria – both concepts of impeccably democratic provenance – 
provides the theoretical model for this thesis. The next chapter explores the original 
Athenian democratic diarchy in greater depth.
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.		The	Origin	of	the	Diarchy:	The	Athenian	Polis	
‘The best counselors are intelligent [but] it is the many who are best at 
listening to the different arguments and judging between them.’ 
Athenagoras at Syracuse (Thuc. 6.39) 
Although we are accustomed to think of Athenian democracy in terms of the power 
(kratos) of the ordinary people (demos), and associate its birth with the 507 BC 
constitution of Cleisthenes, there is no evidence for the use of the word demokratia 
before the reforms of Ephialtes (462/1) and the earliest extant use of the word is in 
Herodotus (6.43.3, 131.1), but it was probably coined about the time of Aeschylus’ 
Suppliants, i.e. in the 470s or 460s. (Mitchell, forthcoming). Earlier sources used 
other terms: eleutheria (liberty), and a small group of concepts beginning with the 
prefix ‘iso’: isonomia (political equality), isegoria (equal speech), isegonia (equal 
birth) and isokratia (equal power), leading to the characterization of Athenian 
democracy in terms of the compound term ‘equal liberty’ or ‘equal freedom’ 
(Hansen, 1999, pp. 73, 81).  
Contrary to modern misunderstandings, traceable to Benjamin Constant’s 1816 
essay, the ancients did make a distinction between public and private liberty, and 
the focus of this thesis is purely on the public sphere – the polis. Political liberty 
was secured by a diarchy of two, very different, forms of equality, which should not 
be conflated. Isonomia, normally translated as ‘equal political rights’,1 referred, inter 
alia,2 to the right of all male citizens to serve as a juror or magistrate and attend 
and vote at the assembly, where each vote carried the same numerical weight, 
irrespective of wealth, birth or connection. Assembly decisions were simple 
                                            
1 Probably originally ‘order based on equality’. 
2 Isonomia was probably modelled on eunomia or ‘governance according to good laws’ 
(Raaflaub, 2004, p. 94). See p. 50 (below) for a discussion of equality under the law (as 
opposed to equality in law-making). 
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majorities, and the same principle applied to the verdict of the dikasteria (people’s 
courts) and nomothetai (fourth-century legislative panels). In this respect isonomia 
translates as (numerical), or natural, equality (Hansen, 1999, p. 83). In fifth-century 
Athens the assembly was sovereign (in the fourth century, final legislative 
judgment was delegated to large randomly-selected nomothetic panels), and the 
equal right of all adult male citizens (or a representative sample thereof) to 
determine the laws indicated the isonomia at the heart of the Athenian demokratia. 
All citizens could, and most did, participate regularly in polis life (in addition to their 
rights as a private citizen, or idiotes – the modern derivation (idiot) being a legacy 
of Athenian contempt for a citizen who failed also to participate in public affairs). 
What made Athens democratic, rather than oligarchic, was the combination of 
isonomia and isegoria, the equal right to speak in the assembly – in Sparta and 
Rome the latter was restricted to the nobility and the magistrates. Isegoria was a 
form of equality available to ton Athenaion ho boulomenos hois exestin (‘he of the 
Athenians who wishes from amongst those who may’). In practice only a tiny 
minority of citizens – mostly members of the self-appointed political class (rhetores) 
availed themselves of this form of equal liberty,3 so isegoria bears a close affinity to 
the concept of (formal) equality of opportunity (Hansen, 1999, p. 83). Any citizen 
who chose to could seek to influence the debate (and the associated Greek notion 
of parrhesia encouraged frank and open speech acts), nevertheless all citizens 
attending the assembly (or the representative sample of citizens allotted to the 
legislative courts) exercised their equal political rights (isonomia) in judging the 
competing speech acts and determining the outcome. 
The Athenians sometimes needed to be reminded of the diarchy at the heart of 
their demokratia, as illustrated by Pericles’ last speech, in which he reminds the 
Athenians that they are just as responsible for the war as he is: ‘I advised it 
[isegoria], but you voted for it [isonomia]’ (Thuc., 2, VII). Thucydides makes the 
point again at the start of Book 8, commenting on the defeat of the Athenians at the 
                                            
3 This is why Hobbes disparaged democracy as an ‘aristocracy of orators’ (Hobbes, 1994, 
p. 120). 
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hands of Syracuse: ‘they were angry with the orators who had joined in promoting 
the expedition, just as if they had not themselves voted it.’ Ditto with Aischines’ 
speech ‘On the Embassy’, when he observes that ‘I propose . . . while you vote’.4 
The brief (and sketchy) excursion into classical-era history in this chapter is merely 
in order to provide some kind of historical provenance for the conceptual distinction 
at the heart of my own modern proposal. Given this limited purpose, I seek only to 
make four points: 
1. The political system that the Greeks referred to as demokratia was in fact 
a hybrid of two important forms of equality – isonomia and isegoria. 
2. This ideological distinction was implemented by a number of different 
institutions that changed over time. 
3. The fourth-century reforms, which transferred the final decision in 
lawmaking to large randomly-selected juries were not viewed by the 
Athenians as undermining the demokratia, as the nomothetic panels 
were, in effect, delegated committees of the assembly (the change 
having been made primarily for bureaucratic reasons). However the fact 
that the juries were composed of older citizens who had sworn the 
Heliastic Oath was clearly intended to improve the stability and epistemic 
quality of the decision process. Law-making was a minor part of fourth-
century political practice and the council and assembly continued to be 
the most important institutions, but the topic of this thesis is law-making 
(the most important aspect of modern politics), rather than ‘magisterial’ 
(executive) functions or ad hoc decrees, hence my exclusive focus on 
nomothesia (law-making). 
4. The fourth century reforms also led in parallel to the increased use of 
election for the more important (primarily financial) magistracies and the 
                                            
4 Aeschin. 2.160, trans. Adams. Note the orators’ use of the second person plural pronoun 
to refer to the demos, as opposed to the inclusive ‘we’ (Cammack, 2013b, p. 122), thereby 
indicating that the distinction between oratory (isegoria) and voting (isonomia) referred to 
differences of personnel, rhetores and idiotes, that are entirely familiar to modern eyes. 
‘The structure of Athenian politics was significantly closer to that of modern political 
systems than is commonly allowed’ (ibid., p. 126). 
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‘professionalisation’ of the role of the political advisor, as exemplified by 
orators like Demosthenes and Aeschines. 
The argument of this thesis is that the fourth-century delegation of isonomic 
judgment to large randomly-selected juries and the professionalisation of isegoria 
could usefully be a template for legislative procedures in large modern states.  
The relative weighting of the two elements in the democratic diarchy is disputed by 
classical historians. On the one hand: 
‘When Herodotos describes the birth of Athenian democracy it is 
isegoria and not isonomia that he singles out as the principal form of 
democratic equality’ (Hansen, 1999, p. 83).  
Whereas, on the other: 
‘It is an impressive witness to the importance which the members of 
the democratic Polis attached to its equal law that Isonomia should be 
their favorite ideological slogan, pre-eminent over even Isegoria or 
Isokratia.’ (Vlastos, 1953, p. 356) 
Given this disagreement over the metonymy of the early Greek demokratia, the 
position of this thesis is that both norms were essential components of the Greek 
notion of equality, as incarnated in the institutions of fifth- and fourth-century 
Athenian democracy. Although scholarly disputes in philology are beyond the 
scope of this thesis, a very brief overview of Athenian history is necessary to justify 
my claim that the transition from assembly- to jury-based lawmaking was viewed at 
the time as entirely democratic, and that this could provide a precedent for the 
modern sortition project. 
2.1  A short note on equality of opportunity 
The term ‘equality of opportunity’ is used throughout this thesis in its formal sense 
– as befits its classical origins – as opposed to the modern emphasis on 
substantive equality. The Athenian phrase ho boulomenos translates as ‘he who 
wishes’ and refers, inter alia, to the formal right of any male citizen to address the 
assembly. (In practice this right was overwhelmingly exercised by a small minority 
of semi-professional politicians, self-selected and primarily drawn from the affluent 
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census classes.) Thucydides’ thoroughly meritocratic rendition of Pericles’ Funeral 
Oration is an ode to formal equality of opportunity: 
[A]dvancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class 
considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again 
does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not 
hindered by the obscurity of his condition. (Thuc.2.37) 
In practice, of course, some animals were a lot more equal than others (certainly in 
the fourth century) as ‘the demos never produced spokesmen in the Assembly 
from their own ranks’ (Finley, 1983, p. 27), although the Old Oligarch’s diatribe 
against ‘any wretch who wants to can stand up and obtain what is good for him’ 
might suggest otherwise (see p. 64, below). Formal equality does nothing at all to 
create substantive opportunity, so the focus of modern egalitarians would be on 
removing the barriers – psychological, educational, financial, ethnic, gender, status 
etc – that dissuade the silent from exercising their speech rights. But that is not the 
sense in which the Athenians used the term isegoria so it is not the meaning 
adopted throughout this thesis.  
The reason that the thesis does not address ways to ameliorate the inequalities 
that lead to the individual voices of the overwhelming majority of citizens going 
unheard is because, in large modern states, isegoria needs to assume a 
representative (collective) form. Chapter 7 outlines a number of representative 
mechanisms that enhance the substantive equality of citizens’ voices in the 
modern democratic diarchy – including (paradoxically) the overwhelming majority 
who have nothing whatsoever to say.  
2.2  Isonomia 
Isonomia (ἰσονοµία) is a compound term denoting equal distribution. According to 
Paul Cartledge: 
The etymological root of nomos [νόµος] would seem to be a verb 
meaning ‘to distribute’. What was on offer for distribution within the 
civic space of the polis was timē, status, prestige or honour, both 
abstractly in the form of the entitlement and encouragement to 
participate, and concretely in the form of political offices . . . By 500 BC 
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this broadly egalitarian ideal had engendered the concept of isonomia: 
an exactly, mathematically equal distribution of timē for those deemed 
relevantly equal (isoi), a precise equality of treatment for all citizens 
under the current positive laws (nomoi). (Cartledge, 2005, p. 15, my 
emphasis) 
This leads to a perspective on isonomia as ‘the equal right of all citizens to exercise 
their political rights’ (Hansen, 1999, p. 396), the focus of this thesis being the right 
of all citizens to have an arithmetically equal share in a) governing and b) 
determining the laws under which they are to be governed – or ‘equal share of all 
citizens in the control of the state’ (Vlastos, 1953, p. 352). My emphasis on b) law-
making, as opposed to a) governing (the role of randomly-selected magistrates), is 
on account of the focus of this thesis on the fourth-century institutional reforms to 
the nomothesia (law-making) process as a potential model for modern legislative 
practice. This thesis has little interest in the Athenian practice of selecting public 
administrators by lot for both numerical and epistemic reasons – the impossibility 
(and undesirability) of everybody ruling and being ruled in turn in large complex 
states. 
Almost all scholars agree that isonomia referred to equal right in ruling, rather than 
just equality under the law (Hansen, 1999, p. 396). According to Gregory Vlastos’ 
rejoinder to (Gomme, 1956), equality under the law is certainly not a case of 
political equality (Vlastos, 1981, pp. 180-181). Equality under the law is a matter of 
normative, not natural equality and ‘is mostly described in language using the 
adjective isos instead of an abstract noun . . . or slogan as in the case of isegoria 
or isonomia’ (Hansen, 1999, p. 84). Although equality under the law was an 
important concept for the understanding of classical democracy, it is entirely 
uncontroversial (and, in theory, already operationalized) in modern democracies 
and therefore not a relevant aspect of equal law from the perspective of this thesis. 
That isonomia in law-making may well be the most important element in the 
democratic diarchy (as opposed to isegoria), at least in its early incarnations, is 
born out by Victor Ehrenberg’s analysis of the policy of the ‘democratic’ monarch 
Pelasgus in Aeschylus’ Suppliants, dated to the beginning of the fifth century: 
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The essential constitutional facts are that the [democratic] form of 
government is strictly opposed to autocratic monarchy, that the ruler 
depends on the decision of the people and is responsible to them, that 
he leads the people by his oratory, and that a decision in the assembly 
is reached by taking a vote through a show of hands. (Ehrenberg, 
1950, p. 524, my emphasis). 
Note in particular that the numerical constitution of the ruler (in Aeschylus’ case the 
mythical ‘democratic’ monarch Pelasgus) is irrelevant, so long as the final power is 
vested in the hands of the democratic assembly, where all citizens exercise 
numerical equality (isonomia) – that is why the term is demokratia, not demarchia. 
This remained largely true until the death of Pericles (de facto democratic monarch 
of Athens for three decades). When the democracy was restored in 403, isegoria in 
the legislative courts was restricted to the proponent of the new law and the five 
defence advocates elected by the assembly, and isonomia in lawmaking was 
achieved via the representative medium of large randomized juries.5  
The task of the next three sub-sections will be to very briefly map the changing 
meaning of isonomia to changes in Athenian political institutions. 
2.2.1  Sixth century: The reforms of Solon 
Solon’s division of the population into four property classes in 594 BC, the 
establishment of a people’s court and (probably) elected council, along with the 
election of important offices of state (restricted to the top economic class) ‘marked 
a complete break with the exclusive rights of a hereditary order, of a nobility of birth’ 
(Finley, 1983, p. 13). Solon created the formal status of citizen and ‘initiated a 
process whereby the demos became conscious of itself in forthrightly political 
terms’ (Ober, 1996, p. 38). However, although a people’s assembly that all citizens 
had the right to attend was created by Solon, its primary function was to elect 
magistrates and hold them to account. Aristotle classified the election and scrutiny 
                                            
5 At the same time the assembly, according to Isocrates’ On the Peace, continued to be 
dominated by demagogues – with isegoria reformulated as parrhesia (boldness of speech) 
– but that is not the concern of this thesis. 
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of magistrates by the people’s assembly as a ‘moderate’ (type 1) form of 
democracy.  
Solon’s reforms only created intra-group isonomia (within each census class); as 
such the term would not have had popular appeal because the equal political rights 
of the demos were limited to electing magistrates (from the higher census classes). 
Isonomia was defined by way of contrast to tyrannical rule or dynasteia (Sealey, 
1987, p. 99), it was ‘the balanced equality of a society which previously had been 
oppressed by the rule of a tyrant. It meant the equality of peers, not of the people’ 
(Ehrenberg, 1950, p. 531). Isonomia, assuming the term existed at the time of the 
Solonic ‘moderate democracy’, would probably have meant ‘equality before the law’ 
in the sense that that the (unequal) distribution of political rights and privileges 
within different social classes was upheld impartially. 
Larsen argues that the word isonomia originated in connection with the expulsion 
of the tyrant in 510, i.e. before the Cleisthenic reforms (Larsen, 1948, p. 8) and that 
its earliest appearance (as an adjective) was in the aristocratic drinking-song on 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton.6 The two tyrannicides are praised because they 
made Athens isonomous by killing the tyrant, not because they empowered the 
demos: 
I will bear the sword in a branch of myrtle 
Just like Harmodios and Aristogeiton 
When they killed the tyrant 
and made Athens isonomos (PMG 893) 
2.2.2  Fifth century: The reforms of Cleisthenes and Ephialtes 
‘Democracy was introduced into Athens by Kleisthenes in 507 BC’ (Hansen, 1999, 
p. 27). However, the ideological catchphrase of the Athenian revolution was 
isonomia – that this predated demokratia as the common name for popular 
                                            
6 This dating is controversial, other scholars date this c.490. However, the aristocratic 
origin of isonomia is endorsed by Cartledge (2005) and Raaflaub (2004). 
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government is attested by the contribution of ‘Otanes’ to the debate on 
constitutions in Herodotus, III, 80 (my emphasis): 
‘Rule by the majority, on the other hand, bears the fairest of all titles: 
isonomia. . . Those in office have their authority courtesy of a lottery, 
and wield it in a way that is strictly accountable. Every policy decision 
must be referred to the commonality of the people. This is why I give it 
as my opinion that we should abolish the monarchy and foster the rule 
of the masses. Everything, after all, is contained within the multitude.’ 
Such was the case made by Otanes. 
According to Herodotus, Cleisthenes introduced his institutional reforms in 507 as, 
‘finding that he had no hope of success with only his aristocratic faction to help him, 
he “took into his faction the ordinary people” ’ (Hdt. 5.66.2.) (Hansen, 1999, p. 33).7 
But if Cleisthenes’ new power base was the demos, why did he not refer to this 
new system of government as demokratia (assuming the term was available at the 
time)? The phrase ‘took into his faction’ suggests adding popular support to his 
existing aristocratic network as opposed to replacing the latter with the former. If so, 
then the adoption of the slogan isonomia8 as opposed to demokratia would have 
the merit of flattering the demos (by including them in a form of equality that was 
previously only a noble privilege) while at the same time not frightening the 
(aristocratic) horses: 
All in all we may feel confident in concluding, therefore, that through 
isonomia and its cognates political equality became a popular slogan 
in the aristocrats’ fight against tyranny, figured prominently in their 
                                            
7 Josiah Ober (and J. Peter Euben) take issue with Herodotus’s ‘elitist’ assumptions by 
arguing that the introduction of democracy was the result of a spontaneous popular 
uprising against Isagoras and the Spartan Cleomenes (Ober, 1996, Ch. 4), but (Rhodes, 
2003, p. 77) concludes that Ober over-interprets an innocent remark by Herodotus, in 
order to buttress his overall thesis that the Athenian democracy was the achievement of an 
active demos, which was not led by the elite so much as led them. The scholarly dispute 
as to who was responsible for the foundation of the democracy (the aristocracy or the 
masses) does not affect the argument of this chapter one way or the other. 
8 ‘More of a banner than a label . . . [isonomia] may well have been the slogan by which 
Cleisthenes rallied the people to the support of his reforms’ (Ostwald, 1969, p. 153). 
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celebration of the the overthrow of tyranny, and possibly was soon 
applied to the system introduced by Cleisthenes, which was 
characterized precisely by more broadly based civic equality and thus 
realized values shared at that time by aristocrats and non-aristocrats 
alike. (Raaflaub, 1996, p. 145) 
The 507 reforms could well be regarded as a dispute between aristocratic factions, 
leading to ‘democracy’ as an unintended by-product, or ‘spandrel’ (to adopt 
Stephen Jay Gould’s term). Hansen’s dating (507) is derived from his ‘institutional’ 
approach to Greek democracy, and this has been criticised by Rhodes, Raaflaub 
and others, who focus more on the language used by the reformers to describe 
their intentions and work (Raaflaub, 2008). The linguistic terms in use at the time of 
Cleisthenes’ reforms privileged two forms of equality (isegoria and isonomia), 
demokratia not surfacing until the 460s: ‘Ephialtes and his supporters in 462/1 
were the first reformers who claimed explicitly to be democratic’ (Rhodes, 2003, p. 
19, my emphasis). 
The creation of the word demokratia indicates a shift of awareness 
among the Athenians. Isonomia (political equality), the word perhaps 
used to characterize Cleisthenes’ system modified a traditional ideal of 
‘good order’ (eunomia) by the criterion of equality. By contrast, 
demokratia and related terms defined a constitution by the criterion of 
who held power (kratos or arche). (Raaflaub, 2008, p. 112) 
The four-decade gap between Cleisthenes’ institutional reforms and the adoption 
of the ideological term demokratia bears an interesting (and close) parallel two 
millennia later. The American founders were, to a man, adamant that their new 
system of government was republican (rather than democratic) and that equal 
political right was limited to the principle of one-man-one-vote. The aristocratic 
nature of the electoral system would ensure the rule of the ‘best’ (or at least the 
most distinguished) citizens; if it were not for their privileging republican Rome over 
Greece, the founders might well have chosen to describe their republican form of 
government as isonomia or even eunomia. The only era of Athenian democracy 
that received the founders’ approbation was the ‘moderate’ (electoral) democracy 
of the Solonic era. Nevertheless within a period of four decades, the political 
language (and partisan allegiance) of founding father James Madison had 
55 
morphed from ‘republican’ (1788) through Republican party (1791) and 
Democratic-Republican party to Democratic Party (1828). Perhaps it’s not entirely 
fanciful to attribute a similar linguistic morphology to the events of the fifth century 
BC as 
The political revolution which began with the expulsion of Hippias and 
culminated in Cleisthenes’ great reform of the political order, started 
under the watchword [isonomia], but soon became the rule of the 
people [demokratia]. (Ehrenberg, 1950, p. 535) 
The ongoing scholarly dispute over the (supposedly) aristocratic origins of 
isonomia, the relative contribution of aristoi and demos to the events of 507 and 
the exact date for the formation of the Athenian demokratia are beyond the scope 
of this thesis. While the origins of the term isonomia – aristocratic or democratic –
are of interest to classical historians and philologists, the argument of this thesis is 
merely that, during the classical era, equal political right was a sine qua non of the 
demokratia. As the ordinary people now possessed isonomia, the outcome was a 
fundamental shift of power from the old council and magistrates to the assembly 
(just as the UK 1867 Reform Act led to a fundamental shift in power from the 
chamber of the House of Commons to the electoral hustings). Thus was born the 
classical age of Athenian direct democracy. Supreme power lay with the demos in 
the ecclesia. Most magistracies – including the council – were filled by lot (the 
exception being the military commanders (strategoi), who were elected), but our 
concern here is legislation and policy-making, not public administration, so the 
focus will be on Herodotus’s phrase: ‘every policy decision must be referred to the 
commonality of the people’. This aspect of isonomia required that key decisions of 
public policy, including the amendment of laws and the declaration of war and 
peace, were made by majority vote in the assembly (by a simple show of hands): 
Cleisthenes will have enlarged the legislative authority of the common 
people by relying on their support for getting his reforms passed, and 
passage by the Assembly remained henceforth a prerequisite for the 
validation of new legislation (Ostwald, 1986, p. 24). 
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Ehrenberg’s interpretation of Aeschylus’ ‘the people’s ruling hand’ (Suppliants, 
621) is that ‘the show of hands is the expression of the people’s rule’ (Ehrenberg, 
1950, p. 522): 
Hail, old man, bringing the most desired messages to me! 
Tell us what has been decided! 
The hand of the people (demos) having voted (kratousa), 
what decision was reached? (602-4) 
Hence my argument that voting in the assembly was a key element of isonomia:  
The typical feature of early democracy was the majority vote of the 
people – the demos being the whole community of citizens as 
represented in the assembly. (Ehrenberg, 1950, p. 547) 
Herodotus, writing probably in the 420s, uses the terms isonomia and demokratia 
‘indiscriminately’ throughout his Histories (Ehrenberg, 1950, p. 526), indicating how 
the former had, by this time, practically morphed into the latter. Isonomia, viewed 
as a form of government, involved several elements, including ‘election by lot, the 
audit of public officials, [and] the power of the assembly to discuss and decide all 
questions of public policy’ (Vlastos, 1953, p. 337). To Vlastos this is emphatically 
‘equality of law . . . equal share of all the citizens in the control of the state’. (ibid., p. 
348; 352) 
From an institutional perspective the equal share of all citizens in the control of the 
state took two forms during the fifth century: a) rotation by lot in administrative 
office and b) policy making by majority vote in the general assembly.  
a) Rotation by lot in office 
The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to the 
common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state; this 
they affirm to be the great end of every democracy. One principle of 
liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn . . . (Arist., Pol., VI, 40). 
During the fifth century all magistracies, apart from the strategoi (military leaders) 
and members of the board of finance, were selected by lot. This would have meant 
a total of some 700 public officials, of which the overwhelming majority were 
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selected by lot, in addition to the 500 randomly-selected members of the council 
(Hansen, 1999, p. 240). Tenure was for one year only and at the end of every year 
each magistrate would have to give an account (euthynai) of his administration and 
use of public finance. In order to ensure that the principle of rotation of office 
worked in practice as well as in theory Pericles introduced daily pay for 
magistrates.9 The political ethos of Athenian society presupposed that all citizens 
would play an active role in the governance of the polis – it was a form of public 
(akin to military) service – indeed most citizens would have served for at least one 
year on the council during their lifetime (Hansen, 1999, p. 249). As such, rotation 
by lot in public office was a way of ensuring Aristotle’s chosen mechanism for 
democratic freedom – that all citizens should ‘rule and be ruled in turn’. In terms of 
isonomia, rotation ensured an equal distribution of timē to all citizens. 
Although the selection principle (sortition) is at the heart of the modern proposals 
outlined in chapter 8 of this thesis, there is no suggestion that it should be used for 
the appointment of individual government officers (‘magistrates’) as rotation is self-
evidently impossible in large modern states for reasons of scale, role-complexity 
and competence. This thesis instead focuses on the use of sortition for selecting 
juries in legislative courts, as dealt with in the next section (2.2.3). 
b) Policy making by majority vote in the general assembly  
. . . democratic justice is the application of numerical not proportionate 
equality; whence it follows that the majority must be supreme, and that 
whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just. (Arist., 
Pol., VI, 40). 
Lawmaking in the fifth century involved a mixture of laws (nomoi) and decrees 
(psephismata), all passed in the general assembly (ecclesia) by majority voting, via 
a show of hands.10 All male citizens over the age of eighteen were entitled to 
                                            
9 Payment was first introduced for jurors, but juries were never considered magistracies. 
10 The council had the right to issue minor administrative decrees, although these could be 
overruled by the assembly, the council being little more than a collegial secretariat for the 
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attend and all votes were equal, so this, along with rotation in office, constituted 
another example of isonomia. Aristotle viewed assembly and jury voting as an 
example of ‘numerical’ equality – in modern terms, equality of outcome or ‘natural’ 
equality (Hansen, 1999, p. 83). As I will demonstrate, Plato and Aristotle’s 
‘proportionate’ equality, which better approximates to (formal) equality of 
opportunity, is reserved for isegoria (equal speech rights), which will be addressed 
in Section 2.3 (and Chapter 7.1). 
2.2.3  Fourth century reaction: The return to the patrios politeia 
The government of Athens is to follow its ancestral pattern, the laws of 
Solon and his measures and weights shall be used, as also the 
ordinances of Draco, which we used in former times. (Andoc. 1.83) 
The democracy was restored (for the second time) in 403 BC and the Athenians 
were determined to learn from past errors and disasters. The new constitution 
would involve ‘rule by laws, not by men’ (Finley, 1983, pp. 135-136): ‘the Athenians 
returned to the idea that the laws, not the people, must be the highest power and 
that the laws must be stable, even if not wholly entrenched’ (Hansen, 1999, p. 174). 
If some form of tyranny is inevitable, it would be the impartial and dispassionate 
tyranny of the laws (Hoekstra, 2013). This development has led some scholars to 
postpone the date of the introduction of democracy to 403 BC: ‘in its fully 
developed form ancient democracy did not come into being before the end of the 
fifth century’ (Eder, 1998, p. 107; c.f. Ostwald, 1986).11 
Aristotle, however, did not believe that the mature Athenian democracy lived up to 
demanding republican standards on the rule of law, as it was rule by the poor. But 
irrespective of whether one adheres to a civic-republican or proto-Marxist analysis 
                                                                                                                                
 
assembly (Manin, Urbinati, & Landemore, 2008). The council ‘prepared the business of the 
Assembly and dealt with emergencies’ (Dahl, 1990, p. 30). 
11 This strikes me as a somewhat epistemic (outcome-oriented) perspective on democracy; 
from a procedural point of view, the high point of democracy as popular sovereignty was 
the last decades of the fifth century. 
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of Athenian politics, the fourth-century reforms were undeniably conservative in 
nature. No longer would it be viewed as ‘shocking not to let the people do whatever 
they wish’ (Xen., Hell., 1.7.12). ‘Written guidelines were needed to give the law 
precedence over the uncontrolled sovereignty of the people . . . in order that 
people were bound by their own nomoi’ (Ostwald, 1986, pp. 411, 444). Key 
financial magistracies (including the all-powerful theoric official) would be elected 
for four years (as opposed to the one-year tenure of amateurs drawn by lot) – the 
success of the restored democracy (it lasted for some eighty years prior to its 
defeat by the overwhelming forces of Philip of Macedon) has largely been 
attributed to this decision (Hansen, 1999, p. 160), along with the general 
professionalisation of the role of the political advisor.12 This led to a ‘more efficient 
system in which men of ability were entrusted with considerable power’ (Rhodes, 
1980, p. 314). The other goals of the restoration democrats were equally 
conservative, motivated by a desire to return to the patrios politeia – the supposed 
golden age of moderate Solonian democracy (Hansen, 1999, p. 296).13 In the 
same way that James Madison and the other American founders created the 
legislative log-jam of the US Constitution by design, the restoration democrats 
(republicans?) did everything to make it as hard as possible to change the laws.  
The most pertinent fourth-century innovation14 was that lawmaking powers were 
transferred from the assembly15 to nomothetai (legislative boards, comprised of 
randomly-selected jurors). These juries were established by a process of double 
                                            
12 The Athenians also chose to ignore the growing threat of Macedonian expansionism (in 
a similar manner to British attitudes to German militarism in the 1930s) as they were 
reluctant to sacrifice both their public theatre subsidies and their own lives in combat. 
(Samons, 2004, p. 161) 
13 Note that the mantle of the patrios politeia was claimed by a variety of agents and 
interpreted in different ways. 
14 The exact date for the establishment of legislative change by randomly-selected 
nomothetic panels is unclear, the earliest recorded date being 382/1 (Sealey, 1987, p. 44). 
15 The assembly still issued decrees (psephismata) and remained the focus for major 
public policy decisions. War or peace? Invade Sicily? Withdraw from the Athenian 
countryside into the city and let the Spartans occupy the countryside? The primacy of the 
assembly in such matters remained true from the sixth through to the fourth centuries 
(although claims for the sixth century are possibly anachronistic). I am grateful to Melissa 
Lane for this point. 
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sortition: every year any male citizen over the age of thirty (and not disqualified for 
other reasons) could put himself forward for selection by lot to a jury pool of 6,000 
(the system was put into place by Ephialtes for the selection of dikastes). Every 
trial day (whether juridical or legislative), members of the pool of jurors could 
present themselves at the courtroom before being allocated to panels via a second 
sortition (using a lottery machine called a kleroterion). Although the second sortition, 
performed on the day of the trial, was clearly intended to reduce the possibility of 
jury nobbling (by threats and/or bribes) the first sortition would have established a 
jury pool that ‘descriptively’ represented the whole citizen body – ‘assemblages of 
[jurors] were commonly regarded as representative of the whole polis’ (Rhodes, 
1980, p. 320).16 
Although selection by lot is normally seen as the hallmark of ‘radical’ democracy, 
this is only really true in the case of the appointment of magistrates – the new 
legislative courts were part of the conservative reaction – juries had far longer to 
consider the merits of legislative proposals and were comprised of older citizens 
(average age 40-50) who had sworn the Heliastic Oath: 
I will cast my vote in consonance with the laws and with the decrees 
passed by the Assembly and by the Council. But if there is no 
                                            
16 However, the higher minimum age and the introduction of subsistence-level jury pay by 
Pericles meant that the poor and the old were over-represented, as ridiculed by 
Aristophanes in Wasps. Sealey argues against the case for the representative microcosm, 
claiming that attributing the notion of statute law expressing the will of the legislator to 
classical-era Athens is anachronistic, as ‘this view springs in part from ideas developed by 
political theorists, who drew in turn on the Roman notion that government derives its 
authority from the consent of the governed’ (Sealey, 1987, p. 52). Josiah Ober has argued 
that the Athenians might have been using the demos as a synecdoche, whereby any 
actions by an organ of the democratic state were attributed to the demos. (Ober, 1989, pp. 
330-331). However it is hard to reconcile a perspective derived from linguistic theory with 
the fifth-century view that it would be ‘shocking not to let the people do whatever they wish’ 
(Xen., Hell., 1.7.12). Aristotle, certainly, did not differentiate between the will of the demos 
and the decisions of jurors, as the same social classes predominated in both instances. 
This is the chief reason why he viewed fourth-century democracy as radical as, in his view, 
supreme authority still resides not in the law, but in the vote of a majority (of jurors) (Arist, 
Pol., 4.1292a4-7). Whilst it would clearly be anachronistic to view the large Athenian jury 
as a representative body in the modern sense, the very silence of the sources regarding 
the 4th century switch from assembly to jury lawmaking indicates that the change was 
certainly not seen as in any way undermining the rule of the demos. 
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[relevant] law I will give judgment in consonance with my own sense of 
what is most just, without favour or enmity. I will vote only on the 
matters raised in the charge, and I will listen impartially to accusers 
and defenders alike. 
Athenian juries, whether ruling in dikasteria or nomothetai, were ‘regarded as 
representing the people as a whole’ (Ostwald, 1986, p. 34; cf. Hansen, 1978, pp. 
127, n.121; Rhodes, 1972, pp. 169, 197-168). Just as the reforms of Ephialtes had 
effectively subdivided the assembly qua judiciary (heliaia) into jury panels, the 
fourth-century reforms performed the same task for the legislative powers of the 
ecclesia. Although the Greeks had no notion of mathematical proportionality, it was 
clear that the verdicts of large juries – whether legislative or juridical – were 
deemed to reflect the considered judgment of the whole political community: ‘each 
panel being regarded as representative of the demos as a whole’ (Ostwald, 1968, 
p. 74). 
In addition to the oath and the higher age threshold, nomothetai voted by show of 
hands17 and the votes were counted rather than estimated. The high standard of 
Athenian juridical practice (in comparison to the assembly) is one of the reasons 
why the court is often described as the highest organ of state.18 (Hansen, 1999, p. 
180). The process for the ‘trial’ of laws was modelled on the trial of persons: the 
citizen who proposed the change in the law would act as ‘prosecutor’ and the 
assembly would appoint five citizens to defend the existing law. Both parties were 
allocated equal time to argue their case, and the verdict would be delivered by the 
majority vote of the allotted jury, without deliberating amongst themselves.19 
Although all men (according to the fifth-century Sophist, Protagoras), are 
possessed of politike techne (the art of political judgment) the formal advocacy and 
                                            
17 Dikastai voted in secret via tokens. 
18 In parallel to the establishment of the nomothetai, assembly decisions were subject to 
appeal by graphe paranomon in the law courts. 
19 Although this ignores the hecklers, viewed by some scholars as part of the democratic 
process (see p. 70, below) 
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silent deliberation20 that characterized fourth-century nomothesia was necessary to 
realize its full potential – factors that ‘deliberative’ democrats seeking (in vain) for 
ancient provenance for their modern projects should reflect on. 
Proposals to revise the legislative code21 would now have to overcome multiple 
hurdles (Blackwell, 2003; Hansen, 1999, pp. 168-9): 
1) Legislative proposals (in writing) by any willing citizen (ho 
boulomenos) 
2) Publication of the proposal before the Monument to the Eponymous 
Heroes in the agora, to inform any citizen who wished to have a say 
in the matter 
3) Pre-legislative scrutiny (probouleumata) 
4) Reading out of the proposal and initial deliberation in the assembly 
(ecclesia) 
5) Vote, at the next session but one of the assembly, whether or not to 
establish a legislative court 
6) Nomothesia (legislative trial) 
7) Publication of revised law before the Monument to the Eponymous 
Heroes 
8) Trial outcome subject to appeal in the people’s court (graphe nomon 
me epitedeion theinai)  
All of these stages were interspersed by long cooling-off periods that would have 
been filled by Condorcet-style public debate in the agora. Even successful 
legislative ventures would be subject to appeal (trial in the people’s court) and the 
proposer would be liable to prosecution throughout (Hansen, 1999, p. 212).  
Once a law (nomos) had been established by the above process it could not be 
overruled by an assembly decree (psephisma), so this was a serious constraint on 
                                            
20 In the sense of ‘deliberation within’ (see Chapter 5.1.2, below) 
21 In addition to the ad hoc ho boulomenos procedure described here, there were parallel 
paths for legislation initiated by the annual review of laws in the assembly, and by the 
Thesmothetai (a board of nine magistrates). 
63 
the kind of willful and erratic decisions that characterize mass democracy. 
Notwithstanding the conservative aims of the 403 reforms, the resulting constitution 
was still truly democratic and egalitarian. Anybody (with a strong nerve) could seek 
to repeal or alter a law. Everybody could participate in the assembly debate 
(isegoria) and the resultant decision (isonomia) whether or not to appoint a board 
of nomothetai, and every mature citizen could (and should) participate at some 
point of their life in the scrutiny process – either as a member of the council or of 
the courts. At the same time there was proper allowance for professional 
competence (in the election of key magistrates) and for the politically ambitious 
(rhetores) – although the Athenians made sure that the stick (or Damoclean sword) 
and the carrot were of equal weight. This meant that the ‘principle of the 
sovereignty of law was given official primacy over the principle of popular 
sovereignty’ (Ostwald, 1986, p. xx). How the restored democracy would have 
developed given a longer run is, like any counterfactual, impossible to say, but 
many of the flaws of fifth-century democracy appear to have been addressed – the 
tyrant of direct popular sovereignty (Demos) was now chained by a multitude of 
checks and balances – albeit insufficiently to convince Aristotle that it amounted to 
kata taxin (right ordering),22 but was certainly an improvement on the radical direct 
democracy of the late fifth century: 
Council and Assembly receded into the background in matters of 
internal policy, and the jury courts held center stage. . . . [I]n matters of 
legislation the Assembly relinquished its final say to nomothetai. Thus 
the democracy achieved stability, consistency, and continuity when 
the higher sovereignty of nomos limited the sovereignty of the people. 
(Ostwald, 1968, p. 524) 
                                            
22 Most of Aristotle’s objections to democracy were aimed at late fifth-century practice 
(Hoekstra, 2013). It remains unclear as to why he chose to ignore the fourth-century 
innovations; perhaps it was because the conservative constraints on the modification of the 
laws did little to check the torrent of assembly edicts (psephismata), and the demos 
(reincarnated in jury form) retained the final veto, as opposed to the mixed system of 
oligarchy, aristocracy and democracy that he preferred.  
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The relative silence of contemporary sources (including critics of jury democracy 
like Aristotle) on the transition from assembly- to jury-based nomothesia should be 
taken as confirmation that the change was viewed as uncontroversial at the time – 
it making little difference (from a democratic perspective) whether the laws were 
determined by the full assembly or a sub-set thereof. The claim of this thesis is that 
a similar switch in modern legislative practice – from mass- to sortition-based 
democracy – should be equally uncontroversial. 
2.3  Isegoria 
‘Who is willing, having some good advice, to bring it before the city?’ 
The man who will has glory, who will not keeps silence. What in the 
city can be more equal than that? (Euripides, The Suppliant Women, 
438-41) 
Although ‘Otanes’ in the constitutional debate describes democratic practice in 
terms of isonomia, when Herodotus charts the birth of Athenian democracy ‘it is 
isegoria and not isonomia that he singles out as the principle of democratic equality’ 
(Hansen, 1999, p. 83). The emphasis on (proportional) equality of opportunity – 
rather than natural (arithmetic) equality – is also taken up by Thucydides in 
Pericles’ funeral oration: 
When it comes to esteem in public affairs, a man is preferred 
according to his own reputation of something, not, on the whole, just 
turn and turn about, but for excellence, and even in poverty no man is 
debarred by obscurity of reputation. (Thuc. 2.37.1-3) 
Isonomia (equal political right) is clearly a necessary but insufficient condition for 
demokratia – the latter presupposes that all citizens should have the right to 
propose legislation and to address the assembly. The ‘Old Oligarch’ in his 
Constitution of the Athenians clearly regards (and deplores) equal speech rights as 
the key element in the demokratia: 
Someone might say that they ought not to let everyone speak on 
equal terms and serve on the council, but rather just the cleverest and 
finest. Yet their policy is also excellent in this very point of allowing 
even the worst people to speak. For if the good men were to speak 
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and make policy, it would be splendid for the likes of themselves but 
not so for the men of the people. But, as things are, any wretch who 
wants to can stand up and obtain what is good for him and the likes of 
himself. (Ps. Xen., Const. Ath., 1.7) 
When was isegoria introduced to Athens? The sources are unclear, largely on 
account of the late fifth- and fourth-century habit of attributing most constitutional 
innovations to the ancestral lawmaker (Solon). Although precise dating is 
unnecessary for the purpose of this thesis, nevertheless the restrictions on 
legislative isegoria introduced by the fourth-century reforms are central to the study, 
so these institutional changes need to be grounded in an overall historical 
perspective, sketched out in the next three sub-sections. 
2.3.1  Sixth century: The reforms of Solon 
What was the historical origin of the right of all Athenian citizens to address the 
assembly? Some scholars have argued that the speech by the common soldier 
Thersites to the assembly in Homer’s Iliad, book II, is an example of archaic 
isegoria (Bonner, 1933, p. 67), but Odysseus’ rebuke: 
I assert there is no worse man than you are. Therefore 
you shall not lift up your mouth to argue with princes (Il., 2, trans. 
Lattimore). 
is surely a sign that isegoria was an aristocratic privilege (Griffith, 1966, p. 117).23 
According to (Lewis, 1971, p. 129) ‘Lysias and Aeschines ascribe the origin of the 
right [of all citizens to address the assembly] to Solon, and Demosthenes asserts 
that Solon excluded [only] male prostitutes from the right’ (Diog. L., I 55; Aesch., iii 
2-4; Dem., Xxii 30). Ehrenberg claims that Solon created ‘an assembly in which 
every citizen could get up and speak’ (Ehrenberg, 1950, p. 538), but we need to be 
                                            
23 Although Odysseus’ ‘discouragement’ of the ‘vulgar, obscene and dull-witted’ Thersites 
(by threatening to strip him naked and bludgeon him with Agamemnon’s scepter) could be 
taken to indicate that aristocratic restrictions on the right of all citizens to address the 
assembly were more de facto than de jure.  
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sceptical regarding such claims, due to ‘the well-known practice of orators of 
ascribing any law to Solon if it was (to them) a fairly old one’ (Griffith, 1966, p. 119). 
Solon himself claimed to have ‘given the demos just as much political privilege as 
suffices, neither less than more’ (Solon, F 5, 1-2), and there is no good reason to 
believe that this included the right to address the assembly. 
There seems little doubt, however, that Solon introduced the principle of ho 
boulomenos (he who is willing) for the launch of prosecutions, but once the judicial 
process was commenced, speech acts would be restricted to elected magistrates. 
The ‘equal right of prosecuting’ may have been Demosthenes’ sense of isegoria 
(Dem., LX 28), and this indeed became the principal characteristic of lawmaking in 
his own time, as the ‘prosecution’ of laws in the courts came to mirror the 
prosecution of persons. 
The other act of the Solonian democracy that is relevant to the subsequent 
development of isegoria was the (probable) establishment of the council of 400. 
The council was restricted to members of the higher census groups, nevertheless 
Solon’s council marked a shift away from the monopolization of power by a 
hereditary aristocracy. In parallel to the notion of isonomos oligarchia, the ‘equal 
right to speak in aristocratic councils was tacitly admitted [only] among gentlemen’ 
(Woodhead, 1967, p. 135). This right would have been inherited by the 
‘intermediate’ Solonic council and passed on to the popular council introduced by 
Cleisthenes’ reforms. As most citizens would serve at some time of their life on the 
council, this may well have been the breeding ground for isegoria in the general 
assembly (Woodhead, 1967). 
2.3.2  Fifth century: The reforms of Cleisthenes, Pericles and Ephialtes 
The isegoria of the Solonic democracy – restricted to members of the council – 
was almost certainly further limited, or even abolished, under the Peisistratan 
tyranny and restored by Cleisthenes to the newly created Council of 500.24 The 
principle of free speech is celebrated in Aeschylus’ Persians (472): 
                                            
24 Ironically Cleisthenes’ political opponent was Isagoras (Equal Speaker)! 
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No longer will the tongues of men 
be under guard. For the people 
have been released to talk freely, 
since the yoke of strength has been removed. 
(Aesch., Persians, 590-3) 
The first recorded use of the word isegoria, however, was not until Herodotus: 
The Athenians grew in strength. For it is clear that not in one thing 
alone but in all respects freedom of speech (isegoria) is a great thing. 
For while the Athenians were ruled by tyrants they were not better at 
the arts of war than their neighbours. But once they had got rid of the 
tyrants they were by far the first. (Hist., 5.78) 
Note that here Herodotus regards isegoria as synonymous with demokratia,25 -- 
‘he named the part to describe the whole’ (metonymy) – and suggests that it 
originated with Cleisthenes’ reforms (Griffith, 1966, p. 115). Griffith, however, 
argues that Herodotus is guilty of anachronism – the reforms of Pericles and 
Ephialtes, which provided pay for public service and severely restricted the role of 
the old aristocratic council, were a necessary prerequisite for full isegoria.26 This is 
because it was less a matter of equal citizen rights than custom, practice and the 
personal confidence required to participate in public speech. Prior to the 
introduction of a daily stipend for council members, citizens of modest means could 
not afford to put themselves forward for council membership, so would not have 
benefited from this training ground in oratory. The very fact that no writer (including 
the fourth-century critics of democracy) refers to any formal change in the law 
leading to full isegoria in the assembly buttresses the view that it can be attributed 
                                            
25 The Online Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon (LSJ) defines isigoria (sic) as 
both ‘equal right of speech’ and ‘political equality’ 
(http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/lsj/#eid=52418&context=search). The term also applied both 
to social and political speech in general as well as the specific right to address the 
assembly on hearing the Herald’s opening call ‘Who is willing, having some good advice, 
to bring it before the city?’ 
26 This would certainly be true for substantive equality, less so for formal equality of 
opportunity (see p. 48, above). 
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more to changes of custom and personnel (in particular the democratization of 
assembly officials) than a formal alteration to law (Lewis, 1971, p. 138).27 
The consequence of the reforms was, after the death of Pericles, ‘the freeing [of] 
the Assembly from all vestiges of restraint by Council or the generals, so that it 
became the supreme controlling authority in the State’ (Griffith, 1966, p. 131). This 
led to the age of the demagogues. Although every citizen who was willing (ho 
boulomenos) had the right to address the assembly (isegoria) and even to propose 
replacement laws, decrees and (from 415) political prosecutions (graphe 
paranomon), in practice this role was assumed by a small minority of semi-
professional politicians, self-selected and generally drawn from the affluent census 
classes – the assembly ‘looked to a few key men in any given period to lay down 
alternative policy lines from which to choose’ (Finley, 1973, p. 24).28 However the 
only power political leaders had was the power of persuasion, the outcome was 
always determined by the popular vote, hence their name rhetores (orators). In the 
fifth century, many of the political leaders were also military commanders, hence 
the compound term rhetores kai strategoi. The politicians were often accused of 
acting like demagogues29 and misleading the people by making proposals that 
were either unconstitutional or against the public interest, hence the frequency of 
ostracisms and political prosecutions in the courts. But our experience of modern 
demagoguery might well make us suspect that the causation was often in the 
opposite direction – sometimes the dog is wagging its tail and sometimes the tail is 
wagging the dog: 
                                            
27 Lewis, however, takes issue with Griffith’s strong conclusion on the post-Periclean 
origins of isonomia, arguing that it existed at least since the reforms of Cleisthenes. (Lewis, 
1971, p. 138). The dispute over the precise dating, however, is not the concern of this 
thesis. 
28 The evidential foundation for this claim is limited, it being possible that in the 5th century 
more people were involved. 
29 Demagogos, derived from demos and ago (to lead) was originally a neutral descriptive 
term for a leader of the people who had (usually) not been a military commander. The 
pejorative sense of the demagogue as mob leader was a consequence of Plato’s 
distinction between the statesman and the demagogue; this became thematic of Athenian 
democracy as a result of Plutarch, not the classical historians. (Ober, 1996, p. 91) 
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Ever since this breed of [demagogos] appeared who ply you with such 
questions as ‘What would you like? What shall I propose? How can I 
oblige you?’ the interests of the state have been frittered away for a 
momentary popularity. The natural consequences follow, and the 
orators profit by your disgrace. (Dem., 3.21-22) 
Demosthenes was writing in the fourth century but, given the opportunity for 
honorary decrees, gold crowns and other perquisites voted by the assembly, late 
fifth-century political leaders were equally likely to tell the demos what it wanted to 
hear. Some have claimed that this is the inevitable consequence of democracy, 
both ancient and modern (Samons, 2004, p. 45): ‘Perhaps the majority of any 
democratic electorate will usually prefer leaders who tell them what they want to 
hear or believe’ (ibid., p.154).30 In the words of the chorus in Aristophanes’ Knights 
(424 BC): 
Demos, the rule you bear is fine, since all humankind fears you like a 
tyrant [andra turannon].  But you are easily led about, you enjoy being 
flattered and beguiled, and the orators always leave you with your 
mouth hanging open. (Aristophanes, Knights, 1111-19) 
Aristophanes’ chorus was perfectly comfortable with the ‘tyrannical’ nature of the 
rule of the demos, but is aware of the risk of this rule being compromised by the 
tendency of Demos to be swayed by seductive speakers (Hoekstra, 2013, p.10, 
DRAFT M/S).  
Although Athenian political leaders received no direct remuneration, many of them 
became very wealthy as a result of perquisites voted by the assembly, or via ‘gifts’ 
from lobbyists: The Greek word for bribery (dorodokia) translates as ‘receiving 
gifts’; whether it was a gift or a bribe depended on whether it was in the interests of 
                                            
30 And the deception cuts both ways: in the UK 2010 general election everyone (politicians 
and voters) knew there would be savage spending cuts after the elections, irrespective of 
who won, but no political party would acknowledge this truth in a straightforward manner. 
So who was (mis)leading who? 
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the state (Harvey, 1985, p. 81).31 The Greeks were perfectly happy for politicians to 
enrich themselves, so long as there was an alignment between their interests and 
the (perceived) interests of the demos.  
As such, political leaders must have been sorely tempted to tell the demos what 
they believed it wanted to hear, leading to endemic financial mismanagement and 
the calamatous decisions (in particular the Sicilian disaster of 413) that led to 
defeat in the Peloponnesian War. This contributed to the decision of the assembly 
in 411 to abolish itself and to replace the demokratia with an oligarchic council. 
2.3.4  Fourth century reaction: The return to the patrios politeia 
When the democracy was restored, conservative reformers were determined to 
learn from the problems of the age of the demagogues. As we saw in section 2.2.3 
(above), the fourth-century reforms imposed significant constraints on the direct 
democracy by transferring isonomia (in lawmaking) from all citizens meeting in the 
assembly to large representative juries comprised of older citizens who had sworn 
the Heliastic Oath. The restrictions on isegoria were, if anything, even more severe 
as ho boulomenos was restricted to the original meetings of the assembly which 
discussed whether or not to initiate the process of nomothesia. From that stage 
onwards isegoria rights were limited to the proposers of the new law and the five 
citizens elected by the assembly to defend the existing law – part of the overall 
professionalisation of the role of the political advisor (with obvious modern 
parallels).  
The legislative jury listened to the debate and then voted by show of hands without 
further deliberation – speech acts from jurors were proscribed as thorubos 
(clamour). Whilst some modern scholars who equate democracy strictly with 
isegoria view dikastic and nomothetic thorubos as the only democratic element in 
the court process (Bers, 1985), this was not the view of the fourth-century 
reformers, who viewed the restrictions on isegoria as an important element in the 
transition from the rule of men to the rule of law. Griffith, in fact, goes so far as to 
                                            
31 It was also held to be more wicked to receive than to offer a ‘gift’. 
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point out that nobody who wrote of the Athenian constitution a century after 
Horodotus seems to have shared his view that isegoria was synonymous with 
democracy (Griffith, 1966, p. 116), fourth-century concerns having more to do with 
equal political rights than equal speech.32 Despite the claims of ‘deliberative’ 
democrats to emulate ancient Athenian norms and practices, this would appear to 
be something that the fourth-century reforms were trying to minimize. 
In some respects the Athenian law courts were a form of ‘audience’ democracy, in 
that the courts were ‘similar to the Theatre of Dionysos’ and litigants were 
‘delivering lines written for them by logographers’ (Lanni, 1997, p. 183). The juries 
were not just judging the merits of the case in hand – in political trials the judgment 
was on the persona of the elite politician. The court was a public stage for the 
social elite to compete for prestige . . . a forum for ongoing communication 
between elite litigants and mass jurors’ (ibid.) ‘in a context which made explicit the 
power of the masses to judge the actions and behavior of elite individuals’ (Ober, 
1989, p. 145). But, unlike modern audience democracies, Athenian jurors were 
obliged to listen to a balanced debate (see p. 61, above), as opposed to selective 
and one-sided sound-bites (as in the assembly) and were sworn to judge the case 
impartially. 
2.4  Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed the changing meanings of isonomia (equal political 
rights) and isegoria (equal speech) along with the institutions that served to 
instantiate them as a working demokratia. In the archaic period nomos was a 
description of, and normative prescription for, some kind of (natural/supernatural) 
order, and nomoi were duly recorded by the original lawgiver (in a manner not 
entirely dissimilar to Moses handing down God’s commandments from Mount 
Sinai). During the fifth century nomoi were viewed as purely human constructs, and 
                                            
32 The term isegoria was rarely used in the 4th century: ‘by the end of the fifth century “free 
speech” or “frank speech” (parrhesia) was used more frequently to describe the Athenians’ 
ability to speak openly . . . perhaps because the idea of equality itself was coming under 
pressure.’ (Mitchell, 2007, p. 6) 
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egalitarian norms and institutions ensured that they were now constructed 
isonomously. The fourth-century reforms were motivated by an attempt to return to 
the sixth-century view that the nomoi took precedence over human artifice, hence 
the need to make changing the laws as difficult as possible: 
It was deliberately made difficult to have a nomos enacted: it could be 
done only at a certain time in the year; the proposer had to examine 
the existing code and if necessary propose the repeal of any law with 
which his new law would conflict; the proposal had to be displayed in 
public and read out at three meetings of the assembly; and the 
nomothetai who finally pronounced on it were not any citizens but men 
who had taken the oath and registered as jurors (inter alia, men of 
thirty and over. (Rhodes, 1980, p. 306) 
The evolution of isegoria also took a circular trajectory – during the sixth century it 
was limited to the lawgiver and his aristocratic circle, whereas during the fifth 
century it became the right of any citizen who wished to advise his peers. The 
fourth-century reformers decided that this amounted to little more than thorubos, 
opting instead to effectively limit political speech to the daring (who adopted the 
risky path of legislative innovation) and the few (the five aristoi elected by their 
peers to defend the existing laws).  
Concept 6th century 5th century 4th century 
Nomos 
(law); Isonomia 
(equal law) 
Ideology Natural order Human statute Law 
Institutions Thesmoi 
(divine law) 
Show of hands in 
the assembly 
Deliberative 
scrutiny 
Isegoria 
(equal speech); 
Agoreuein 
(public speech) 
Ideology The province of ‘the 
cleverest and the 
finest’ (Ps.Xen.) 
Ho boulomenos Effective return to 
‘the cleverest and 
the finest’ 
Institutions Magistrates and 
aristocrats only 
Anyone who chose 
to advise the 
people 
Proposers and 
elected opposers 
Table 2.1: The evolution of isonomia and isegoria in classical-era Athens 
As acknowledged at the start of this chapter, the focus on the law-making process 
and the fourth-century reforms will appear one-sided from the perspective of 
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classical historians, as it overlooks the ongoing role of the council, assembly (and 
agora). But the goal of this chapter is the limited one of finding ancient provenance 
for a modern constitutional proposal, rather than being a well-rounded portrait of 
political practice at the time (a modern nomothetai would also play a partial role in 
a mixed constitution but the context would be entirely different). Given that my 
undertaking is that of the grave-robber (rather than the historian), I feel under no 
obligation to scrutinize ancient artifacts that have no relevance to my own proposal. 
No doubt Arlene Saxonhouse would consider this work part of the ‘modern 
mythmaking’ project. (Saxonhouse, 1993) 
Having established in this chapter the centrality of the democratic diarchy 
(isonomia and isegoria) to the Athenian demokratia, the remainder of this thesis 
examines how these principles have been instantiated in modern democracies, the 
principal difference being the need for representation for both elements in the 
diarchy (on account of the vast increase in the number of citizens of modern poleis 
and the complex requirements of modern governance). The principle of isonomic 
lawmaking by randomly-selected sample can apply equally well to large and small 
poleis, and the professionalization of the role of the orator (and the election by the 
demos of representatives to defend the existing laws) in the fourth century appears 
to be a portend of modern developments. 
The final conclusion, outlined in Chapter 8, is that modern representative 
democracy could also benefit from a return to the patrios politeia by incorporating 
some of the practices of fourth-century Athens – specifically nomothetic judgment 
by large representative juries, elected by lot – and that the move to representative 
isegoria via the election of spokesmen by the assembly also has modern parallels. 
The next chapter considers why, at the birth of the modern era – given the 
understanding (derived from Aristotle via Montesquieu) that sortition was a 
democratic mechanism (and election aristocratic) – sortition was not even 
considered as a mechanism for a system of governance based on foundational 
beliefs in the democratic equality of all citizens. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.		The	Triumph	of	Election:	
Natural	Right	or	Wrong?	
In her 2014 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, 
Jane Mansbridge argued that: 
Legitimate coercion is the fundamental problem of governance. How 
can large, highly interdependent structures produce sufficient 
legitimate coercion to solve their collective action problems? 
(Mansbridge, 2014, p. 9, my emphasis) 
Democratic norms presuppose that this fundamental problem of governance 
should be resolved by ‘mutual coercion mutually arrived at’ (ibid., p.10) and this is 
normally associated with the consent associated with electoral democracy and 
majority rule. However, and crucially from the perspective of this thesis, 
Mansbridge claims that ‘legitimacy can be based on representation by lot’ (ibid., 
p.11). Bernard Manin, however, disagrees with Mansbridge’s claim and argues 
that the ‘triumph of election’ over sortition at the time of the birth of modern 
representative government was a consequence of the natural right theory of 
consent:  
‘However lot is interpreted, whatever its other properties, it cannot 
possibly be perceived as an expression of consent.’ (Manin, 1997, pp. 
84-5, my emphasis)1 
The need to obtain the consent of the governed is Manin’s explanation as to what 
would otherwise be something of a historical conundrum: 
At the same time that the founding fathers were declaring the equality 
of all citizens, they decided without the least hesitation to establish, on 
                                            
1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at Bernard Manin’s Tirage au Sort 
seminar, SciencesPo, Paris, May 24-5, 2012. (Delannoi, 2012) 
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both sides of the Atlantic, the unqualified dominion of a method of 
selection, long deemed to be aristocratic.  (Manin, 1997, p.79) 
This is clearly a puzzle for our understanding of the French Revolution, where 
égalité was an explicit goal. But the American revolutionaries were equally 
determined to avoid aristocratic domination, so why did they choose to ignore the 
lessons of antiquity? Direct democracy might well have been impossible in the 
extended republic but why not random selection by lot – one of the principal 
mechanisms of the original demokratia? 
Manin argues that sortition was not even considered as a candidate mechanism at 
the time of the birth of representative government, on account of the ‘natural right’ 
perspective on consent that was dominant at the time. Although the English 
translation of Manin’s book – originally published in French as Principes du 
Gouvernement Représentif (Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1995) – uses the phrase 
‘perceived as an expression of consent’ (rather than ‘conceived’), the context 
indicates that his concern is with logical possibility, rather than appearance. The 
original (French) text reads: 
Quelles que soient par ailleurs ses mérites et ses propriétés, le tirage 
au sort présente en effet ce caractère incontestable qu'il ne fait pas 
intervenir la volonté humaine et ne peut pas passer pour une 
expression du consentement. 
Which would more accurately translate as: 
Whatever its other merits and properties, selection by lot has [one] 
incontestable characteristic – it does not involve the human will – and 
[therefore] cannot possibly be an expression of consent. 
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‘ne peut pas passer pour’ has the strong meaning of something not being possible, 
or reasonable.2 There are in fact two separate issues involved in Manin’s claim that 
I would like to deal with in turn: 
1. Is the claim historically accurate, or were there other factors involved, 
apart from the natural right theory of consent? 
2. Is it logically true, irrespective of the beliefs of the founders of 
representative government (or the linguistic paradigms in use at the 
time)? It should be noted that Manin employs the present tense – ‘il ne 
peut pas passer pour une expression du consentement’ – so his 
argument is a general philosophical one, rather than just a matter of 
historical interpretation. 
Although the principal concern of this thesis is the latter claim, as opposed to a 
study in the history of political thought, I will first deal briefly with the former. 
3.1  The historical problem 
3.1.1  The natural rights theory of consent 
Manin’s focus is on the intellectual climate that was prevalent at the time of the 
foundation of representative government (the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries). The particular linguistic context that he privileges is natural rights theory, 
in its dominant (Lockean) form, according to which the legitimacy of government 
depends on the consent of the governed. He references all of the usual authorities 
from the natural right and social contract traditions (Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, 
Locke and Rousseau) to illustrate the undeniable importance of the natural rights 
theory of consent at the time. What evidence is there for the explicit connection 
between natural rights, consent and election? Manin acknowledges that ‘among 
the natural rights theorists, only Locke mentions the need to renew popular 
consent by the regular election of Parliament’ (Manin, 1997, p. 176). But Locke’s 
                                            
2 I am grateful to Gil Delannoi for this point. My interpretation assumes that Manin respects 
the distinction between how things are (esse) as opposed to how they might appear 
(percipere) and is more concerned with the former. 
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call for regular elections was on account of the special case of property rights and 
taxation; ultimately he viewed government as a sacred trust (which could be 
instantiated in a number of ways) and was more concerned with the legitimate 
grounds for the withdrawal of consent when that trust was betrayed. The only 
author that I could locate in Manin’s book directly connecting election and natural 
right is Rousseau, who subtitled The Social Contract ‘The Principles of Political 
Right’ but who viewed parliamentary elections as producing a form of slavery. 
Rousseau demanded that every citizen should consent in person and that 
precluded electoral representation, which only allowed Englishmen a brief moment 
of freedom every five years during the election of parliamentary representatives. 
The other natural rights theorists named (Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf) agree 
that representative government requires popular consent, but without stipulating 
the mechanism of election. Hobbesian consent, while a necessary condition for 
obligation and authority ‘can be inferred from certain states of affairs’: 
In casting the net of obligation as widely as possible, consent is 
sometimes stretched vanishingly thin. He allows consent to be tacit, 
so that one who openly lives under a government and receives 
protection from it thereby consents, and so authorizes the soverign 
and obligates himself (Hoekstra, 2004, p. 67)  
The requirement for consent has no implications for the chosen method of 
representation (monarchical, elective, sortive etc). Hugo Grotius’s writings on 
election were primarily concerned with the theological meaning of the word 
(salvation); Pufendorf did argue that ‘a kingdom is acquired by the voluntary 
consent of a people through the medium of an election’ but his reference here was 
to the original foundational act – subsequent descent could be by hereditary right if 
that was the wish of the original founders. (Pufendorf, 1682, X.3) 
Manin notes that all talk of sortition suddenly ‘vanished almost without all trace’, 
one generation after the publication of Spirit of the Laws (1748) and the Social 
Contract (1762), (Manin, 1997, p. 79). This period, however, corresponds with the 
waning tide of natural rights theory – 1748 also saw the publication of Hume’s 
critique of ‘tacit’ consent ‘Of the Original Contract’, and Jeremy Bentham wrote his 
condemnation of natural rights as ‘rhetorical nonsense – nonsense on stilts’ in 
1791 – leading to a new emphasis on positive (civil) rights. The high tide of natural 
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rights theory occurred almost a century before all talk of sortition vanished without 
trace. According to Manin, election is the obvious way of instantiating consent-
based natural right as ‘under an elective system, the consent of the people is 
constantly reiterated’ (Manin, 1997, p. 85). Unfortunately I was unable to find in his 
book any direct citations from the contemporary literature to support his ‘somewhat 
conjectural’ (ibid., p.83) claim regarding the causal connection between election 
and consent – in every case the connection is only between representation and 
consent; the assumption that representation has to be via the mechanism of 
election is based on his general philosophical claim: ‘What makes a system 
representative is not the fact that a few govern in the place of the people, but that 
they are selected by election alone’ (Manin, 1997, p. 41). This (tautological) 
assumption, which is the basis of his argument, fails to consider alternative forms 
of representation (symbolic, descriptive, ascriptive etc.) so he is correct (ibid., p.6) 
to differentiate his historical and institutional approach from the conceptual focus of 
(Liebholz, 1966) and (Pitkin, 1967), but the failure to address such conceptual 
issues opens his thesis to accusations of circularity. Whilst it’s entirely plausible 
that the natural rights theory of consent directly led to the ‘triumph of election’ – 
indeed Manin may be proved to be correct – the veracity of this claim can only be 
established by a careful literature review of the authors who were influential at the 
time. Absent such a review – which is outside the scope of this thesis’s focus on 
conceptual rather than historical issues – it’s worth pointing out that there are 
several other candidates for the historical triumph of election, both circumstantial 
and ideational, that I will deal with briefly below. 
3.1.2  Institutional path-dependency 
Manin’s purported focus is on ‘concrete institutional arrangements’, not ‘abstract, 
timeless ideas’ (Manin, 1997, p. 4), so he opens his discussion of natural rights 
theories with an examination of the medieval institutional context in which they 
developed: 
There are good grounds for thinking that the electoral techniques 
employed by representative governments had their origins in medieval 
elections, both those of ‘Assemblies of Estates’ and those practiced by 
the Church. (Manin, 1997, p. 86) 
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Harrington, Rousseau and Montesquieu agreed that the appointment of 
representatives by election had its origins in feudal institutions. To Harrington this 
was an example of ‘Gothic prudence’ and to Montesquieu the ‘marvellous system 
[of election] was found in the woods [of Germania]’ (Manin, 1997, p. 90). The 
choice of the word ‘prudence’ by both Harrington and Montesquieu would suggest 
that political institutions were being judged in terms of epistemic outcomes, as 
opposed to compliance with normative doctrines such as the natural right theory of 
consent. 
Although this was also the context in which natural rights theories developed, the 
emphasis on election may well have been a consequence of the development of 
existing and familiar institutional practices, as opposed to abstract ideational 
factors. Manin claims that the American revolutionary slogan ‘no taxation without 
representation’ refers to ‘the prevalence of the ancient belief that the convening of 
elected representatives was the only legitimate way to impose taxation’ (ibid., p.86, 
my emphasis). However the slogan would be equally comprehensible in the 
absence of the word ‘elected’; had the English parliament been constituted by 
sortition, then the American colonists would have insisted that they select their 
indigenous representatives in the same way. No doubt if the revolution had 
occurred a hundred or more years earlier the American colonists would have 
demanded their own hereditary aristocracy (or monarch).3 The issue at hand was 
the delineation of the demos, not the chosen mechanism of representation. 
Manin does acknowledge that natural rights theories developed partly in response 
to the primitive ‘ascriptive’ representation involved in the medieval principle of 
Quod Omnes Tangit (QOT) with its assumption of ‘consent’ to the decisions of 
elected representatives (ibid., p.  88). It should, of course be recognized that 
ascriptive ‘consent’ is more akin to having a gun placed against your head than the 
free expression of will that we normally associate with the term (Griffiths & 
Wollheim, 1960), a fact that Manin duly acknowledges, claiming that very often the 
                                            
3 Eric Nelson’s revisionist argument that the American Revolution was against 
parliamentary (elective) rule is of relevance here. (Nelson, 2014) 
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elected representatives of the people were merely asked to give their seal of 
approval to what the authorities had proposed. There were usually no policy 
choices involved and the process was often limited to a mere ‘acclamation’ (Manin, 
1997, p. 88): 
Once the delegates had given their consent to a particular measure or 
tax, the king, pope, or emperor could then turn to the people and say: 
‘You consented to have representatives speak on your behalf; you 
must now obey what they have approved.’ (ibid., pp.87-8). 
But the connection with preference election is entirely contingent, as parliamentary 
representatives were selected by a variety of procedures. A popular assembly 
constituted by random sampling (sortition) would be treated in an identical manner 
to elected representatives when faced with the taxation demands of the executive. 
3.1.3  Geography and technology 
Another circumstantial candidate of particular relevance to the American 
Revolution was the difficulty, in the absence of modern sampling technology, of 
instituting sortition in the widespread and thinly-populated North American states. 
Given the founders’ arguments (or at least those of the dominant Federalist faction) 
in favour of large constituencies, a very large hat would have been required from 
which to draw the tokens for those selected for political office, although Manin 
discusses the possibility of a multiple-step procedure, starting at the local level 
(Manin, 1997, p. 82).4 There is also the issue of confidence in the probity of the 
draw process, traditionally guaranteed by the draw taking place in public 
                                            
4 Manin might also draw support from the evidence in (Goldie, 2001) indicating that rotation 
in officeholding (which was traditionally associated with sortition) was surprisingly 
widespread in early-modern England. Goldie estimates that there must have been 50,000 
office holders (at parish level) at any one time and that, with rotation, during a decade, over 
half the adult male population would have had to have held office. He might also be 
encouraged by Iain Hampsher-Monk’s argument that the transition from the early-modern 
concept of limited freedom as a consequence of office-holding to the modern notion of 
freedom as the exercise of individual judgment freed from institutional constraint was a 
consequence of the Lockean version of radical Protestantism closely linked to natural 
rights theory. (Hampsher-Monk, 2012) 
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ceremonials, again difficult in widely-dispersed rural communities. Manin’s book 
includes a sympathetic consideration of the Anti-Federalist case for ‘descriptive’ 
representation and concludes that (Ball, 1988) [and (Landemore, 2010)] were 
wrong to conflate the Federalist–Anti-Federalist argument with Pitkin’s distinction 
between trustee and delegate styles of representation (Manin, 1997, pp. 108-115), 
with its implicit suggestion that only persons of distinction are capable of 
disinterested judgment. However he fails (as did the Anti-Federalists themselves) 
to consider that sortition would be the best way of establishing a legislative 
assembly that was a ‘portrait in miniature’ of the entire political community. It 
should be noted that geographical extent and size constraints were the main 
impediment to achieving the Anti-Federalist ideal of descriptive representation as, 
in the absence of 20th-century proportional sampling technologies, it would 
necessitate an excessively large legislative assembly. This was the main reason 
the Anti-Federalists failed to pursue the argument for descriptive representation 
more aggressively. 
3.1.4  The influence of Roman republicanism 
An alternative perspective on the ideational context prevalent in the eighteenth 
century has been offered by M.H. Hansen, one of the leading historians of 
Athenian democracy, who argues that there was much more interest at the time in 
the mixed constitution of republican Rome than democratic Athens (Hansen, 2005). 
The choice of noms de plume of contemporary political writers (Publius, Brutus, 
Cato etc) and a cursory study of upstate New York place names (Camillus, Cicero, 
Cincinnatus, Corinth, Fabius, Ilion, Junius, Macedon, Marcellus, Pompey, Rome, 
Romulus, Scipio, Sempronius, Sparta, Syracuse, Troy, Ulysses, and Virgil) 
indicates a numerical balance favouring Rome over Greece, notwithstanding the 
central place of ancient Greek philosophy and literature in the classical educational 
canon. The focus on republican Rome was because of the dissemination of a 
hostile view of Greek democracy by philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, so it was 
unsurprising that the electoral system of republican Rome was preferred over the 
supposed ‘chaos’ of Greek democracy (the very different practices of Athens and 
the other poleis being frequently conflated by the philosophers). The historian 
Polybius ‘took no interest in Athenian democracy and dismissed it in one sentence’ 
(Hansen, 2005, p. 9). Plutarch’s Life of Solon mis-described the fourth century as a 
period in which democracy was in decline, and Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon 
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and Demosthenes went unread (ibid, p.13). A true understanding of Athenian 
democracy was not available until the ‘historical turn’ of the nineteenth century, 
ushered in by Vols. 4-6 of George Grote’s History of Greece (1847-8), but 
anticipated by Bulwer Lytton’s Athens: Its Rise and Fall (1837). After that there was 
a growing interest in Athenian democracy, but the elective republican institutions 
now opportunistically relabeled ‘democratic’ were entirely different from anything 
that would have passed for democracy in the classical period (as Manin 
acknowledges throughout his book). 
3.1.5  Class interests 
The protection of property rights was the primary concern of the founders of 
representative government, hence their use of Lockean slogans like ‘no taxation 
without representation’. It would not have escaped the notice of wannabee 
governing elites that the electoral system of Rome invariably led to rule being 
concentrated in the hands of aristocratic families. The classical sources all viewed 
election as an oligarchic mechanism: 
We know that in Rome, though the people had given itself the right to 
elevate plebeians to office, it could not bring itself to elect them; and 
although in Athens it was possible, by virtue of the law of Aristides, for 
magistrates to be drawn from any class, Xenophon tells us it never 
happened that the common people asked for themselves those 
magistracies that might affect its safety or its glory. (Montesquieu, 
Spirit of the Laws, Book II, ch. 2, cited in (Manin, 1997, p. 73)) 
Manin cites the Putney debate between Rainsborough and Ireton in defence of his 
thesis (ibid., p. 84). This debate, however was not over the principle of election per 
se, it was over the extension of the franchise beyond those with a ‘fixed permanent 
[property] interest in this kingdom’ and as such would have been equally applicable 
to a sortition-based approach where a limited suffrage was in operation.5 Locke’s 
                                            
5 Although Professor Manin took issue with this claim in his response to my paper during 
his 2012 Paris sortition seminar, the record of the debate in the General Council of the 
Army, Putney Church, 29 October 1647 indicates clearly that the dispute was over the 
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arguments on consent as a prerequisite to taxation (which Manin cites on p.85) 
were also specifically aimed at the protection of property rights, rather than a 
defence of the electoral principle per se. If parliamentary representatives had been 
selected by lot from the same narrow band of forty-shilling freeholders there is no 
reason to believe that this would have led to a different representation of the will of 
the propertied class. The focus on election as a way of indicating consent is 
particularly problematic in the English case owing to the inconvenient truth that, 
prior to the Great Reform Act of 1832, elections in eighty-five percent of UK county 
constituencies were uncontested (Ingle, 2000, p. 6) – a statistic explained by the 
prevailing culture of deference, allied with the considerable personal expense 
involved by the candidates (Manin, 1997, p. 96). Modern notions of consent 
presuppose an element of choice, leading us to reject as undemocratic elections 
that only offer a single candidate, as well as rotten and pocket boroughs, where 
voters had little choice other than to consent to the will (in Edmund Burke’s case) 
of the Marquess of Rockingham. 
According to the Marxian perspective on class interests, ideological factors such as 
natural rights theories are nothing but a smoke-screen to disguise material 
interests (Macpherson, 1962). Natural rights (as opposed to property rights) have 
stronger entailments for the extension of the suffrage than they do for the particular 
choice of balloting mechanisms. The decision by representative governments in 
England and France6 to impose markedly higher property qualifications (or indirect 
elections combined with a tax threshold) for electoral candidates than ordinary 
voters (Manin, 1997, ch. 3) would support the suspicion that election was a way to 
                                                                                                                                
 
extension of the franchise (beyond the forty-shilling threshold), rather than the choice of 
balloting method, which was simply assumed to be preference election (Wooton, 1986, pp. 
285-317). Sortition was used by the Athenian oligarchy in 411 and also by the Venetian 
republic (Dowlen, 2008), so a clear distinction needs to be drawn between balloting 
methods and the extent of the suffrage. 
6 Manin attributes American exceptionalism to the property qualification to expediency 
rather than principle: ‘the exceptionally egalitarian character of representation in the United 
States owes more to geography than philosophy’. (Manin, 1997, p. 107) 
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ensure that power remained in the hands of the rich. Election is the best way to 
ensure that, whoever was chosen, the executive of the modern state would remain 
‘a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’ (Marx & 
Engels, 2004, p. 221). Many of the modern-day activists advocating the 
replacement of election by sortition are influenced by neo-Marxist perspectives.7 
3.1.6  Religion 
The connection between election and ‘the elect’ in both Calvinist and Arminian 
thought is also of relevance: it is no coincidence that the triumph of election was 
largely in northern Protestant states, whereas sortition survived longest in Catholic 
Italy. The governance of Presbyterian churches by elected lay leaders (‘elders’ or 
‘presbyters’) must have had an important influence on preferences in the field of 
secular government, especially as American settlers and their descendants would 
have been more familiar with the writings of John Calvin than John Locke. 
Madison’s tutor at Princeton was the evangelical minister John Witherspoon, and 
Madison’s use of the phrase ‘chosen body of citizens’ in the Federalist passage 
celebrating the refining effect of the electoral filter (Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, 2008, 
No. 10, p. 53) was a clear allusion to the Calvinist notion of the ‘chosen Few’ 
(Manin, 1997, p. 117). Although the argument for the religious origin of lot has long 
been discredited, Protestant sensibilities may have had a part to play in its demise, 
as lot-drawing ceremonies would, for those of a Puritan disposition, have smacked 
of Catholic ritualism, or even as a continuation of pagan notions of the religious 
significance of the lot-drawn ‘prerogative century’ in the Roman comitia (Manin, 
1997, p. 48). Protestants prefer to make their decisions based on the inner voice of 
conscience rather than by following the lead of the gods (omen) or other forms of 
divination that might be revealed by lot. This is why the work on lotteries of the 
Puritan divine Thomas Gataker ruled out divination as a blasphemous use of the 
lot (Gataker, 2008 (1627)).8 Although the divinatory role of the lot was also banned 
                                            
7 See, for example, some of the proposals on the leading sortition forum Equality by Lot: 
https://equalitybylot.wordpress.com/ 
8 Although some Protestant sects (e.g. the Moravians) took very seriously the divinatory 
uses of the lot. 
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by Pope Honorius III in 1223 (Manin, 1997, pp. 88-89), popular Catholic 
sensibilities do not always follow papal decretals.  
3.1.7  Meritocracy 
Socrates’ sarcastic quip about sortition being akin to choosing ship-pilots, 
architects or flute-players ‘by bean’ is usually cited by those who argue that 
election is the best way of selecting the most able for political office. Indeed the 
Athenians reserved magistracies that required military experience or particular 
technical and financial skills for election. The contextual evidence that Manin cites 
tends to support this consequentialist explanation, rather than any natural right 
concern for securing the consent of the governed: 
There was no doubt in Harrington’s mind that election, unlike lot, 
selected preexisting elites. When men are left free, he argued, they 
spontaneously recognize their betters. (Manin, 1997, p. 67, discussing 
Harrington, The Prerogative of Popular Governance, p. 477) 
Harrington, it must be emphasized, believed in a ‘natural aristocracy’ of merit, 
rather than seeking to privilege accidents of birth, and elections would enable men 
to select not so much their social betters, but the competent rather than the foolish 
(ibid.). Montesquieu also praised ‘the natural ability of the people to discern merit’ 
via election (Manin, 1997, p. 72). Although ‘merit’ was, to Montesquieu a 
combination of natural aristocracy and privilege defined by birth, wealth and 
prestige, nevertheless, election was preferred for consequentialist reasons (ibid., 
p.73). Election was advocated in order to select the best leaders, rather than to 
indicate the consent of ordinary citizens.  Likewise, Rousseau’s argument for 
election in the context of aristocratic government was as ‘a method by which 
probity, intelligence, experience, and all the other grounds for preference and 
public esteem are so many guarantees that men will be wisely governed.’ 
(Rousseau, 1998, III, Ch. 5) 
Similarly, for James Madison: 
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain 
for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue 
to pursue, the common good of the society. . . . The elective mode of 
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obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government’ 
(Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, 2008, No. 57, p. 282).  
Once again, Madison was not concerned with natural rights, the consent of the 
governed, or the representativity of those selected for office, only the best way to 
select ‘wise and virtuous legislators’. Similarly, to Siéyès ‘politics was a realm of 
competence, not equality’ (Urbinati, 2006, p. 143), and election was the best way 
of selecting competent political officers. Adam Smith had demonstrated that the 
division of labour was the most productive way of organizing the economy and 
Benjamin Constant merely applied the same principles to the body politic in his 
1819 formula: 
The representative system is nothing but an organization by means of 
which a nation charges a few individuals to do what it cannot or does 
not wish to do herself. (Constant, 1988, p. 325) 
Competence in political office, of course, might also be secured by competitive 
examinations, recruitment consultants or rule by a Platonic guardian class. Our 
task, however, is the more limited one of deciding why, at the time of the birth of 
representative democracy, election was chosen over sortition as the appropriate 
mechanism. The evidence cited above would suggest that election was chosen 
over sortition primarily on account of consequentialist considerations (wise and 
competent government) rather than the normative case for natural rights and the 
consent of the governed. Manin also refers to our ‘amazement’ at how such a 
politically-sophisticated people as the ancient Athenians could adopt a policy so 
likely to arrogate power to those ‘with no particular aptitude for governing’ (Manin, 
1997, p. 9). Fustel de Coulanges resorted to a religious explanation as he was also 
puzzled as to why politically-sophisticated Athenians should adopt such a ‘bizarre’ 
and ‘absurd’ system of ruling (Fustel de Coulanges, 1984, III, Ch. 10). For Gustave 
Glotz: ‘Appointing rulers by lot seems so absurd to us today that we find it difficult 
to imagine how an intelligent people managed to conceive of and sustain such a 
system’ (Glotz, 1988, p.26, cited in Manin, 1997, p. 26). Scepticism over outcomes, 
rather than concern about natural rights, would appear to be the knock-down 
argument against ‘this manifestly defective method of selection’, both for modern 
people and the founders of representative government – indeed, ‘its 
disappearance requires no further explanation’. (Manin, 1997, p. 10) 
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This thesis will offer no further contextual evidence to demonstrate that any of the 
factors discussed in this section directly led to the ‘triumph of election’ and as such 
they are just as speculative as Manin’s chosen explanation. My principal concern, 
however, is not with disputes in the history of political thought (which I would be 
happy, if the evidence pointed that way, to concede to Manin),9 it is the 
philosophical question of whether sortition could ever be a mechanism for 
representative government based on the consent of the governed. Although this 
would only require demonstration of its representational potential, (Fishkin, 2009) 
makes the further argument that sortition is a better candidate to indicate consent 
than election, and it is this greater challenge that is the principal focus of the 
present chapter. 
3.2  The conceptual problem 
But how could sortition possibly be perceived as a mechanism of consent? The 
philosophical literature on the legitimacy of political authority and the associated 
problem of democratic consent is extensive. The natural right to freedom and the 
role of ‘tacit’ consent outlined in 1690 by Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil 
Government (Locke, 1967) has been subject to extensive criticism (Bentham, 
2002; Brilmayer, 1989; D. Hume, 1965 [1748]; Raz, 1986; Simmons, 2001; 
Wellman, 2001). The attempts to overcome these objections – including John 
Rawls’s theory of ‘reasonable consensus’ (Rawls, 1996) and David Estlund’s 
notion of ‘normative consent’ (Estlund, 2008) – have in turn been subject to 
criticisms from Thomas Christiano (Christiano, 1996) and Jeremy Waldron 
(Waldron, 1999b). But these philosophical disagreements are well beyond the 
purview of this thesis, in which I address the far more tractable question – 
assuming the coherence of the notion of political consent, is there any reason why 
                                            
9 However if it is the case, as the balance of evidence would suggest, that the triumph of 
election was down to consequentialist concerns, then the two issues are not entirely 
unrelated. Recent work in deliberative democracy (an area in which Manin has long been 
active) would support the view that the epistemic diversity generated by sortition may well 
be an essential component of sound decision procedures (see Chapter 6, below), casting 
serious doubt on the traditional understanding of elite competence. 
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it may not equally well be instantiated by allotted ‘representation by proxy’ as by 
preference election? 
Sortition as a way of indicating consent would have been unproblematic to Hobbes, 
as he would have argued that if you live under a sovereign body constituted by 
sortition then your consent is exactly the same as under any other form of 
sovereignty (consent merely being your understanding of the obligations resulting 
from accepting the protection of the ruler). To Hobbes, consent can be ‘attributed’, 
or ‘presumed’ as, by Nature, every man is supposed to endeavor all he can to 
obtain that which is necessary for his conservation. Although 
‘the Conquerour makes no Law over the Conquered by vertue of his 
power’ but by virtue of their assent’, Hobbes says, however, that even 
‘in receaving . . . protection they have assented, so the mere fact of 
their being alive counts for assent (whenever there exists a a power 
that can destroy them). (Hoekstra, 2004, p. 68) 
Although Hobbes’s ‘there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from 
some act of his own’10 looks, at face value, like the words of a liberal consent 
theorist, the ‘very ubiquity of consent, as the foundation of all obligations, has an 
opposite effect . . . in this sense one has consented when one ought to have 
consented’ (ibid., pp.68-9). 
However, the construction of Lockean-style government-by-consent (where every 
citizen must indicate her own consent)11 in a mass democracy of atomised 
individuals with disparate views and interests is a much more serious challenge – 
and this is just as true in the case of election as it is of sortition. Note that the form 
of consent under consideration is the ongoing consent to the specific outcomes of 
the political decision-making process as opposed to any inferred agreement to a 
hypothetical social contract as a foundational act.	
                                            
10 Leviathan 21.10, p. 111. 
11 Or, at the very least, the reserve power to withhold consent under certain conditions. 
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Hegel adopted the pre-modern perspective that political representation was 
conducted through the ‘corporations’12 of civil society: ‘[deputies] are 
representatives not of individuals or a conglomeration of them, but of one of the 
essential spheres of society and its large-scale interests’ (Hegel, 2010, p. 160). 
Burke held a similar view and argued that parliament existed to facilitate the 
deliberative exchange of reasons between the representatives of these unattached 
corporate interests, the goal being the determination of the national good (Pitkin, 
1967, Ch. 8). All members of corporations are assumed to consent to the decisions 
of their representatives, as they share an identity of interests. However, a 
representative assembly in a greatly expanded franchise becomes (as both these 
authors predicted) a congress of individual particular interests, so the distinction 
between the majority and minority positions becomes a very real one. How is it 
possible to maintain the principle that everyone should give their own consent 
under universal franchise with, in Hobbes’s words, the inevitable conflict between 
the interests of a ‘multitude of particular men’? 
Today, a person is deemed to be politically ‘represented’ no matter 
what, i.e., regardless of his own will and actions or that of his 
representative. A person is considered represented if he votes, but 
also if he does not vote. He is considered represented if the candidate 
he has voted for is elected, but also if another candidate is elected. He 
is represented, whether the candidate he voted or did not vote for 
does or does not do what he wished him to do. And he is considered 
politically represented, whether ‘his’ representative will find majority 
support among all elected representatives or not (Hoppe, 2001, pp. 
283-284). 
Consent by the mechanism of preference elections is at best partial, tacit and 
approximate as it reflects only the consent of the majority. Unfortunately there is no 
direct way for parliamentary representatives accurately to gauge what the actual 
                                            
12 ‘Corporations’ should be understood in the context of medieval estates theory, rather 
than the institutions of modern commerce. 
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views of their constituents are, and the task of bundling preferences together in a 
coherent way would appear to be impossible (Arrow, 1951). This is particularly 
problematic when substantial numbers of citizens choose to boycott the poll (and 
thereby withhold their consent)13 either because they believe the system to be 
corrupt or unjust, or because they realize that their individual votes will make no 
essential difference to the outcome; another problem being inhabitants of foreign 
origin without citizen rights. Particular problems (from a consent perspective) also 
apply to countries with compulsory voting systems.14 So it’s not entirely clear that, 
under modern conditions, election is the inevitable, or even the best, way of 
ensuring that the political system embodies the consent of the people.  
An alternative approach to this form of electoral approximation, and one arguably 
better suited to a mass society, is representation by proxy – I may not attend (and 
consent or dissent) in person but, if the statistical sampling process is accurate, 
there would be people like me present who could participate in a deliberative forum 
and then vote as my proxy, and their presence (and voting power) would be 
directly proportionate to how many people ‘like me’ there are in the wider 
population – i.e. sortition as a form of unmediated proportional representation: 
A representative microcosm offers a picture of what everyone would 
think under good conditions [well-informed deliberation]. In theory if 
everyone deliberated, the conclusions would not be much different. So 
the microcosm offers a proxy for the much more ambitious scenario of 
what would happen if everyone discussed the issues and weighed 
competing arguments under similarly favourable conditions (Fishkin, 
2009, p. 194, my emphasis). 
Sortititon might well be viewed as a return to a virtual corporatist form of 
representation – focusing on ‘types’, rather than ‘persons’ – as a lot-derived 
assembly would include: 
                                            
13 ‘Don’t vote, it only encourages them’, as the old anarchist slogan puts it. 
14 I am grateful to M.H. Hansen (private communication) for these points. 
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On average about 50% women; 12% blacks; 6% Latinos; 25% blue-
collar workers; 10% unemployed persons; two doctors or dentists; one 
school administrator; two accountants; one real estate agent; eight 
teachers; one scientist; four bookkeepers; nine food service workers; 
one childcare worker; three carpenters; four farm laborers; thee auto 
mechanics; one fire fighter; one computer specialist; and a Buddhist. 
(Callenbach & Phillips, 2008, pp. 29-31) 
It’s important to note that the word ‘proxy’ pertains to the aggregate representation 
across the whole sample – there is no suggestion that there is any kind of one-to-
one relationship between a citizen and ‘her’ proxy. But could representation-by-
proxy ever be considered a form of consent? Can I be a party to a contract that I 
did not sign myself? Admittedly this is a difficulty, as the judgment (and interests) of 
all Buddhist food-service workers would not necessarily be identical, although the 
corporatist perspective would anticipate significant commonalities. But the difficulty 
is no greater than that generated by mythical social contracts that are either the 
result, in Hobbes’s case, of logical deduction of how a rational person would 
choose to act or, in Locke’s case, ‘speculative economic history’ (Hampsher-Monk, 
1992, p. 90). The notion that consent is somehow embodied in electoral 
representation is true only under the near-unanimous conditions of the tiny 
property-based franchise of Locke’s time. So consent-by-proxy would have to do 
very little work to improve on the dubious claims of consent by electoral 
approximation.  
The argument for consent by proxy would take the following lines (paraphrasing 
Fishkin, 2009): 
1. Someone ‘like me’ would, ex hypothesi, exercise judgment in the same 
way that I would myself. The argument does not require a definition of 
the likeness criteria (age, gender, occupation, political preferences etc.), 
as the random selection process in principle reflects the incidence of any 
politically-significant quality in the general population (assuming a large 
enough sample).  
2. The number of representatives sharing characteristics and preferences 
‘like me’ in an allotted assembly would be proportionate to the number in 
the general population. If the sample were not sufficiently fine-grained to 
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accurately reflect the distribution of any quality deemed to be salient to 
the exercise of political judgment then the sample numbers would need 
to be increased accordingly. Only a relatively small sample would be 
needed to provide an accurate gender balance, whereas the proportional 
representation of, say, albinos or molecular microbiologists would require 
a larger sample. The rapid growth of the polling industry is a testimonial 
to the accuracy and validity of the probability sampling principle. 
3. Therefore, assuming a) well-balanced information and expert advocacy 
and b) independence, then the aggregate judgment of the allotted 
assembly would represent the considered judgment of the whole 
population. 
All electors are currently deemed to consent to the results of a general election, 
whether or not ‘their’ candidate was victorious; so the same principle should apply 
to the result of a vote in an allotted assembly, the only difference being the 
employment of one or other of the two mechanisms – preference election or 
sortition – that constitute a ballot. Although one might successfully argue that the 
consent involved is at best tacit or hypothetical, the same is true in both instances 
of the ballot. 
The legitimacy of a lot-based approach to consent requires very careful institutional 
design, in order to ensure that an assembly constituted by sortition accurately 
reflects the majority preferences of the population that it represents – to the extent 
that it makes no difference which concrete individuals are comprised in the sample. 
‘Consent’ would be regarded by statisticians as a ‘population parameter’ and would 
be no different from any other attempt to estimate the value of some attribute of a 
population.15 Indeed opinion polls often directly ask respondents to consent to, or 
disagree with, a variety of different propositions, and even to indicate the depth of 
feeling involved – strongly agree/agree/undecided/ disagree/strongly disagree – 
rather than a simple yes/no verdict. If multiple public opinion polls were performed 
by independent polling organizations, using identical questionnaires and sampling 
                                            
15 I am grateful to the statistician Conall Boyle for this point. 
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methodologies (but drawing different samples from the same population), one 
would anticipate closely matching, if not identical results. James Fishkin’s 
Deliberative Polling programme presupposes a similar paradigm (although with 
added small-group deliberation) – considerable effort is made to ensure that as 
many of those selected actually attend (in order to ensure accurate statistical 
representation), the issues to be debated are decided in advance and balanced 
information and advocacy are provided exogenously. The outcome of the 
Deliberative Poll is decided by secret vote, on majoritarian principles. 
Independence is important to statisticians, so every effort should be made to 
ensure that all members vote without influencing each other – if necessary by 
eliminating the face-to-face small-group deliberation that is an integral part of the 
existing DP methodology. This would limit the speech acts of proxy representatives 
to asking questions to the expert advocates. Independence is also an essential 
factor from an epistemic point of view, as evidenced by the preconditions of the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem and the wisdom-of-crowds literature. (Condorcet, 1994; 
Surowiecki, 2004) 
All notions of implied consent are open to Hume’s objection that to claim people 
have given their ‘tacit’ consent to obey the laws simply by remaining in their 
country of birth is tantamount to saying that someone tacitly consents to obey a 
ship’s captain ‘though he was carried on board while asleep and must leap into the 
ocean and perish the moment he leaves her’ (Hume, 1965), along with Ronald 
Dworkin’s objection that a hypothetical contract ‘is no contract at all’ (Dworkin, 
1977, p. 151). This thesis, however, is more concerned with ongoing day-to-day 
consent than mythical social contracts, and the hypothesis underlying the notion of 
consent by proxy has the benefit of being open to experimental refutation. Given 
the default assumption of majority rule, then the condition that it would make no 
difference which empirical individuals are included in the sample can be tested by 
convening multiple concurrent DP-style groups with identical information/advocacy. 
If all groups return the same decision outcome (within a pre-specified margin of 
error) then hypothetical consent has been demonstrated, in that no reasonable and 
democratically-minded person could refuse to consent to a decision taken by a 
proxy group that would have returned the same decision if she had participated in 
person. In theory the experiment could be extended so that every citizen 
participates in a massive concurrent DP, or ‘Deliberation Day’ (Ackerman & Fishkin, 
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2005) and the result would be the same – the reasons for proportional sampling 
being both practical (financial and opportunity costs) and the early breaching of the 
rational ignorance threshold. Those of a Hobbesian or Humean (rather than 
democratic) persuasion might also require that rule by representative proxies 
should continue to deliver a system of laws that enables people to pursue their 
interests peacefully and conveniently. If so, they might well turn straight to Chapter 
6, which considers the epistemic potential of the ‘wisdom of crowds’. 
3.3  Mansbridge revisited: perceived legitimacy 
As this is a thesis in normative political theory, the emphasis has been on the need 
to ‘justify legitimate coercion . . . with good reasons that withstand collective 
scrutiny’ (Mansbridge, 2014, p. 11, my emphasis). However ‘perceived’ or 
‘empirical’ legitimacy – ‘when a group of people believes that something is 
legitimate’ – is equally important (ibid.), and this sub-section is devoted to the 
public reception of the 20-year research programme in Deliberative Polling as an 
indication of the feasibility of extending the procedure beyond a purely advisory 
role. 
A Deliberative Poll on healthcare options undertaken by Fishkin in Rome enabled 
elected officials to argue that the ‘perceived legitimacy’ of the DP results gave them 
the ‘cover to do the right thing’ (Fishkin, 2009, p.151): the implication being that 
electoral success and legitimacy are anything other than synonymous. The crucial 
issue, from a citizen’s perspective, is the perceived legitimacy of political 
institutions, rather than the arcane conceptual arguments that are the province of 
political theorists. A sophisticated knowledge of probability theory is required in 
order to understand how a sample can truly be representative of a target 
population.16 Probability theory was unknown in classical times, casting doubt on 
                                            
16 The advantage of sortition over stratified sampling is that, from the perspective of 
general political judgment, there is no obvious way of knowing in advance which particular 
factors merit representation – socio-economic, gender, ethnicity, religious belief, underlying 
policy orientation, moral principles, psycho-political attitudinal dispositions etc. Although 
some would claim that the protection of minority interests would require stratified sampling, 
this would be better served by ensuring such interests were included in an independent 
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the claim that the lot was used explicitly as a method of random sampling.17 But 
that does not rule out probability sampling as a way of representing public opinion 
in modern times (otherwise the opinion pollsters would all go bankrupt). All that is 
needed is to educate the wider public regarding the potential legitimacy of sortition; 
such an approach would be instrumental in the development of hypothetical 
consent to the decision outcomes of sortition democracy. This would also 
presuppose that allotted assemblies would deliver ‘sensible’ decisions on policy 
proposals – epistemic evaluations of the value of cognitive diversity in the decision-
making process are dealt with in Chapter 6, below. 
Participants in a symposium on Fishkin’s 2009 book When the People Speak 
noted that careful experiments in deliberative polling are the best way of 
establishing the perceived legitimacy of majoritarian decision-making by a 
randomly-selected deliberative microcosm. Jane Mansbridge describes Fishkin’s 
work as the ‘gold standard of attempts to sample what a considered public opinion 
might be on issues of political importance’ (Mansbridge, 2010, p. 55). Focussing on 
the issue of consent, she describes the consent afforded by citizens to electoral 
representation as ‘somewhat tacit’ and based on ‘incomplete information, incorrect 
premises, or manipulated loyalties’ (Mansbridge, 2010, p.57). Her hope is that lot 
will ‘make a significant comeback’ but that would require both ‘a nuanced 
theoretical discussion of its [normative] legitimacy’ as a form of representation and 
‘sufficient citizen experience with the institution to make an informed judgment’ 
(Mansbridge, 2010, p.57). We are only just beginning on this path, Mansbridge 
                                                                                                                                
 
house of advocates rather than in the judgment chamber, where democratic norms should 
predominate, or by extra-democratic constitutional safeguards (See Chapter 7.3.3, below). 
17 Manin, however, argues that ‘thinking about the political use of lot may have led the 
Greeks to an intuition not unlike the notion of mathematically equal chances. It was true, in 
any case, that lot had the effect of distributing something equal in terms of number (to ison 
kat’arihtmon), even if its precise nature eluded rigorous theorization’ (Manin, 1997, p.39). 
Richard Tuck notes that the ‘estimation of probabilities’ predates Leibniz and Huygens’s 
mathematical studies – appearing, for example, in the writings of Grotius and the members 
of the Tew Circle, thereby casting doubt on Ian Hacking’s account of the context in which 
the concept of probability emerged (Tuck, 1979, pp. 104-105).  
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concludes, and Fishkin’s book is a milestone along the way, although ‘it will take a 
while for the public and for the deliberative system as a whole to give Deliberative 
Polls the credibility and the respect that they deserve’ (ibid., p.60).  
The jurist Sanford Levinson, another participant in the symposium, also focused on 
how a random sample might be seen as a legitimate form of representation: 
The legitimacy arises from both the equal probability that any given 
person (discounting for minimal baseline qualifications) might have 
been chosen and the perception by those not chosen that the system 
of lottery selection assures the relative ‘representativeness’ of the 
sample chosen. To adopt the language of Bill Clinton, the deliberative 
assembly will look sufficiently ‘like America’ to provide necessary 
reassurance that one’s own views are not absent from the assembly. 
(Levinson, 2010, p. 66) 
Although Levinson acknowledges that the necessary grasp of probability theory 
(‘representativeness’) will require a great deal of sophistication on the part of 
ordinary citizens, the biggest obstacle is the vested interests of elected legislators. 
Fishkin’s 2007 DP in Zeguo, China, did not suffer from this as the results were 
eagerly implemented by the local Communist Party leaders and People’s 
Congress, thus suggesting that liberal democracy may actually impede the 
institutionalisation of the deliberative process. The success of the Zeguo DP has 
given rise to further projects in China which provide a judicious mix of élite and 
deliberative democracy, providing the ‘first glimmerings of another model’ which 
‘may set an example for public consultation in many settings around the world’ 
(Fishkin, 2009, pp.155, 156). The response from the political class in liberal 
democracies has been less enthusiastic: turkeys are unlikely to vote for Christmas 
because, in the words of the political scientist John P. Roche, paraphrasing Acton: 
‘power corrupts, and the possibility of losing power corrupts absolutely’ (cited in 
Levinson, 2010). As a consequence Fishkin appears to be cautiously promoting 
the DP as an informed focus group. 
This chapter, however, has argued that deliberation by an allotted microcosm is a 
more legitimate way of indicating democratic consent than its electoral equivalent. 
As Fishkin puts it, ‘consulting the public’s considered judgments is a bit like seeking 
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its collective informed consent’ (2009, p.195, my emphasis). One might counter 
that perceived legitimacy is not the same thing as consent, but the legitimating 
narrative of electoral democracy fares no better on this score: few governments 
are mandated by the votes of the majority of the electorate.  If a hypothetical 
contract (social or otherwise) is ‘not worth the paper that it’s not written on’, then 
perhaps we need a new discourse for the age of universal suffrage. 
3.4  Conclusion 
Some of the commentators on an earlier draft of this chapter pleaded with me to 
give up on the liberal notion of consent in favour of the republican notion of 
‘democratic legitimacy’ (often presupposing the ominous requirement that citizens 
be ‘forced to be free’), or to concentrate instead on the anti-elitist or 
epistemic/consequentialist case for selecting legislators by lot. However I agree 
with Manin that the consent of the governed is a core element of democratic 
legitimacy, but would simply argue that Fishkin’s case for consent-by-proxy turns 
out to be a better candidate than preference election. This is because the consent 
justification of electoral democracy is at best partial, tacit, implicit and approximate 
as it reflects only the consent of the majority (or their elected representatives) to an 
arbitrary bundle of policy preferences. Given the ‘crisis of legitimacy’ affecting 
modern electoral democracies – a dubious trope in Manin’s eyes (Manin, et al., 
2008) – the triumph of election may well turn out to be something of a Pyrrhic 
victory. 
One of the reasons behind Manin’s claim for the sheer impossibility of sortition as a 
way of implementing consent may well be that the classical use of sortition was the 
random selection of persons as magistrates (archai), and jurors (dikastai).18 To the 
Athenians this would have indicated diachronic consent via the principle of ‘rule 
and be ruled in turn’ (rotation) – as such, sortition was an aspect of direct 
democracy. Such a principle, however, is of no relevance in large modern states, 
                                            
18 Juries are the best approximation to the modern notion of sortition as a means to 
represent the considered judgment of the whole community. It’s no coincidence that this is 
the only residual modern usage of sortition. 
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where diachronic ‘consent’ can only be instituted by the effective rotation of parties 
– if ‘your’ party doesn’t win, chances are it could next time, when the previous 
winners are ejected at the polls. Consent-by-proxy is a synchronic mechanism, as 
each and every legislative proposal would be subject to the real-time deliberative 
scrutiny of a randomly-selected microcosm of the entire citizen body. Such a 
proposal is an example of indirect democracy via descriptive representation and as 
such has little, or nothing, in common with its classical namesake.  
Sortive representation-by-proxy involves a return to a pre-modern concept of 
representation, and shares a number of features in common with Edmund Burke’s 
vision of members of parliament representing their subordinate ‘corporations’ and 
their associate interests ‘virtually’.19 In Burke’s and (Hegel’s) time these 
‘corporations’ (a relic of the medieval estates), included the mercantile, agricultural 
and professional interests (Pitkin, 1967, p. 174). Modern advocates of descriptive 
representation assume a similar view of unattached interests but, whereas 
proponents of stratified sampling seek to privilege the representation of gender and 
racial interests (Phillips, 1995), Kleroterians20 are happy to leave it all down to the 
luck of the draw. Descriptive representation by proxy is ‘virtual’ in the Burkean 
sense of there being no formal relationship between proxy representatives and 
their ‘constituents’: 
Neither election nor actual transmission of consent were necessary 
elements of representation. As long as the natural coincidence of 
                                            
19 Nadia Urbinati argues that a parallel could be drawn between Burkean virtual 
representation and Sieyes’ distinction between passive and active electors: ‘Nonelectors 
participated indirectly in the political life of their country through the voice of the electors 
who, in exercising their active rights, also guarded the passive rights of all’ (Urbinati, 2008, 
p. 151). But she acknowledges that Sieyes’ focus on the election of competent political 
officials meant that ‘representativity had no place in his theory of electoral consent’ – it is 
‘an authorizing system of appointing experts’, ‘associated directly with rationality in contrast 
to prejudice and partial interests’ (ibid., pp. 147, 159). As such it is hard to see a parallel 
between Sieyes’ vision of the national assembly as a virtual representation of the people 
(or, more accurately, the citizen body) and the virtual representativity of a randomly-
selected microcosm of the political community – which would provide a mirror image of the 
latter (warts and all).  
20 This term for advocates of sortition is derived from Equality by Lot, ‘the blog of the 
Kleroterians.’ http://www.equalitybylot@wordpress.com 
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interests was in place, the representatives could deliberate for the 
people, in Burke’s words, as part of an ‘assembly of one nation, with 
one interest, that of the whole.’ (Castiglione, 2017, p. 14 (English m/s)) 
As with Burke, decision-making would result from the deliberative exchange of 
reasons in the forum of the nation, but would also depend on the eliciting of ‘similar 
feelings, dispositions and prejudices’ (Hampsher-Monk, 2011, p. 4) in the proxies 
and the target groupings that they represent.  
Where Kleroterians would part company with Burke is over their claim that the 
aggregate judgment of a random sample of ordinary citizens would be, at minimum, 
no worse than that of an elected elite. They might well agree with Harrington’s view 
that elites are simply better at articulating interests and would therefore allocate an 
advocacy rather than judgment role to political elites. Kleroterians also disagree 
over the value of proportionality, with Habermasian deliberative democrats taking 
the Burkean line that there is no obvious connection between counting votes and 
rational judgment. Advocates of sortition argue instead that, once the deliberative 
exchange has finished, evaluation of the best arguments will inevitably (and quite 
properly) be made against the background of feelings, dispositions, prejudices and 
interests and that the outcome should be decided on majoritarian principles. Such 
an approach combines, in Hampsher-Monk’s terminology, the Burkean notion of 
the dispositional affect binding the representative to her constituents with the 
mimetic precision of a descriptive sample, so we can have Burke’s cake and eat it. 
Virtual representation occurs: 
[when] there is a communion of interests, and a sympathy in feelings 
and desires, between those who act in the name of any description of 
people, and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees 
are not actually chosen by them . . . Such a representation I think to 
be, in many cases, even better than the actual. It possesses most of 
its advantages, and is free from many of its inconveniences; it corrects 
the irregularities in the literal representation, when the shifting current 
of human affairs, or the acting of public interests in different ways, 
carry it obliquely from its first line of direction. The people may err in 
their choice [of representatives], but common interest and common 
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sentiment are rarely mistaken. (Edmund Burke, ‘A Letter to Hercules 
Langrishe MP’, cited in (Hampsher-Monk, 2011), my emphasis) 
This chapter has sought to establish the principle that sortition could (and should) 
play an important and democratically legitimate role in representative government 
through the mechanism of representation by proxy. The next chapter examines the 
scope and limitations of the ‘descriptive’ representation principle involved and the 
entailments for the division of political labour. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.		The	Diarchy	Reborn:	
The	Representative	Republic	
After two chapters that touched on historical issues, it is time to refocus on the 
conceptual diarchy at the heart of this thesis: 
The process for making binding decisions includes at least two 
analytically distinguishable stages: [1] setting the agenda and [2] 
deciding the outcome. (Dahl, 1989, p. 107) 
For the decision process to be ‘democratic’ it is necessary that the sovereignty of 
‘the people’ (or at least all citizen members of the political association) should be 
the validating principle (ibid., p. 106). In the original polis, the principal of ho 
boulomenos meant that any Athenian citizen who so desired could (in principle) 
contribute directly to the first stage – setting the political agenda (isegoria). In 
addition to this every citizen could (and should) attend in person at the general 
assembly, where the decision outcome was determined by the (equal) reckoning of 
votes (isonomia). It was also possible for citizens to ‘rule and be ruled in turn’ by 
offering themselves for selection as magistrates, jurors and/or for the Council of 
500 (rotation). The consequence of these three principles – isegoria, isonomia and 
rotation – was an effective system of popular sovereignty based on the 
presumption of equality between citizens. No doubt actual practice failed to live up 
to these lofty ideals, but the same could be said of any political undertaking. 
The notion of equality was at the heart of Athenian democracy1 – Athens in the 
Age of Pericles was unashamedly meritocratic and anyone who wished to advise 
the people merely had to approach the platform when hearing the crier’s call ‘who 
wishes to speak?’ (Hansen, 1991, p. 142). Nobody was ruled out on account of 
                                            
1 See Chapter 2.1, above, for a discussion of ancient and modern perspectives on equality 
of opportunity. 
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poverty, or humble birth. Most citizens would have served on the Council at least 
once in their lifetime and stood a reasonable chance of being epistates ton 
prytaneon (Council leader) by rotation (ibid., p. 250). In fact ‘every fourth adult male 
Athenian citizen could say, “I have been for twenty-four hours President of Athens”’ 
(ibid., p. 314). 
Although fully respecting the three principles, the fourth-century reforms outlined in 
Chapter 2 introduced a proto-representative system. The direct-democratic 
principle of ho boulomenos was restricted to the preliminary stage of the legislative 
process – once the challenge was accepted to consider a change in the law, the 
assembly instituted a representative system of isegoria by electing the five officials 
to speak for the people in defence of the existing laws, selected in a manner that 
would satisfy Manin’s principle of distinction. The reforms also marked a departure 
from direct-democratic isonomia by entrusting the final legislative judgment to a 
sortition-based sample of mature citizens who had taken the Heliastic Oath.2  
However the fourth-century reforms were introduced primarily for administrative 
convenience; the Greeks did not believe in the possibility of a democratic polis that 
was larger than one in which all citizens could, in principle, participate directly and 
they had no explicit notion of political representation – the Persian empire was 
inevitably a despotism, purely on account of its size (Dahl, 1989, p. 16). In classical 
political thought the distinction between different systems of ruling was primarily 
numerical (counting the number of archai), the assumption being that a tyrant 
would rule in his own interests, oligarchs in the interests of the rich and democrats 
in the interests of the poor.  
In any event democracy failed to survive the collapse of polis civilization and Dahl 
goes on to examine the ‘second major transformation’ with the ‘gradual shift of the 
idea of democracy away from its historical locus in the city-state to the vaster 
                                            
2 Given that the final legislative decisions were still taken by a jury of ordinary citizens (as 
opposed to elected representatives), some might describe this as an example of direct 
democracy, or an intermediate genus: ‘lottery democracy’ (Goodwin, 2012). From the point 
of view of this thesis, however, such a system is an example of indirect democracy, merely 
substituting a different method of balloting (lot rather than preference election) 
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domain of the nation, country, or national state’ (Dahl, 1989, p. 213). Although the 
second transformation ended up with the same name as its classical forebear, the 
new system was in fact a hybrid of Athenian democracy, Roman republicanism, 
medieval notions of representation and universal claims of freedom, equality and 
rights. The Athenians, however would not have been impressed by the formal 
egalitarianism of the modern nation state as the equal portion of political rights 
(isonomia) possessed by each citizen is so tiny as to have no causal efficacy.  
Substantive political equality is effectively limited to members of the political class 
as the casting of a single vote in an election in a large modern state does nothing 
to empower individual citizens.3 
It might be argued that the inequality in large modern states could be redressed by 
the reintroduction of sortition, as every citizen has an equal probability of securing 
effective political power via the lottery. Whereas a single vote in a large modern 
state has no effective causal value, if an individual is selected by sortition to serve 
in a modern sovereign assembly comprising only several hundred citizens then 
that would represent an equal opportunity to acquire serious political power. 
However, whereas most members of the Athenian polis could expect to exercise 
genuine sovereign power via the sortition process (the citizen body was only 30-
40,000 strong and every year over 7,000 magistracies and jury places were 
distributed by lot), the probability of an individual citizen being elected by lot in a 
large modern state is infinitessimally small. It is hard to take sortition seriously as 
an egalitarian principle when the selection of the vast majority of citizens can be 
ruled out a priori on account of the mathematics of scale.  
Of course this is the reason why large modern states have to rely on the principle 
of representation in order to achieve substantive political equality and the same 
principle would apply to the adoption of sortition.4 But what exactly do we mean by 
                                            
3 See pp. 154-5, below, for a discussion of the diminishing returns resulting from universal 
franchise. 
4 Note that, with the exception of Chapter 6 (‘Epistemic democracy and the wisdom of 
crowds’), the concern of this thesis is substantive political equality, rather than whether or 
not the adoption of sortition would improve democratic outcomes from an epistemic point 
of view. 
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political representation, and what form of representation would be required for a 
sortition-based system? In ordinary language, the noun ‘representation’ has 
(broadly speaking) two distinct meanings – one ‘active’, and the other ‘descriptive’: 
1. The action of speaking or acting on behalf of someone or the state of 
being so represented: ‘You may qualify for free legal representation’. 
2. The description or portrayal of someone or something in a particular way: 
‘The representation of women in newspapers’.5 
Electoral democracy is based on the first meaning, as voters choose the person(s) 
or political parties who they judge best suited to act on their behalf. The last few 
decades, however, have witnessed a growing disaffection with electoral 
representation in Western democracies, illustrated by a dramatic fall in the 
membership of political parties. For example, membership of the UK Conservative 
Party has dropped from 2.8 million in 1953 to around 100,000 (2013).6 Political 
parties are no longer mass-membership organisations and might better be 
described as political ‘franchises’ – less than 1% of UK citizens in 2014 belonged 
to one of the three principal longstanding political parties (Labour, Conservative 
and Liberal Democrats). And the problem goes far beyond party membership as 
‘the 2001 election in the UK was marked by the lowest level of turnout since the 
advent of mass democracy’. (Mair, 2013, p. 26)  
Although the above party membership figures are drawn from the UK, Peter Mair 
provides comparable figures for European democracies and concludes that ‘What 
we see now, however, is a much clearer indication of cross-national convergence 
in the trends that matter. In other words, not only are these various trends now 
pointing in the same direction, they are also doing so almost everywhere’ (Mair, 
2013, p. 21). The decline in party members seems a characteristic of all long-
                                            
5 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/representation 
6 The 2016 surge in membership for the UK Labour Party may be anomalous on account 
of the apparent disconnect between Labour activists and voters (at the time). In the same 
year that party membership soared, the Labour candidate in the Richmond Park by-
election lost his deposit. At the time of writing (July 2017) it was to soon to judge the extent 
to which the rise in support for Labour at the June election was a product of contingent 
factors or represented a genuine change in voter preferences. 
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established democracies (Van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012). Mair and Van 
Biezen’s comparative study of thirteen long-established European democracies in 
the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated a halving of the ratio of party members to the 
electorate at large during this period; across all twenty, the average membership 
ratio (5%) was little more than a third of the level recorded in the early 1960s (Mair 
& Van Biezen, 2001). Mair’s research indicates a pan-European ‘picture of 
membership loss of quite staggering proportions . . . on average, across 
established democracies, membership levels in absolute numbers have nearly 
halved since 1980’. (Mair, 2013, pp. 40, 42) 
One of the reasons for the fall in party membership and electoral participation is 
that it’s not clear how mainstream political parties can adequately represent the 
sheer diversity of modern multicultural societies. Elected politicians often appear 
very different from their constituents in terms of ethnicity, education, occupation, 
wealth, gender etc. – and this has, rightly or wrongly, led to the perception of a tiny 
self-serving political elite, only concerned with pursuing its own ‘sinister’ interest 
(Bentham, 1990, 1999; cf. Elster, 2013). There are also epistemic concerns – if 
politicians are drawn from a narrow homogeneous group that fails to represent the 
electorate ‘descriptively’ then they will lack the necessary cognitive and life-
experience diversity to properly address all the issues that come up in everyday 
politics.  
Geographically-defined single-member constituencies render it impossible for the 
two forms of representation, active and descriptive, to be combined – whilst a 
single agent might well be elected to actively champion the majority interests of her 
constituents there is no way that a single person can ‘describe’ a large number of 
persons. The argument of this thesis is that both types of representation (active 
and descriptive) are necessary for democracy to function well and that the two 
varieties map reasonably well to the Greek isegoria/isonomia distinction. ‘Active’ 
representatives are those who seek to lead and advise the people by making a 
representative claim (Saward, 2010), whereas the final legislative judgment should, 
as in fourth-century democracy, be in the hands of a ‘descriptively’ representative 
sample of the demos. The case for this hybrid solution – politicians proposing and 
(a representative sample of) the people disposing – requires first of all a thorough 
investigation of the very concept of representation. 
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4.1  ‘Acting for’ and ‘standing for’: two forms of representation 
In a 1960 Aristotelian Society symposium ‘How can one person represent another’ 
A. Phillips Griffiths and Richard Wollheim described how there are in fact four 
distinct concepts of representation – ‘descriptive’, ‘symbolic’, ‘ascriptive’ and the 
active ‘representation of interests’ (Griffiths & Wollheim, 1960).  Griffiths defined 
these concepts as follows: 
Descriptive Representation: 
I am a descriptive representative of my generation – a sample, 
specimen, or analogue – when I am sufficiently like my fellows for 
someone to be reasonably safe in drawing conclusions about the 
other members of my generation from what they know about me. I 
cannot of course be made such a representative; I can only properly 
be thought to be one if I am in fact already like my contemporaries. 
For one thing to descriptively represent [‘stand for’] another it is both 
necessary and sufficient that it is similar in some respects to what it is 
supposed to represent. (Griffiths & Wollheim, 1960, p.188, my 
emphasis) 
Symbolic Representation: 
We might say that the monarch represents the majesty of the state 
even though we know that in himself he is not at all majestic but a 
rather silly little man. I shall call this sense – in which an individual is 
for some reason or for none chosen as a focus of attitudes thought 
appropriate to something other than himself – symbolic 
representation. (ibid., p.189) 
Ascriptive Representation: 
A man’s legal representative may be quite unlike him. He represents 
him in virtue of the fact that what he does or decides commits his 
client . . . as his accredited representative [he] commits him to 
something whatever the facts may be about what [his principal] is 
willing or is not willing to agree to (ibid., p.189, my emphasis). [In 
Hanna Pitkin’s words ‘the “essential function” of ascriptive 
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representation is that the consequences of A’s action should fall on B’. 
(Pitkin, 1967, p.50)] 
Representation of Interests: 
A member of Parliament, while not being like [say] a trade unionist, 
nor appointed by any trade union, may on some ground or other 
always concern himself with [‘act for’] the interests of trades unions as 
against any other interests. The sense in which he would be a 
representative, not only or necessarily of some class or persons, but 
of some interests, I shall call representation of interests. (ibid., pp.189-
90)7 
Griffiths rules out symbolic representation as of any relevance to democratic 
legislatures, although he acknowledges that the Labour Party might, for rhetorical 
reasons, have chosen [in 1960] to appeal to the icon of Kier Hardy as a symbol of 
the ‘fine old traditions of the British working class movement etc.’ (ibid., p.189), and 
that right-wing parties might, for similar reasons, choose to appeal to the Union 
Jack as a symbolic representation of British sovereignty (ibid., p.191). The 
tendency for voters in some countries to vote for wives/sons/cognates of deceased 
representatives is arguably an instance of symbolic representation. Although Indira 
Gandhi was not a blood relative of Mahatma Gandhi, the name (acquired by 
marriage to Feroze Gandhi) certainly helped her gain and retain power (and pass 
on the mantle to her son Rajiv and then, in turn, to his Italian-born widow Sonia). 
Electoral nepotism in elections to the Irish Dáil is commonplace – ‘The election of a 
close relative of a sitting or former TD may require a popular mandate, but it is 
almost as automatic in practice as the succession of a royal heir’ (Martin, 2009). 
                                            
7 ‘Interests’ in this sense refer both to raw preferences and reflective judgment as to how 
such interests (including class-based and economic factors) are best served. According to 
a further distinction in (Pitkin, 1967, Ch. 7), the former are served by delegate- and the 
latter by trustee-style representation, but Pitkin’s further distinction is not central to this 
thesis. The relevant point is that ‘interests’ pertain to particular individuals and social 
groups (L: interesse – to be in between; to differ) and thus correspond (in aggregate) to 
Rousseau’s ‘will of all’, whereas the hypothetical ‘general will’ (the common good) does not 
admit of such differentiation. 
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Griffiths argues that democratic representation involves a combination of 
ascriptive representation and the active representation of interests. The former 
is true as a matter of historical fact, at least in the case of the UK parliament, which 
had its origins in the requirement by medieval kings for the towns and counties of 
the realm to send knights and burgesses to meet with the king’s council. 
Attendance was a ‘chore and a duty, reluctantly performed’ (Pitkin, 1967, p.3). 
However ‘[t]he authorities who thus called for the election of representatives 
usually insisted that they be invested with full powers (plenipotentiarii) – that is to 
say, that the electors should consider themselves bound by the decisions of the 
elected, whatever those decisions may be’ (Manin, 1997, p.87, my emphasis). 
Thus electoral representation started out for the convenience of the executive (see 
Chapter 3.1.2, above). 
But, as always, there was a quid pro quo: as the power of parliament grew 
(resulting from the need of the executive to have its taxation requirements granted) 
MPs increasingly came to assert their own side of the bargain – if they were going 
to (ascriptively) bind their constituents with their assent to the crown’s fiscal agenda 
then the crown would, in turn, have to respect the interests of its constituents. The 
growth of political parties resulting from the expansion of the franchise during the 
nineteenth century enabled constituents to enforce this bargain – if voters’ 
ascriptive representatives failed to protect their interests then they would be 
removed during the subsequent general election.8 This leads Griffiths to conclude 
that there is ‘some kind of conceptual connexion between ascriptive representation 
and the representation of interests’ (Griffiths & Wollheim, 1960, p. 190), as they are 
the two sides of a Faustian pact. 
                                            
8 Notwithstanding this sanction, Griffiths is adamant that ascriptive representation does not 
embody the ‘consent’ of the principals – constituents in the case of political representatives 
(Griffiths & Wollheim, 1960, p. 202). The best gloss that he can put on this ‘consent’ is that 
‘the normative consequence falling on the principal in the case of Parliamentary 
representation is that so far as he is represented he loses the right to complain when his 
own political judgment is ignored; a right he would have if he were not represented’ (ibid., 
p.204). This is in direct contrast to Bernard Manin’s Lockean argument that the ‘triumph of 
election’ (over sortition) was on account of the natural right theory of consent (Manin, 1997, 
Ch. 2). For a detailed rejoinder to Manin’s claim, along with an outline of Fishkin’s 
competing notion of ‘consent by proxy’ see Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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Moving now to the case of descriptive representation, Griffiths opens his article by 
citing John Stuart Mill’s plea for the presence of the working classes in parliament: 
On the question of strikes, for instance, it is doubtful if there is so 
much as one among the leading members of the House who is not 
firmly convinced that the reason of the matter is unqualifiedly on the 
side of the masters, and that the men’s view of it is simply absurd. 
Those who have studied the question know well how far this is from 
being the case; and in how different, and how infinitely less superficial 
a manner the point would have to be argued, if the classes who strike 
were able to make themselves heard in Parliament’ (Mill, 1991, pp. 
246-247). 
However, Griffiths, in his gloss on Mill’s observation, observes that there is no 
necessary connection between descriptive and other forms of representation: 
Mill is not concerned to assert any necessary connexion: his 
arguments are designed to show a connexion which as a matter of 
fact exists between descriptive representation and the representation 
of interests, which gives a ground for choosing a certain kind of 
ascriptive representatives (Griffiths & Wollheim, 1960, p. 190). 
Indeed, while working-class MPs might well reflect the interests of the indigenous 
working classes,9 such a ‘matter of fact’ correlation between descriptive 
representation and the representation of interests will not be true in every case: ‘we 
should not allow lunatics to be represented by lunatics’. It would seem therefore 
that ‘the connexion between descriptive and ascriptive representation where it 
exists is mediated by the demand that ascriptive representation should be the 
representation of interests’ (ibid.). This is because ‘the representation of interests 
                                            
9 An alternative reading of this passage would be that Mill’s concern was less with the 
interests of the working man and more with the general epistemic benefits (the ‘reason of 
the matter’) that would be derived from a working-class presence in parliament, although 
there is a clear overlap between the two perspectives (representation of interests 
presupposes the knowledge of what those interests are). I am grateful to Hélène 
Landemore for this point. 
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implies action on the part of the representative’ (ibid, p.191, my emphasis): while 
lunatics are most accurately ‘described’ by other lunatics this doesn’t mean that 
they will be the best advocates for their interests. 
Hanna Pitkin adopts a similar perspective in her book The Concept of 
Representation (Pitkin, 1967), concluding that there are a variety of aspects to 
representation – aesthetic, symbolic, formalistic, descriptive and active – the last 
two being the most relevant to political representation.  
Pitkin opens her book with an examination of Hobbes’s purely formalistic system of 
representation, presented in Chapter 16 (‘Of Persons, Authors and Things 
Personated’) of Leviathan. According to Hobbes, a representative is an ‘artificial 
person’: 
he that acteth another, is said to bear his person, or act in his name; 
… and is called in divers occasions, diversely; as a representer, or 
representative, a lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a 
procurator, an actor, and the like. (Hobbes, 1996, p.112) 
Unfortunately Hobbes’s scheme of representation places all the rights at the 
representative’s disposal and all the burdens on the represented, who is deemed 
to have authorized the act of representation (even if he played no part whatsoever 
in contracting with his peers in the creation of the commonwealth or choosing the 
representative). But what can it mean to have an unaccountable representative? 
Pitkin has little time for such a formalized conception of representation, arguing that 
‘we feel that something has gone wrong, that representation has somehow 
disappeared while our backs were turned’ (Pitkin, 1967, p. 37). She is similarly 
dismissive of other purely formal perspectives on representation, including 
Organschaft theorists, Max Weber and Eric Voegelin (ibid., Chapter 3), drawing a 
sharp contrast between formal ‘authorization’ theories and substantive 
‘accountability’ theories, her interest being purely in the latter. 
Pitkin, like Griffiths, concludes that political representation is primarily to do with the 
active representation of interests (‘acting for others’, ibid., p.141), but 
nevertheless devotes a chapter of her book to descriptive representation. The 
latter involves ‘standing for’ and requires a degree of identity between the 
representative and her constituency, as evidenced by contemporary demands for 
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all-women shortlists and positive discrimination for ethnic minorities (Mansbridge, 
1999; Phillips, 1995). For someone to descriptively represent a target population, 
she would have to be ‘like’ them according to the pertinent criteria (age, gender, 
socio-economic class, ethnicity, etc.) Random selection of a statistically-
representative sample is the most accurate way of achieving descriptive 
representation – in fact the only way, given the combinatorial complexity of 
stratified sampling by even a modest number of criteria10 -- hence the use of 
random sampling by the Stanford Center for Deliberative Democracy for its 
Deliberative Polling (DP) programme (Fishkin, 2009). An implicit assumption of the 
DP programme is that political preferences, attitudes, interests and ideologies are 
distributed in a similar fashion to objective demographic factors and that, given a 
large enough sample, the allotted microcosm will mirror the population in terms of 
all these qualities (the more fine-grained the factors deemed pertinent, the larger 
the sample base required). 
The descriptively-sampled ‘representative’,11 however, ‘does not represent by 
doing anything at all; so it makes no sense to talk about his role or his duties and 
whether he has performed them’ (Pitkin, 1967, p. 113, my emphasis). On the other 
hand, active (substantive) representation, Pitkin’s primary category for political 
representation, requires the representative to pursue the interests of her 
constituents, in a similar manner to a trustee or legal advocate.12 There is no need 
                                            
10 Advocates of ‘stratified’ sampling would impose quotas according to certain arbitrarily-
privileged criteria, generally to protect the interests of gender and ethnic groups who would 
otherwise be under-represented (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995). However such an 
approach could never generate the rich diversity enabled by sortition (see the passage 
from Callenbach and Phillips, below). 
11 The word ‘representative’ (singular) is really a misnomer, as the representation only 
exists at the collective (aggregate) level. ‘Descriptive representative’ is a rare example of a 
noun that exists in plural form only. 
12 The use here of the word ‘trustee’ is not a reference to Pitkin’s additional ‘trustee–
delegate’ distinction regarding the degree to which representatives are mandate-
independent. A trustee or legal advocate may well privilege her own judgment over that of 
her principal, nevertheless is legally or contractually obliged to represent the interests of 
her principal rather than the interests of the whole (the latter being Burke’s idealization of 
the role of the political representative). For liberal theorists like Pitkin the interests of the 
whole are constructed out of the aggregation of the votes of individual political 
representatives. Burke’s ideal-typical politician would more accurately be described as a 
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for ‘active’ representatives to in any way mirror their constituents’ identities, thereby 
justifying the continuing use of electoral representation in single-member 
constituencies. According to Pitkin, descriptive representation doesn’t cover what 
the representatives do, while active representation is indifferent to who does it. 
Although, as Griffiths observed, the two forms may well be contingently related, 
there is no inherent conceptual relationship. 
A similar distinction, drawing on (Skinner, 2005), is made by the republican theorist 
Philip Pettit: 
There are two fundamentally contrasting varieties of representation, 
indicative and responsive. Indicative [descriptive] representers stand 
for the representees in the sense of typifying or epitomizing them . . .  
Responsive representers act for or speak for the representees, 
playing the part of an agent in relation to a principal; how they act is 
responsive to how the representees would want them to act. (Pettit, 
2010a, p. 65)13 
                                                                                                                                
 
statesman (in Plato’s sense of a disinterested promoter of the public good) rather than 
representative. Synonyms that Pitkin lists for active representative include actor, agent, 
ambassador, attorney, commissioner, delegate, deputy, emissary, envoy, factor, guardian, 
lieutenant, proctor, procurator, proxy, steward, substitute, trustee, tutor and vicar (Pitkin, 
1967, p. 119, my emphasis). Writers may differ over the degree to which a political 
representative is a ‘mere delegate’ or a ‘free agent’ (ibid., p 120), nevertheless there is no 
disputing the obligation of the representative to act for her principal – the only dispute being 
over the degree to which she should follow her principal’s instructions or use her own 
judgment as to how her principal’s ‘true’ interests are best pursued. Pitkin acknowledges 
that the notion of ‘acting for others’ involves the conflation of three distinct ideas: ‘the idea 
of substitution or acting instead of, the idea of taking care of or acting in the interest of, and 
the idea of acting as a subordinate, on instructions, in accord with the wishes of another’ 
(ibid, p. 139). These distinctions, however, are orthogonal to the main thrust of this thesis. 
13 Unfortunately Pettit is vague on how indicative (descriptive) representation might be 
achieved in practice. Although he does from time to time mention sortition, the extra-
electoral contestatory institutions he typically advocates ‘function much more like the 
countermajoritarian ones typifying liberal constitutionalism – namely, upper legislative 
chambers and supreme courts’ (McCormick, 2011, p. 155). To Pettit, and other neo-
republicans, the principal problem with democracy is the tyranny of the majority, whereas 
to advocates of descriptive representation by sortition the problem is the tyranny of the 
ruling elite (ibid., p.158). 
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Pettit’s distinction maps particularly well to the isonomia/isegoria distinction at the 
heart of this thesis. Isonomia as a democratic norm presupposes that all citizens 
should have a mathematically equal share in legislative decision-making; but given 
that practical considerations of scale rule out this possibility in modern states then 
a large statistically-representative sample that ‘stands for’ the whole citizen body is 
the next best alternative. Few citizens, however, will seek to play an active role in 
politics, and considerations of scale and distance require that those who do seek to 
advise the sovereign body should make a representative claim. The representative 
claims of those whose isegoria is most responsive to the needs and/or wishes of 
the representees will be successful (see Chapter 7, below).  
Note that the currency of politics (both ancient and modern) is speech acts 
(advocacy); this thesis presupposes a categorical distinction between democratic 
politics and public administration (as opposed to the fused ‘Westminster’ system of 
parliamentary democracy) – appointment of persons to the latter function 
(‘magistrates’ in ancient parlance and government executives in modern) being 
subject to other principles. Although the Athenians appointed both administrative 
magistrates and jurors by lot, these were entirely different functions, the equal 
freedom of the former being secured by the principle of rotation (all citizens being 
able, in principle, to rule and be ruled in turn).14 Rotation is clearly impossible in 
large modern states, and alternative mechanisms for the selection of government 
executives are discussed in Chapter 8.3.5. The fact that the Athenians chose to 
elect certain key (financial and military) magistracies is likewise orthogonal to 
elective isegoria (the choice by the assembly of the five spokesmen to defend the 
existing law). 
                                            
14 The sheer size of Athenian juries – 501 to 5,001 – would suggest that some sort of 
proto-representative principle was involved (that would have been unnecessary for purely 
administrative roles). Unfortunately the sources are silent on exactly why sortition was 
adopted in antiquity. 
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4.2  Advocacy and judgment: The Madisonian moment 
The Athenians were absolutely clear regarding the entirely different roles of policy 
advocates and the sovereign demos – as Pericles put it ‘I advised it, but you voted 
for it’ (Thuc., 2, VII). The same principle was true in the age of Demosthenes, the 
only difference being that the final legislative judgment was delegated to a 
representative sample (the allotted jury in the legislative court), rather than all 
citizens voting in the assembly. Not so in modern representative assemblies, 
where the two roles are hopelessly conflated: 
[a] body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same 
time . . . Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and 
the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction 
must be expected to prevail (Federalist, 10, ¶8).15 
In this important passage ‘Publius’ (James Madison) outlines two entirely distinct 
aspects of political representation – ‘judges’ (decision-makers) and ‘parties’ 
(advocates for interests) – that, when combined in a single ‘body of men’, run the 
danger of corrupting each other: for legislative decision-makers are also ‘advocates 
and parties to the causes which they determine’ (ibid.)  Madison’s view on political 
judgment appears to be that of a classical republican who believed in the possibility 
of disinterested virtue in human affairs (Banning, 1988, pp. 194-195); but from the 
point of view of parties (interests) he is a proto-liberal, ‘concerned with men who 
are pursuing their own interests, sometimes rationally calculated, in a system that 
is more amoral than immoral’ (Howe, 1988, p. 108). Proto-liberal, that is, until one 
considers the passions that underlie those interests, at which point Madison’s 
pessimism regarding the need to impose controls on the evil inclinations of 
mankind is closer to Hobbes or Calvin. 
                                            
15 An earlier version of this section was published as ‘The Two Sides of the Representative 
Coin’, Studies in Social Justice, 5 (2), pp. 197-211. In view of the numerous editions of the 
Federalist Papers, all references are to volume and paragraph rather than to a specific 
edition. 
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But how can one writer be all these three creatures – republican, liberal and 
Hobbist – at one and the same time? Madison, like many of his eighteenth-century 
peers, was steeped in ‘faculty’ psychology,16 which posited an ascending hierarchy 
of human nature: from the ‘mechanical’ through the ‘animal’ to the ‘rational’ (ibid., p. 
109). According to this school of thought, the passions were part of man’s animal 
nature but ‘interest’ inhabited a precarious half-way house – ‘passionate’ when 
parties are motivated by short-term self-interest, ‘prudential’ when motivated by 
long-term and general considerations.  At the top of the pinnacle stood reason and 
conscience: collective, dispassionate, wise and virtuous. Unfortunately, as 
Alexander Pope realized, for most mortals ‘the ruling passion conquers reason still’, 
leading Madison to the Calvinist conclusion that the ‘stern virtue [reason] is the 
growth of few soils’ (Federalist, 73, ¶1). This is one reason why he advocated the 
enlarged republic, as it would provide a deeper pool from which to elect ‘a chosen 
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, 
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to 
temporary or partial considerations’ (Federalist, 10,¶16), thereby ensuring that 
judgment was exercised by ‘the elect’ – representatives of ‘enlightened views and 
virtuous sentiments’ (Federalist, 10,¶21). 
Madison deplored the formation of parties or ‘factions’17 because they seduced 
interests away from long-term and general considerations (Federalist, 50,¶6); 
furthermore he acknowledged that parties were likely to predominate, owing to the 
strength of the passions, and would thus tend to corrupt the constitution. Hence the 
second role of the extended republic, over and above that of ensuring the 
judgment of a virtuous elite: ‘extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of 
parties and interests’ (Federalist, 10,¶20). In an extended republic, with large 
                                            
16 Madison’s tutor at Princeton was the Scottish Presbyterian cleric and moral philosopher 
John Witherspoon. Faculty psychology was in some respects a secularized version of the 
Calvinist doctrine of original sin – Madison’s famous ‘If men were angels, no government 
would be necessary’ (Federalist, 51, ¶4) was lifted straight from John Calvin’s Sermon on 
Galatians 3:19-20, ‘The Many Functions of God’s Law’ (1558). 
17 The reason Madison and the other founding fathers disliked democracy and always 
connected it with factional evils is that they learned about it from Plato, Aristotle and 
Plutarch, who were all critical of democracy (M.H. Hansen, personal communication). 
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constituencies, the multiplicity of interests balances out as ‘ambition counteracts 
ambition’ (Federalist, 51,¶4). Divede et impera: divide interests and reason will 
(given sufficient time), conquer all. 
While Madison/Publius was advocating the positive benefits of the enlarged 
republic, his Antifederalist opponents argued that the preservation of republican 
virtù required small political units and a primarily agrarian economy. Antifederalists 
preferred the simple and heroic Spartan virtues to the corrupting influence of 
commerce and trade in unnecessary luxury goods: ‘Frugality, industry, temperance 
and simplicity – the rustic traits of the sturdy yeoman – were the stuff that made 
society strong’ (Wood, 1969, p. 52). They rejected the aristocratic hierarchy of 
merit assumed by faculty psychology, arguing instead the democratic case that the 
legislature should represent all ‘classes’ (occupations) ‘descriptively’: ‘the farmer, 
merchant, mecanick and other various orders of people, ought to be represented 
according to their respective weight and numbers’ (Dry, 1985, p. 125).  
Unfortunately events such as Shays’s rebellion18 meant that the delegates at the 
US Constitutional Convention were more than a little nervous about Antifederalist 
plans for the legislature accurately to reflect the weight and numbers of the demos, 
so Publius won the ratification battle. However he lost the war. All the calamities 
that Madison predicted through combining ‘judges’ and ‘advocates’ in a ‘single 
body of men’ quickly came to pass. Partisan interests and the corrupting influence 
of money, media and celebrity quickly put paid to his hope that an enlarged 
republic would produce enlightened and virtuous representatives. The 
unanticipated seizure of power by political parties during Madison’s own lifetime 
meant that his hopes that the enlarged republic would balance out interests by 
allowing ‘ambition to counteract ambition’ (Federalist, 51, ¶4) were dashed by the 
forces of factionalism. ‘Advocates’ and ‘judges’ became well and truly fused in an 
electoral system dominated by factional political parties. Madison’s ‘republican 
                                            
18 An armed uprising in central and western Massachusetts (mainly Springfield) from 1786 
to 1787. 
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remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government’ (Federalist, 10, 
¶23) turned out be more akin to a dose of quack medicine.19 
4.2.1  A binary solution to the representative conundrum 
It would appear then that the combination of judgment and advocacy in one 
legislative body inevitably leads to factionalism and corruption: 
One of the reasons why [the legislature] is so prone to the evils of 
factionalism, Publius argues, is that legislators are constantly being 
cast in the dual role of advocates and judges in the causes before 
them (Federalist, 10, ¶8). Their self-interest corrupts what should 
ideally be a disinterested pursuit of the common good (Howe, 1988, 
p.124). 
But if Madison is right – judgment and the advocacy of interests are impossible to 
combine in one ‘body of [fallen] men’ – then why not have two bodies (‘judges’ and 
‘advocates’) created by two entirely different systems of representation – as in 
fourth-century Athenian practice?20  
According to Hanna Pitkin (1967), the primary duty of a representative is as an 
active advocate for the substantive interests of her constituents. Active 
representation does not require that an elected representative should resemble her 
constituents in any respect, only that she should act as a 
trustee/delegate/advocate for their interests, in a similar manner to a lawyer 
representing the beneficiaries of a trust fund. Competitive elections are the time-
honoured way voters choose advocates to act on their behalf. Legal advocates 
                                            
19 Although British patent medicines lost their dominance in the US after the American 
Revolution, they were soon replaced by sales of home produced ‘snake oil’ elixirs. 
20 The use throughout this chapter of the words ‘advocate’ and ‘judge’ should not be 
confused with their judicial meaning (my distinction corresponds better to ‘advocate’ and 
‘jury’); meanwhile ‘parties’, ‘interests’ and ‘advocates’ are treated here as synonymous. 
This confusion of modern terminology is the reason that I prefer the original Greek 
alternative of isonomia and isegoria. Also, although Howe (1988) associates advocacy with 
self-interest, one can also be an advocate for a cause on the basis of ideological conviction 
– the motivating claim of many political activists. 
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would be out of a job if they failed to act solely in their clients’ interests; likewise 
with elected representatives. In politics, however, we expect our advocates also to 
be judge and jury (and, in the case of fused parliamentary systems like the UK, 
executioner as well). But how can a member of the tiny elite of ‘natural aristocrats’ 
returned by the electoral process overcome her own self-interest and that of the 
faction she represents, so as to judge impartially on behalf of the whole nation? 
Nadia Urbinati acknowledges the conceptual distinction between advocacy and 
judgment (‘deliberation’ in the sense of weighing alternatives) along with Madison’s 
dilemma that ‘the actors who advocate their cause in the assembly are the same 
ones who pass judgment’ (Urbinati, 2006, p.47). However her solution to the 
possibility of corruption when the two functions are mixed is purely normative: 
‘impartiality is at most a prescriptive maxim and a moral duty’, and relies on 
Aristotelian and Ciceronian notions of the norms of deliberative rhetoric: 
‘Advocates must “feel” the force of others’ arguments in order to envision the path 
toward the best possible outcome’ (Urbinati, 2006, p.47). This normative 
exhortation – reminiscent of the advice given by Star Wars’ Obi-Wan Kenobe to 
the young Luke Skywalker to ‘feel the force’ – glosses over three obvious problems. 
First, classical rhetoricians assumed moral virtue as a prerequisite in debate, 
whereas their modern equivalents presuppose knavery (Remer, 1995); second, 
the term ‘advocate’ is drawn from jurisprudence, where the ‘judging’ is performed 
by a supposedly dispassionate jury; and third, the modern UK and other similar 
parliaments are characterized by an almost total absence of deliberation (the 
outcome of the ‘debate’ being predetermined by the parliamentary arithmetic), 
whereas in US-style constitutions, pork trading has more influence on judgment 
than deliberative rhetoric.21 
 According to Madison’s Antifederalist opponents there was no such thing as 
‘dispassionate’ judgment; the best we can do is to ensure that all interests are 
represented ‘descriptively’. The legislative assembly should be ‘an exact portrait, in 
miniature’ of the whole citizenry (Adams, 1951, p.205), one that mirrors the 
                                            
21 Cf. (Pettit, 2010b, p. 65), drawing on (Skinner, 2005). 
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composition of the nation: the ‘farmer, merchant and mecanick’ (Dry, 1985, p.125) 
rather than predominately white male lawyers. The ideal democracy is direct, but 
where this is rendered impossible for reasons of scale, the legislature should be a 
representative cross-section of the larger citizen body – isonomia by statistically-
representative sample. 
4.2.2  Ancient remedies for a modern disease 
The legal process is indifferent about who the advocates are (they are judged 
purely on their competence and rhetorical ability) but reserves the final judgment 
for a randomly-selected lay group (the jury) whose verdict, according to the UK 
Home Office guide for jurors, represents the considered judgment of the whole 
community. But if this works for the law courts, then why not the High Court of 
Parliament? Most readers will share Antifederalist scepticism about the 
dispassionate, rational judgment of a natural aristocracy of wisdom and virtue, 
magically transcending partisan interests.22 Modern sensibilities are better 
represented by James Surowiecki (2004) and Philip Tetlock’s (2005) arguments 
that the aggregate ‘wisdom of crowds’ is a more reliable and democratic way of 
judging most issues than reliance on experts and aristocrats, natural or otherwise 
(c.f. Estlund, 2008; Landemore, 2012; Page, 2007). If there is such a thing as the 
‘general will’, then the best way to capture it is via the mechanical principle of 
Condorcet’s ‘jury theorem’ regarding the probability of a group of individuals 
arriving at a ‘correct’ decision, rather than by privileging the ‘god’s eye’ view of an 
aristocratic elite (Urbinati, 2006, Ch.6; Grofman and Feld, 1988). Modern parallels 
include Philip Converse’s ‘miracle of aggregation’ (Converse, 1990), Robert 
Erikson and colleagues’ portrayal of the properties of the Macro Polity: ‘the 
collective intelligence that emerges when the voices of the public are pooled into 
an aggregated unit’ (Erikson, Mackuen, & Stimson, 2002, p. 447), and Benjamin 
Page and Robert Shapiro’s notion of emergent ‘collective [political] wisdom’ (Page 
                                            
22 The early-modern republican theorist James Harrington believed that élites were simply 
better at dressing up their own interests in discursive language. By ‘wisdom’ Harrington did 
not mean a ‘Platonic capacity to know metaphysical truths’, simply an ability of the élite to 
calculate its own interests (Remer, 1995, p.552): ‘Reason is nothing but interest, there be 
divers interests, and so divers reasons’ (Harrington, 1992, p. 171). 
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and Shapiro, 1992, p. 15) This ‘collective wisdom’ approach to deliberative 
judgment (and its origins in Greek political thought) is explored in full in Chapter 6. 
The only democratically-legitimate way of harnessing the wisdom of crowds in a 
large nation state is via descriptive representation and, as the polling industry has 
demonstrated, the only way of ensuring accurate descriptive representation is 
through probability sampling using a randomly-selected microcosm (Levy, 2008) a 
process known, when applied to political representation, as stochation.23 Although 
the mechanism has its origins in fourth-century Athens – they even invented a 
lottery machine, the kleroterion – it has not fallen entirely out of use: in addition to 
the Anglo-American jury, the Deliberative Polling (DP) experiments of James 
Fishkin (2009) and his colleagues have shown that a large, randomly-selected 
group of ordinary citizens confirms Condorcet’s jury theorem: it can judge an issue 
just as rationally as any elite body.   
On the other hand election is the best – or perhaps the only – way of ensuring 
active representation. As Bernard Manin (1997) has argued, elections produce 
elites: ‘It is no accident that the terms “election” and “elite” have the same 
etymology and that in a number of languages the same adjective denotes a person 
of distinction and a person who has been chosen.’ (Manin, 1997, p.140) This is 
because elections are designed to select the best candidates (hoi aristoi). Manin’s 
observation on the aristocratic nature of the electoral process applies universally – 
including under universal suffrage with the opportunity for everyone to stand as a 
candidate – so the term ‘electoral democracy’ is verging on the oxymoronic 
(‘electoral aristocracy’ would be a more accurate term).  
The crucial question is how to combine these two distinct aspects of 
representation: ‘judgment’ and ‘advocacy’ – isonomia and isegoria – without 
incurring the factional evils that Madison deplored. A radical answer would be a 
                                            
23 A neologism, coined by André Sauzeau, for the establishment of a descriptively-
representative microcosm of a target population by statistical sampling. The term derives 
from the Greek στόχος (stokhos) – to ‘aim’, conjecture, or approximate. Such a body would 
have a random probability distribution that may be analysed statistically and whose 
predictive accuracy depends, primarily, on sample size.   
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binary division of roles within the legislature, as James Harrington proposed in his 
Commonwealth of Oceana (1656). Harrington’s proposal was based on the 
Venetian ballot, which involved a combination of election and sortition. Harrington’s 
proposal assumed the complete separation of executive24 and legislative powers 
and advocated a further separation within the legislature – responsibility for policy 
proposals (isegoria) being allocated to the ‘aristocratic’ (elected) element in the 
legislature and voting rights (isonomia) restricted to the ‘democratic’ (randomly-
selected)25 element: 
An equal commonwealth is a government founded upon balance . . . a 
senate debating and proposing, a representative of the people 
resolving, and a magistracy executing (Harrington, 1992, p.25). 
According to J.G.A. Pocock, the editor of the Cambridge edition of Oceana, 
there is to be a ‘natural aristocracy’, constituted by the people 
themselves in the act of recognizing [via elections] and deferring to 
those of superior talent; it will possess its own ‘virtue,’ the capacity to 
reflect, and will exercise its own function, that of proposing alternatives 
[isegoria] between which the many’s ‘virtue,’ the capacity to decide, 
entitles them to choose [isonomia]. The difference between 
aristocracy and democracy is moral, numerical and functional but has 
no necessary connection with the existence of estates, orders or 
classes (Pocock, 1988, pp. 63, my emphasis). 
                                            
24 Although this thesis does not address how the executive should be constituted, 
Harrington’s analysis would suggest that it is not a political office. If competence is the 
foremost requirement then there is no reason in principle for the appointment of 
government ministers to be any different from the recruitment process for any other senior 
executive role. The general argument of this chapter – that the distinction between the 
three aspects of political power (advocacy, judgment and execution) should be maintained 
by a unique selection mechanism for each role – would rule out using one process 
(election) for the selection of advocates and executives.  
25 In fact Harrington’s Senate was created by election alone and entailed a property 
franchise, whereas the democratic house – the Popular Tribe – was constituted by a 
complex mix of sortition and election. Given that the property franchise is no longer 
acceptable, my modern re-working of Harrington’s proposal relies instead on election for 
the ‘aristocratic’ and sortition for the ‘democratic’ chambers. 
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Harrington illustrates the natural justice of his binary legislature with the example of 
two girls dividing a cake equally: 
Two of them have a cake yet undivided, which was given between 
them: that each of them therefore might have that which is due, 
‘Divide’, says one to the other, ‘and I will choose; or let me divide, and 
you shall choose.’ If this be but once agreed upon, it is enough; for the 
divident, dividing unequally, loses, in regard that the other takes the 
better half. Wherefore she divides equally, and so both have right 
(Harrington, 1992, p.22). 
In the modern reworking of Harrington’s proposal (see below, Chapter 8) both 
elements – hoi aristoi and hoi polloi – sit within the same house: the elective 
element proposes and debates legislative alternatives (isegoria) and the sortive 
element decides the outcome by voting (isonomia), in a similar manner to a (very 
large) trial jury. The right of elected politicians (hoi aristoi) to introduce legislative 
proposals is restricted to the manifesto commitments of the political party or parties 
that won the most votes in the general election.26 Given that the winners of the 
election are not forming a government but only putting forward policy proposals, a 
nationwide system of proportional representation would most accurately mirror the 
raw preferences of the electorate. Allotted members have the monopoly of the vote 
but cannot propose legislative alternatives, as descriptive-democratic legitimacy 
applies only in aggregate, rather than to individual members (see Chapter 5, 
below). In this respect elected members correspond to Harrington’s ‘divident’, 
whereas the allotted members correspond to the second girl, who chooses which 
slice of cake to eat (Harrington, 1992, p.22). 
A constitution respecting this binary distinction has been proposed by Marcus 
Schmidt, who runs the largest Danish opinion poll organisation (Hansen, 2005, pp. 
54-5).  Schmidt’s proposal is for a 70,000-strong Electronic Second Chamber, 
                                            
26 In addition, government ministers would be entitled to introduce bills of a ‘housekeeping’ 
nature as ‘secondary’ legislation is normally viewed as an executive function. There could 
also be a role for successful direct-democratic initiatives, i.e. online petitions that exceeded 
the 100,000 signature threshold. This option is examined in more detail in Chapter 7.3.4. 
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selected annually by lot. As Denmark has only four million electors, this means that 
most citizens would serve for one year during their life, thereby emulating the 
rotation effect of Athenian-style sortition – ‘rule and be ruled in turn’ (Aristotle, 2008, 
VI .1.1317b). The first chamber of parliament, elected on a party-political basis, 
continues to prepare all bills. Working members of the second chamber have a 
paid day off every week to study and debate the proposals and then vote by 
pincode-activated telephone (every vote is rewarded by a tax credit). In Schmidt’s 
bicameral constitution, if the votes in the elected and allotted chambers fail to reach 
unanimity, then the proposal is put to a general referendum. However, the 
functional distinction within Harrington’s legislature between ‘debating/proposing’ 
(isegoria) and ‘resolving’ (isonomia) (Harrington, 1992, p.25) – ‘parties’ and ‘judges’ 
in Madison’s terminology – does not require a bicameral solution. Indeed the trial 
jury analogy suggests that both elements would need to meet in plenary, as it is 
hard to understand how a jury could adequately judge a case without first hearing 
the evidence (both for and against the legislative proposal). 
However, the victorious party or parties in the election (hoi aristoi) would still need 
to convince the allotted legislature through the force of their arguments, as voting 
rights would be restricted to the members of the randomly-selected minidemos (hoi 
polloi). It would no longer be possible for a victorious party to steamroller through a 
policy that was buried in an election manifesto that few had bothered to read or 
that was deliberately concealed before the election. But given it is the same 
electorate that is being balloted in two complementary ways (preference election 
and sortition) one would anticipate that the winning party/parties in the election 
would also have a reasonable probability of winning the parliamentary vote. 
However – and this is the crucial point – the victorious political parties would need 
to ensure that their policies won both the mass (unconsidered) vote and the 
considered verdict of the same population, sampled descriptively – populism 
checked by deliberative rationality. The time interval between the original elections 
and the debate in the allotted chamber would also greatly improve the quality of 
legislation by allowing space for extended deliberation in the media and the 
general public, an essential part of Condorcet’s constitutional proposal (Urbinati, 
2006, Ch.6).  
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4.3  Conclusion 
The two norms of equal freedom that we have derived from Athenian political 
practice – equal speech rights (isegoria) and equal right to determine the outcome 
of the legislative debate (isonomia) can only be implemented in large modern 
states by representative mechanisms. A study of the modern literature on 
representation suggests that the first norm maps well onto the principle of the 
active representation of interests. Successful makers of representative claims have 
the right for their proposals to be considered for legislative judgment. Given the 
impossibility of all citizens in large modern states participating directly in the act of 
judgment, isonomia can best be ensured by a randomly-selected microcosm, 
thereby fulfilling the other principal desideratum of political representation – 
judgment by a group that ‘stands for’ the whole citizen body ‘descriptively’. 
Modern political practice conflates both forms of representation – active and 
descriptive – so that parties come to be judges in their own cause, a danger 
identified by James Madison in Federalist 10. A bicameral constitution along the 
lines of James Harrington’s Commonwealth of Oceana would inoculate the body 
politic against Madisonian corruption, and honour in full the distinction between 
‘descriptive’ and ‘active’ representation, isonomia and isegoria. Several other 
sortive proposals have featured in the recent literature (Burnheim, 1989; Lieb, 
2004; O’Leary, 2006; Callenbach and Phillips, 2008; van Reybouck, 2016; Hennig, 
2017) but they are potentially open to corruption on account of their failure to 
acknowledge and implement the isonomia/isegoria distinction. The Federalists won 
the ratification debate at the Constitutional Convention; a compromise solution 
would have included the Anti-Federalist proposal for descriptive representation. 
The next two chapters (5 and 6) are devoted to a detailed discussion of the 
entailments of the need for isonomia in large modern states to be representative. 
Although the topic of Chapter 7 (representative isegoria) should, logically, come 
first, it focuses more on the empirical political science literature and, as such, 
provides a smoother segue into the final chapter in which I make some tentative 
proposals as to how the distinctions made in this thesis might be realized in 
constitutional design.
125 
CHAPTER FIVE 
5.		Isonomia:	the	Deliberative	Microcosm	
Almost all the work in democratic theory being done these days is of 
the deliberative/discursive kind, or responses to it (Minch, 2009, p. 1). 
The previous chapter made the case for the verdict of a descriptively-
representative microcosm as a proxy for ‘what everybody would think under good 
conditions’ (Fishkin, 2009, p.194). The model for this is the Deliberative Polling 
methodology of the Stanford Center for Deliberative Democracy. But what are the 
‘good conditions’ that would be required in a large-scale modern democracy to 
ensure representative isonomia? Since the so-called ‘deliberative turn’ starting in 
the 1980s, the democracy agenda has been driven by theorists in ‘discursive’ and 
‘deliberative’ democracy – the quotation at the start of this chapter is from a study 
of the contribution of Michael Oakeshott to the field of democratic theory. However 
Oakeshott is best known as an advocate of ‘government by conversation’, a 
practice that (arguably) ended in the UK with the introduction of mass democracy 
in the wake of the 1867 Reform Act. The 1867 Act enfranchised much of the male 
urban working class and transferred political power from the forum of the nation to 
the electoral hustings, where the discourse style is more of a shouting match than 
a deliberative conversation.1 As the outcome of parliamentary and congressional 
votes is now largely pre-determined by party arithmetic, most elected politicians 
don’t even bother to attend the debates, thereby destroying the notion of the 
parliamentary/congressional assembly as the deliberative chamber of the nation – 
in the UK parliament, the only serious plenary deliberation takes place in the 
unelected House of Lords (Weatherill, 2000, p. 173). Current democratic practice 
                                            
1 Even before the reform acts it was doubtful whether a meaningful conversation could 
take place in an assembly as large as the House of Commons, leading Walter Bagehot to 
locate the efficient source of power in the much smaller cabinet  (Bagehot, 1963) – the size 
of which corresponds closely to the maximum size feasible for a deliberative group (Coote 
& Lenaghan, 1997). 
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would appear to be a very long way removed from normative political theory. 
Indeed, judging from the disconnect between the literature in 
descriptive/comparative/quantitative political science and normative political theory, 
academics in each area appear to inhabit different intellectual worlds, even though 
they are members of the same university departments.2 
Bernard Manin views the 1867 Reform Act as a key factor in the transition from 
‘parliamentary’ to ‘party’ democracy (Manin, 1997) – any substantive deliberation 
that takes place in a party democracy takes place in camera, far removed from the 
public arena, either in secret cabinet committee or, more recently, amongst a tiny 
cabal of advisers in the party leader’s snug. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Parliamentary democracy (c. 1865) Party democracy (c. 2009) 
If it is the case that, historically speaking, the introduction of democracy (or, more 
precisely, universal suffrage) has led to the demise of 
(parliamentary/congressional) deliberation, then surely the very concept of 
‘deliberative democracy’ is oxymoronic – a shotgun marriage rather than a union of 
souls. Most deliberative democrats, following the lead of the early work of Jurgen 
Habermas (1973, 1992), are interested in civil-society rather than parliamentary (or 
congressional) deliberation and focus primarily on the norms governing the internal 
                                            
2 The upgrade committee for my PhD advised me to read and reference either one or the 
other literature, leading me to jettison a couple of chapters of an earlier draft of this thesis. 
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procedures of deliberative forums, but the concern of this chapter is somewhat 
different – how to reconcile deliberation with political representation. My topic here 
is demokratia (a form of government) as opposed to democracy as a set of 
procedural norms that could be applied to any deliberative body. This chapter 
argues that there are two competing models of deliberation, one derived from 
isegoria (equal speech) and one from isonomia (equal political right). Only the 
latter form is appropriate to a sortition-based demokratia, the former being more 
closely related to election (discussed in Chapter 7, below). 
According to political theorist Yves Sintomer, the word ‘deliberation’ has two 
conflicting meanings. In the Latinate literature (and its Anglophone derivatives), 
deliberation means ‘the decision of a collective body’, whereas  
In German, conversely, deliberation excludes decision and a 
‘deliberative Stimme’ (a deliberative voice) is only consultative. These 
semantic differences partly explain the difficult diffusion of the concept 
of ‘deliberative democracy’ in West European languages other than 
English. (Sintomer, 2010a, p. 36).  
5.1  Two Concepts of Deliberation 
5.1.1  ‘Germanic’ isegoria-based theories3 
Deliberative theorists have evolved two distinct approaches to bringing together the 
two partners in the shotgun marriage of democracy and deliberation – but this 
involves a stark choice of whether to side with the bride (democracy) or the groom 
(deliberation). Opting for the pews on the groom’s side, Habermasians, Rawlsians, 
communitarians and critical theorists focus on the procedural rules of the 
communicative exchange – the search for the ‘ideal speech situation’ or equal 
speech rights (isegoria) (Habermas, 1973). The pews on the bride’s side of the 
church are occupied by those whose primary concern is accurate descriptive 
                                            
3 Note that the terms ‘Germanic’ and ‘Latinate’ refer only to the derivation of the concepts, 
not the nationality of the theorists involved (most of the ‘Germanic’ authors are American). 
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representation (discussed in 5.1.2), the obvious example being practitioners of 
James Fishkin’s Deliberative Polling methodology. Habermasians are primarily 
concerned with the isegoria of all the participants in the deliberation, whereas 
Fishkinians are more concerned with preserving the proxy-based isonomia of the 
vast majority of citizens who fail to draw the lottery ticket. 
This binary distinction should not be confused with Rainer Forst’s ‘Three Models of 
Deliberative Democracy’ (Forst, 2001). Forst’s overwhelming interest is the norms 
that guide deliberation, which leads him to distinguish three types of deliberative 
democrats: liberals (Ackerman, Larmore, Nagel, Rawls); communitarians 
(MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor, Walzer) and those advocating ‘the rule of reasons’ 
(Cohen, Dryzek, Fraser, Habermas, Young). Forst’s concern is not so much with 
what actions deliberators should or should not perform but what values they should 
pursue (justice, the common good, or the ‘best reasons’) – as such the three 
models are a subset of what I will (synoptically) refer to as ‘Germanic’ deliberative 
democracy as it derives from the German ‘deliberative Stimme’ (deliberative voice) 
– hence the emphasis on discourse rights (isegoria) and consultation in the 
literature on deliberative democracy from this tradition (Sintomer, 2010a, p. 36). 
For the ‘stern proponents of deliberative democracy . . . overcoming disagreement 
is a regulative ideal’ (Rosenblum, 2008, p. 3). Advocates of all three of Forst’s 
variants of the ‘Germanic’ deliberative model are, to a greater or lesser extent, 
contemptuous of the aggregation of individual preferences (informed or otherwise) 
that is the goal of Fishkin’s Deliberative Poll and would be impatient with the 
limitations imposed on the deliberative mandate required to ensure statistical 
representativity (the principal topic of this chapter). As Forst’s concerns are with the 
internal workings of the deliberative body the word ‘representation’ only occurs 
once in his article (p. 370) and is only referenced as a problem (without proposing 
a solution): ‘the question of the institutional conditions [of representational 
fidelity] . . . is too complex even to begin to take up here’ (ibid., p.350). Given that 
the concern of this thesis is modern-day demokratia (i.e. the institutional conditions 
of political representation), there is no need to enter into the argument between 
these three competing norms of (Germanic) deliberative democracy as they all fail 
the representativity test, for reasons provided below.  
‘Germanic’ theorists are not particularly concerned as to whether or not those 
invited to the wedding feast generate an accurate microcosm of society at large. 
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For example Jon Elster’s perspective on deliberative democracy as ‘decision 
making by discussion among free and equal citizens’ is predicated on an 
(acknowledged) ‘minimal’ definition of democracy as ‘any kind of effective and 
formalized control by citizens over leaders or policies’ (Elster, 1998, p.1; p.98). 
Note that Elster does appear to be referring to demokratia (‘citizens’, ‘leaders’, 
‘policies’) rather than deliberative democracy as a general set of procedural norms, 
but appears unconcerned as to which citizens get to deliberate and whether or not 
they accurately (and proportionately) represent the views and interests of their 
peers: 
The rationalist promise of deliberation makes the question of who 
participates secondary, if not irrelevant . . . what matters is that 
decisions fulfill the rationalist promise of an ideal speech situation, not 
who specifically gets to engage in the actual conversation and who, on 
the other hand, must remain in a position of spectatorship. (Green, 
2010, p.58, my emphasis) 
Deliberative democrats are actually seeking to return to the Burkean ideal of the 
deliberative pursuit of the ‘laws of God and nature’ (Pitkin, 1967, p. 169). At least 
Burke accepted the notion of diverse interests (albeit of an ‘unattached’ nature, not 
requiring a direct relationship between voters and parliamentary representatives); 
Elster, however, is content with the homogeneous notion of ‘citizen’. If there is an 
implicit notion of interests it is the Machiavellian/Marxist distinction between the 
interests of the popolo and the grandi – elected parliaments being nothing but 
committees for managing the affairs of the latter. 
The model underlying the Germanic model of deliberation appears to be isegoria – 
the equal right of any Athenian citizen who wished to avail himself of the Assembly 
cryer’s open invitation to ‘who wishes to speak’, but there is no modern equivalent 
of the Athenian assembly where all citizens can attend and make a judgment on 
each speech act, so such an approach to democracy is distinctly anachronistic. 
This lack of concern with concrete persons is also because the Habermasian 
deliberative ideal is for an ‘“anonymous” or even “subject-less” deliberative civil 
society’ (Scheuerman, 2006, p. 87). Unfortunately this leads to  
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a problematic conceptual bifurcation between deliberation and 
democracy. Deliberation without the meaningful (deliberative) 
involvement of concrete subjects is, in reality, no longer democratic. 
(Scheuerman, 2006, pp. 87, emphasis in original) 
Similarly, Joshua Cohen’s view of deliberative democracy as ‘free public reasoning 
among equals’ (J. Cohen, 1998, p. 186) focuses on the internal workings of the 
deliberative forum and ignores issues of representativity. Despite acknowledging 
that for political power to be legitimate it must ‘arise from the collective decisions of 
the equal members of a society who are governed by that power’ (Cohen, 1998, 
p.185), his article fails to explain how this is even possible in large modern states. 
Habermas himself is accused of an ‘extraordinary disregard for detail . . . the 
project seems clear from afar, but becomes fuzzier as one approaches’ (Heath, 
1995, p. 146). Adam Przeworski appears equally nonchalant about which citizens 
get to deliberate: ‘“democratic political deliberation” occurs when a discussion 
leads to a decision by voting’ (Przeworski, 1998, p. 140); note that such a definition 
of ‘democratic’ deliberation could be equally applicable to the decision procedure of 
a military junta or a meeting of Plato’s guardians. Surely though, if a deliberative 
assembly is to implement demokratia (rule of the people), then we ‘need to know 
who deliberates, and we should be worried if most people are kept at the margins 
of political deliberation’ (Gargarella, 1998, pp. 274, my emphasis). Note that 
‘keeping most people at the margins’ is the reciprocal – or perhaps even intended 
– consequence of the current preoccupation of ‘deliberative democrats’ with the 
inclusion of ‘marginalized’ people (at the expense of the ‘average’ citzen). 
This lack of concern over which citizens participate in the discussion is because 
deliberative theorists focus on the ‘forceless force of the better argument’4 
(Habermas, 1981, Vol. 1, p. 47) – deliberation is a discursive process and 
discursive rationality doesn’t require accurate representation any more than 
Burke’s deliberative assembly of statesmen required that Manchester and the 
other new conurbations should return MPs in proportion to their population. Burke 
                                            
4 Der zwanglose Zwang des besseren Arguments. 
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recognized the existence of collective interests (commercial, agricultural, 
professional etc.), but such interests could be represented ‘virtually’ so long as they 
had some representatives sharing the same interests – thus the members for 
Bristol could act as advocates for the (trading) interests of the citizens of 
Manchester (Pitkin, 1967, p. 174). Modern deliberative democrats are also 
concerned that previously ‘disadvantaged’ collective identities should be included, 
the principal categories being gender, ethnicity, race [and, more recently, sexual 
orientation] (Phillips, 1995).  
The focus of Habermasians on disadvantaged and excluded minorities, social 
injustice, and the inequalities of contemporary capitalist society (as opposed to the 
liberal-pluralist concern of the Fishkinians with the proportionate representation of 
‘mainstream’ interests), is largely because ‘deliberative democracy, when properly 
conceived, is the rightful heir of the early Frankfurt School [of cultural Marxism]’ 
(Scheuerman, 2006, pp. 86) – deliberative democracy adopts a ‘critical approach 
to the liberal state and its political economy [capitalism]’ (Dryzek, 2000, p. 89).  In 
his essay ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ Max Horkheimer expands on Marx’s 
notion of ‘real democracy’: 
Democracy is for Marx the political form of socialism . . . democratic 
institutions on this view should no longer be aggregative or based on 
rational self-interest; rather, they should be participatory and based on 
richer notions of reason and solidarity. . . The underpinnings of such a 
notion of democracy . . . are to be found in an historical notion of 
universal reason. . . (J. Bohman, 1996, p. 191)  
Deliberative theorists, like Burke (and, in the above sense only, Marx), are 
‘concerned not with votes but with arguments’ (Gargarella, 1998, p.264). 
Deliberative democracy can be seen as a nostalgic return to the form of politics 
immortalized in Burke’s 1774 Speech to the Electors of Bristol in which he 
described parliament as a ‘deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, 
that of the whole’ (Burke, 1975, pp. 28-29). Burke’s deliberative assembly was 
intent on discovering the ‘laws of God and nature’ (Pitkin, 1967, p.169); modern 
deliberative theorists might well be seen as repackaging this quest for a secular 
age – the Mind of God having been replaced by the Principle of Reason, a direct 
descendant of Christian teleology (Gray, 2003; O'Hear, 2000): 
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[D]emocratic procedure no longer draws its legitimizing force only, 
indeed not even predominantly, from political participation and the 
expression of political will, but rather from the general accessibility of a 
deliberative process whose structure grounds an expectation of 
rationally acceptable results. (Habermas, 2001, pp. 110, my 
emphasis)  
Habermas’s rejection of ‘political participation’ and ‘the expression of political will’ is 
the reason that Nadia Urbinati associates deliberative democracy with one of the 
‘disfigurations’ of democracy, namely ‘unpolitical democracy’ or ‘epistocracy’ 
(Urbinati, 2014, Ch. 2). ‘Germanic’ deliberative theorists are scornful of the shift 
from discursive rationality to social psychology that characterized the evolution of 
parliamentary institutions from the Burkean virtual representation of ‘objective’ 
interests to ‘liberalism and the representation of people with interests’ (Pitkin, 1967, 
Ch. 9). As the ideal outcome of deliberation is rational consensus, discursive 
democrats are uncomfortable with majority voting, with its attendant risk of the 
aggregation of interests (the political equivalent of bourgeois ‘possessive 
individualism’ (Macpherson, 1962)), horse trading and other grubby compromises, 
preferring instead the pursuit of normative ideals like justification rationality, 
common good orientation, respect and agreement, interactivity, constructive 
politics, sincerity and truthfulness (Baechtiger, Shikano, Pedrini, & Ryser, 2009).5 
There is an element of motherhood and apple pie involved here, Habermas himself 
acknowledging that ‘rational discourses have an improbable character and are like 
islands in the ocean of everyday practice’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 323): 
                                            
5 These authors in fact describe pure (Habermasian) deliberative democracy, rooted in the 
‘logic of communicative action’ as Type I deliberation; Type II deliberation ‘incorporates 
alternative forms of communication (such as story-telling) and embraces self-interested 
behavior such as bargaining’ (ibid., p. 3). But such accommodation with political realpolitik 
is viewed by many deliberative theorists as a regrettable corruption of the Habermasian 
ideal and would argue that if it’s not possible in practice to revert to eighteenth-century 
government by conversation then, as normative political theorists, that’s really not their 
problem. The goal of this thesis, however, is to reconcile deliberative ideals with the 
contingent empirical constraints of modern democracies and that will require significant 
compromises all round. 
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Underlying mainstream approaches to contemporary [deliberative] 
democratic theory is the image of an idealized citizen, free from 
prejudice, devoted to the common interest, and perfectly capable of 
arriving at rationally informed preferences. (Femia, 2009, p. 68) 
Deliberative theorists are generally content for participants in the debate to be 
volunteers (certainly not randomly-drafted conscripts, as is the case with trial juries) 
and the voluntary principle inevitably privileges the ‘usual suspects’ – i.e. those 
already active in civil society (Burnheim, 2006 (1985); Chapman & Lowndes, 2009; 
Elstub, 2008) rather than the proverbial Man on the Clapham Omnibus. Thus the 
pursuit of equal speech rights (isegoria) is at the expense of some of the isonomic 
principles of electoral democracy – equal representation (of individuals rather than 
favoured social categories) and majority rule. This is unsurprising, seeing as 
‘largely under the influence of Habermas, the idea that democracy revolves around 
the transformation rather than the aggregation of preferences [a principal focus of 
the critical theory project] has become almost an axiom of contemporary 
democratic theory’. (Femia, 2009, p. 68, my emphasis). The overriding need, 
according to the Italian cultural Marxist Antonio Gramsci, was to emancipate the 
masses from the ‘bourgeois cultural hegemony’ created by the myriad 
mechanisms of socialization, by dissolving the resultant ‘contradictory 
consciousness’ to reveal an underlying rationality of everyday ‘lived’ experience 
(Femia, 1987). Deliberation amongst ‘ordinary’ people, under conditions of equality, 
might6 help overcome the prevailing bourgeois hegemony, as it could allow the 
working-class to develop organic intellectuals and an alternative hegemony within 
civil society. The (statistical) privileging of ‘ordinary’ people is the prime attraction of 
sortition to Marxists like C.L.R. James. (James, 1956) 
                                            
6 Gramsci, however, would have been sceptical, as mass attitudes are largely a function of 
elite discourse (Zaller, 1992). Post-Marxists, however, appear to believe the transformation 
can be achieved without the need for a vanguard party to ‘iron out’ the contradictions in 
working class consciousness. This is because elite deliberation has replaced economism 
as the driving force of historical development, and the left have won the culture wars even 
if they failed to capture the commanding heights of the economy. 
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Given the argument of this thesis that demokratia involves a judicious combination 
of isegoria and isonomia, the focus of ‘Germanic’ deliberative democrats on the 
ideal speech situation (isegoria) is one-sided: 
What is striking about Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality 
is that the listening element of the communication is entirely absent. 
His ideal speech operates as if the listening element is wholly 
unproblematic.’ (Dobson, 2012, p. 855; cf. Dobson, 2014) 
Habermas’s account of communicative action unwittingly postulates 
an unproblematic hearing: a listener who always hears all there is to 
be heard; a listening which is invariably accurate and complete. There 
is no theoretical recognition of auditory distortion, ideological 
deafness, institutional noise, the specific ways in which power 
channels hearing and listening channels power. It is as if, when it 
comes to listening, a metaphysics of presence still governed his 
thinking. (Levin, 1989, p. 111) 
5.1.2  ‘Latinate’ isonomia-based deliberation 
In ordinary language, deliberation usually means something like 
careful consideration before a decision. (Chambers, 2012, p. 58) 
Deliberative theorists in this ‘ordinary language’ camp – those who privilege 
democratic equality over discursive rationality – use the trial jury model, where 
most of the talking is done by third parties (courtroom advocates) and the model for 
the speech acts involved is forensic or rhetorical rather than deliberative. The role 
of the trial jury is to listen to the evidence and judge accordingly (most jurors make 
their minds up prior to entering the jury room). Jurors are selected at random, 
partly in order to ensure that defendants are tried by their peers – i.e. by a 
representative cross-section of ordinary citizens. Advocates of this jury-style 
‘minipublic’ approach will be found on the bride’s side of the church at the 
deliberative democracy shotgun wedding, where the pews have been block-
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booked by the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University, in the 
front row of which is seated its director, Professor James Fishkin.7 The corporate 
lawyers arrived before the wedding and stamped the pews with the Center’s 
trademark: Deliberative Polling®. Fishkinians emphasise the ‘descriptive’ 
(statistical) representivity of the Deliberative Poll (DP) and go to great lengths to 
ensure that all those who are selected by lot actually turn up for the debate. In St. 
Luke’s rendering of the parable of the wedding feast the host instructed his 
servants to ‘Go out to the highways and country roads and urge people to come in, 
so that my house will be filled’; in a similar manner Professor Fishkin instructs his 
deliberative pollsters to ensure that as many of the randomly-selected conscripts 
as possible turn up for the debate by ensuring that they are financially 
compensated, that their child-minding needs are met and that their employers are 
willing to grant them the necessary leave. This is because, just as a statistical 
sample selected for a public opinion poll has to be an accurate reflection of the 
demographics of the whole population, a deliberative assembly needs to be a 
‘portrait in miniature’ of the whole electorate, especially if the assembly is designed 
to serve some kind of isonomic legislative function. Participation would ideally be 
mandatory, thereby obviating the need for stratified sampling (Stone, 2011, p. 176, 
n. 27). This is because a voluntary model would lead to the over-representation of 
political activists (Buchstein & Hein, 2010, p. 147). As Jon Elster acknowledges, 
‘those who know a great deal about a subject also tend to have an interest in it or 
to be moved by strong passions; otherwise they would not have bothered to 
become informed about it’ (Elster, 1998, p.109), thus any concession to the 
voluntary principle will distort the descriptive accuracy of the sample. 
However the flip side of Fishkin’s concern for representativity is that the wedding 
feast is a meagre affair – more akin to Oliver Twist’s bowl of gruel than St. 
Matthew’s fatted calf. Randomly-selected citizen conscripts will know very little 
about the subject under discussion and are unlikely to introduce well-considered 
                                            
7 There are many other examples of citizen-jury style approaches to deliberative 
democracy but the Deliberative Poll is unique in the emphasis that it places on a) accurate 
statistical representativity and b) balanced exogenous advocacy – the deliberative model 
underlying this thesis. 
136 
and innovative arguments of their own. Thus the DP is structured around a 
balanced expert briefing followed by a joust between partisan advocates (for and 
against the proposal under consideration). DP participants get to formulate their 
own questions for the experts, but their prime function is to determine the outcome 
(or, more accurately, indicate a shift in preferences) via a secret ballot at the end of 
the debate. Active participation is restricted to conversations in small sub-groups, 
under the watchful eye of trained moderators, and the primary purpose of the small 
groups is to prepare questions for the experts in the plenary sessions.  
In sharp contrast to the Habermasian ‘deliberative Stimme’ (deliberative voice), 
Fishkin’s notion of deliberation is derived from the Latin root of the word (libra: 
weight), according to which the role of a de-liber-ator is to arrive at a decision by 
‘weighing up’ competing arguments (Fishkin, 2009, p. 35). As such, his concept of 
deliberation is not dissimilar to the silent, inner deliberation (and secret voting) 
preferred by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, also derived from this Latinate meaning in 
which deliberation is associated with the decision of a collective body. Other 
advocates of silent ‘deliberation within’ are Robert Goodin and Simon Niemeyer 
(Goodin & Niemeyer, 2003) who: 
deplore that since the deliberative turn of the 1990s, most deliberative 
democrats have moved away from the monological ideal of 
deliberation at the heart of the early Rawls model of the original 
position and embraced instead Habermas’s later emphasis on actual 
interpersonal engagements. For Goodin and Niemeyer, this move 
away from hypothetical imagined discourse toward actual deliberation 
is misguided because, for them, it is ‘deliberation within’ rather than 
talking with others – or ‘external deliberation’ – that should be the 
focus of theories of deliberative democracy. (Landemore, 2012, pp. 
130-131)8 
                                            
8 I will consider Landemore’s epistemic objection to ‘deliberation within’ in Chapter 6.2.1, 
below. 
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Other advocates of the silent model of ‘deliberation within’ include the Belfast 
political scientist John Garry: ‘talking gets in the way of democracy’ (Garry, 
Stevenson, & Stone, 2015, p. 4 [draft paper, needs updating]), and the Green 
political theorist Andrew Dobson (Dobson, 2012, 2014): 
people taking it in turns to listen have a better chance of developing 
the required ‘we’ community than people taking it in turns to speak. . . 
It might appear ironic that discursive democracy could be improved by 
having less discussion, but it only appears to because we have got so 
used to thinking of discursive democracy in terms of speaking’ 
(Dobson, 2012, pp. 846, 857, emphasis in original). 
Garry and Dobson’s focus on listening should not be confused with Jeffrey Green’s 
‘ocular’ approach (Green, 2010), but the advocates of listening and watching are 
few in comparison with those focusing on the vox populi. According to Garry, 
Dobson and Green the ears and eyes of the people have been displaced by the 
Habermasian emphasis on its big mouth – isegoria at the expense of isonomia. 
Although the term ‘deliberation’ is derived from the Latin libra, the concept of 
deliberation (bouleusis) as choosing between different alternatives (prohairesis) 
originated in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (Book VI).9 As the first biologist, 
Aristotle would have been delighted to hear that evolutionary psychologists now 
believe that we are all equipped with innate cognitive mechanisms specifically 
designed for the weighing of alternative arguments in order to find the epistemically 
optimal outcome (Landemore, 2012, p. 126). Although Aristotle defined the political 
animal (zoon politikon) in terms of the capacity to speak, nevertheless convincing 
people and the ability to evaluate the arguments of others are distinct cognitive 
mechanisms (Landemore, 2012, p. 124): ‘deliberative talk . . . admirable though it 
is as a “discovery procedure”, ought not in and of itself constitute our “decision 
procedure”’ (Goodin, 2008, p. 255).  
                                            
9 Although the standard interpretation of the comparative model of deliberation in 
Nichomachean Ethics is subject to scholarly dispute. (Nielsen, 2011) 
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It’s important to recognize that we are dealing here with two entirely distinct 
deliberative traditions, one (Germanic) emphasizing the norms governing equal 
speech rights (isegoria) and the other (Latinate) the decision of a collective body 
(isonomia) (Sintomer, 2010a, p. 47), hence my adoption of these two terms to label 
an otherwise diverse group of theorists. Note that the terms ‘Germanic’ and 
‘Latinate’ refer only to the derivation of the concepts, not the nationality of the 
theorists involved (most of the ‘Germanic’ authors are American). An alternative 
terminology would be the Goodin/Niemeyer distinction between ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ deliberation (there is an exact one-to-one mapping) but my preference is 
for etymology. 
Given the tensions and contradictions described above, can deliberation possibly 
ameliorate any of the problems of representative democracy, and if so what form 
should it take (‘Germanic’ or ‘Latinate’)? The disaffection with electoral democracy 
has led to a revival of interest in Athenian-style democracy,10 one of its key 
mechanisms being selection of public officials and jurors by random lot (sortition) – 
and this is the method used by Fishkin for the Deliberative Poll. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, the meanings of the word ‘ballot’ include both 
preference elections and random selection or ‘allotment’ (sortition). Given the 
current dissatisfaction with preference election and the various proposals for 
deliberative alternatives, why not refashion a deliberative legislature by an 
Athenian-style ballot (bronze dice in a stone box) rather than by the Westminster-
style ballot (paper tokens in a metal box)? Could a randomly-selected allotted 
chamber (AC) be an alternative model for political representation, in which the 
legislature represents the demographic composition of society ‘descriptively’, in the 
                                            
10 This thesis will not deal with the other aspect of Athenian democracy – the right of all 
(male) citizens to attend and vote at the assembly (ecclesia). There have been a number 
of recent calls for the incorporation of direct democracy into large modern states, usually 
by means of electronic technologies (telephone or internet voting). However, given the 
huge size of modern nation states, the problem of ‘rational ignorance’ (see below) is even 
more applicable than during the election of political representatives (Downs, 1957). Apart 
from in small countries with a long tradition of direct democracy, such as Switzerland, 
referendums on particular issues are frequently used as an opportunity for citizens to 
express their general approval or disapproval for the government, as opposed to providing 
a considered verdict on the specific topic of the plebiscite. 
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same way that those selected randomly for a statistical opinion poll represent the 
wider population proportionately? And if so what would be the appropriate 
procedural model for such a legislature – the full-blooded deliberation presupposed 
by the Germanic ideal speech situation or the anaemic Latinate model of the 
Deliberative Poll? 
This chapter argues that the Latinate approach is (unfortunately) right – 
deliberation has to be limited to a tightly-constrained form in order not to 
contravene the equal freedom (isonomia) of the vast majority of citizens who fail to 
be selected by lot. Preference elections in large states may do little to empower 
individual citizens, but at least everyone is equally impotent. Like Odysseus’s 
choice of whether to navigate closer to Scylla or Charybdis, it’s better to 
compromise the ideal speech situation than to put at risk the isonomic ship of state. 
This, as argued in the previous chapter, is largely for conceptual reasons – 
‘descriptive’ representation is an aggregate, statistical concept; whereas the ‘active’ 
functions of political representation can only be fulfilled by preference elections, 
partisan or plebiscitory (see Chapter 7.3.1, below). The Germanic deliberative 
model, if applied to an allotted demokratia, would contravene democratic norms by 
mixing statistical and active functions in a single body.11  
To understand this argument requires a careful unpicking of the hybrid concept of 
representation into its component elements (undertaken in Chapter 4). If Griffiths, 
Pitkin and Pettit are correct, and political representation requires both aspects – 
descriptive and active – (although all their analyses privilege the latter),12 then how 
                                            
11 And there would also be practical objections – if members of a randomly-selected 
deliberative assembly were to have the powers to initiate and act as advocates for 
legislation they would become vulnerable to corruption by rich and powerful lobbyists, as 
assembly members would not be constrained by manifesto commitments, party ideology 
or the need to seek re-election. This problem would not apply if the assembly were 
designed along Fishkinian lines (silent deliberation and secret voting). The model also pre-
supposes a strict separation between legislative and executive powers, with the latter 
personnel appointed on ability and/or past administrative experience (as opposed to being 
elected either directly or from within the legislature). 
12 In a more recent (2004) paper, Pitkin concluded that her earlier book was too sanguine 
as to the ability of (active) representation to instantiate democracy: ‘Like most people even 
today, I more or less [in 1967] equated democracy with representation, or at least with 
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is it possible to realize these two different aspects simultaneously in the design of 
political institutions? Descriptive representation is the easy part – James Fishkin’s 
experiments in Deliberative Polling provide a template to develop proportional 
opinion sampling into a full-blown method of descriptive representation. Fishkin’s 
experiments have indicated that a randomly-selected assembly can decide the 
outcome of a debate on political issues in a competent manner when assisted by 
balanced teams of expert advocates. The quality of the resultant decision-making 
would appear to be no worse than decisions taken by elected representatives,13 
few of whom even attend parliamentary debates and then only generally vote 
along predetermined partisan lines. Thus the Deliberative Poll design would 
appear to be a paradigm example of informed decision-making (or preference 
aggregation) by a descriptively representative body. Fishkin’s findings have been 
supported by a growing body of literature favourably comparing the ‘wisdom of 
crowds’ with so-called ‘expert’ political judgment. The issue of the ‘rightness’ of the 
decision-making process is dealt with in Chapter 6 – my concerns here are with 
egalitarian rather than epistemic norms. For the present purpose suffice it to say 
that measuring the informed preferences of a statistically-representative sample is 
adequate from an epistemic point of view and is a considerable improvement on 
the recording of uninformed preferences in a public referendum (and most general 
elections). 
A Deliberative Poll (DP) would normally consist of 200-300 members, but if an 
allotted legislative chamber (AC) were designed along similar lines and given 
                                                                                                                                
 
representative government. It seemed axiomatic that under modern conditions only 
representation can make democracy possible. That assumption is not false, but it is 
profoundly misleading . . . Representation has supplanted democracy instead of serving it.’ 
(Pitkin, 2004, pp. 336, 339) 
13 Strictly speaking Fishkin’s findings only indicate that post-deliberative preferences are 
seemingly more ‘informed’ and that deliberation is not afflicted by many of the problems 
that cause epistemic failure (polarization, group think etc.). It isn’t at all clear how it would 
be possible to judge the epistemic ‘rightness’ of a deliberative poll – although (Tetlock, 
2005) contains a few clues – whereas the consequences of the decisions of legislative 
bodies are open to comparative and retrospective scrutiny. For further consideration on the 
epistemic potential of randomly-selected amateur decision makers see Chapter 6, below. 
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statutory (as opposed to advisory) powers, it might well be felt that the number 
should be larger, as legislative chambers typically involve 500-600 members.14 
And this is the nub of the problem – an AC is democratically representative only in 
aggregate, whereas the maximum effective size for (Germanic-style) group 
deliberation is as low as twenty-four or even twelve! (Coote & Lenaghan, 1997).15 
Thus dividing the chamber into small working groups immediately fails in terms of 
representative equality, hence Fishkin’s reliance on carefully-trained monitors for 
the small-group sessions to ensure that exchanges are not monopolized by 
garrulous or high-status individuals. My own personal experience of jury service 
has shown me how individual jurors can affect the verdict through sheer 
argumentative force during the jury-room deliberations. Whilst this might well be 
deemed acceptable from an epistemic point of view, the resultant decision cannot 
be taken to be representative of the population that the group is supposedly 
mirroring as the outcome is determined by the random presence or absence of 
single individuals. Whatever the epistemic merits of the verdict of the jury in the trial 
of Socrates (which entailed no jury-room deliberation), it would be hard to claim 
that it did not represent the majority view of Athenian citizens – a different jury (of 
500 citizens) would almost certainly have returned the same verdict (assuming the 
same rhetoric for the prosecution and defence). The consistency of outcomes 
between different samples is a prerequisite to the use of legislative juries and this 
would preclude anything other than balanced (exogenous) advocacy: ‘Decisions 
made by imagined [silent] deliberation are invariant across sample but decisions 
made by talk-based deliberation are not’ (Garry, et al., 2015, p. 7[draft, needs 
updating] my emphasis) 
On the face of it, [ongoing descriptive representativity of the 
minipopulus] seems unlikely. From everyday life we know that 
different conversations with different participants (or with the same 
                                            
14 The statistician John Garry has argued for an absolute mimimum of 1,000. (Garry, et al., 
2015) 
15 c.f. Dahl, 1990, p. 53: ‘I think that the optimal size for a working committee of actively 
participating members can hardly be more than ten or a dozen and is probably less.’ 
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participants interjecting at different points) proceed in radically different 
directions. Given the path dependency of conversational dynamics, 
and the sheer creativity of conversing agents, it beggars belief that 
any one group would come to exactly the same conclusions by exactly 
the same route as any other. (Lawyers say it is a ‘well-known secret’ 
that ‘no two juries and no two judges are alike.) Yet that is what strong 
advocates of ersatz deliberation must be claiming to be at least 
approximately true, in insisting that deliberation within a representative 
subset will genuinely mirror, and can therefore substitute for, 
deliberations across the whole community. (Goodin, 2003, pp. 58-59) 
In his report on deliberative polls done for three different local public 
utilities in Texas, Fishkin is pleased to report that in all three cases the 
shift in public opinion, pre- to post-deliberation, was in the 
same direction (Fishkin, 1997, p. 220). But the absolute 
numbers nonetheless diverged wildly. In one case, half the 
respondents thought post-deliberation that ‘investing in conservation’ 
was the ‘option to pursue first’, whereas in another case less than a 
sixth thought so. In one case, over a third still thought post-
deliberation that ‘renewable energy’ should be the top option, whereas 
in another case less than a sixth thought so. Clearly, these 
deliberating groups ought not to be regarded as interchangeable. 
Neither, in consequence, does this evidence inspire confidence in the 
general theory of ‘ersatz deliberation’, treating smaller deliberative 
groups as microcosms capable of literally ‘substituting’ for deliberation 
across the whole community. (ibid., p. 74) 
To those who share the perspective of this thesis – that descriptive representativity 
should be privileged over collective wisdom – this finding is deeply disturbing. 
There is a need to isolate and exclude those aspects of deliberation that lead to 
inconsistency between the samples. One possibility is that this would mean 
excluding all intra-group deliberation, leaving jury members with little more to do 
than ask questions and then record their anonymous votes at the end of the 
exchange of reasons between exogenously-selected and well-balanced 
advocates. This procedure could be tested (for invariance) experimentally by 
convening a number of randomly-selected samples to see if they judged the merits 
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of information/advocacy presented to them (consistently across the different 
samples) in the same way (allowing for a pre-defined margin of error). 
If the assembly had statutory powers,16 scrutinizing the independence of the 
monitors of the DP small-groups would also produce a problem of infinite 
regression, on the principle of quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (who will guard the 
guards themselves?) (Juvenal, Satires, VI, lines 347–8). Given that the ultimate 
role of the DP jurors is to listen to the arguments of competing teams of expert 
advocates and then decide the outcome of the issue under debate by secret ballot 
it’s not clear exactly what the role of small-group deliberation would be (other than 
to formulate questions for the panels of experts at the plenary session). In the case 
of the court-room trial, active deliberation in the jury room is on account of the 
requirement to arrive at a consensual (and, hopefully, epistemically correct) verdict; 
not so with the majority-vote requirement of the political jury. It should also be 
noted that proponents of the ‘wisdom of crowds’ warn of the dangers of bias and 
convergent ‘groupthink’ occasioned by the (likely) dominance of articulate, 
educated and other high-status individuals (Surowiecki, 2004). This is because ‘the 
debates tend to be dominated by a small number of skilled and charismatic 
speakers’ (Elster, 1998, p.109). Although the best way of overcoming 
demagoguery is to reduce the size of the group, small groups cease to be an 
accurate microcosm of the whole electorate and thus fail in terms of statistical 
representativity (the original raison d’être for random selection). 
Fishkin, however, is adamant (personal communication) that the small-group 
sessions play an important role in ensuring informed decision making, perhaps on 
the basis of E.M. Forster’s epithet, coined at the high point of the behaviourist era – 
‘How can I know what I think till I [hear] what I say’. One suspects however that the 
small-group deliberations may well be a reflection of the dominance of the 
                                            
16 According to James Bohman, a deliberative group with binding decision-making rather 
than purely advisory powers would be a ‘minidemos’ rather than a ‘minipublic’. (James 
Bohman, 2012, p. 77) In Habermasian terminology the minidemos has communicative 
power, whereas the minipublic only communicative freedom. This is the reason that a 
minidemos could not be subject to facilitation or monitoring, irrespective of any claims for 
independence on the part of the facilitators. 
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Germanic ‘Ideal Speech Situation’ (isegoria) model within the broader deliberative 
democracy community, which has criticized the DP for the comparatively low level 
of active deliberation (although ‘Germanic’ deliberative theorists may in turn be 
criticized for their lack of concern for accurate descriptive representation). But if 
small-group sessions depend on impartial trained monitors and if this is deemed to 
be unacceptable in a legislative assembly with statutory powers (for Juvenal’s 
reasons), then it may well be that the small-group aspect would need to be 
jettisoned. According to (Goodin, 2008, Ch. 3), most of the heavy lifting is done by 
silent (Rousseauian) ‘deliberation within’ (as is generally the case with trial jurors’ 
decisions). 
5.2  Advocacy - vs - Judgment 
The problem becomes even worse if members of the assembly are also to act as 
advocates for and against legislative bills. Although Pitkin only deals briefly with 
random selection in her book, nevertheless the following passage outlines the 
general problem regarding the role of ‘descriptive representatives’: 
If the contemplated action is voting, then presumably (but not 
obviously) it means that the [descriptively-mandated] representative 
must vote as a majority of his constituents would. But any activities 
other than voting are less easy to deal with. Is he really literally to 
deliberate as if he were several hundred thousand people? To bargain 
that way? To speak that way? And if not that way, then how? (Pitkin, 
1967, pp. 144-145) 
What Pitkin is saying here is that voting on binary issues (yea or nay) is a simple 
aggregative process17 – it would be possible for example for a binding-mandate 
                                            
17 It is frequently retorted that the legislative process differs from the trial procedure in that 
legislative issues are more complex and not subject to binary decisions. However this 
conflates the policy-making and legislative processes. The existing High Court of 
Parliament only has two lobbies (yea and nay) and an AC (allotted chamber) might well 
choose to reject a bill, recommending (effectively) to ‘revise and resubmit’. For additional 
arguments as to how seemingly complex decisions can be resolved into a series of 
binaries see (Landemore, 2008). 
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representative to simply act as a token for the aggregate votes of her constituents 
(as is the standard practice at trade union conferences). However the delegate is 
entirely ignorant as to why each of her members might choose to vote that way – 
as soon as the delegate rises to her feet to speak, she can only give a particular 
argument and immediately loses democratic legitimacy as only those in the target 
population sharing that particular perspective would be represented. Anything 
other than aggregate behaviour by a descriptively-representative chamber is in 
breach of its democratic legitimacy and that means that allotted members would 
necessarily be restricted to asking questions (on points of information) and voting. 
5.2.1  Speech Acts and their Measurement 
As soon as a descriptively-representative member engages in a speech act 
(isegoria) – either to the whole assembly or to a sub-group – she becomes an 
(individual) advocate and thereby loses her (statistical) democratic legitimacy. The 
reason for this is that the OMOV18 principle of democracy requires that the 
members of an allotted chamber (AC) possess an equal influence in the secret 
ballot that determines the outcome of the debate (isonomia). However, in the 
parlance of Austinian linguistic philosophy, the ‘perlocutionary force’ (outcome) of 
the speech acts of each individual will be anything but equal (Austin, 1975). This is 
because allotted members, unlike elected politicians, have not been selected on 
the basis of their intelligence, social status, knowledge or rhetorical skills, so those 
members who perchance possess persuasive skills, or who are perceived to be of 
high social or occupational status will influence the outcome of the debate in a 
manner that is incompatible with their descriptively-representative status. ‘Eloquent 
or charismatic or highly motivated speakers can, in such circumstances, dominate 
the proceedings, no matter how silly or self-serving their arguments may be’ 
(Femia, 2009, p. 75). And less active members will tend to follow the lead provided 
by the eloquent: 
                                            
18 One [Person] One Vote. All votes carry exactly the same causal power to affect the 
outcome. 
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People in collective settings appear only too ready to conform to the 
majority in the group and to abandon their own personal beliefs and 
opinions. Study after study has shown this to be a ‘near-universal 
phenomenon’, probably related to the human need for self-evaluation. 
(Brown, 1988, quoted in Femia, 2009, p. 73) 
The fact is that nobody wants to be the ‘odd one out’19 (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), 
and people will value uniformity in groups and will often behave so as to enforce it 
(Festinger, 1950, 1954); however most of the advocates of deliberative democracy 
‘betray little, if any, interest in [such] findings of political science and social 
psychology’ (Femia, 2009, p. 69). But the claim that, as George Orwell put it in his 
political satire on Stalinism, Animal Farm, ‘all animals are equal, but some animals 
are more equal than others’ is born out by the following extract from interviewing 
participants in the popular deliberative assemblies20 established in the wake of 
Argentina’s political crisis of 2001: 
although there were no ‘titles’ or ‘hierarchies’ in the assemblies, there 
were indeed ‘people with different interests’, with different ‘histories’, 
‘careers’, ‘training’ or ‘personalities’, all of which established clear 
differences among them. These were not expressed in terms of the 
right to speak (which was in principle accessible to all), but in terms of 
                                            
19 This is not necessarily because people trust the judgments of their confederates but 
simply because they want to avoid the possibility of social ridicule (Femia, 2009, p. 74). 
The ‘need to belong’ is a ‘powerful, fundamental and extremely pervasive motivation’ (R.F. 
& Leary, 1995); such a powerful social psychological mechanism can only harm the 
epistemic value of collective deliberation. Although ‘groupthink’ (Janis, 1972; Sunstein, 
2002) is less of a risk in the sort of cognitively diverse assembly constituted by sortition, 
nevertheless any deliberative group charged with arriving at a consensus (the ideal 
outcome of Habermasian deliberation), will ‘insulate itself from inconvenient information 
and rarely search systematically through alternative policy options to assess their relative 
merits . . . Once the members converge on a normatively “correct” point of view, their 
attachment to it will become dogmatic. The price of unanimity or harmony – the aim, after 
all, of deliberative democracy – may thus be bad decisions and half-baked policies’. 
(Femia, 2009, p. 74) 
20 As the popular assemblies arose ‘spontaneously’ rather than as a result of sortition, they 
could not claim to be statistically representative, nevertheless they are a valuable 
indication of the intrinsic problem of imbalance of perlocutionary outcomes in the 
performance of speech acts, which is a characteristic of any deliberative assembly. 
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the extent to which each one’s words were taken into account. 
‘Proposals’, states a member of the Asamblea 20 de Diciembre de 
Flores, ‘had a different weight according to who said them’ (Male, 34, 
with previous political experience). 
Few consider that the sprouting of this kind of differences could have 
been avoided; the majority considers it instead as a natural process as 
they acknowledge the presence of ‘natural hierarchies’, ‘spontaneous 
leaderships’ and ‘natural-born leaders’. ‘All processes yield leaders’, 
says a politically experienced member of the Asamblea Popular de 
Liniers. ‘Who is the one who says “let’s do this”? There are always 
leaders, natural commanders’ (Male, 47). 
Since what is at stake is the differential of attention given to the word 
of some above that of others within a space characterized, above all, 
by the production of discourse, it is only natural that those who are 
considered to be ‘points of reference’ are in the first place those who 
‘know how to speak’, have ‘rhetorical abilities’, show ‘a high cultural 
level’ or bring in some useful knowledge on a relevant field. Those 
who fit that description were usually professionals and intellectuals 
who ‘could easily occupy all the space with their ideas’. (Pousadela, 
2008, pp. 111-112) 
‘One [Person] One Vote’ as a clearly-defined principle of democracy can easily be 
undermined by the unequal distribution of the persuasive powers to influence how 
the votes are cast. Formal isonomia and isegoria are easily undermined by the 
kind of imbalances revealed by the Argentinian experiment in deliberative 
democracy. In the words of one assembly participant, this quickly led to disillusion: 
[At the beginning we thought] ‘fine, we have people who did not finish 
elementary school and who join because they want security, they 
want their children to be able to safely go through the park, and at the 
same time we have a psychologist, an economist, people with 
previous political participation. Our discussions are going to oscillate 
and we are going to grow up together. The lady who is worried that 
their children can walk through the park is going to learn from the 
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other one, and the latter is going to learn from her’. I thought that was 
going to yield a change. But no, the neighbor simply left (…) People 
who came as plain neighbors, without much of an intellect, had to give 
way to those who knew, because those who knew were the 
visionaries (Female, 55, ex- Asamblea de Monserrat, with previous 
political experience). (ibid., p. 112) 
The equal freedom of people with previous political experience, and even 
‘visionaries’ is already well catered for in liberal democratic societies. However 
nobody elects the members of a voluntary or descriptively-representative assembly 
on the basis of their stated views or rhetorical abilities, so they cannot claim the 
mandate that comes via electoral success. Only if it were possible to equalize the 
time allotted to each speaker (including obliging shy and retiring members to match 
colleagues of a more Churchillian disposition) and to equalize the perlocutionary 
force of each utterance would it be possible for members of an allotted chamber to 
actively participate in a debate leading to a statutory legislative outcome without 
contravening democratic norms. However, without a ‘robust account of the “force” 
of language in social and political interaction’ this is a serious challenge (Johnson, 
1998, p. 175). 
The ‘empirical turn’ in deliberative democracy has led to positivistic attempts to 
monitor the speech-act equality of all participants by using metrics like the 
Discourse Quality Index (Steenbergen, Baechtiger, Sporndlie, & Steiner, 2003), but 
it’s unclear how monitoring the frequency of participation and the number of words 
used by chosen ‘disadvantaged’ minority groups (generally women and ethnic 
minorities) can translate into substantive equality of perlocutionary outcome 
(Baechtiger, et al., 2009, p. 5; Stromer-Galley, 2007). Whilst participants may be 
urged to respect all participants and defer to the better argument (rather than the 
most persuasive oratory), it is hard to establish any sort of discourse parity 
between a seasoned public speaker and a member of a ‘disadvantaged’ group 
who does not habitually engage in idealized forms of deliberation (Sanders, 1997). 
And how is it possible to guard against the wolf in sheep’s clothing – a partisan 
interest masquerading as an argument for the general good, as deliberators will be 
motivated to make utterances of a ‘plays-well-with-others’ nature (Mucciaroni & 
Quirk, 2010). ‘The [deliberative] norm does not induce members to become 
impartial, only to appear to be so’ (Elster, 1998, p.101). In sum, the difficulties 
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involved in ensuring the sincerity and substantive (outcome) equality of the speech 
acts of individual members of a descriptively-representative legislature are so great 
as to negate the original case for sortition.  
Note that this observation is true ex hypothesi, as it depends on the nature of the 
concept of descriptive representation, rather than any empirical observations. 
Public opinion surveys based on probability sampling (Levy, 2008), are only valid in 
aggregate – pollsters ask the same question to a large number of respondents and 
then present the results using statistical tools. The individual response of one 
respondent might be of interest to a social anthropologist or ethnomethodologist 
but is of no scientific significance and is of no value from a democratic perspective. 
The very fact that ‘descriptive’ and ‘statistical’ representation are synonymous is a 
further indication that it is impossible for an individual member of an allotted 
parliament (unlike an individual MP) to claim the status of a ‘descriptive 
representative’ as the concept only applies in plural. When the (elected) 
Honourable Member for Bristol South stands up to speak she can legitimately 
expect to command the attention of the House, but this is not the case for a 
‘descriptive’ representative. This is a knock-down argument in the ‘analytical a 
priori’ sense. Any democratic theorist who advocates an active isegoria role for 
individual members of an allotted assembly would first need to refute this argument 
regarding the conceptual status of descriptive (statistical) representation. I am not 
aware (at the time of writing) of any such successful refutation, most writers naively 
viewing ‘allotted members’ as on a par with elected members – i.e. political agents 
selected by two different forms of balloting. Proposals to introduce sortition 
alongside election are generally bicameral, with the representatives in allotted and 
elected chambers performing identical functions in parallel (Callenbach and Phillips, 
2008; O’Leary, 2006), without recognition of the entirely different forms of 
representation involved – active for election, and descriptive for sortition. 
This distinction is derived from Pitkin’s ‘ordinary language’ approach to 
philosophical issues: take, for example, the argument that a legislature should be a 
‘portrait in miniature’ of the whole electorate. Although a (painted) portrait is 
composed of a number of individual brush strokes, the overall representation is 
based on the aggregation of the strokes – individual brush strokes hold no 
significance outside of the context of the full work. A representation of an image 
displayed on a digital computer screen is even more pertinent – the screen I am 
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using to compose this thesis contains 2,073,600 pixels, but no individual pixel 
contains any information that is of relevance to the document being displayed – 
this would only be the case if the computer screen relied on holographic 
technology, where each piece of film contains a lower-resolution version of the full 
image. If individual ‘descriptive representatives’ were like holographic film then we 
would only need one of them to mirror the whole society; the fact that we need 
several hundred in order to ensure a reasonably accurate description indicates that 
the allotted representative in this analogy better resembles an individual computer 
pixel than a tiny piece of holographic film.  
Advocates of  ‘Germanic’ deliberative democracy reject Austinian arguments on 
perlocutionary imbalances, as isegoria (equal right of addressing the public 
assembly) only demands equal access to speech, not equal outcomes: ‘All 
members of the political community . . . take part in discourse. Each must have 
fundamentally equal chances to take a position on all relevant contributions’ 
(Habermas, 1996, pp. 182, my emphasis).21 ‘Equal’ deliberation must have the 
following attributes: 
(1) participation in such deliberation is governed by norms of equality 
and symmetry; all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to 
question, to interrogate, and to open debate (2) all have the same right 
to question the assigned topics of conversation; and (3) all have the 
same right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the 
discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied.22 
(Benhabib, 1996, p. 70) 
                                            
21 Note, however, that isegoria was an aspect of Athenian direct democracy – all citizens 
had the right to address the assembly; not so with a deliberative microcosm established by 
sortition. Large modern states require a system of representation, and references by 
deliberative democrats to the practices of Athenian direct democracy unhelpfully ignore 
this distinction.  
22 One is reminded here of the classical liberal perspective on freedom prior to T.H. 
Green’s observations on its economic and social prerequisites. Unfortunately, for isegoria 
to be anything more than a merely formal equality of opportunity presupposes an 
egalitarian social and economic setting that ‘has emerged from the confines of class and 
thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social stratification and exploitation’ (Habermas, 
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Just as Burke was confident that the deliberative forum of the nation needed only 
one advocate for (say) the merchant interest, ‘Germanic’ deliberators would be 
content (in principle) with a single advocate of a particular viewpoint, such is their 
faith in the power of rational discourse (and disdain for interest aggregation and 
majority voting). Such assemblies only require a few dozen deliberators, but would 
not be considered descriptively representative in a way that would be meaningful 
to anyone working in the polling industry. 
To choose another ordinary-language example, when someone refers to 
themselves as ‘only a statistic’ this implies a denial of individuality, as a ‘statistic’ 
(singular) properly refers to a number (usually a percentage), as opposed to an 
individual unit in the target population that the statistic is used to represent. ‘Allotted 
representatives’ is an example of the limited set of substantives that only exist in 
plural form so, in order to avoid confusion, it would be better to refer to ‘allotted 
forum’, ‘allotted chamber’, ‘allotted assembly’, ‘allotted legislature’ etc. as opposed 
to the traditional language of parliamentary or congressional representatives 
(persons). That way there will be no further temptation to commit the error of 
reifying the result of a conceptual confusion into the ‘allotted representative’, 
through the mistaken belief that a change in the balloting method (from election to 
sortition) will produce a ‘descriptive representative’ that is on a par with an elected 
representative.23 Elections are for named individuals (or, in the case of some 
systems of proportional representation, place-holders on party lists), whereas 
sortition generates a collective representation that is a portrait in miniature of the 
whole society. This must cast serious doubt on some recent proposals for allotted 
assemblies where individual members perform an active function (Burnheim, 2006; 
                                                                                                                                
 
1996, p. 308). Given the growing inequality of modern societies this is a demanding 
precondition for equal deliberation that is unlikely to be realized any time soon – it is 
‘fundamentally utopian given present economic and political conditions’ (Scheuerman, 
2006, p. 95). For further discussion of equality of opportunity, see Chapter 2.1 (above). 
23 One is reminded here of Gilbert Ryle’s example of the category error made when one 
looks for an entity called ‘Oxford University’, only to find a collection of individual buildings 
(colleges, libraries etc). (Ryle, 1949) 
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Callenbach & Phillips, 2008; McCormick, 2011; O'Leary, 2006; van Reybrouck, 
2016; Hennig, 2017), as opposed to proposals that limit the role of the allotted 
assembly to a collective judgment or veto function (Barnett & Carty, 2008; Lieb, 
2004; Schmidt, 2001; Sutherland, 2008; Zakaras, 2010). (Fishkin, 2009) would 
also fit into the latter category were he to propose that Deliberative Polling 
assemblies have more than a modest advisory or educative role. Such a model 
would, paradoxically, be far more radical than the civil-society ‘influence’ models of 
deliberative democracy inspired by Critical Theory, as 
deliberative influence does not a democracy make . . . By neglecting 
the question of how the commanding heights of global power could be 
directly subjected to popular self-legislation, these models risk 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater. In contrast, the core idea of 
modern democracy requires the exercise of political power in 
accordance with rules and laws freely consented to by those affected 
by them. In this classical view, democracy requires autonomous self-
legislation. Only the exercise of the commanding heights of decision-
making by deliberative citizens can achieve democracy’ (Scheurman, 
2006, p. 94, my emphasis). 
The problem with the ‘subjectless’ and ‘anonymous’ deliberation favoured by 
Habermasians is ‘how can the plurality of deliberative civil society undergo an 
effective funneling into a (unified) expression of democratically legitimate political 
power?’ (Scheuerman, 2006, p. 98). (Dryzek, 2000a), in characteristic Frankfurt 
School style, describes these concerns as a political sellout to ‘liberal 
constitutionalism’ but all genuine democrats must surely be concerned with the 
mechanisms for general law-making and the rule of law. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
this was the primary concern of the fourth-century Athenian reforms. Once again 
we are witnessing the tension between the two elements of the oxymoron that 
constitutes ‘Germanic’ deliberative democracy – a ‘worrisome tendency to discount 
the indispensable democratic core of the idea of deliberative democracy’ 
(Scheuerman, 2006, p. 102). However democratic the internal procedural norms, it 
still ain’t demokratia. 
153 
5.3  The ongoing need for election 
The problem of the aggregate nature of the descriptively-democratic mandate 
becomes even worse when one considers the possible role of an allotted chamber 
in formulating its own legislative agenda. Although the randomly-selected Athenian 
Council of 500 (boule) was the principal channel for legislative innovations, the 
boule was not the prime law-making body – it was just a ‘collegial magistracy’ 
(secretariat for the legislative assembly) and emphatically not a representative 
institution as it ‘was not perceived as standing for the people’ (Manin, et al., 2008, p. 
2). Legislative proposals made by, or via, the boule were subject to ratification by 
the entire citizen body at the legislative assembly (ecclesia), before (in the fourth 
century) undergoing further deliberative scrutiny in randomly-selected nomothetai 
(legislative courts). In this sense legislative proposals generated by a randomly-
selected council had to overcome two additional democratic filters:  
• The unconsidered assent of the entire demos in the assembly (where 
there was little opportunity for serious deliberative scrutiny), and  
• The considered verdict of the allotted jury in the legislative court, 
comprised of jurors who were over thirty who had taken the dikastic oath 
(Hansen, 1990, pp. 222-226). 
How might such a three-fold legislative process be replicated in a large-scale 
modern democracy, and would it fulfil the requirement for both forms of 
representation (descriptive and active)? A typical meeting of the Athenian 
assembly might have involved the presence of some 3,000-6,000 citizens, which is 
pretty much the upper limit for direct democracy. One of the reasons for the 
introduction of electoral representation was the dramatically-increased size of the 
modern nation state, the resultant problem being that the inherently ‘aristocratic’ 
nature of the electoral process inevitably returns an assembly that no longer 
accurately reflects the full diversity of the population that is being represented 
(Manin, 1997). Selection by election is based on the ‘principle of distinction’ and, as 
such, elected representatives will be anything but typical of their constituents (ibid.). 
The problem of scale was the principal reason that the Anti-Federalist faction of the 
American founders failed to pursue the argument for accurate descriptive 
representation (which they favoured) with more vigour – they thought that it was 
‘wildly impractical’ in so large a union: 
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Is it practicable for a country so large and so numerous … to elect a 
representation that will speak their sentiments, without their becoming 
so numerous as to be incapable of transacting public business? … [A] 
legislature, formed of representatives from the respective parts, would 
not only be too numerous to act with any care or decision, but would 
be composed of such heterogeneous and discordant principles, as 
would constantly be contending with each other (Brutus, 1981). 
This is clearly true if representatives are required to ‘speak their sentiments’, as 
every speaker will have an individual perspective on a particular issue, resulting in 
a ‘confusion of voices’ not heard since the Tower of Babel. Not so if participation is 
restricted to the aggregate function of voting. Each participant in a proportional 
opinion poll will have her own private reasons for answering a question in the 
positive or negative (or assigning a weight to a preference) but the aggregation of 
the results will indicate overall preferences, irrespective of the individual factors 
that give rise to them. The mathematics of proportional opinion polls demonstrates 
that samples can be surprisingly small and still accurately reflect aggregate opinion. 
Needless to say the technology to enable large-scale statistical sampling was not 
available to the American founders. 
A key problem in large-scale democracies is that the ability of individual votes to 
affect the final election outcome is so small that few of the electors who turn out to 
vote take the trouble to study the issues at stake and the proposals that political 
parties make to address them. The thinly-disguised secret of modern politics is that 
nobody reads the election manifesto and the votes cast are largely on the basis of 
what is in effect a political beauty contest. The public choice theorist Anthony 
Downs referred to this as the problem of ‘rational ignorance’ (Downs, 1957) – an 
elector in a mass democracy has no reason to study the issues in depth because 
her individual vote has little causal power. The power of the individual elector to 
change the outcome of elections is minimal as in modern democracies the 
extension of the suffrage cannot in the end empower individuals because once the 
democratic ‘cake’ has grown past a critical size each voter’s slice becomes so 
small as to be causally irrelevant. This is because – unlike with other public goods 
such as street lighting – the efficacy of the vote suffers from diminishing returns as 
the franchise is extended. However, democratic mythology hides this fact so 
democracy is not believed to suffer from diminishing returns. When people see 
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through the myth, and discover voting is causally irrelevant, apathy results 
(Graham, 2002), a result accurately predicted by (Hegel, 2010, §311).24 
Arguably this is little worse than the decisions of the Athenian assembly, which 
were often poorly considered and swayed by demagogues – this was one of the 
reasons for the fourth-century innovation of the nomothetai (randomly-selected 
legislative courts). But, presupposing the need to reconcile large political states 
with democratic norms, is there any alternative to an element of ignorance (rational 
or otherwise) in the initial choice of legislative proposals if, as argued in this 
chapter, the introduction of laws is an active function that cannot legitimately be 
undertaken by a descriptively-representative chamber?25 It would appear that 
elections (and/or direct-democratic initiatives) are the only legitimate mechanism 
for introducing legislative proposals: the victorious party or parties in the election 
would have the right to introduce manifesto bills for the considered judgment of the 
descriptively-representative sovereign assembly. Notwithstanding the elitist 
                                            
24 This ‘public-choice’ analysis of electoral impotence is not without its critics, Richard Tuck 
claiming that the ‘free-rider’ argument does not apply to cases (for example majoritarian 
elections) where there is a specific threshold involved (Tuck, 2008). However this ignores 
the fact that in closely-contested elections the inevitable recounts eliminate the causal 
efficacy of the individual ballot slip, so there is no clear instance of the ‘casting’ vote 
(Graham, 2002). And even if one accepts Tuck’s argument that voting is a rational act, 
innumerable studies have revealed that voters remain profoundly ignorant of the issues 
and policies involved when casting their votes. Tuck claims that the free-rider problem was 
only invented some fifty years ago and that its all-pervasive influence is down to the 
effective propaganda of free-market economists. But is this explanation plausible? – for 
example a swift check on Amazon.com reveals a low ranking for Anthony Downs’s 
Economic Theory of Democracy. Whilst Tuck is no doubt right that the widespread belief 
that self-interest is the major causal explanation of human behaviour is an aspect of 
modernity, such views clearly pre-date public choice economics and their wide influence is 
better attributed to Hobbes, Bentham, Darwin, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. For further 
criticism of economic theories of democracy see (Mackie, 2003, 2011). 
25 Rousseau’s (and Mill’s) solution was to limit the right to propose new legislation to the 
executive branch, which would, in large states, be constituted by some principle other than 
election. Rousseau viewed the executive as the active, ‘physical’ branch of the polity, 
reserving the requirement for democratic equality for the sovereign (moral) branch. Such a 
system was ideally suited to a small community like Geneva; sortition might well be the 
only way of enabling sovereign equality in a large state. The distinction between the active 
and descriptive aspects of the representative function is entirely compatible with The Social 
Contract; Rousseau’s famous rejection of representative government was, in effect, a 
criticism of the merging of the two distinct functions (sovereign and executive) in the British 
parliament. 
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implications of election and the fact that voters are doing little more than 
expressing a raw preference or voting in a political beauty contest, election would 
appear to be the obvious democratic method for the initiation of legislation.26  
5.4  Conclusion 
This chapter has examined two competing ‘schools’ of deliberative democracy – 
the ‘Germanic’ and the ‘Latinate’ and concludes that only the latter is suitable as a 
template for a modern demokratia. In order not to contravene democratic equality 
(isonomia), a randomly-selected legislative assembly has to be of a sufficient size 
(300–1,000) to ensure statistical representativity, and can only legitimately act in 
aggregate. As soon as the assembly is sub-divided, or as soon as any member 
performs a speech act – such as policy proposal and advocacy – the assembly 
loses its democratic mandate. ‘[F]ace to face dialogue may subvert deliberative 
democratic ideals’ (Smith, 2000, p. 36) by undermining the isonomia of the vast 
majority of citizens not selected by the political lottery, and may encourage the 
suppression of conflict (Mansbridge, 1983, pp. 276-277). As such, sortition can 
only be one element in a mixed constitution, alongside preference elections or 
petitions/plebiscites (for policy initiation) as well as other extra-democratic 
mechanisms to ensure executive competence, the preservation of long-term 
interests and balanced expert advocacy. The need for equal speech (isegoria) in 
large modern states to be subject to representative mechanisms is addressed in 
Chapter 7. 
                                            
26 It might be argued that the 2004 initiative by the government of British Columbia to 
empower a randomly-selected citizen assembly as a democratic alternative for 
constitution-making and reform provides an exception to this principle (Warren & Pearse, 
2008). However, of the original stratified sample of 23,034 only 1,715 opted to be selected, 
964 (4% of the original sample) came to the selection meeting and 158 were randomly 
selected (Goodin, 2008, p. 14), so there is no way to tell the degree to which the final 
assembly was an accurate microcosm of the whole population (arguably citizens with a 
proactive interest in political and constitutional issues would be more likely to agree to 
participate). Another potential problem is the power of the full-time officials to influence the 
debate, in particular via the (assumed) impartiality of the selection process of expert 
advisors, as (unlike in most Deliberative Polls) there was no clear division between ‘pros’ 
and ‘antis’. Another criticism was the use of quota sampling (stratified sampling with 
weakened adherence to randomization). (O’Flynn & Sood, 2014) 
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Nevertheless sortition is an indispensible component of any system of government 
that seeks to call itself democratic: ‘what is needed is a public with the 
representativeness of minipublics and the decision authority of existing democratic 
institutions (Bohman, 2012, p. 87).27  
The discussion of sortition so far has focused on its intrinsic legitimacy in terms of 
democratic equality, the next chapter addresses consequentialist concerns 
regarding the ability of ordinary citizens to make well-considered political 
judgments with benign epistemic outcomes. 
                                            
27 No doubt ‘Germanic’ deliberative democracy would continue to seek to influence public 
policy but this would be more akin to the existing role of think tanks (the twenty-first century 
equivalent of the bourgeois coffee house) than a formal element of a democratic 
constitution (see Chapter 7.4.3, below). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.		Epistemic	Democracy	and	the	Wisdom	of	Crowds	
The previous chapter considered isonomia from the perspective of egalitarian 
norms – how the aggregate judgment of a minidemos could be said to fairly 
represent the preferences of its target population. The normative focus of Chapter 
7 is similar in that it discusses how it might be possible to implement equal speech 
rights in large modern states where sheer numbers preclude the direct-democratic 
principle of ho boulomenos. The current chapter is very different in that it focuses 
on consequential considerations – i.e. epistemic outcomes as opposed to intrinsic 
norms such as democratic equality and procedural legitimacy.  
According to the perspective known as ‘political cognitivism’ the purpose of 
majority voting is to ‘predict which [solution to a governance problem] is likely to be 
the most effective’1 (Landemore, 2013, p. 11). Granted this epistemic perspective, 
then who is best suited to give the ‘right’ solution? If Socrates doubted the 
phronesis (practical wisdom) of selecting ordinary citizens to offices of state ‘by 
bean’ in a small ancient polis, then how much more of a problem is governance by 
amateurs in complex modern states? Hoi idiotai was, in classical Greece, a neutral 
descriptive term for private citizens, whereas few moderns would favour rule by 
idiots. (Landemore, 2013b, p. 1) 
The chapter examines the modern social science research regarding the epistemic 
competence of large groups – the so-called ‘wisdom of crowds’ (Surowiecki, 2004) 
or ‘wisdom of the multitude’ (Waldron, 1995). But first of all it is necessary to 
examine the case for the supposed advantage of the judgment of political experts.  
                                            
1 Stating that a public decision has epistemic value means that it can be judged according 
to standards of rightness that are independent of the virtues of the procedures that lead to 
it (Burgers, 2015, pp. 27, fn.24; cf. Estlund, 2008, pp. 159-183). ‘Political cognitivism [is] 
roughly the view that there are right and wrong answers in politics and that these answers 
can be known, if only approximately’. (Landemore, 2013, p. 15) 
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Since the publication of Benjamin Constant’s 1819 essay on ancient and modern 
liberty (Constant, 1988), the governance of modern states has become 
increasingly professional, notwithstanding the growth of democracy – if anything 
the growth of professionalization maps closely to the extension of the franchise. If it 
is the case that specialization and the division of labour have been beneficial in 
every other occupation, then surely the same principle must apply to political 
decision-making? Republican liberty was appropriate for small, cohesive slave-
owning societies, but in large commercial societies everyone has to earn a living, 
so direct involvement by most citizens in politics requires, to purloin Oscar Wilde’s 
quip, ‘too many evenings’. Constant wrote his essay in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution and the Terror – when the danger of republican enthusiasm was fresh 
in the minds of his audience – so his emphasis on civil liberties, the rule of law and 
freedom from excessive state intervention went down well in bourgeois circles. The 
nineteenth century was a time to get rich – enrichissez-vous, as Guizot put it – not 
to get directly involved in matters of state. 
But while it may be expedient to choose political specialists by election, is there 
any evidence that the resulting decisions are (epistemically) better than those 
taken by amateurs, or even better than random? This is particularly problematic on 
account of the ‘ingenuity and determination that political elites display in rendering 
their positions impregnable to evidence’ (Tetlock, 2005, p. xi). An obvious example 
here is the ongoing claim by Tony Blair that removing Saddam Hussein was the 
‘right’ thing to do, notwithstanding the disastrous consequences for Iraq and the 
Middle East. Psychologist Philip Tetlock attributes this to the fact that ‘smart people 
are bad Bayesians’, in that they are less likely to update their beliefs in the light of 
changing circumstances2 (ibid., p. 125): 
Reviewing the cognitive strategies experts use to justify holding firm, 
we discover a formidable array of dissonance-reduction strategies 
                                            
2 The lesson of J.M. Keynes’ question ‘when the facts change, I change my mind, what do 
you do sir?’ has still to be learned in neoconservative circles. 
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tailor-made for defusing threats to professional self-esteem. (ibid., p. 
162) 
Non-experts, who have no territory or status to defend, are more amenable to a 
dispassionate evaluation of the evidence. In a fourteen-year, fifty-eight-country 
study comparing the accuracy of 284 expert and non-expert (‘dilettante’) 
predictions (27,451 total forecasts) on a wide range of political futures, Tetlock 
discovered that  
experts on their home turf made neither better calibrated nor more 
discriminating forecasts than did dilettante trespassers [participants 
who were opining on matters outside their own professional domain] 
…[and] there was also little sign that expertise by itself, or indicators of 
degrees of expertise, improved performance … People who devoted 
years of arduous study to a [politically-salient] topic were as hard-
pressed as colleagues casually dropping in from other fields to affix 
realistic probabilities to possible futures.3 (Tetlock, 2005, p. 54) 
The research results demonstrated that there was no evidence that ‘distinguished 
political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on – are any better 
than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in “reading” emerging 
situations.’ (ibid., p. 233) 
Tetlock claims that his findings are robust when controlled for seniority, types of 
expertise (academic, government or private-sector background), and apply across 
a variety of subtypes – short-term or long-term, domestic, economic and national 
security issues, thereby leading him to the conclusion that ‘the case for 
performance parity between experts and dilettantes is strong’ (ibid.). Unfortunately 
human beings are predisposed to put a high premium on expert opinion: 
                                            
3 The predictions Tetlock considers are of the same normative type as ‘Was the Iraq war a 
good decision?’ as opposed to a factual question like ‘Does Saddam have WMDs?’. I’m 
grateful to Hélène Landemore for this point. 
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We are in thrall to experts for the same reasons that our ancestors 
submitted to shamans and oracles: our uncontrollable need to believe 
in a controllable world and our flawed understanding of the laws of 
chance. We lack the willpower and good sense to resist the snake oil 
products on offer. Who wants to believe that, on the big questions, we 
could do as well tossing a coin as by consulting the accredited 
experts? (Tetlock, 2005, p. 63) 
The central argument of this thesis is that we would, indeed, be better off ‘tossing a 
coin’ – in the metaphorical sense of devolving our political decisions to a random 
sample of dilettantes selected ‘by bean’ rather then relying on a class of self-
proclaimed political experts, given that the aggregate epistemic ability of dilettantes 
appears just as good. If anything it’s better than parity as ‘better-known forecasters 
– those more likely to be feted by the media – were less well calibrated than their 
lower-profile colleagues’ (Tetlock, 2005, p. 68, my emphasis). This may well be 
because media pundits (and some celebrity politicians) tend to be strongly 
opinionated and primarily drawn from those who ‘know one big thing’ – doggedly 
persistent ‘hedgehogs’ in Isaiah Berlin’s dichotomy, as opposed to the wily 
opportunist pragmatism of their fox-like opponents (Berlin, 1997). ‘The worst 
performers were hedgehog extremists making long-term predictions in their 
domain of expertise’ (Tetlock, 2005, p. 80) – just the sort of people who make 
interesting media pundits. Knowledge decreases the accuracy of forecasters that 
fall within this category of cognitive styles – another factor supporting the case for a 
diverse sample of amateur decision makers.  
It might well be retorted that elected politicians are not, and could never be, experts 
on the wide range of issues that they are asked to legislate over. Politicians draw 
heavily on an army of advisors (both within their own staff and the government 
bureaucracy) and generally take decisions on the basis of a short executive 
summary or other heuristic (such as party policy and manifesto commitments). 
Elections are undertaken in order to select intelligent and competent decision-
makers, rather than experts – ‘elections appear to vet candidates so that the better 
ones for the job are more likely to be selected’ (Bergers, 2015, p. 13) – so it is no 
coincidence that most elected politicians have a background in professions with 
highly-transferrable cognitive skills – law, finance, business or public service. 
(Ornstein, Mann, & Malbin, 2008, p. 35) 
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There is, however, a growing body of empirical research in deliberative polling, 
citizens’ juries, and randomly-selected constitutional assemblies indicating that 
ordinary citizens are capable of judging a range of complex political issues in an 
equally competent manner, when presented with balanced information and 
advocacy (Fishkin, 2009; Gronlund, Bachtiger, & Setala, 2014; Smith, 2009). The 
principal reason for the lack of citizen competence regarding political matters is the 
problem of rational ignorance in the context of elections – there is no obvious 
incentive for citizens to inform themselves on issues where their single vote has 
negligible causal efficacy. This problem, however, is resolved by randomly-
selected mini-publics, where every vote really does count and proper deliberation 
is integrated into the process before the vote. Coote and Leneghan, who ran 
projects with citizens’ juries in the UK observe that: 
The pilots indicate that most jurors are reasonably well able to deal 
with quite complex issues and to scrutinise and assimilate arguments 
and data. Their capacity to do so depends to a great extent upon the 
question and agenda being prepared in an appropriate and 
manageable form . . . [W]e were deeply impressed – as were most 
other observers – with the level of competence with which jurors 
tackled their task. (Coote & Lenaghan, 1997, pp. 88-89) 
Tetlock’s findings would suggest that a random sample would be as good decision-
makers as professional politicians, less amenable to group-think and other forms of 
cognitive bias, and would more accurately represent the preferences and interests 
of the target population that they represent ‘statistically’, whereas there are reasons 
to believe that the preferences and interests of the political class may well deviate 
from those of the wider population (Gilens & Page, 2014).4 Although a random 
                                            
4 Although commentators like Hélène Landemore, drawing on the tradition of J.S. Mill, view 
the representation of preferences and interests in epistemic terms, this thesis is closer to 
the Marxist understanding of the determination of interests by social and economic factors, 
so deals with the representation of interests in a different context (Chapter 4); ditto the 
(lack of) accountability of political decision-makers selected by lot (Chapter 5).
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sample of all citizens would be equally likely to include those of a ‘hedgehog’5 
disposition (we have all come across the ‘Alf Garnett’ type – the saloon bar bore 
who regales all in earshot with his dogmatic and poorly-informed view of the world), 
there are good reasons to believe that the aggregate judgment of the random 
sample would be closer to Tetlock’s epistemic ideal: 
Good judges tend to be moderate foxes: eclectic thinkers who are 
tolerant of counterarguments, and prone to hedge their probabilistic 
bets and not stray too far from just-guessing and base-rate 
probabilities of events’ (Tetllock, 2005, p. 85).  
The moderation and ‘foxeyness’ of the group is for purely statistical reasons – 
given that the remit of the minidemos would be limited to listening to balanced 
information and then voting, there are reasons to think that the outliers (the ‘Alf 
Garnetts’ and ‘Citizen Smiths’ in the sample) would cancel out (assuming a large 
enough sample), leaving the aggregate decision in the hands of the silent 
majority.6 Moderation and pragmatism would be an emergent property of the group 
judgment, which would not require a majority of fox-like pragmatists in the group. In 
psephological terms this would be equivalent to the mean – rather, than median – 
voter theorem. This fox-like style of judgment (that correlates with accurate 
forecasting) – ‘scattered and diffused, moving on many levels, seizing upon the 
essence of a vast variety of experiences’ (Tetlock, 2005, p. 87) – is a product of the 
diversity of a randomly-selected sample, rather than the cognitive styles of 
individual members of the group: 
[A] single expert who thinks like a ‘fox’ rather than a ‘hedgehog’ . . . is 
probably equivalent to a diverse enough group of people. In fact, 
diverse enough groups can outperform even a ‘fox’, since the fox is 
outperformed by statistical regression, and large groups’ predictive 
                                            
5 ‘Hedgehogs were more likely to be [ideological] extremists (average r = .31 across the 
three content of belief system scales.’ (Tetlock, 2005, p. 84) 
6 Extreme views would also tend to be filtered out at the earlier (deliberative) stage, so 
decision-makers would only get to vote on more reasonable proposals. 
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power can be uncannily close to a complex statistical regression. 
(Landemore, 2013, pp. 15-16) 
There are also good reasons to imagine that sampling from a pool of (effective) 
volunteers7 (a procedure used in a number of citizen assemblies and policy juries) 
would return a higher proportion of partisans and strongly-opinionated hedgehog 
types (Fiorina, 1999), whereas randomly-selected ‘conscripts’8 – who have no 
particular interest in political matters – would be more likely to make their minds up 
after listening to the evidence and arguments. This is a statistical variant of James 
Madison’s search for ‘disinterested’ political representatives that he argued (rightly 
or wrongly) would be privileged by elections in large constituencies. 
This chapter considers in turn two very different models for the implementation of 
aggregate judgment and collective wisdom – the Condorcetian ‘jury theorem’ and 
the Aristotelian ‘pot-luck meal’ – as relevant to isonomia and isegoria (the diarchy 
at the heart of this thesis) respectively, and argues that sortition is the 
epistemically-appropriate way to implement aggregate judgment (isonomia) only. 
This is because, in the words of Thucydides’ Athenagoras at democratic Syracuse, 
although ‘the best counselors are the intelligent it is the many who are best at 
listening to the different arguments and judging between them’ (Th. 6.39.1). 
However, when it comes to harvesting the cognitive diversity necessary for 
representative isegoria, better mechanisms are available than relying on the 
democratic mechanism of ‘pot luck’. The two mechanisms are entirely different, as 
the independent judgment required by Condorcetian procedures to establish the 
                                            
7 The word ‘volunteer’ reflects the disparity between those invited to participate via the 
original random sample and the small minority who accept the invitation – in the case of 
the British Columbia Citizen Assembly a mere 4% (Warren and Pearse, 2008). There is no 
way to tell the degree to which the final assembly was an accurate microcosm of the whole 
population – arguably citizens with a proactive interest in political and constitutional issues 
would be more likely to volunteer their time, thereby making a highly unrepresentative 
sample of the target population (see p. 156, above).  
8 The use of the term ‘conscript’ assumes that the summons to serve on a political jury 
would be at least as mandatory as that of its judicial equivalent. Consideration would also 
need to be given to minimum age and competence levels, along with the exclusion of 
felons or citizens with a history of psychological disorders. (Burgers, 2012, p. 16) 
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‘right’ answer rules out the collaborative exchange of ideas suggested by the pot-
luck meal analogy: 
The [Condorcetian] collective wisdom9 that something like the Iowa 
Electronic Markets produces is, at least when it’s working well, the 
result of many different independent judgments, rather than something 
that the group as a whole has consciously come up with. In a small 
[Aristotelian] group, by contrast, the group – even if it is an ad hoc 
group formed for the sake of a single project or experiment – has an 
identity of its own. And the influence of the people in the group on 
each other’s judgment is inescapable. (Surowiecki, 2004, p. 176) 
According to Hélène Landemore this distinction – between ‘counting’ [isonomia] 
and ‘talking’ [isegoria] 10 has its origins in Plato’s dialogue Protagoras: or the 
Sophists.11 According to Protagoras’s myth, every human being has a parcel of 
political knowledge (politike techne) and Zeus insisted that this should be 
distributed equally to everybody. Political knowledge can be accessed in a 
democratic manner either by a) counting heads or b) exchanging reasons. The 
modern ‘counting’ tradition takes up the aggregative idea present in the myth: 
Spinoza is possibly the first to refer to the advantage conferred by the 
sheer number of people involved in the making of a decision. This 
tradition focuses on the epistemic properties of judgment aggregation 
when large numbers of people are involved. This intuitive idea takes 
proper analytical shape in the Jury Theorem of the philosopher and 
mathematician Condorcet, which puts the law of large numbers in the 
                                            
9 Arguably markets’ wisdom is better explained by ‘the Miracle of Aggregation’ (Landemore, 
2013, pp. 156-60), as the CJT is a narrower result, tailored specifically to explain majority 
rule’s epistemic properties.  
10 Landemore attributes the labeling – ‘counting’ and ‘talking’ – to Jacob Levy. 
11 Protagoras (485-420 BC) is often viewed as the first democratic political theorist. (Farrar, 
1988, p. 77; Finley, 1973, p. 28). As this is a thesis in conceptual political theory as 
opposed to the history of political thought, my discussion of the historical sources of the 
dichotomy are more sketchy than the chapter of Landemore’s book devoted to a ‘Selective 
Genealogy of the Epistemic Argument for Democracy’. (Landemore, 2013, Ch.3) 
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service of an epistemic argument for majority rule. . . . the aggregative 
tradition is heavily dependent on the progress of the mathematical 
sciences and, in particular, probability theory. (Landemore, 2013, p. 
54) 
The alternative, ‘talking’, tradition in the myth, which runs from Aristotle to Dewey, 
develops the idea in a deliberative direction: 
The contemporary heirs of such a tradition are deliberative epistemic 
democrats (e.g., Cohen, Estlund, Habermas). This deliberative 
tradition suggests that if the many can be smarter than, or at least as 
smart as, the few, it is because democratic discussion mirrors at the 
level of the group the individual elements of reason present in each 
citizen. (ibid., p. 53) 
The exposition of the ‘counting’ rationale in the next section is heavily indebted to 
James Surowiecki’s 2004 book The Wisdom of Crowds – and I argue at the end of 
the chapter that his dismissal of James Fishkin’s attempt to apply the wisdom of 
crowds to political decision-making is on account of a widespread failure within the 
deliberative democracy literature to draw a clear conceptual distinction between 
the two forms of collective wisdom – Condorcetian (counting) and Aristotelian 
(talking). 
6.1  The counting approach: 
 Condorcet’s jury theorem and the ‘wisdom of crowds’ 
The ‘wisdom’ of the aggregate judgment of a large group is a statistical one – the 
mathematics behind the Condorcet Jury Theorem being not that dissimilar from the 
Law of Large Numbers (see Appendix A2.2.2). What is the nature of the ‘wisdom’ 
involved? 
[T]he answer rests on a mathematical truism. If you ask a large 
enough group of diverse, independent people to make a prediction or 
estimate a probability, and then average those estimates, the errors 
each of them makes in coming up with an answer will cancel 
themselves out. Each person’s guess, you might say, has two 
168 
components: information and error. Subtract the error, and you’re left 
with the information.12 (Surowiecki, 2004, p. 10) 
In his 1785 work Essai sur l'application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions 
rendues à la pluralité des voix (Condorcet, 1994), the Marquis de Condorcet 
imagined a decision-making jury each of whose members could make a correct13 
decision with a fixed probability p, where ½ < p < 1. From this assumption, 
Condorcet proved that 1) the probability that the committee’s majority will decide 
correctly is higher than p; and 2) the probability that the committee’s majority will 
decide correctly approaches 1 as the size of the jury increases (Stone, 1999, p. 1). 
The theorem has been confirmed by a number of recent studies, including the 
demonstration that majorities will still outperform the average individual in a group 
event even if p is allowed to vary by individual, as long as the distribution of values 
of p is symmetric. (Grofman, Owen, & Feld, 1983) 
The outcomes of this mathematical truism are surprisingly useful in practice. 
Francis Galton was astonished to discover at a 1906 country fair that the average 
of the entries to a competition to estimate the weight of a dressed ox was 1,197 
pounds, whereas the actual weight was 1,198 pounds (Surowiecki, 2004, p. xiii). In 
the TV game show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, pre-selected experts were only 
correct sixty-five percent of the time, whereas the comparable average figure for 
the random studio audience was ninety-one percent (ibid., p. 4); in an experiment 
in the 1920s, the aggregate judgment of students asked to guess the temperature 
                                            
12 There is also an elitist version of this ‘miracle of aggregation’, according to which ‘a few 
informed people in a group are enough to guide the group to the right average answer, as 
long as uninformed people’s answers are randomly or symmetrically distributed and thus 
cancel each other out’. (Landemore, 2013, p. 157) 
13 From the perspective of this chapter the assumption that there is such a thing as an 
epistemically ‘correct’ decision in political matters is deemed plausible, as few would deny 
that a procedurally-legitimate decision that resulted in a famine or economic collapse was 
a wrong one from an epistemic perspective (Estlund, 2008, pp. 159-183). Whilst relativists 
and proceduralists might question the validity of extending this principle beyond such 
extreme examples, the aims of this thesis are comparatively modest. All that is required is 
to demonstrate that 1) the aggregate decision is of higher epistemic value than those of the 
individuals making up the group and 2) that the decision is no worse than one that might 
have been arrived at by other procedures (including arrogating the decision to 
professionals and experts). 
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of a classroom was less than half a degree Farenheit off the actual temperature; 
and a group estimate of the number of jelly beans in a jar (871) was very close to 
the actual number (850) (ibid., pp. 3-5). The wisdom of crowds is an emergent 
statistical property and the accuracy increases with the size of the group (as 
Condorcet demonstrated mathematically) – in Galton’s case 787 entry tickets, but 
in the jelly bean experiment a mere fifty-six (ibid., p. 5). 
Tetlock’s quantitative study of the accuracy of political predictions also endorsed 
the value of statistical aggregation as ‘the average predictions of forecasters are 
generally more accurate than the majority of [individual] forecasters from whom the 
averages were computed’ (Tetlock, 2005, p. 118). And this mathematical truism 
has important implications in the real world beyond the social science laboratory. 
For example the spread betting industry depends entirely on the aggregate 
statistical accuracy of punters’ predictions – the profitability of the business does 
not depend on bookmaker’s professional knowledge of ‘form’, but on the fact that 
the bookie’s margin on the bets they win is higher than on those they lose (ibid., p. 
12); Google’s phenomenally successful page-ranking algorithm merely reflects the 
aggregate ‘wisdom’ of millions of independent web users (ibid., pp. 16-17); and the 
accuracy of prediction, futures and decision markets like the Iowa Electronic 
Markets and Hollywood Stock Exchange depends entirely on the diversity, 
independence and decentralization of thousands of punters who are prepared to 
put their money where their mouth is (ibid., p. 22). Google’s recent (2016) Penguin 
algorithm revisions introduced severe penalties for attempts to undermine the 
accuracy of diverse and independent collective wisdom via search engine 
optimization (SEO). 
These three vital conditions – diversity, independence and decentralization – are 
what differentiate the ‘crowd’ in the heading of this section (borrowed from the title 
of James Surowiecki’s book), from a herd (or a mob). A well-calibrated stock 
market degenerates into a bubble when too many people follow each others’ lead, 
the problem being, in the words of Fortune managing editor Andy Serwer, ‘the 
more stocks go up, the more of us get into the market’ (cited in Surowiecki, 2004, p. 
257). At this point the market begins to look more like a herd or a mob:  
A mob in the middle of a riot appears to be a single organism acting 
with one mind. And obviously the mob’s behavior has a collective 
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dimension that a group of random people just milling about does not 
have. (ibid., pp. 256-7) 
As Charles Mackay put it in his 1841 book Extraordinary Popular Delusions and 
the Madness of Crowds (to which Surowiecki tilts his hat ironically): 
Men, it has been well said, think in herds . . . It will be seen that they 
go mad in herds, while they only recover their senses slowly, and one 
by one. (Mackay, 1980 (1841), p. xx) 
Surowiecki’s inversion of Mackay’s claim depends on the diversity in the cognitive 
styles of a large number of sovereign individuals:  
[I]n most of [the experiments] the members of the group were not 
talking to each other or working on a problem together. They were 
making individual guesses, which were aggregated and then 
averaged. This is exactly what Galton did, and it is likely to produce 
excellent results. . . . Each fairgoer figured out his estimate of the 
weight of the ox on his own, relying on what economists call ‘private 
information’. (Private information isn’t just concrete data. It can also 
include interpretation, analysis, or even intuition.) And when you put all 
those independent estimates together, the combined guess was, as 
we’ve seen, near perfect. (Surowiecki, 2004, pp. 5, 41) 
In this respect Surowiecki would not disagree with Friedrich Schiller’s dictum: 
‘anyone taken as an individual is tolerably sensible or reasonable – as a member 
of a [herd] he at once becomes a blockhead’ (quoted by financier Bernard Baruch 
in his introduction to the 1934 edition of Mackay’s book). In other words as soon as 
sovereign individuals start to act in harmony (i.e. as a herd) then the benefit of 
epistemic diversity is lost. Herding behaviour can also explain the innate 
conservatism of football coaches and mutual-fund managers and why ‘no one ever 
got fired for buying IBM’ (Surowiecki, 2004, p. 49). ‘Someone who bucks the [herd] 
runs the risk of being considered crazy’ (ibid., p. 50). For this reason Surowiecki’s 
thesis presupposes the categorical distinction between crowd and herd. A crowd, 
unlike a herd, mob, or colony of ants, is a group of individuals who just happen to 
be sharing the same space (physical and/or virtual). 
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And this is not just a matter of large crowds, as the phenomenon of ‘groupthink’ 
(Janis, 1982), group polarization (Sunstein, 2002), status deference (Torrance, 
1955), talkativeness, informational and reputational cascades, and ‘conformation 
bias’ – when decision makers unconsciously seek information that reinforces their 
underlying intuitions (Surowiecki, 2004, pp. 177-8) – mostly applies to small 
collectivities like working parties, parliaments or juries14 deliberating together (Le 
Bon, 1982):  
Fostering diversity is actually more important in small groups and in 
formal organizations than in larger collectives – like markets or 
electorates – for a simple reason: the sheer size of most markets, 
coupled with the fact that anyone with money can enter them (you 
don’t need to be admitted or hired), means that a certain level of 
diversity is almost guaranteed. (Surowiecki, 2001, p. 29) 
According to the psychologist Irving Janis, the principal cause of a foreign policy 
disaster like the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion was the fact that a small committee 
within the Kennedy administration planned and carried out its strategy without ever 
talking to anyone who was sceptical of the prospects of success (Janis, 1982). As 
the historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. put it, ‘Our meetings took place in a curious 
atmosphere of assumed consensus’ (cited in Surowiecki, 2004, p. 37). In a group 
that shares a common mindset the centripetal forces leading to unanimity are hard 
to resist, and shared beliefs are reinforced by a process that discredits or overlooks 
information that challenges the conventional wisdom. Ongoing independence of 
                                            
14 Note the difference between the aggregative (majority) judgment of the legislative juries 
proposed in Chapter 4 (comprised of sovereign individuals) and the collective judgment of 
a trial jury (where unanimity is the default outcome). The former is a passive act of 
isonomic representation (of the opinions, interests and beliefs of the target population), 
whereas the latter is an attempt to uncover the truth of the matter (guilt or innocence); the 
former ‘does not ask it’s members to modify their positions in order to let the group reach a 
decision everyone can be happy with’ (Surowiecki, 2004, p. xix). Such an individualist 
procedure would be of no use in a criminal trial (jury members do indeed seek to persuade 
minority members to change their position, as Landemore (2013) notes in her study of the 
movie Twelve Angry Men) and would be frowned on by Habermasian-style deliberative 
democrats, who privilege unanimity. The only way to reconcile the two different jury styles 
is to (artificially) insist that political decision-making is a purely epistemic process in which 
values and preferences have no part to play. 
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judgment is much harder to achieve in small deliberative groups, especially ones 
that frown on opinion/preference aggregation mechanisms like voting by privileging 
the dispassionate rule of reasons that everybody can accept.15 This is an 
inconvenient truth for advocates of (Habermasian) deliberative democracy as ‘you 
can be biased and irrational, but as long as you’re independent, you won’t make 
the group any dumber’ (Surowiecki, 2004, p. 41). Solomon Asch’s classic studies 
in which experimental subjects were induced to deny the clear evidence of their 
own eyes by an emergent group consensus (manufactured by undercover 
confederates of the experimenter) provide graphic evidence of the power of 
groupthink. (Asch, 1963) 
Independence is important as it helps ‘keep the mistakes that people make from 
becoming correlated’ and because independents are more likely to be able to 
contribute new information rather than the familiar old data (Surowiecki, 2004, p. 
41). The other value is that independence and decentralization help prevent 
‘information cascades’ – when everyone ends up making the wrong decision by 
following the lead of pioneers possessed (by chance) of the wrong information. 
This was the reason behind the nineteenth-century mania for plank roads and 
other evolutionary dead ends.  (ibid., pp. 53-4) 
Although Surowiecki uses terms like ‘crowd’, ‘collectivity, ‘group’, and ‘collective 
intelligence’ interchangeably throughout the book, most of his (benign) examples 
aggregate the judgments of individuals (who may or may not be gathered together 
in one place at the same time) as ‘paradoxically, the best way for the group to be 
smart is for each person in it to think and act as independently as possible’. 
(Surowiecki, 2004, pp. xix-xx) – the group is a ‘statistical’ reality, rather than an 
‘experiential’ one (ibid., p. 175). This is the model underwriting the practical 
proposal in Chapter 8 for large randomly-selected legislative juries whose remit is 
limited to listening to balanced information and advocacy and then voting in secret, 
                                            
15 Although independence can be cultivated by ‘positive dissensus’ (Landemore and Page, 
2015), and under ideal conditions the epistemic benefits of active deliberation can 
potentially outrank those of voting. 
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thereby maintaining the diversity and independence criteria essential for the 
(statistical) wisdom of crowds.16  
However, the evidence supporting the epistemic value of randomly-selected 
bodies is limited to the ability of juries to make an aggregate judgment on a pre-
specified agenda, hence Jan-Willem Burgers’ (2015) claim that sortition-based 
assemblies are only suitable for holding politicians to account and judging the 
outcome of an informed debate on legislative proposals – i.e. an isonomic function 
(in the terminology of this thesis). The (statistical) wisdom of crowds has no 
relevance to the other, innovative, role of elected politicians, i.e. coming up with, 
and arguing the merits of new proposals (isegoria). This would suggest a 
bicameral design in which the allotted assembly had a veto role over proposals 
generated exogenously by elected politicians or direct-democratic mechanisms. 
The competing ‘democratic reason’ model – in which ordinary citizens are required 
to play a far more active role in proposing and arguing for or against policy 
initiatives – is outlined in the next section, along with criticism of the claim that 
random selection has a useful role to play in the process. 
6.2  The talking approach: 
Cognitive diversity and democratic reason 
Hélène Landemore’s 2013 book Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective 
Intelligence and the Rule of the Many is the principal critical focus of this section as 
                                            
16 (Landemore & Page, 2015) argue that political decision making is largely a matter of 
prediction (e.g. ‘assessment of what is most conducive to the common good on, let us say, 
the question of budget deficits’ (ibid., p. 230), and that deliberative exchange can eliminate 
errors and enrich people’s predictive models on such issues, on the basis of ‘positive 
dissensus’. However the authors specifically bracket out the problem of preference 
aggregation (arguably the most important responsibility of legislative juries acting as a 
proxy for the whole political community), and it is unclear how large randomly-selected 
groups of amateurs could do anything more than ‘report their signals’ – a form of 
deliberation ruled out as having no epistemic value (ibid., p. 239) – without adversely 
affecting the descriptive representativity of the jury. Such forms of deliberation may be of 
value to elite bodies (many of the examples chosen are from macroeconomic theory), but 
of little relevance to a large randomly-selected body charged with reflecting the informed 
preferences of the whole political community. 
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it offers one of the most developed arguments for the epistemic benefits of the 
talking approach. Deliberative democrats are, by contrast, more interested in 
procedural norms, and Landemore also distances her approach from the wisdom 
of crowds model outlined in the previous section: 
Although James Surowiecki (2004) has made the case for more-
inclusive decision making on the basis of the statistical properties of 
large numbers and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, he says little about 
cognitive diversity per se. He also tends to focus only on the purely 
aggregative side of collective intelligence, dismissing its deliberative 
aspects as counterproductive and conducive to polarization. 
(Landemore, 2013, p. 7) 
Many of the advocates for the talking approach to collective wisdom ground their 
argument in a passage from Aristotle’s Politics: 
The many (hoi polloi), of whom none is individually an excellent 
(spoudaios) man, nevertheless can, when joined together, be better 
than those [the excellent few], not as individuals but all together (hôs 
sumpantas), just as potluck (sumphorêta) dinners can be better than 
those provided at one man's expense. For, there being many, each 
person possesses a constituent part (morion) of virtue (aretê) and 
practical reason (phronêsis), and when they have come together, the 
multitude (plêthos) is like a single person (hôsper hena anthrôpon), yet 
many-footed and many-handed and possessing many sense-
capacities (aisthêseis), so it is likewise [like a single person with 
multiple excellences] as regards to its facets of character (ta êthê) and 
its intelligence (dianoia). This is why the many (hoi polloi) judge better 
in regard to musical works and those of the poets, for some judge a 
particular part (ti morion), while all of them judge the whole (panta de 
pantes). (Arist., Pol, 3.1281a42-b10) 
The interpretation of this passage is the subject of ongoing scholarly dispute 
(Cammack, 2013a; Waldron, 1995); Waldron’s interpretation underwrites 
Landemore’s epistemic case for democracy, whereas Cammack focuses instead 
on collective virtue. Waldron suggests two versions of the ‘doctrine of the wisdom 
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of the multitude’ (DWM): a weak version (DWM1) claims that the wisdom of the 
group is superior to that of any of its component members, whereas a strong 
version (DWM2) argues that the people as a whole (i.e. the demos) is wiser than 
any subset – aristocratic or otherwise – on account of the maximisation of cognitive 
diversity. Landemore acknowledges Bernard Manin’s observation (Manin, 2005, p. 
17) that nowhere in the passage does Aristotle employ the notion of deliberation 
(sumbouleuoin), suggesting that deliberative democrats need to be a little cautious 
about grounding their project in this particular classic text; however most 
commentators (Risse, 2001; Waldron, 1999a) view the mechanism as deliberative 
(talking) rather than aggregative (counting). As the methodology of this thesis is 
conceptual analysis as opposed to historical exegesis, this interpretative debate is 
of secondary importance and I’m content therefore for Aristotle to be used as the 
pin-up boy for those arguing the case for the deliberative approach to collective 
wisdom17 – the claim will be judged on its own merits, as opposed to an argument 
from ancient authority.  
Landemore tracks the development of the notion of collective wisdom in the 
writings of Aquinas, Peter of Auvergne and in Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor Pacis 
(‘the common utility of a law is better known by the entire multitude’).18 However 
this could be taken as an example of the combination of aristocratic deliberation 
and popular judgment, on account of the Aristotelian argument that whereas artists 
and architects are the best designers of paintings and buildings, those who look at 
the paintings and live in the houses are the best judges of their quality (Landemore, 
2013, p. 64). If you want a reliable hotel review then aggregate the total ratings on 
Trip Advisor, but this has nothing to do with deliberation (the ideal review system 
would prohibit new commentators from reading earlier reviews before posting their 
own ratings). 
                                            
17 Aristotle, of course, was no democrat and thought you needed to have a reasonably 
well-educated populace to get the right answer. 
18 Cited in (Bull, 2005, p. 26). 
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Landemore’s interpretation of Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy – which famously 
equates vox populi with vox dei – also sugggests a non-deliberative slant as the 
‘prudence’, ‘stability’ and ‘better judgment’ of the people is on account of its ‘hidden’ 
virtue (Landemore, 2013, p. 64, my emphasis). Sometimes Machiavelli claims that 
this virtue is an innate (social-psychological) characteristic of the populi, but it 
always cashes out in terms of the aggregative judgment revealed by voting: 
As to judging things, if a people hears two orators who incline to 
different sides, when they are of equal virtue, very few times does one 
see it not take up the better opinion, and not be persuaded of the truth 
that it hears. (Machiavelli, 1996, p. 158) 
In this example the deliberative function is arrogated to the (elite) orators, so the 
‘voice’ of the populi is limited to voting – when defeated candidate Dick Tuck 
remarked that ‘the people have spoken, the bastards’, his reference was to the 
counting of the votes for the California State Senate election of 1966. As such 
Machiavelli’s Discourses would support the case for the Wisdom of Crowds 
(previous section), rather than Collective Wisdom (this section). John P. 
McCormick’s Machiavellian Democracy also proposes that the direct-democratic 
role of the populi in a modern democracy should be limited to a randomly-selected 
minidemos, which would possess a judgment (or veto) role – the modern 
equivalent of the Tribuni Plebis (McCormick, 2011, Ch. 4). Once again this is a 
hidden virtue that emerges through the aggregation process, not through 
deliberation: 
This ability to make good judgments is, in Machiavelli’s account, 
passive and reactive. The people do not initiate a view; they simply 
respond to those voiced [by elite orators] in the public forum. 
(Landemore, 2013, p. 66) 
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Landemore’s discussion of Rousseau’s general will assumes an epistemic, rather 
than proceduralist, interpretation (ibid., p. 69).19 However Rousseau is 
unambiguously hostile to deliberation in any context other than behind the closed 
doors of the council chamber of the (aristocratic) government. Rousseau’s 
requirement for independent judgment, untarnished by discursive and factional 
considerations, means that citizens should vote independently and on the basis of 
their own intuitive knowledge of the issues involved – to Rousseau, the right 
answer is simply obvious, so long as the citizen is pure of heart (Landemore, 2013, 
p. 74). Another passage from the Social Contract suggests that Rousseauian 
judgment may even be aggregative as ‘if one takes away the pluses and minuses 
[of the individual wills] which cancel each other out, what is left as the sum of the 
differences is the general will (Rousseau, 1998, p. 29). Rousseau is firmly in the 
counting not the talking camp, as he believes deliberation should be in camera – 
quarantined behind the doors of the (aristocratic) council chamber. 
Perhaps the first thinker since Aristotle to adopt the conception of deliberative 
collective wisdom was John Stuart Mill, via his argument for the epistemic merits of 
government by discussion and popular participation (Landemore, 2013, p. 75). But 
Landemore is more inclined to describe Mill as an epistemic liberal (with an elitist 
inclination) rather than a deliberative democrat as ‘the function of the 
democratically elected legislature is merely to vote up or down on legislation that a 
committee of experts write’ (ibid., p. 81). Mill does, however, make the epistemic 
case for democracy: 
When a subject arises in which the labourers as such have an 
interest, is it regarded from any point of view but that of the employers 
of labour? I do not say that the working men’s view of these questions 
is in general nearer to the truth than the other: but it is sometimes 
quite as near; and in any case it ought to be respectfully listened to, 
                                            
19 For an overview of the epistemic/proceduralist debate on Rousseau’s general will see 
(Bertram, 2012). Whereas proceduralists claim that the outcome of the vote defines the 
general will, epistemic democrats see it as (fallible) evidence for it. (Landemore, 2013, p. 
45) 
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instead of being, as it is, not merely turned away from, but ignored.20 
(Mill, 1991, p. 246) 
Note that ‘respectfully listened to’ might be taken to suggest that active deliberation 
is an elite function, with the representatives of labour being afforded the status of 
expert witnesses (rather than equal participants), and popular participation is 
primarily lauded for its ‘educative’ and ‘protective’ rather than epistemic function. 
Mill’s plural voting system, with multiple votes allocated to those with a university 
degree and freely-elected members of learned societies, was more liberal than 
democratic. Nevertheless he was probably the first modern thinker to make the 
epistemic case for deliberation and to couch it in terms of the whole citizen body: 
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is 
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; 
those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If 
the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging 
error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the 
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its 
collision with error. (Mill, 1991, p. 21) 
The deliberative assembly should be a ‘Congress of Opinions’ and it should be 
comprised of ‘a fair sample of every grade of intellect among the people’ rather 
than ‘a selection of the greatest political minds in the country’ (Mill, 1991, p. 284, 
cited in Landemore, 2013, p. 81), and it is for this reason that Mill is correctly cited 
as the first modern advocate of democratic reason (collective wisdom). 
Landemore recruits John Dewey (1859-1952) to the talking wing of the collective 
wisdom dichotomy – as an ‘epistemic deliberative democrat’ – on account of his 
model of embodied social intelligence, whereby everyone benefits from ‘the 
knowledge contributed by many people, in however small amounts, crystallized 
and fixed for the future of public knowledge’ (Landemore, 2013, pp. 83-4). The 
                                            
20 The above passage would have been understood by Mill’s contemporary Karl Marx in 
terms of the representation of interests, as opposed to the search for truth, see p. 163, 
above. 
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development of embodied intelligence presupposes that all citizens engage in 
face-to-face community deliberation, as the important thing about democracy is not 
voting per se, but the public discussion that precedes it. However, when it comes 
to his discussion of political institutions in The Public and Its Problems (Dewey, 
1954 [1927]), the traditional distinction between elites and the public is preserved:  
Dewey suggests that even if the public is not necessarily the best 
problem solver, it is nevertheless the best judge of where the problem 
lies; hence the need to consult it. (Landemore, 2013, p. 82) 
In fact Dewey’s division of labour between elite and public (the former talking and 
the latter voting) bears more affinity to the counting model outlined in the previous 
section: 
It is not necessary that the many should have the knowledge and skill 
to carry on the needed investigations; what is required is that they 
have the ability to judge the bearing of the knowledge supplied by 
others upon common concerns. It is easy to exaggerate the amount of 
intelligence and ability demanded to render such judgments fitted for 
their purpose. (Dewey, 1954, p. 208, my emphasis) 
It would appear that, for Dewey, popular deliberation should be reserved for the 
informal public sphere as opposed to being part of the institutions of governance, 
so he can be viewed as a precursor of the modern deliberative democracy 
movement, prior to the change of focus introduced by (Habermas, 2006). 
Landemore concludes her ‘selective genealogy of the epistemic argument for 
democracy’ with a discussion of Hayek, but only to illustrate her argument that the 
agora and the pnyx need to be kept separate.  
In summary, although some of the writers that she engages with do flirt with talking, 
the majority (Mill being the key exception) focus primarily on counting and draw a 
distinction between the proposers and the disposers, the talkers and the counters. 
Landemore’s selective genealogy of the epistemic argument for democracy 
provides little support for the talking approach to collective wisdom, so her case 
must stand or fall on its own intrinsic merits. 
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6.2.1  Exchanging reasons – vs – weighing reasons 
Following Bernard Manin, Landemore identifies two forms of simple deliberation: 
1. The action of deliberating, or weighing a thing in the mind; careful 
consideration with a view to decision. 
2. The consideration and discussions of the reasons for and against a 
measure by a number of councillors (e.g. in a legislative assembly). 
(Manin, 2005, p. 14)21 
Yves Sintomer (2010, pp. 36n; 47) goes further and describes these as two 
alternative forms of deliberation, with different etymologies. The first derives from 
the Latin liber (weight), so the role of de-liber-ators is to ‘weigh’ arguments in their 
minds before disposing (deciding the outcome of the debate): 
Deliberation is nothing else but a weighing, as it were in scales, the 
conveniences, and inconveniences of the fact we are attempting. 
(Hobbes, De Cive, XIII, 16) 
The second (Habermasian) form of deliberation (good discussion) is derived from 
the German for ‘deliberative voice’, and is at the core of the proposing function 
(see Chapter 5.1.1, above). The ‘weighing’ variant pertains to the previous section 
of this chapter (and the general thrust of this thesis), as the counting approach 
requires prior mental evaluation before voting. The silent deliberation privileged by 
Robert Goodin, Simon Niemeyer and James Fishkin presupposes the Latin 
derivation (although Fishkin does make some token concessions towards 
Habermasian norms in the small-group deliberation stage of the DP). But 
proposing is a prerequisite for disposing and you can’t really have the one without 
the other. Dividing the two forms of deliberation between two institutions (as in the 
judicial separation of advocates and jury) protects against corruption, and it’s not 
clear why randomly-selected disposers need to participate in the speech acts that 
are the defining characteristic of the proposing function (see Chapter 4, above).  
                                            
21 Manin’s source was the Oxford English Dictionary. For further discussion of this 
distinction, see Chapter 5.1, above. 
181 
Indeed Landemore suggests distinct cognitive mechanisms corresponding to each 
form of deliberation. The ‘argumentative theory of reasoning’ (conceptualized by 
Dan Sperber and developed with the evolutionary psychologist Hugo Mercier) 
hypothesizes that reasoning serves two distinct survival-related functions: a) 
convincing people and b) evaluating the arguments of others – ‘thereby allowing 
communication to proceed even when trust is limited’ (Landemore, 2013, p. 126). 
The theory – developed as an evolutionarily-plausible alternative to the classical 
(Cartesian) model of reasoning as a way of updating and correcting one’s own 
beliefs – is based on the distinction between performing speech acts and 
evaluating the performative utterances of others: 
According to this theory, individual reasoning works best when used to 
[a] produce and [b] evaluate arguments during a public deliberation. It 
predicts that when diverse opinions are discussed, group reasoning 
will outperform individual reasoning. (Mercier & Landemore, 2012, p. 
243) 
According to Mercier and Landemore the argumentative theory of reasoning 
privileges intra-group exchanges as opposed to individual ‘deliberation within’. 
However they appear to agree with (Goodin, 2000) that ‘internal deliberation can 
sometimes be very similar to public deliberation’ (Mercier and Landemore, 2012, p. 
251). What matters is that ‘exposing people to disagreement and debates 
increases their ability to entertain different opinions . . . either by witnessing a 
debate or by being part of one’ (ibid., p. 252). The important factor is not 
participation in speech acts so much as ‘the presence or expression of dissenting 
opinions in deliberative settings’ (ibid., p. 254, my emphasis). (Mercier & Sperber, 
2017) also point out that as a species we are much better at evaluating reasons 
than producing them – I may not be able to see the beam in my own eye, but I can 
find the mote in yours. Appeals to authority underlying this claim cited in The 
Enigma of Reason includes William Blackstone’s arguments on the value of juries, 
backed up by field work demonstating that they do a good (epistemic) job. 
Laboratory studies also indicate that we are better able to find the flaws in our own 
reasons when we believe those reasons to have been produced by someone else, 
thereby supporting the case for the division of labour between persuaders and 
evaluators at the core of this thesis (ibid.), as it’s very hard to change one’s mind 
about one’s ‘own’ (i.e. indigenous) convictions. 
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Bernard Manin, in his brief review of experiments in Deliberative Polling, argues 
that the success of the DP in avoiding group-think and polarization is on account of 
the ‘presence of diverse and conflicting views amongst deliberators’. He 
conjectures that the introduction of the graphe para nomon into Athenian 
democracy was because ‘the adversarial proceedings were required during the 
second hearing on grounds of their superior epistemic merits’, (Manin, 2005, pp. 8, 
17). 
Given that the argumentative theory of reasoning suggests two distinct 
mechanisms this would also suggest two categories of persons in a deliberative 
context – proposers and disposers. The former category 
should only be concerned with  . . . [arguments] that increase the 
plausibility of a conclusion one is trying to defend, or those that 
decrease the plausibility of a conclusion one is trying to rebut. 
Representations that have the opposite effect are of no direct value if 
one wants to convince one’s interlocutor. Reasoning should therefore 
be directed towards these valuable representations, and, as a result, it 
should display a strong confirmation bias (Mercier and Landemore, 
2012, p. 241, emphasis in original) 
The confirmation bias, however, ‘mostly affects the production, and not the 
evaluation of arguments’ and can be ‘checked, compensated by the confirmation 
bias of individuals who defend another opinion’, hence the necessity for ‘the 
presence or expression of dissenting opinions in deliberative settings’ (ibid., pp. 
251, 253, 254). The requisite cognitive tool for those whose task is to evaluate 
communicated information (i.e. disposers) is ‘epistemic vigilence’, the polar 
opposite of the confirmation bias (Mercier, 2013; Sperber et al., 2010). 
Mixing the two cognitive styles in the same persons, as Landemore and most 
deliberative democrats advocate, is sub-optimal as while ‘reasoning is mostly truth 
oriented when it come to evaluating arguments, it is still biased by the function of 
producing arguments’ (ibid., p. 127, my emphasis).  Whilst it is possible for the 
same agents to oscillate between the two different cognitive styles . . . 
After reviewing and weighing for ourselves the reasons for and against 
a given action, we come to a conclusion. We then take a position. 
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However, when we speak in public in the course of deliberation, we 
share only the part of information that supports our position. (Manin, 
2005, p. 16) 
. . . nevertheless, cognitive dissonance theory would suggest that it is more difficult 
to modify one’s evaluation of an argument once having expressed an opinion. E.M. 
Forster’s dictum ‘how do I know what I think until I [hear] what I say’ could be taken 
as contributing to the confirmation bias – it’s much harder to change your mind 
once you know what you think. Speech acts intended to persuade (whether 
oneself or others) are inherently partisan and Landemore makes a good case for 
the confirmation bias as a valuable cognitive tool for proposers and other rhetorical 
persuaders (but not for disposers). This would also suggest a dialectical approach 
to truth-proposing, whereby different parties institute ‘an exchange of arguments 
for and against something’ – as in a judicial trial (Landemore, 2013, p.140).  
Habermas’s focus on the force of the argument (albeit an ‘unforced’ force) 
illustrates the relevance of speech-act theory to the proposing function (and also 
the evolution from war-war to jaw-jaw). Inverting Clausewitz, why go to the risk and 
expense of fighting when the same result can be achieved using purely rhetorical 
ordinance? Just as battles tend to have two sides, this tends to be equally true of 
argumentative exchanges and debates – legislative or otherwise – as most 
proposals can be reduced to a binary format – which has the added advantage of 
a simple resolution mechanism via up/down majority vote (Risse, 2004). By 
contrast, deliberative and epistemic democracy – which makes no distinction 
between proposers and disposers – would appear to adhere to the classical 
(Cartesian) model of reasoning as the revision and updating of one’s own beliefs. 
The fact that human agents do not appear to be endowed with cognitive 
mechanisms designed for the impartial updating/correction of their own beliefs 
would suggest that this is largely a set of ideal procedures – ‘a normative theory of 
democracy initially developed at a highly abstract level by philosophers and 
political theorists’ (Mercier and Landemore, 2012, p. 243), rather than a form of 
reasoning that comes naturally to human beings, and explains why attempts to 
implement deliberative democracy are heavily reliant on the use of procedural 
rules, along with trained moderators and facilitators. 
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Gary Remer (1999) has criticized the preference of deliberative democrats for the 
conversational style of reasoning (sermo), arguing (with Cicero) that while this is 
appropriate for private and philosophical discussions it has no place in political 
deliberation, which is essentially forensic and agonistic (contentio): 
The contentious character of political speech is suggested by the fact 
that the Greek word agon not only means ‘contest’ or ‘struggle’ but 
also denotes the ‘public assembly’ and ‘assembly place’ (Remer, 
1999, p. 43) 
Political oratory was sometimes viewed as an athletic competition – ‘a contest in 
which man exhibits something of his manliness’ (Kennedy, 1974, p. 189) – 
whereas Cicero and Quintilian adopt ‘the metaphor of the orator as soldier, 
vanquishing his enemies on the battlefield. . . [however] regardless of the metaphor 
chosen, athletic or military, rhetoric is represented as a struggle in which one side 
wins and the other side loses’ (Remer, 1999, p. 43). Needless to say deliberative 
democrats abhor the agonism of classical thought and claim that the distinction of 
Cicero and other elite Roman republicans between the best class of citizens 
(optimates) and the passion-driven commoners (populares) is no longer relevant. 
But Cicero’s distinction between rhetorical styles was more domain-specific and 
numerical than based on social class: ‘oratory is directed to action in a way that 
conversation is not, and politics depends on action’,22 and Cicero argued that 
deliberative rhetoric, rather than conversation, was also the appropriate style even 
when addressing one’s own peers in the Senate on account of the size of the 
audience – 300 members before Sulla’s reforms and 600 thereafter (Remer, 1999, 
p. 53). Note that, from a modern democratic perspective, groups of this size – while 
unmanageably large for a conversation – would be necessary to ensure a 
decision-making body that is a ‘portrait in miniature’ of the population that it seeks 
to describe. 
                                            
22 Sir John Chilcot, in his forensic analysis of the decision-making process leading up to the 
Iraq war, focused his ire on the conversational sofa-style chummocracy that characterized 
Tony Blair’s style of government, rather than his rhetorical skills in Parliament. 
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The focus on reasoning as a persuasive speech act is not unlike the role of court-
room advocates – Cicero argued that the deliberative and judicial styles of political 
oratory ‘possess some common characteristics’ (Remer, 1999, p. 41) – but all trials 
(should) have a jury and this is where the second pole of the argumentative theory 
of reasoning comes into play. Evolution has equipped us with both the cognitive 
tools to persuade and the (converse) ability to evaluate the arguments of others.23 
This requires a different set of cognitive tools – the argumentative theory of 
reasoning would recommend a separation between the proposers and the 
disposers and, if the experience of Britain’s 2016 Brexit referendum is anything to 
go by, there would be no shortage of advocates volunteering for the former role. 
Disposal, however, should be in the hands of a statistically-representative body, 
and both evolutionary psychology and the wisdom of crowds suggest that a 
randomly-selected group of ordinary citizens would have the necessary cognitive 
tools to perform this function on behalf of the population that it ‘describes’: 
Despite the wishes of deliberative democrats, the distinction between 
speaker and audience cannot be made to vanish. That speaker and 
listeners are not equal, however, does not exclude listeners from the 
political process. Ultimately, it is the audience, not the speaker, that 
must deliberate, in the literal sense of ‘weighing’ the competing 
arguments and deciding between them. Although such deliberation 
may not conform to the [utopian?] dictates of ‘rational-critical’ 
discourse, it is participation nevertheless’ (Remer, 1999, pp. 57-8) 
Bernard Manin – whose seminal paper ‘On legitimacy and political deliberation’ 
(Manin, 1987) is often cited as the manifesto for the modern deliberative 
democracy movement – is in agreement: 
                                            
23 Landemore notes that ‘it is possible for even a lone reasoner to find arguments for an 
opposite point of view than hers’, thereby lending unintended support to Goodin and 
Niemeyer’s case for silent deliberation within (2013, pp. 127-8, emphasis in original). 
Although Landemore acknowledges this as possible, she finds it implausible, as it is ‘not 
what our brains are designed to do’ (private communication), although our brains are 
certainly designed to decide between the merits of competing arguments (the role of the 
silent deliberator). 
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Debate format – in which speakers address an audience that merely 
listens to them – is a more promising set-up for exposure to conflicting 
positions24 than interactive personal engagement amongst holders of 
opposing views, as people tend to avoid face-to-face disagreement. 
… speakers should be primarily policy experts, group leaders, moral 
authorities. Politicians may be involved too, but on the condition that 
their participation is decoupled from electoral campaigns. … The 
cleavages articulated in these debates would differ from partisan 
cleavages on two accounts: 1) cleavage on an issue-by-issue basis, 
rather [than] multiple item platforms; 2) disconnected, as far as 
possible, from competition for office. (Manin, 2005, pp. 18-19) 
The mixed constitutional proposal outlined in Chapter 8 of this thesis is fully 
compabible with Manin’s strictures. 
* * * 
Landemore’s approach is, for analytic simplicity, to focus on ‘pure’ [and somewhat 
unworldly] models of decision-making, i.e. 
models where the deliberative and aggregative phases are either 
oligarchic through and through or democratic through and through – 
so I will not consider the epistemic properties of mixed combinations, 
where the deliberation takes place among the few and then the vote 
takes place among the many. (Landemore, 2013, pp. 146-7) 
However, both her own literature review of the genealogy of political deliberation 
and the two different cognitive mechanisms involved would suggest that the hybrid 
mixed constitution model is just as relevant to modern so-called ‘democracies’ as it 
was at the time of Aristotle or Polybius (Hansen, 2010; Manin, 1997).25 The 
                                            
24 Cf. Landemore, 2013, p. 122: parties should be ‘exposed to conflicting viewpoints, not 
just a variety of viewpoints’ (my emphasis). 
25 Landemore (private communication) accepts Richard Tuck’s observation that the so-
called sovereign is fast asleep most of the time (Tuck, 2016), but argues that the model 
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proposal function (isegoria) has been (effectively, if not always formally) a property 
of political elites since the founding of democracy, whereas the judging function 
(isonomia) has always involved the counting of votes – either within the whole 
citizen body or a statistically-representative subset, however inconvenient that may 
be from an analytically pure perspective. 
6.2.2  Cognitive diversity – vs – the wisdom of crowds 
Individual cognitive diversity is of value to proposers, whereas the aggregate 
wisdom of crowds appertains to disposers. Landemore’s principal case study for 
the role of cognitive diversity in practical problem-solving – the New Haven 
neighbourhood watch committee (Landemore, 2013, pp. 100-101) – required 
extending the diversity of the group membership sufficiently in order to identify just 
two people responsible for proposing the ‘right’ answer to the problem of night-time 
muggings on a bridge (solar lighting), as the knowledge of how best to finance the 
lights (Federal stimulus funding) might well have come from a regular city hall 
official. In principle one person would have been enough. I would argue that the 
relationship between cognitive diversity and political democracy (either electoral or 
lot-based) with respect to the proposal aspect of problem-solving is purely 
contingent – crowd-sourcing, e-petitions, innovation/knowledge markets26 and 
public competitions might be a better way of establishing case-specific27 cognitive 
                                                                                                                                
 
has run its course and is undemocratic. The view of this thesis is that it is better to accept 
Manin and Hansen’s mixed constitution model as an accurate description of modern 
‘democracies’, but to re-establish genuine popular sovereignty in decision making via the 
use of randomly-selected legislative juries (see Chapter 8, below). 
26 Landemore does seriously consider political information markets such as the short-lived 
DoD Policy Analysis Market in which punters were invited to bet on future options such as 
the political instability of Iran and the likelihood of terrorist attacks and political 
assassinations as an alternative (or supplement) to democratic policy making. She makes 
the interesting point that the Athenian practice of ostracism, in which citizens were invited 
to identify through a vote the prominent political figure likely to be a threat to the city was a 
‘proto-information market’ (Landemore, 2013, pp. 179, 183; c.f. Ober, 2008, p. 161). 
27 Unlike Landemore, my model for sortition-based legislative juries is ad hoc (as in 4th-
century Athens), with the innovation, continuity and accountability functions met by other 
institutions of governance (see Chapter 8, below). As such her concerns that ‘it is 
 
 
188 
diversity than a group of elected or randomly-selected persons, few of whom would 
have any relevant knowledge to contribute directly to the proposal function. The 
public competition which led to clockmaker John Harrison’s solution to the 
longitude problem would be a better model for generating public policy innovations 
than a random selection of citizens.28 Her New Haven neighbourhood committee 
was comprised of a self-selecting group of citizens with a particularly strong 
interest in resolving a local problem (mugging incidents on a poorly-lit bridge), and 
it’s difficult to see how such a perspective could be easily scaled up for the general 
political arrangements of large modern states.29 As for her other two examples of 
‘democratic reason’: French députés (pp. 99-100) would not normally be viewed as 
a case of cognitive diversity (elected politicians are normally viewed as the 
paradigm example of rich, white, male lawyers), and Twelve Angry Men (pp. 98-9) 
is a Hollywood movie. 
Landemore’s thesis is heavily reliant on the mathematical models of the complex 
systems theorist Scott E. Page and the economist Lu Hong and it’s important to 
understand that (unlike the empirical evidence for the wisdom of crowds cited by 
                                                                                                                                
 
impossible to identify in advance all the questions that any given representatives will have 
to deal with over the several years of her tenure’ do not apply, as they assume, as is 
generally the case, that a sortition-based legislative assembly would parallel one 
generated by preference election (Landemore, 2013a, p. 1219). According to this thesis, 
that would be neither possible or desirable. 
28 Athenian political oratory could also be viewed as a competition for gold crowns and 
other public honours and perquisites. (Hansen, 1999, pp. 274-5) 
29 Landemore acknowledges (private communication) that specific problem-solving 
assemblies designed in non-random ways could be more epistemically efficient, but insists 
that random selection is the optimal way for selecting all-purpose assemblies like 
legislatures because of the fundamental uncertainty of politics: ‘If the goal is to staff a 
generalist Congress as opposed to a multitude of issue-specific assemblies, it is clear that 
we will never be able to identify universal knowers as no one can have the amount and 
diversity of knowledge required to address all possible political issues’ (Landemore, 2014, 
p. 171). This thesis endorses the view of democracy as a combination of isegoria and 
equal voting power (isonomia) outlined in her article, but assigns these two functions to 
separate bodies with random selection only pertinent to the latter. Whilst the cognitive 
diversity of a randomly-selected Congress would still only extend to several hundred 
individuals (most of whom would have little to contribute to the debate), this thesis 
proposes no restrictions whatsoever on the isegoria right (see Chapter 7, below). 
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Surowiecki) their oft-quoted ‘Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem’ – which claims that, 
given certain conditions, ‘a randomly selected collection of problem solvers 
outperforms a collection of the best individual problem solvers’ – only has the 
status of an a priori ‘logical truth’, i.e. heavily dependent on its premises (S. Page, 
2007, pp. 162, my emphasis). According to Page: 
The veracity of the diversity trumps ability claim is not a matter of 
dispute. It’s true, just as 1 + 1 = 2 is true. (Page, 2007, p. 165) 
Moreover the theorem, originally outlined in a paper in the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences (Hong & Page, 2004) has been subject to robust 
criticism on account of its equation of mathematical entities like computer 
algorithms with human agents and of computational randomness with human 
diversity: 
the paper . . . contains a theorem that has neither mathematical 
content nor real-world applications, and a contrived computer 
simulation that illustrates the well-known fact that random algorithms 
are often effective. What the paper emphatically does not contain is 
information that can be applied to any real-world situation involving 
actual people. (A. Thompson, 2014) 
Once ‘unnecessary technicalities’ are removed and ‘basic’ mathematical errors 
corrected ‘the theorem is revealed to be little more than a straightforward 
restatement of its hypothesis’ (ibid., p. 1025). Although tautology is an inherent 
property of mathematical theorems, Hong and Page’s paper has been widely cited 
and used by a number of high-profile institutions in order to justify a ‘diversity-first’ 
recruitment policy over one putting a greater emphasis on ability – an example, 
according to Thompson, of the misuse of mathematics in the social sciences. 
Page published a rejoinder to Thompson’s criticisms (S. E. Page, 2015) and his 
2007 book includes an updated version of the theorem (the version cited by 
Landemore in Democratic Reason). Jason Brennan, however, argues that even if 
the theorem is correct ‘it cannot be used to defend most realistic democratic 
decisions, and it presents no serious challenge to [elite] epistocrats’ (Brennan, 
2016, p. 182). Whilst Brennan and Ilya Somin’s Democracy and Political Ignorance 
(Somin, 2013) agree that diverse views and abilities can be better than small 
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expert groups, they are sceptical that this has any relevance to democracy [either 
elective or sortition-based] as, although ‘sometimes two heads are better than one, 
that doesn’t mean that all the heads [or a statistical sample thereof] are always 
better than some of them’ (Brennan, 2016, p. 182). Landemore likens democratic 
reason to a group of people trying to work out the best way of exiting a maze, but 
ignores the fact that most people will have little or no relevant knowledge to 
contribute to the solution, and are likely to follow the lead of those with the linguistic 
and cryptographic skills to decode the pictograms and equations written on the 
maze wall indicating the way to the exit (Landemore, 2013, p. 3). Although the 
WW2 Enigma Code was broken at Bletchley Park by a cognitively diverse group, 
including mathematicians, classicists, linguists, chess champions, cryptologists, 
archaeologists and crossword-puzzle enthusiasts, they were all experts in their 
chosen domain. Page’s theorem also presupposes that, as in a maze, there is a 
definitive answer to the problems likely to be encountered in democratic societies, 
whereas in modern pluralistic societies it’s hard enough for everyone to agree on 
the nature of the general good, let alone the path best followed to attain it. This is 
the problem that Gerald Gaus has termed ‘The Fundamental Diversity Dilemma”: 
As we increase diversity of perspectives we can bring the ideal closer 
to our world, but as diversity increases we disagree about the justice 
of alternative social worlds, including the ideal. (Gaus, 2017, p. 131) 
Although more sympathetic to Landemore and Page’s case for cognitive diversity, 
Gaus concludes that it is only applicable to political contexts where the group 
concurs on the domain of options ‘and the scores of each option are known by (or 
agreed to by) all (ibid., p. 116). The theorem would in fact only apply to the ideal 
(Habermasian) deliberative context, as 
In this pure problem-solving context, we implicity assume the 
existence of an oracle, namely a machine, person, or internal intuition, 
than can reveal the correct ranking of any proposed solutions. 
(Landemore and Page, 2015, p. 234) 
If such an oracle were discovered, then ‘politics’ would become redundant. 
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Despite her protestations of analytic purity, Landemore’s case for collective 
intelligence is in fact a hybrid model30 ‘that explicitly connects the epistemic 
properties of a liberal society and those of democratic decision procedure’: 
I argue that in an open liberal society, it is simply more likely that a 
larger group of decision makers will be more cognitively diverse, and 
therefore smarter, than a smaller group. (Landemore, 2013, p. 7, my 
emphasis) 
It should be noted that such an argument could also apply to a large group of 
oligarchs – ‘an aristocratic regime may itself benefit from this doctrine’ (Waldron, 
1995, p. 564) – and that the connection with democracy is entirely contingent. 
Although such a group is likely to be constituted by a democratic procedure (such 
as election or sortition) cognitive diversity could also be established by non-
democratic means. As such this thesis’s criticisms of Michael Saward’s 
representative claim model as liberal rather than democratic would also apply (see 
p. 269, below). Landemore frankly admits that her concerns are purely 
epistemic/consequential and do not address the case for democracy in terms of 
intrinsic procedural norms such as fairness, equality and representativity 
(Landemore, 2013, p. 8).  
Landemore freely acknowledges that her focus on epistemic considerations 
(prediction of the most effective solution) distances her from the conventional focus 
on preference aggregation and the adjudication between competing interests. Her 
(analytical) assumption that all forms of government seek to rule in the interests of 
the people (rather than those of the rulers) is in order to ‘avoid complicating the 
comparative issue of epistemic competence (the kind of knowledge one has) with 
the problem of moral competence (the kind of intentions one has) (ibid., p. 11). 
This leads her to adopt an analytic framework somewhat removed from empirical 
political behaviour:  
                                            
30 Landemore views her model as incomplete rather than hybrid, and is content with the 
limited claim that ‘given a liberal society, a democracy works better than expert rule’ 
(private communication). 
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[T]he epistemic framework of the argument presented in this book 
assumes that people are voting what they think is right for the 
common good, no matter how unpleasant it is for them, whether 
ideologically or economically. (Landemore, 2013, pp. 196-7, my 
emphasis). 
Whilst, as a former student of Richard Tuck, one might expect Landemore to back 
his campaign to remove the tanks of the rational-choice economists from the 
neatly-mown lawns of Harvard’s Department of Government (she devotes a long 
section of her book to a polemic against Bryan Caplan’s Myth of the Rational 
Voter), this is taking Rousseauian civic obligation well into Buzz Lightyear 
territory.31  
6.2.3  Authority, legitimacy and consent 
Landemore states that the issue of democratic authority (the principal concern of 
both David Estlund’s eponymous 2008 work, as well as this thesis) is ‘a maze that I 
do not wish, or need, to enter’: 
Whether epistemic properties add to the legitimacy of democratic 
decisions in general or simply provide prudential reasons to abide by 
them is a question I will thus leave unaddressed. (ibid., p. 47) 
Like most deliberative democrats, Landemore has little interest in the question of 
‘who ought to be included among the participants of deliberation in the first place. It 
is simply assumed that democratic deliberation is inclusive’32 (Landemore, 2013, p. 
96). Needless to say such a perspective is problematic from the point of view of 
this thesis. David Estlund’s proposal for ‘epistemic proceduralism’ addresses both 
elements (democratic legitimacy and epistemic outcomes), although his standard 
for outcomes is minimalist (merely better than random), and his procedural 
                                            
31 ‘To Infinity and Beyond’. 
32 Note that the issue is not the extent of the demos – geographical constraints or the 
principle of all affected interests – but legitimacy in the sense of ensuring that deliberators 
accurately represent the beliefs and preferences of the demos, however it may be 
construed (it being assumed that it is impractical for all citizens to participate directly). 
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approach Rawlsian (qualified acceptability criterion), which is arguably more liberal 
than democratic (Estlund, 2008, p. 116). His example of the trial jury puts equal 
emphasis on legal and moral force – ‘Owing partly to its epistemic value [as well as 
its respect for trial procedures], its decisions are (within limits) morally binding even 
when they are incorrect’ (Estlund, 2008, p. 8), and this has implications for an 
epistemic approach to democracy: 
If we can see why people would be obligated to consent to the 
authority of a jury system, I believe that a strikingly analogous 
argument suggests itself for thinking that people would be obligated to 
consent to epistemic proceduralist democracy. (ibid., p. 10) 
Note that in Estlund’s argument the epistemic factors are subservient to 
proceduralist considerations (‘morally binding even when they are incorrect’). 
Estlund relies on the jury analogy throughout the book, and courtroom procedures 
(evidence, testimony, cross-examination, adversarial equality, and collective 
deliberation by a jury) are central to the moral and epistemic authority of trial 
verdicts (ibid., p. 8). From the perspective of authority/legitimacy the analogy 
between the trial jury and democracy is apposite: 
[b]oth systems serve urgent collective tasks with institutions that can 
publicly be seen to have some decent tendency (better than or at least 
nearly as good as any other and also better than random) to produce 
good or correct decisions. (Estlund, 2008, p. 137) 
The practical proposals outlined in the final chapter of this thesis draw on judicial 
practice for their legitimacy, and attempt to combine the epistemic and procedural 
benefits of the trial procedure, with a particular emphasis on the representational 
claims of the principle of trial by a random sample of one’s own peers. This is a key 
reason why all citizens are deemed to consent to the verdict of jury trials. As such I 
anticipate that my proposals pass Estlund’s tests for democratically legitimate 
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authority – substantive justice, demographic neutrality,33 collective wisdom, and 
better outcomes than nondemocratic alternatives (Estlund, 2008, p. 157). In this 
respect I’m encouraged by his conclusion that ‘decision making by a small 
randomly chosen set of voters’ would not be ‘offensive or contrary to the moral 
spirit of democracy if it turned out to have pragmatic advantages’ (ibid., p. 182). 
6.3  The exception that proves the rule? 
Whilst Landemore concludes her book with the claim that democracy is a ‘gamble 
worth taking’, Surowiecki argues in his conclusion that the one exception to his 
‘wisdom of crowds’ thesis is democratic politics, his final sentence reading: 
The decisions that democracies make may not demonstrate the 
wisdom of the crowd. The decision to make them democratically 
does.’ (Surowiecki, 2004, p. 271) 
I would argue that Surowiecki’s scepticism regarding the applicability of his thesis 
to democratic innovations is on account of the conflation of talking and counting 
within the literature. Although I have used James Fishkin’s programme in 
Deliberative Polling as a paradigm example of the wisdom of crowds (counting) 
tradition, Fishkin tries to have his cake and eat it, as both his methodology (which 
includes the exchange of reasons within small moderated groups of deliberators) 
and general normative framework (focusing on the public good rather than merely 
the aggregation of preferences) crosses into the territory occupied by epistemic 
and deliberative democrats. Although Fishkin defines the term ‘deliberation’ in a 
Surowieckian sense (aggregate judgment via the ‘weighing’ of arguments), the 
term, when used by political theorists, generally means the free exchange of 
reasons between equals. This, combined with Fishkin’s insistence (private 
communication) on the essential role of the exchange of reasons in the DP small-
group sessions, and his frequent departure from the language of preference 
                                            
33 Mill’s case for the ‘epistocracy of the educated’ fails on account of the demographic 
objection. (Estlund, 2008. p. 222) 
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expression into Rousseauian territory causes Surowiecki to dismiss the 
Deliberative Polling programme as ‘quixotic’: 
Fishkin’s project is a profoundly optimistic one, predicated on a kind of 
deep faith in both the virtue of informed debate and the ability of 
ordinary people to govern themselves (Surowiecki, 2004, p. 260, my 
emphasis).  
Whilst Surowiecki’s scepticism regarding the ‘virtue’ (in both the strong and weak 
senses of the word) of informed debate might well be expected, his dismissal of 
the ‘ability of ordinary people’ is profoundly at odds with the rest of his book. If the 
aggregate judgment of ordinary people is the best way of coming to the truth in 
most non-specialist knowledge domains, then why should political decision-making 
be any different? My perspective on political decision-making is derived from the 
view that politics is just ‘the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a 
set of people whom chance or choice have brought together’ (Oakeshott, 1962, p. 
113). Why should ‘the people’ (or a well-informed and descriptively-representative 
subset thereof) not be the best judge of their own ‘general arrangements’? If not 
then who? Surowiecki prefers Judge Richard Posner’s view that ‘it is far more 
difficult to form an informed opinion about what is good for society as a whole than 
it is to determine where one’s self-interest lies’ (ibid., p. 261). True, but the 
Deliberative Poll, stripped of it's occasional drift into Rousseauian waters, would be 
compatible with both – allotted citizens would be entirely free to use their (secret) 
vote for the general good or their own preferences (or a combination of the two) as 
they see fit. Given that we (allegedly) get the government we deserve, this strikes 
me as entirely appropriate. 
The focus of this thesis so far has been primarily isonomia and has concluded that 
the aggregate judgment of large randomly-selected juries can (under certain strict 
conditions) be both democratically legitimate (Chapter 5) and epistemically benign 
(Chapter 6). The next chapter moves on to isegoria – the ‘opinion’ element of the 
democratic diarchy. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7.	Isegoria:	The	Representative	Claim	
The demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how 
matters are to be placed on the agenda of matters that are to be 
decided by means of the democratic process. (Dahl, 1989, p. 113) 
In Chapter 8 of Democracy and Its Critics, Robert Dahl concluded that decision-
making by a randomly-selected body of citizens would not be incompatible with the 
requirement for ‘voting equality at the decisive stage’ (ibid., pp. 109-11). But his 
fourth criterion for democratic equality, cited above, is that citizens must also have 
‘adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the agenda’ (ibid. p. 
109). In the Athenian direct democracy this was ensured by the principle of ho 
boulomenos, whereby any Athenian citizen ‘who so wished’ could propose a 
change in the laws. Although this was usually via the medium of probouleusis – 
where the council (assembly secretariat) drew up the agenda – any citizen could 
propose a new law and speak for or against any other motions in the assembly. In 
keeping with its conceptual origins in classical democracy this thesis has adopted 
the Greek term isegoria (equal speech rights) for both agenda setting and 
advocacy (for or against) a political proposal. But this is where it gets extremely 
difficult – how might this equal right of agenda setting and policy advocacy be 
instituted in large modern states where direct participation (ho boulomenos) is 
impossible on account of issues of scale? Dahl immediately qualifies his fourth 
criterion (democratic agenda setting) by insisting that the demos need only have 
the final say in the agenda-setting process, thereby (potentially) legitimizing indirect 
and representative forms of isegoria. But what are the appropriate representational 
principles for isegoria – agenda setting, advocacy and other such speech acts? 
In Chapter 5 of this thesis we concluded that, in order to preserve the isonomia of 
all the citizens who are not included in the legislative microcosm, it would be 
necessary to limit the remit of the randomly-selected assembly to silent 
‘deliberation within’ followed by the secret vote – agenda setting and advocacy 
being provided exogenously. This is because there is no reason to believe that the 
illocutionary force of the speech acts of randomly-selected individuals would 
accurately mirror the preferences, beliefs and knowledge of the target population 
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as ‘these are frequently “arbitrary” and can be deeply antidemocratic, particularly 
when those who are shy, more thoughtful, or less confident “cede political power to 
arrogant loudmouths whom no one chose to represent them”’1 (Young, 2000, p. 
125, cited in Disch, 2004, pp. 5-6). This would suggest that random selection – for 
anything other than aggregate (isonomic) functions – contravenes basic equal 
opportunity norms and could have no legitimate role to play when it comes to 
agenda setting and advocacy. Democratic norms presuppose that discursive 
advocacy (isegoria) in large (indirect) democracies assumes a completely different 
representational form, as it cannot be left to the purely aleatory composition of a 
small randomly-selected group, as the ‘descriptive’ representativity of the group is 
predicated on the law of large numbers and this only applies to collective acts (i.e. 
voting).  
This chapter explores how the representative principle should be applied to 
advocacy and agenda setting, including speech acts (of elected officials and 
others), direct-democratic initiatives, mass media and other forms of discursive 
input. Equal speech for all citizens (including, in particular, the overwhelming 
majority who choose not to speak) is the goal, and the sheer scale of modern 
democracy requires that this should be achieved by representational means, 
because if everyone chose to exercise their isegoria right directly then the resulting 
cacophony would far surpass that of the Tower of Babel.  
In electoral systems the silent majority exercise their speech rights by choosing a 
candidate or political party whose speech acts and choice of discourse best 
approximates what they would have said had they the opportunity and rhetorical 
gifts themselves. ‘Best approximates’ acknowledges the fact that – particularly in 
single-member plurality systems – the need to aggregate disparate issues into an 
electorally-viable package will mean voters have, on many occasions, to block their 
ears (and hold their noses) against speech acts by their ‘own’ representatives that 
                                            
1 Note that a similar criticism could be made regarding the self-selecting rhetores and 
demagogoi who chose to address the Athenian assembly; however, in the classical 
example, all citizens had the right both to speak and to judge the speech acts of those who 
availed themselves of this right – not so in large modern states. 
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they dislike. However the system still strives to empower the silent majority to 
speak vicariously, via the principle of ‘representative isegoria’. In the 2016 
presidential election a near plurality of American voters decided, rightly or wrongly, 
that Donald J. Trump was speaking for them (or, at least, more so than the 
competing candidate). 
But how would the principle of representative isegoria be preserved in a minipublic-
based legislative system? Who would assume the role of gatekeeper for the 
assembly, deciding who should and should not speak and (most importantly) who 
should speak for the (dispositionally or circumstantially) mute? What is the relevant 
filtering principle? If I cannot speak myself then my ‘representative’ (a chosen 
person, a political party, a pressure group, a ‘discourse’, a newspaper or whatever) 
needs to speak on my behalf and the illocutionary force of the resulting speech act 
should be ‘proportionate’ – both in the modern (statistical) and classical sense of 
proportional equality of ‘worth’. But how is it possible to reconcile these two very 
different – or even contradictory – forms of equality, both conceptually and in 
practice? Whereas representative isonomia is simple to formulate (by statistical 
theory) and operationalize (by proportional sampling), representative isegoria is a 
far more challenging problem and the solution will, unfortunately, be anything other 
than simple and elegant. As a result, this chapter has potential for a PhD thesis in 
its own right. All that can be attempted within the constraints of a single thesis is to 
outline the relevant issues (with the aid of illustrative examples), in the hope that 
future researchers might fully examine the role of (for example) competitive media 
as a source of representative isegoria. 
7.1  Numerical (arithmetic) and proportional (geometric) equality 
According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of equal justice, numerical and 
proportional: 
One kind [numerical justice] is exercised in the distribution of honor, 
wealth, and the other divisible assets of the community, which may be 
allotted among its members in equal or unequal shares. . . . [However] 
all are agreed that justice in distributions must be based on desert of 
some sort [proportional justice], although they do not all mean the 
same sort of desert; democrats make the criterion free birth; those of 
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oligarchical sympathies wealth, or in other cases birth; upholders of 
aristocracy make it virtue. Justice is therefore a sort of proportion; for 
proportion is not a property of numerical quantity only, but of quantity 
in general, proportion being equality of ratios. (Arist., Nich. Eth., 
1130b-1132b)  
Or, as Plato put it:  
There are two kinds of equality which, though identical in name, are 
often almost opposites in their practical results. The one of these 
[numerical equality] any State or lawgiver is competent to apply in the 
assignment of honors – namely, the equality determined by measure, 
weight and number – by simply employing the lot to give even results 
in the distributions; but the truest and best form of equality 
[proportional equality] is not an easy thing for everyone to discern. It is 
the judgment of Zeus, and men it never assists save in small 
measure, but in so far as it does assist either States or individuals, it 
produces all things good; for it dispenses more to the greater and less 
to the smaller,2 giving due measure to each according to nature; and 
with regard to honors also, by granting the greater to those that are 
greater in goodness, and the less to those of the opposite character in 
respect of goodness and education, it assigns in proportion what is 
fitting to each. Indeed, it is precisely this which constitutes for us 
‘political justice,’ which is the object we must strive for. (Plato, Laws, 
VI.757b-c) 
Note that both philosophers assume distribution by lot to be the natural mechanism 
to institute numerical (arithmetic) equality, hence my equation with the isonomic 
equality of the representative minidemos. But Thucydides’ rendering of Pericles’ 
                                            
2 Cf the Parable of the Talents: ‘For to everyone who has will more be given, and he will 
have an abundance. But from the one who has not, even what he has will be taken away’. 
(Matt., 25:29, ESV) 
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Funeral Oration shifts the focus of the Athenian demokratia from numerical to 
proportional equality: 
[W]hile the law secures equality of all alike in their private disputes, the 
claim of excellence is also recognised; and when a citizen is in any 
way distinguished, he is generally preferred to the public service, not 
in rotation, but for merit. (Thuc., 2,37,1, trs. Jowett revised Brunt). 
‘Pericles is claiming, in fact, that the opponents of democracy were wrong in their 
assertion that democracy was so obsessed with [numerical] equality that it ignored 
all other considerations’ (Harvey, 1965, p. 102). Here David Harvey, like his 
Marxist mentor G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, is claiming that ‘proportional’ equality is in 
fact inequality dressed up in sheep’s clothing; however he acknowledges the origin 
of proportional equality, along with its application to political philosophy, in 
Pythagorean geometry (ibid., p 146). And this classical distinction has carried 
through to modern usage – according to the ‘equality’ entry in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 
[A] distribution is equal numerically when it treats all persons as 
indistinguishable, thus treating them identically or granting them the 
same quantity of a good per capita. That is not always just. In contrast, 
a . . . distribution is proportional or relatively equal when it treats all 
relevant persons in relation to their due. (Gosepath, 2007) 
Although the focus of the SEP article is distributive justice, the principle applies to 
the distribution of political goods, especially as this is a common use of the term 
isonomia in the classical literature (see p. 49, above). In the case of numerical 
equality the ‘good’ being distributed is political decision power, operationalized as 
the vote (each vote has equal causal weight); whereas the proportional equality of 
the speech acts of the ‘relevant person’ equates to their ‘worth’ or ‘merit’ – whether 
conceived in terms of wisdom, virtue, knowledge, military prowess, wealth, birth, 
education, socio-economic status, rhetorical/demagogic skills, personal charisma, 
good looks or whatever. According to the classical view of proportional equality, the 
views of ‘worthy’ people (in the above sense) are due more consideration than 
others. 
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The two forms of equality (numerical and proportional) are sharply opposed and, 
according to the present thesis, need to be theorized (and operationalized) 
separately (the focus of this chapter being proportional equality). The thesis claims 
that there is an isomorphism between the two classical components of democratic 
freedom (equal lawmaking power and equal speech rights) and the Greek notions 
of numerical and proportional equality: 
Variant of democratic freedom Form of equality 
isonomia numerical 
isegoria proportional 
Table 7.1: Freedoms and equalities 
Numerical equality is a straightforward concept – all citizens should have equal 
decision power (voting) over the laws that govern them, and all votes count exactly 
the same. Add the votes up and the result is isonomic (numerical) equality, albeit 
mediated by the majoritarian principle and the particular decision rule in place. The 
argument is equally applicable to direct, indirect and stochastic (random sample-
based)3 democracy and is unproblematic from the perspective of this thesis and 
dealt with in detail in Chapter 5. Classical philosophers were (on the whole) hostile 
to isonomic equality as it meant rule by the poor and uneducated, as there were a 
lot more of them.4 
However equal speech rights and proportional equality (the subject of this chapter) 
are anything but straightforward. This is doubly problematic in so far as distribution 
is governed by the mathematical principle of ratio: ‘more to the greater and less to 
                                            
3 The fact that ‘stochastic’ (sortition-based) democracy is proportional in the modern 
(statistical) sense – there being a high probability that a large random sample will be 
comprised of approximately the same proportion of, say, males and females as the target 
population – should not be conflated with the classical meaning of proportionality as 
equality of ‘worth’. 
4 Marx’s class-based political sociology has its foundations in Aristotle, although each 
philosopher attributed diametrically-opposed valence to the different forms of equality 
involved: ‘For it is [proportional – i.e. true] equality for the poor to have no larger share of 
power than the rich, and not for the poor alone to be supreme but for all [classes] to govern 
equally.’ (Arist., Pol., 1318 A 3-8, trs. H. Rackham) 
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the smaller’, but the concept of ‘greatness’ and ‘smallness’ are not derived 
mathematically and it ‘is not an easy thing for everyone to discern’: 
It is the judgment of Zeus . . . it dispenses more to the greater and less 
to the smaller, giving due measure to each according to nature; and 
with regard to honors also, by granting the greater to those that are 
greater in goodness, and the less to those of the opposite character in 
respect of goodness and education. (Plato, Laws, VI.757b-c) 
Note that once ‘goodness’ has been determined, the allocation criterion is a 
mathematical ratio as ‘it assigns in proportion what is fitting to each’. In a small 
direct democracy (such as classical-era Athens) any citizen who chose to could 
propose new laws and argue for or against proposals. But, in practice, the 
effectiveness of the speech acts would be proportional to the ‘merit’ of the citizen in 
question. The ‘merit’ of each speaker was judged in real time by the audience (in 
theory the whole citizen body) and the proportional equality of Pericles and 
Demosthenes would have greatly exceeded that of poor and uneducated citizens 
who, even if they had the temerity to speak, ran the risk of being howled down. 
This would have been entirely appropriate from the perspective of proportional 
equality as some animals (like Pericles and Demosthenes) are by ‘nature’, 
‘goodness’ and education a lot more equal than others, as David Harvey, citing 
Orwell, points out (Harvey, 1965, p. 101) 
But at least each and every citizen could speak, if he so chose, and his audience 
would have been the whole assembly. It has been argued that the internet has 
recreated the isegoria of classical Athens as anyone who wishes to can now set up 
a blog and speak to everyone else. However this overlooks the fact that most blogs 
have no significant audience (this problem reflects sheer information overload and 
has nothing to do with the merit of individual bloggers.) Large-scale democracy 
necessitates representation and how should proportional equality in large-scale 
societies be instantiated, given the plethora of competing voices? From the 
perspective of numerical equality it might be argued that the representative 
isegoria of a leading article in the Sun (circulation 2.2 million at the time of writing) 
is ‘worth’ more than a leading article in the Independent (circulation c. 40,000 prior 
to its demise), but such a perspective presupposes an arithmetic criterion in that 
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each subscriber is viewed to be of equal worth (irrespective of ‘nature’, ‘goodness’ 
and education). 
In fifth-century Athens the two forms of proportional equality overlapped – the 
period is (in part) characterised as the ‘Age of Pericles’ as the (intrinsic) ‘worth’ of 
Athens’ first citizen (as a general and a statesman) automatically translated into 
demotic support. But modern ‘audience’ democracies bear a closer similarity to 
fourth-century Athens, when the rhetores were no longer strategoi. Fourth-century 
statesmen, like their modern equivalents, were often lampooned as demagogues, 
in that they lacked intrinsic ‘worth’, so there was considerably less overlap between 
the two forms of equality. This is even more problematic in modern societies where 
politicians rank with telemarketers and car dealers in terms of public esteem (only 
political lobbyists rank lower). More Britons now trust their hairdresser (sixty-nine 
percent) than their politicians (twenty-one percent) (Hosking, 2014). Which voices 
are ‘worthy’ of inclusion and what numerical weight should be assigned to each? 
Classical societies were characterized by homonoia (same-mindedness) and there 
was little clash of competing ‘discourses’, so homonoia left little space for anything 
more than ad hominem attacks.5 Can the sheer heterogeneity of voices in modern 
multicultural societies provide a solution? ‘Discourse theory’, alas, provides no 
easy answer, as the power arrogated to the men in white coats to determine which 
discourses should be included via social science Q methodology (see section 
7.4.3.2, below) is clearly undemocratic and runs the risk of drowning out the silent 
(hegemonic) majority with the sheer plethora of subaltern voices. This is 
unsurprising, given that discourse theory is ‘the rightful heir of the early Frankfurt 
School [of cultural Marxism]’ (Scheuerman, 2006, p. 86). ‘The devil has the best 
tunes’6 (and a lot more of them) – Dryzek pointing out the plethora of different 
                                            
5 ‘Athenian democracy at its core relied on the possibility that the cultural homogeneity of 
its male citizenry, bound together by myths of autochthony and loyalty to the artificial tribes 
to which Cleisthenes had allocated their demes, could override the divisive class interests 
that otherwise might lead to faction and civil war. Some of the most powerful appeals in 
Greek rhetoric, from Pericles’ funeral speech to Themistocles’ appeal to the Greeks before 
Salamis, are to similarity and shared culture.’ (Atack, 2017, p. 585) 
6 An aphorism illustrated by the different common-language valence of buzzwords like 
‘progressive’ and ‘liberal’, as opposed to ‘conservative’ and ‘reactionary’. 
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approaches of environmental activists, including wildlife management, 
conservation, preservation, reform environmentalism, deep ecology, environmental 
justice and ecofeminism.  It’s all very well arguing that ‘for policy-making rationality 
all relevant discourses should get represented, regardless of how many people 
subscribe to each’ (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008b, p. 482). However if Q methodology 
is to determine which discourses to include then each would have the same 
isegoric rights as the hegemonic perspective shared by most citizens (and not just 
business corporations) that the earth is a resource intended primarily for the benefit 
of its human occupants. While discourse theory may well make for ‘policy-making 
rationality’, it sits uneasily with standard models of democratic equality, as we see 
when we remind ourselves of Dahl’s insistence that ‘the demos must have the 
exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are placed on the agenda’ (Dahl, 1989, 
p. 113, my emphasis). Why should the demos include an arcane discourse on the 
agenda that it’s never even heard of, purely at the behest of Q (James Bond 
allusion intended)? 
Whereas the modern incarnation of isonomia is relatively straightforward, the 
uneasy trade-off between the two senses of proportionality – the intrinsic ‘value’ of 
a discourse and the number of people supporting it (or who have even heard of it) 
– would suggest that the solution to the problem of representative isegoria will, of 
necessity, be an untidy compromise between proportionality in the ancient 
(meritocratic) and modern (statistical) sense. Deliberative and epistemic theorists 
are often content for solutions to emerge from the free exchange of reasons and 
the problems with this from the perspective of democratic equality have been 
addressed in Chapter 5. However, from the point of view of the present chapter, 
the problem is simply how to package up the blooming, buzzing confusion that 
constitutes the competing discourses of the public sphere in modern multicultural 
societies into clear options that can be chosen between on the basis of the 
isonomic equality of the sovereign minipublic. How is it possible to decide which 
discourses are both ‘worthy’ of inclusion (classical proportional equality) and at the 
same time ensure that the discourses represent the views of a significant 
proportion of citizens (proportional equality in the statistical sense)? The answer 
will, of necessity, be messy and pluralistic – as befits the representative isegoria 
needs of modern polyarchic societies. Bear in mind that the ‘worth’ of the speech 
acts will be judged by the ‘audience’ of the ‘representative claim’ (see section 7.2, 
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below) – whether that be voters in a general election or subscribers to a national 
newspaper – according to whatever criteria the audience deems fit, thereby 
providing a filter in line with Dahl’s requirement that the demos should (ultimately) 
set the agenda. Given that the final up/down decision will reflect the isonomic 
equality of votes in the minidemos, this might be seen to provide a double dose of 
mathematical equality, so we might well choose to relax Dahl’s (conveniently 
vague) fourth criterion and lean slightly in the direction of discourse theory – 
thereby allowing rare flowers to bloom that would normally be snuffed out by the 
sheer weight of more popular options in the competitive ecosphere of 
representative isegoria. If this sounds like a vague and overly complicated answer 
this merely reflects the intractable nature of the question. In the words, once again, 
of the godfather of democratic theory: 
Perhaps the greatest error in thinking about democratic authority is to 
believe that ideas about democracy and authority are simple and must 
lead to simple prescriptions . . . if you think there are simple 
prescriptions, then we cannot hope to understand one another. (Dahl, 
1990, p. 73) 
The messy, imprecise and pluralistic nature of the solution requires that this 
chapter briefly reference literature from empirical political science, sociology and 
media studies, and that the criteria will need to be applied differently in different 
contexts – representative mechanisms that convert isegoria directly into political 
power will need to lean more towards the statistical pole, whereas discourse 
opportunities that are restricted to the informal public sphere can afford to take a 
more qualitative perspective, as they will still be subject to selection via a series of 
isonomic filters. However, a diverse and inclusive approach like this requires a 
clear conceptual framework, for which I am indebted to the recent work of Michael 
Saward, arguably one of the most successful (and influential) recent attempts to 
extend the remit of representation theory beyond the electoral model. Whilst this 
thesis does not fully endorse Saward’s ‘Representative Claim’ – indeed I argue in 
section 7.5 below that the claim model fails on the criterion of democratic 
legitimacy – nevertheless Saward’s analytical model provides an invaluable tool to 
help structure the blooming, buzzing confusion that characterizes representative 
isegoria in large-scale multicultural societies. 
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7.2  The ‘Representative Claim’ 
Given the grounding of this thesis in principles abstracted from classical Athenian 
democracy, there is no reason to limit political representation to the modern 
preference-election variant or, indeed, any other form of personal agency – media, 
‘discourses’ and other public-sphere phenomena can also be representative – so 
the overall framework of this chapter is loosely based on Michael Saward’s 
inclusive and highly influential ‘representative claim’ model (Saward, 2006, 2010). 
Although the representative claim has been adopted as a loose template for this 
chapter, it is not intended as a detailed exposition and/or critique. Indeed the 
decision to purloin Saward’s model for my own purposes should be taken as a 
compliment regarding both its adaptability and widespread influence on the current 
debate on representation beyond the confines of traditional models of electoral 
democracy. The chapter also endorses Lisa Disch’s suggestion (Disch, 2014) that 
Saward’s ‘constructivist’ approach applies only to claim-making, other mechanisms 
being required to ensure that representative claims are received and judged in a 
democratically-legitimate fashion. Saward is right to insist that, as in classical 
Athenian ho boulomenos, anyone should be able to advise the people by making 
the claim to represent their interests (‘who wishes to address the assembly?’), but 
his book does little to suggest how the resulting claims should be evaluated under 
conditions of isonomic equality, as would have been the case in the classical 
demokratia, in which all citizens could (in principle) attend the assembly and vote 
on the competing claims – in Aristotelian terminology the proportional equality of 
isegoria tempered by numerical (isonomic) equality. However, following Saward’s 
own methodology, I will leave the problem of the evaluation of representative 
claims (and by what ‘constituency’) until the end of this chapter (7.5). 
The topic of this thesis is primarily the isegoria/isonomia diarchy within the formal 
(institutional) organs of governance, as opposed to the traditional focus of 
deliberative theorists on the role of opinion in the informal public sphere (Habermas, 
1992), discussed at length in Chapter 1, above. In classical parlance, my primary 
interest is the pnyx (forum of the legislative assembly) rather than the agora 
(gathering place for the market and the centre of athletic, spiritual and (informal) 
political life). Nevertheless the formation and representation of public opinion, 
although of secondary interest to this thesis, is a vital component of a well-
functioning democracy, so deserves to be discussed in a chapter devoted to 
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representative isegoria. Indeed, to Nadia Urbinati, democracy is ‘government by 
means of opinion’ and the rightful focus is ‘the extra-institutional domain of public 
opinion’ (Urbinati, 2014, p. 2, my emphasis). Urbinati, like Habermas (1992), is 
concerned with the formation of opinion in the informal public sphere and the 
‘disfigurations’ of democracy that her book outlines include ‘power concentration in 
the sphere of political opinion formation’, along with ‘polarized forms of consensus’ 
(ibid., p. 3). One of the factors that prompted Urbinati to write Democracy 
Disfigured was her concern over the ‘Berlusconi effect’, whereby a single politician 
was able to dominate the political landscape by corrupting public opinion via his 
control of large sections of the Italian media (Urbinati, 2014, p. 4).  
Given J.S. Mill’s argument regarding the role of newspapers in extending the 
democratic agora beyond the reach of the herald’s voice, Saward’s book is 
strangely silent on the key role of the media in representative isegoria, so the 
public-sphere section (7.4) of this chapter attempts to correct this lacuna by 
evaluating Mill’s argument in the light of subsequent developments in 
communications technology and media ownership. The section also evaluates the 
potential role of deliberative, discursive and associational democracy in the 
informal sphere of public opinion. 
Saward’s model for the representative claim is both abstract and comprehensive: 
A maker of representations (‘M’) puts forward a subject (‘S’) which 
stands for an object (‘O’) that is related to a referent (‘R’) and is offered 
to an audience (‘A’). (Saward, 2010, p. 36). 
The high level of abstraction means that the model is applicable to a wide range of 
phenomena, including the representative claims of a) members of parliament, b) 
political parties, c) political visionaries (Marx being Saward’s chosen example), and 
d) antiglobalization demonstrators; the audiences of the claim-makers being, 
respectively, a) the MP’s constituency, b) the full electorate, c) the working class7 
                                            
7 Saward distinguishes between ‘intended’ and ‘actual’ audiences – in practice the actual 
audience for the representative claims of political visionaries like Marx has been middle-
class intellectuals, students and activists rather than the ‘proletariat’. 
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and d) Western governments (ibid., p. 37). It’s important to note that the only 
mention of ‘constituency’ is in the first example (the standard Westminster model), 
as Saward chooses to defer all evaluation of normative legitimacy (how and by 
what constituency the claim is evaluated and according to what decision rule) until 
the final chapter of the book. This is largely on account of the constructivist 
epistemology underlying his thesis, which is critical of the notion of pre-existing 
constituencies, preferring instead the view that they are constructed or ‘constituted’ 
by the very act of claim making: 
The active sense of constituency – to constitute – has [wrongly] taken 
a back seat to the passive sense – a fixed territorial group of people or 
voters – in modern democracy. (ibid., p. 52) 
This suggests that there is no essential difference between political and aesthetic 
representation and that Hanna Pitkin’s dismissal of symbolic representation as 
‘fascist’ is unwarranted (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 107-9). Saward recruits Pitkin’s footnote 
(Pitkin, 1967, pp. 254-5, n. 14) – where she acknowledges that a Wittgensteinian 
version of her book would have been very different to her Austin-inspired natural-
language approach – in support of his constructivist epistemology: ‘the whole thrust 
of my approach to representation is linked to a constructivist’s skepticism about the 
ready accessibility of the “real”’ (Saward, 2010, p. 69), even though he is reluctant 
to embrace radical linguistic constructivism. Saward’s constructivism is derived 
from the ‘radical democratic pluralism’ perspective that representation is necessary 
to constitute the represented as a democratic subject (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).  
Postponing as he does until the last chapter his evaluation of how to judge the 
democratic validity of any particular claim, Saward is relaxed in principle about 
non-elective forms of representation, including the singer and activist Bono’s claim 
to ‘represent a lot of people [in Africa] who have no voice at all’ (ibid., p. 82). This 
thesis shares, in part, Saward’s laid-back attitude to non-electoral isegoria, not on 
account of an epistemological commitment to constructivism but on account of the 
radical democratic diarchy of isegoria and isonomia – so long as the decision 
function (the evaluation and legitimisation of the representative claim) is in the 
hands of a statistically-representative sample of all ‘constituents’, then the criteria 
for the democratic provenance of the proposals being judged can be less exacting. 
So long as the separation between the proposers (those making the representative 
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claim) and the disposers (those judging the claim) is rigorously maintained and so 
long as the numerical equality of the demos (via representational fidelity) is fully 
protected (see Chapter 5, above), then the origin of a legislative proposal is less 
important – as the numerical equality of the judges trumps the proportional equality 
of the advocates. This being the case, Saward’s distinction between ‘audience’ and 
‘constituency’ is, in the final analysis, elided in my use of his model, as the 
disposing minidemos is both the audience for the claim-making and the legally-
constituted judge of the legitimacy of the claims. And even at the earlier stage of 
agenda-setting (the topic of this chapter), voters – the audience for representative 
claim-making – determine the success of the competing claims through returning 
politicians via existing territorial constituencies. Unlike Saward, my concern from 
the start is the old-fashioned one of evaluating the democratic legitimacy of 
competing representative claims, rather than examining how such claims are 
constructed in real time. 
As this thesis, unlike Saward’s book, includes a chapter (8) in which institutional 
structures to implement the isonomia/isegoria distinction are outlined, albeit in a 
sketchy form, it is necessary to distinguish between forms of isegoria that could 
play a formal role in the legislative process and those limited to the formation and 
representation of opinion in the public sphere. The next two sections deal with 
these in turn. The first (pnyx) section (7.3) considers the various forms of formal 
representative isegoria that are available in large modern states, including electoral 
representation, direct-democratic initiatives, along with (more controversially) 
pressure groups and single-issue advocates. As these are extensively covered in 
the political science literature (and in Saward’s book) they are only sketched in 
outline here. The second (agora) section (7.4), on the informal public sphere, 
outlines in brief the representative claims of the ‘fourth estate’ (overlooked in The 
Representative Claim and an equally controversial topic from a political science 
and media studies perspective). The section also includes an outline of proposals 
for policy-generation by randomly-selected demarchic committees (John 
Burnheim) and agenda panels (Terry Bouricius), along with an assessment of the 
role of deliberative, discursive and associational democracy in the formation of 
public opinion. The chapter concludes with an examination of Lisa Disch’s 
argument that Saward’s model only really applies to representative claim-making, 
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and is deficient when it comes to an assessment of the democratic legitimacy of 
representative claims. 
7.3  Pnyx: Representative isegoria in formal political institutions 
The following subsections outline and evaluate candidates for representative 
claim-making as part of formal political institutions. This being the case, the 
standards for acceptable claim-making are more exacting than those in the 
informal public sphere (section 7.4). 
7.3.1  Electoral representation 
Men have differed in opinion, and been divided into parties by these 
opinions, from the first origin of societies, and in all governments 
where they have been permitted freely to think and to speak, the 
terms whig and tory belong to natural as well as to civil history. 
(Jefferson, 1907, p. 279) 
Political parties function both as a medium for organizing public opinion and also 
as a means of selecting political decision makers.8 At the time of the foundation of 
modern representative governance the combination of these two analytically-
distinct functions was necessary on account of issues of geographical scale and 
limited communications technology – it was necessary to first select a political 
representative whose opinions/interests best mirrored one’s own and then put him 
on a horse and send him off to the forum of the nation to judge and/or implement 
policies on the basis of those opinions/interests. Political parties emerged from 
these two requirements within a very short period of time. This thesis proposes the 
analytical and institutional separation of these two functions (opinion and judgment) 
and acknowledges that the political party has an essential role to play in the 
development and representation of opinion (policy advocacy), while devolving 
judgment to a stochastic sample of the citizen body, so the focus of this section is  
on the formation of election manifestos rather than the process of parliamentary or 
                                            
8 And, in parliamentary regimes, appointing government ministers. 
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congressional decision making. Needless to say the literature on political parties 
conflates these two analytically-distinct functions, hence the need at this stage for 
disambiguation – my concern is purely the ‘isegoric’ function of the political party, 
so references in citations from the political science literature to ‘government 
enactments’, ‘administrations’ and the like should be ignored. The claim of this 
section is that political parties are an essential means for organizing public opinion 
and setting the legislative agenda, but that they should not continue to play a role 
in decision making or putting the decisions into practice – in this respect my earlier 
polemic on this topic, The Party’s Over (Sutherland, 2004), was guilty of over-
egging the pudding. Although the focus of this section is on opinion, I make no 
attempt to refute the (cynical) claim that opinion is little more than interests dressed 
up in fancy words; the distinction here is purely between proposing (the proper 
function of a political party in a large-scale democracy) and disposing (the proper 
function of the deliberative minidemos). 
In the wake of the post-1960s focus on ‘participation’ and the ‘deliberative turn’ in 
democracy studies during the 1980s, it is fair to say that the study of political 
parties has been of little interest to democratic theorists. For a rare modern 
defence of partisanship as a means of civilizing the natural cleavages described in 
the opening citation of this section – to ‘move from militarism to militancy, from 
private armies to verbal attacks’ – see (Rosenblum, 2008, p. 123). Regulated 
rivalry is ‘an alternative or preventative to civil war’ (ibid., p. 363), and party rivalry 
is ‘constitutive’ as ‘through parties interests and opinions are organized and 
brought into opposition’, parties being a ‘principal source of political creativity (ibid., 
pp. 456-7, my emphasis). ‘[N]o open society over the past three centuries has 
lacked party and partisanship’ (Muirhead, 2006, p. 715). Robert Goodin argues 
that ‘the essence of democracy lies in a community’s being “self-legislating”, 
understood as “giving laws to itself”’, and struggles to imagine how ‘a coherent 
ratio for government enactments . . . required in “giving laws to ourselves”’ would 
be possible in the absence of political parties (Goodin, 2008, pp. 212, 216). 
Electoral politics without parties would be personalistic, clientelist, administrative 
and patronage- and identity-based (ibid., pp. 209-10). Goodin’s focus on ratio (the 
‘why’ rather than just the ‘what’, leads him to endorse Burke’s view that ‘party is a 
body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, 
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upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed’ (Burke, 1886 [1770], pp. 
119, my emphasis).  
Although parties are, on the whole, only of marginal interest to political theorists, it 
is a truism of political science that parties winning a plurality of votes in a general 
election have thereby secured a democratic mandate for their representative 
claims – at least with respect to the commitments made in their election manifesto. 
Such claims were hard to deny in two-party political systems when each party had 
a distinctive philosophy underwriting its policy proposals and/or appealed to a 
distinctive and relatively homogeneous socio-economic support base – i.e. during 
the era of ‘party democracy’ (Manin, 1997, pp. 206-218). Such claims are more 
difficult to justify in PR-based electoral systems where the policies of coalition 
administrations bear only a loose relationship with election manifestos and small 
parties may exert a disproportionate influence. Electoral claim-making is also 
harder to evaluate in postmodern ‘audience’ democracies (Manin, 1997, pp. 218-
234) where the core identity/ideology of a political party is more difficult to pin down 
– the representative claim of a political party as an expression of pre-existing 
constituencies (ideas, identities and interests) is easier to evaluate than a party 
seeking to construct a ‘reflexive’ position purely in terms of its electoral 
attractiveness (and which may well camouflage a different agenda). Jeremy 
Corbyn’s claim to represent core Labour Party values and ideology during the 2015 
leadership election was easier to evaluate than those of leadership candidates 
whose primary claim was their electoral appeal (i.e. seeking to mirror public 
preferences reflexively as opposed to ‘nailing one’s colours to the mast’). 
In addition to the problem of postmodern ‘audience’ democracy, another concern 
of political theorists is the manipulation of public opinion by elites for partisan 
reasons as ‘elites educate constituents as they recruit them to positions that work 
to elites’ own advantage in an interparty struggle for power’ (Disch, 2011, p. 100; cf. 
Gerber & Jackson, 1993). Although empirical political scientists now acknowledge 
that voters are more competent to hold coherent and stable political views than 
thought at the time of Philip Converse’s sceptical analysis of political beliefs in 
mass publics (Converse, 1964), these views are ‘framed’ or even constituted by 
party elites for partisan reasons, including the control of the political agenda 
(Althaus, Edy, Entman, & Phelen, 1996; W. L. Bennett, 1990; W. L. Bennett & 
Manheim, 1993). 
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These empirical findings bring into question the widespread ‘bedrock’ perspective 
on political representation (Disch, 2011, p. 100) – the commonsense notion that 
democratic representatives should take citizen preferences as the ‘bedrock for 
social choice’ (B. I. Page & Shapiro, 1992, p. 354), along with the idea that 
representative government is defined by the ‘continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens’ (Dahl, 1971, p. 1).9 This ‘traditional 
model of promissory representation’ (Mansbridge, 2003, p. 518) is unidirectional as, 
in democratic representation, the ‘representative must be responsive to [the 
constituent] rather than the other way around’ (Pitkin, 1967, p. 140). However the 
empirical findings about preference formation (and the resultant agenda setting) 
referenced above 
sit uneasily with this norm because they defy this static portrait of 
preferences together with this linear dyadic model of influence. They 
reveal, instead, that the representative process is dynamic and 
interactive. Representatives look backward to preferences that have 
been expressed, and orient themselves forward in a speculative mode 
toward what their constituency might want or be induced to want at the 
next election. In short empirical research reveals political 
representation to be constitutive: legislators do not simply respond to 
constituent preferences but are ‘active . . . in searching out and 
sometimes creating them.’ (Mansbridge, 2003, p. 518, cited in Disch, 
2011, pp. 100-101) 
Disch argues that the seeds of Mansbridge’s ‘reflexive’ model of political 
representation can be found in Pitkin’s 1967 work, which is not quite as 
unidirectional as generally believed, representation being more of a system 
property than a simple principal-agent relationship. Representation is an ‘emergent’ 
property of ‘the over-all structure and functioning of the system’ (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 
221-2): 
                                            
9 Dahl in fact acknowledged that political leaders under modern pluralistic conditions ‘do 
not merely respond to the preferences of constituents; leaders also shape preferences’. 
(Dahl, 1961, p. 164) 
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[R]epresentation may emerge from a political system in which many 
individuals, both voters and legislators, are pursuing quite other goals. 
. . . Legislators often pattern their actions not on what their 
constituents ought to want but on what they anticipate their 
constituents will want (in all their ignorance). (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 224, 
167)  
However, a representative system in which politicians look forward to what their 
constituencies might/will/ought to want in the next election is open to manipulation: 
[A]s soon as representation becomes anticipatory (rather than merely 
responsive) it opens up the possibility for political elites to change 
voters’ preferences. Pitkin, like Mansbridge, is inclined to parse this 
possibility in terms of what she presents as an opposition between 
‘leadership’ and ‘manipulation’. (Disch, 2011, p. 108) 
But there is a fine line between leadership and manipulation, so Disch chooses the 
more neutral term ‘mobilization’ to describe how voter preferences are ‘constituted’ 
by political elites, hoping thereby to bridge the gap between the warring tribes of 
Downsian public-choice theorists, Dahlian pluralists and post-Marxist elite theorists 
(Lukes, 2005).  
However, from the point of view of this thesis, it matters little whether political 
parties reflect or mobilize public opinion as they clearly have an important role to 
play in the representation of voter preferences in proportion to their prevalence 
within the electorate, even if it is no longer tenable to argue that the relationship is 
of a simple dyadic and unidirectional nature. The distinction between promissory, 
anticipatory and responsive representation (Mansbridge, 2003) is purely temporal 
and doesn’t affect the argument that the political party is still seeking to shape 
and/or respond to – ‘refine and enlarge’ – the ‘public views’ (Madison, Federalist, 
10). 
Political theorists of a ‘deliberative’ persuasion are uneasy with the representative 
claims of electoral democracy on account of the blurring of ‘communicative’ and 
‘strategic’ action by political leaders. According to the norms of (Habermasian) 
deliberative democracy, voter preferences should be formed in the context of the 
give and take of reasons, not threats, bribes or other strategic factors: 
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The discourse ideal casts suspicion on preferences that are formed in 
information contexts where power is at stake and where unstated 
motives exist – the very conditions of preference formation [in electoral 
democracy] according to empirical scholarship. (Disch, 2011, p. 101) 
Given the need of political parties to win competitive elections, the manipulation of 
voter preferences for strategic purposes is inevitable. However, the binary nature 
of the constitutional proposal outlined in Chapter 8 ensures that the final decision 
on policy proposals will be taken in a fully deliberative context by a representative 
minidemos. As such the thesis, while not discounting the manipulation of voter 
preferences by the ‘crafted talk’ (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000, p. 17) that constitutes 
partisan isegoria, has confidence that any such biases will be, at the very least, 
ameliorated at the final decision stage. The combination of communicative and 
strategic action leads to the ‘dilemma of democratic competence’ – whereby the 
educative effect of political discourse is tarnished by the self-interested 
communication needs of elites (Disch, 2011, p. 101), which can only be overcome 
by a two-stage political process that involves a separation of isegoria and isonomia, 
the two distinct elements of the democratic diarchy. Without such a separation ‘one 
form of incompetence simply replaces another’. (Druckman, 2001, p. 239) 
In addition to the problem of the manipulation of political education for strategic 
(party political) purposes, in Power: A Radical View, originally published in 1974, 
Steven Lukes raised the problem of policies that were deliberately excluded from 
the political agenda. Dahl’s ‘behaviourist’ analysis of New Haven politics ‘may be 
highly misleading if power is being exercised within the system to limit decision-
making to acceptable issues’ (Lukes, 2005, p. 39). Lukes’ analysis was based on 
Matthew Crenson’s study of air pollution in Gary, Indiana, a one-company town 
dominated by US Steel, with a strong party organization which managed 
successfully to keep the problem of air pollution off the political agenda for over a 
decade longer than steel towns like East Chicago that had a number of steel 
companies (Lukes, 2005, p. 45): ‘A polity that is pluralistic in its decision-making 
can be unified in its non-decision-making’ (Crenson, 1971, p. 179). Although Dahl 
might well have responded that the politics of a town built by a single company and 
responsible for its prosperity was the exception that proved the polyarchic rule, 
nevertheless the political class is perfectly capable of keeping policies it sees as 
beyond the pale off the political agenda – witness the three-party politically-correct 
216 
consensus underpinning high levels of immigration in the UK for more than a 
decade at the turn of the twenty-first century. This is one of the reasons that this 
thesis endorses the ‘open access’ approach to agenda-setting characterized by the 
representative claim model, in which political parties are only one agent amongst 
others. 
The other problems with electoral representation (touched on in the introduction) – 
including ideological factionalism, the construction of artificial cleavages in order to 
secure success at the polls, Arrow’s impossibility theorem, pork-trading, and the 
alienation between the political class and the electorate (owing to the inability of the 
legislature to mirror the sheer diversity of modern pluralized, fragmented and 
‘disenchanted’ societies) (Weber, 1946) – are so well-known as to need no further 
elaboration. The 2015 events in Greece – when a party, elected on the basis of a 
clear manifesto, was subsequently obliged to pursue policies that it fundamentally 
opposed – further complicates the problem of evaluating the legitimacy of electoral 
representative claim-making. Although at the time of writing Syriza appears to be 
the exception that proves the rule, ongoing economic and fiscal trauma throughout 
Western democracies, leading possibly to an increased role for unelected and non-
governmental organisations, may well make for similar incidents to the Syriza case. 
Notwithstanding all the above caveats, this thesis argues – uncontroversially – that 
political parties that gain the requisite number of votes in a general election have 
the democratic right to have the representative claims of their manifesto 
commitments converted into parliamentary bills for consideration by the randomly-
selected legislature. Michels’ ‘iron law’ of oligarchy is of secondary interest 
because ‘democracy is not to be found in the parties but between the parties’ 
(Schattschneider, 1942, p. 60). Or, as Robert Dahl put it: 
Michels made an elementary mistake. If political parties are highly 
competitive, it may not matter a great deal if they are not internally 
democratic or even if they are internally rather oligarchical. If parties 
are actively competing for votes in elections, the party that fails to 
respond to majority concerns will probably lose elections, while a party 
that does respond to majority concerns will probably win elections. 
(Dahl, 1990 [1970], p. 5) 
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The precise nature of the electoral algorithm (the threshold of votes required for the 
right to make legislative proposals) is not the concern of a thesis in political theory 
– the point is only that the separation of function in the democratic diarchy of 
isegoria and isonomia (along with the radical separation of executive and 
legislative powers outlined in Chapter 8.3.5, below), suggests that there would be 
no need for initiative rights to be limited to those with a simple plurality of the votes 
counted. As such, electoral representation is an essential component of 
democratic isegoria, but electorally-mandated advocates should not be the judge in 
their own cause (for Madisonian reasons outlined in Chapter 4.2, above). As the 
audience for the representative claim of the political party happens to be the same 
as the legal constituency, the party is (uncontroversially) an essential element in 
the institution of representative isegoria. 
7.3.2  Pressure groups and single-issue advocates 
7.3.2.1  New political parties 
The membership of established political parties declined catastrophically during the 
second half of the twentieth century, particularly in the UK. The Conservative Party 
had nearly three million members during the 1950s but the figure in September 
2014 was only 135,000 – a 95.5% decline.10 The story with new political 
movements is somewhat different – both the UK Independence Party and the 
Scottish National Party were founded as single-issue campaign groups but 
subsequently extended their remit beyond their foundational issue. Whilst the SNP 
lost the 2014 Scottish independence referendum it won almost all Scottish 
parliamentary constituencies in the 2015 Westminster election on the basis of a 
general manifesto. Membership levels for the SNP are currently (April 2015) 
105,000, challenging the UK Conservative Party in sheer membership numbers, 
                                            
10 The supporters of Jeremy Corbyn like to argue that his 2015 ‘landslide’ victory as Labour 
Party leader provided him with an unprecedented mandate, but this was on the basis of 
251,417 votes, including a large number of ‘affiliate’ members paying a one-off fee of £3.00 
to vote – less than half (121,751) of Corbyn’s votes were from full Labour Party members. 
The Corbyn phenomenon demonstrates that there is still a demand for genuine party 
democracy as opposed to the reflexive audience variant. 
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despite the SNP’s enormous demographic disadvantage in terms of potential 
members. This would indicate that the distinction between campaign groups and 
general-purpose political parties is becoming more blurred, particularly in the case 
of populist and ‘reflexive’ political movements: 
Parties may become ‘mutants’ or ‘hybrids’ . . . Parties that edge 
toward claiming to be representative primarily in the reflexive11 model 
have already gone some way down that road (Saward, 2010, p. 136). 
Mutant/hybrid parties can (uncontroversially) make a representative claim and 
expect it to be received in an identical way to long-established political parties, 
notwithstanding the party’s recent provenance as a single-issue pressure group or 
as a medium for reflexive ‘audience’ democracy. Depending on the electoral 
decision rule in place, successful mutant/hybrid organizations would have the 
same rights to initiate legislative proposals as ‘traditional’ political parties and for 
their representative claims to be judged in an identical manner by a randomly-
selected legislature. According to Ian Budge’s proposal for legislative decision-
making by randomly-selected minipublics (Budge, 2000, p. 201), confining agenda-
setting and debating rights to political parties would have the advantage of moving 
beyond the elitist ‘university seminar’ model advocated by most deliberative 
democrats to a ‘forensic’ (courtroom) model better suited to evaluation by 
randomly-selected juries:12 
Party participation thus transforms seminar discussions into courtroom 
dramas. The object in forensic debate is not to make up your mind on 
whether or not your case is a just one. That is already given by your 
remit. The object is to win the case. That does not eliminate 
                                            
11 ‘Reflexive’ political parties are those that devise policy proposals on the basis of their 
assessment of ‘consumer’ demand, using market research tools like focus groups. Philip 
Gould, Tony Blair’s pollster, was adamant that the primary purpose of focus groups and 
public opinion surveys was ‘bottom-up’ (reflexive) policy making as opposed to the top-
down imperative to ‘get the message out’ in a voter-friendly manner. (Gould, 1998) 
12 See p. 184, above, for discussion of the distinction between deliberative and forensic 
rhetoric. 
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deliberation and debate, but it does change its purpose. The object 
now it to put forward arguments which will induce third parties – judge, 
jury or electors – to come down on your side. (Budge, 2000, pp. 201-
2) 
Although Budge’s model of forensic (adversarial) rhetoric will be greeted with 
horror by deliberative purists, it is, arguably, better adapted to the agonism that is 
the defining characteristic of democratic politics (Mouffe, 2013). Budge views his 
proposal as a hybrid – ‘deliberative, and direct democracy – and political parties!’ 
(ibid., p. 208). The view of this thesis is that Budge’s proposal for decision-making 
by large randomly-selected juries is a form of descriptive representation 
(stochation)13 rather than direct democracy. However this is an argument over 
terminology rather than over principle or institutional design.  
7.3.2.2  Single-issue advocates 
While the rolls of most mainstream political parties have been in free fall, 
membership of Greenpeace, Oxfam, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
(RSPB) and other single-issue pressure groups has soared, with the RSPB alone 
claiming over a million members (primarily in the UK). In the ‘standard model’ of 
democracy (Castiglione & Warren, 2005), such organizations would be viewed as 
advocates, lobbyists and pressure groups on behalf of the particular issue that they 
campaigned for – the environment, famine victims, wildlife etc. – but Saward and 
other constructivists invite us to consider their advocacy in terms of a 
representative claim. 
This approach has been subject to extensive criticism (Nasstrom, 2011): for 
example Jennifer Rubenstein, in her study of the work of Oxfam and other INGOs 
(international non-governmental organisations), responds to the Economist 
headline ‘Who Elected Oxfam’ (Economist, 2000) that the problem is in fact the 
misuse of advocacy and quasi-governmental power, not bad representation. 
Rubenstein takes issue with the claim that Oxfam is a ‘non-elected representative 
                                            
13 For full definition of ‘stochation’, see glossary, p. 338, below; also Appendix II, p. 337. 
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of poor Ghanaians’ (Rubenstein, 2014, p. 206). Her claim is that (constructivist) 
representation theorists overstate their case: 
When one has a hammer, everything can look like a nail. Likewise, 
when one studies representation, everything can look like 
representation. I have argued that democratic theorists, especially 
theorists of representation, need to take off our representation-
coloured glasses and look anew at advocacy through the lens of 
power, and not only representation. (Rubenstein, 2014, p. 230, my 
emphasis). 
This thesis agrees with Rubenstein that INGOs are better described as advocates 
than ‘unelected representatives’ and, as such, have no inherent right to introduce 
legislative proposals without going through the direct-democratic filter described in 
section 7.3.4, below. A pressure- or advocacy group would otherwise need to 
morph into a general-purpose political party (the most relevant examples being the 
Green Party and UKIP) and secure broader public support prior to gaining initiative 
rights (subject to a suitably accommodating electoral algorithm). Nevertheless the 
knowledge and skills of such advocates would naturally fall under the remit of the 
advocacy house outlined in Chapter 8 (below). 
7.3.3  Representation of ‘all affected interests’, non-human life, the 
environment and future generations 
One of the key factors leading to the recent surge of interest in deliberative 
democracy has been the inability of national legislatures to do little more than 
respond ‘reflexively’ to the short-term interests of their territorial constituents 
(Dobson, 1996; Eckersley, 2000). The acidification of Swedish lakes was a direct 
consequence of UK industrial policy, but Swedish citizens have no representation 
in the UK national parliament (Dobson, 1996, p. 128), and rainforests (along with 
their non-human inhabitants) and unborn generations don’t get to vote.  
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Considerations like this have led to the argument that rather than limiting the 
demos geographically, ‘everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government 
should have the right to participate in that government’ (Dahl, 1990, p. 49).14 
However ‘the set of persons who are affected often varies from one decision to 
another’ (ibid.), so it’s unclear how to establish stable and coherent governance15 
on the basis of the principle of all affected interests. Added to that, in a globalized 
world the principle of all affected interests ‘understood in a suitably expansive 
“possibilistic” way would mean giving virtually everyone everywhere a vote on 
virtually everything decided anywhere’. (Goodin, 2008, p. 153) 
Although the principle of all affected interests is generally cashed out in terms of 
‘who is entitled to vote’, of greater interest from the point of view of this chapter is 
‘who is entitled to a say’ (Goodin, 2008, p. 129). Deliberative democrats claim that 
their (speech-oriented) approach is better suited to the problem of all affected 
interests as 
[O]lder models always saw the first task in their application as 
specification of the boundaries of a political community. Deliberation 
and communication, in contrast, can cope with fluid boundaries, and 
the production of outcomes across boundaries. For we can now look 
for democracy in the character of political interaction, without worrying 
about whether or not it is confined to particular territorial entities. 
(Dryzek, 1999, p. 44) 
To Dennis Thompson, the switch from aggregative to deliberative democracy 
would have normative entailments for policymakers in an increasingly global 
society: 
[P]ublic officials must consider not only their electoral constituents but 
also what may be called their moral constituents, all those individuals 
                                            
14 C.f. (Mill, 1991; Dahl, 1989, pp. 93-95, 119-31).  
15 Note the earlier disclaimer (p. 211, above) that references to ‘government decisions’ etc 
should be ignored, as the focus of this chapter is on the representation of the underlying 
views and interests that give rise to the decisions, rather than political authority per se. 
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who are bound by the decisions they make, whether de jure or de 
facto. (D. Thompson, F, 1999, p. 120) 
However if deliberative democracy is going to be anything more than a set of 
normative ideals (what public officials should do), it needs to come up with 
proposals as to how best to put the deliberative norms into practice, and here 
Thompson only makes outline suggestions:  
[A] state could establish forums in which representatives could speak 
for the ordinary citizens of foreign states. . . . The responsibility could 
even be formalized by establishing a special office – a kind of Tribune 
for non-citizens. (Thompson, 1999, pp. 121-2) 
Moreover the switch of focus to deliberative democracy does little to resolve the 
outreach problem, on account of Dahl’s back-of-the-envelope calculation of the 
exponential time cost to deliberative democracy of increasing the range of 
participants (Dahl, 1990, p. 54).16 This being the case then  
substituting discursive accountability for electoral accountability does 
nothing to cure – rather, it exacerbates – the problems arising from 
genuinely including all affected interests among those to whom we 
must be accountable. (Goodin, 2008, p. 149) 
If this is the case, then the problem of all affected interests might well be better 
addressed by extra-democratic constitutional safeguards, discussed below (section 
7.3.3.2), as opposed to democratic innovations, deliberative or otherwise. 
7.3.3.1  The environment, non-human animals and future generations 
According to Green political theorist Andrew Dobson (Dobson, 2014), political 
theory has been unduly shaped by Aristotle’s emphasis on political speech: 
                                            
16 Taking his own home town (pop. 20,000) – ‘the largest in Connecticut to retain some of 
the old town meeting system’ as an example, Dahl calculates that ‘allowing two minutes for 
each speaker in a meeting lasting six hours, less than 1 percent of the citizens would have 
the opportunity to speak.’ (ibid.) 
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Nature, as we say, does nothing without some purpose; and for the 
purpose of making man a political animal (zoon politikon) she has 
endowed him alone among the animals with the power of reasoned 
speech. . . Speech . . . serves to indicate what is useful and what is 
harmful, and so what is right and what is wrong. (Arist, Pol. Bk. 1, c.2) 
Western political theory is little more than a footnote to this observation, Hobbes, 
for example, arguing that: 
[T]he most noble and profitable invention of all other was that of 
SPEECH, consisting of Names or Appellations, and their Connexion; 
whereby men register their Thoughts, recall them when they are past; 
and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and 
conversation; without which there had been amongst men neither 
Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than 
amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. (Hobbes, 1996, p. 24) 
Animals ‘cannot speak and therefore cannot make contracts’ and are thereby 
excluded from the political process (Dobson, 2014, p. 141); they ‘cannot enter into 
contractual agreements, or make promises’ (Feinberg, 1974, p. 46). Like the earlier 
arguments for deliberative and discursive democracy, Dobson’s response is largely 
normative – Aristotle’s political animal should learn how to listen – concluding that  
[W]e need to replace Aristotle with Epictetus, so to speak: ‘Nature has 
given men one tongue but two ears, that we may hear from others 
[and nature] twice as much as we speak’. (Dobson, 2014, p. 196). 
In a similar vein: 
Recognition of agency in nature therefore means that we should listen 
to signals emanating from the natural world with the same sort of 
respect we accord communication emanating from human subjects, 
and as requiring equally careful interpretation. (Dryzek, 2000, p. 149) 
Green political theorists ‘necessarily attach value to naturally-occurring objects, 
independently of the values which we humans (presently) attach to them’ (Goodin, 
1996, p. 835). If this is the case then it follows that ‘natural objects are shown to 
have interests as deserving of protection as are those of natural individuals of the 
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human sort’ (ibid., p. 836). The problem, of course, is that the language of interests, 
politically speaking, only makes sense when couched in terms of the interests of 
members of a specific political community (and their dependents). Although Green 
theorists respond with the analogy of the past exclusion of the interests of slaves, 
coloured people and women, it remains the case that their interests were only 
properly respected when they became full members of the political community and 
it is hard to see how this might be possible in the case even of chimpanzees (with 
whom we share 98.4 percent of our DNA (Goodin, Pateman, & Pateman, 1997, p. 
831)), let alone rainforests. 
The style of listening that Dobson advocates is ‘apophatic’ in that the listener lays 
aside the prefigured and domineering categories of ‘closed ear’ cataphatic speech 
and is ‘still’ and attentive to the ‘speaker’ (Garrison, 2010, pp. 2770-2771): 
‘apophatic listeners allow categories to emerge from what they hear’ (Dobson, 
2014, p. 146). The use of inverted commas around ‘speaker’ is intentional because 
apophatic listening is applicable when ‘speakers’ are either non-human animals or 
nature – we need to listen to the drip-drip of melting glaciers, or a river or a troop of 
elephants as political ‘propositions’ (Latour, 2004, p. 83; c.f. Bennett, 2010).  
How might apophatic (empathetic) listening work out in practice? Dobson uses the 
example of the autistic savant, Temple Grandin:17 
[A]utistic people can think the way animals think . . . Autism is a kind of 
way station on the road from animals to humans, which puts autistic 
people like me in a perfect position to translate ‘animal talk’ into 
English. I can tell people why their animals are doing the things they 
do.18 (Grandin, 2005, pp. 6-7) 
                                            
17 Autism, ironically, is associated with low levels of empathetic listening vis-à-vis other 
human beings. 
18 Grandin’s work in the cattle-handling industry is pertinent from the perspective of Jeremy 
Bentham’s extension of the realm of political consideration to the animal world: ‘the 
question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’ (Bentham, 
1970, pp. 311, fn.) 
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The approach of the epistemologist Bruno Latour is to ‘smear’ together the 
Aristotelian distinction between nature and politics: both things and people have 
‘spokespersons’, and it is this that shows the ‘profound kinship between 
representatives of humans (in the political sense) and representatives of non-
humans (in the epistemological sense)’ (Latour, 2004, p. 250). But how will the 
spokespersons  or ‘actants’19 be selected, given that out of Latour’s proposal for 
two assemblies – the House of Science and the House of Politics – only the latter 
is amenable to a democratic mandate. The ‘hard question’ of the political capacity 
of actants remains: 
[W]e have to acknowledge that the notion of the spokesperson lends 
itself admirably to the definition of the work done by scientists in lab 
coats . . . the lab coats are the spokespersons of the nonhumans, and, 
as is the case with all spokespersons, we have to entertain serious but 
not definitive doubts about their capacity to speak in the name of those 
they represent. (Latour, 2004, pp. 64-5, emphasis in original) 
Similar to Latour’s House of Science and House of Politics is Daniel Bell’s neo-
Confucian proposal for a meritocratic house with veto powers over the democratic 
house outlined in his book The China Model: 
A Huang20-style meritocratic house composed of representatives 
selected on the basis of competitive examinations can be combined 
with a democratic house composed of representatives selected by 
competitive elections. The democratic house would have the task of 
representing the interests of voters, and the meritocratic house would 
have the task of representing the interests of nonvoters affected by the 
policies of government, such as foreigners and future generations. 
                                            
19 Latour’s term for human and non-human actors, derived from actor-network semiotic 
theory, is endorsed by political theorist Jane Bennett in her book Vibrant Matter (J. Bennett, 
2010, p. ix). However, as the book title suggests, Bennett’s concern is ontology rather than 
epistemology. 
20 The reference is to the seventeenth-century Confucian scholar Huang Zongxi’s proposal 
for a ‘parliament of scholars’. 
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Deputies of the meritocratic house could be chosen on the basis of 
examinations that test not just for knowledge of the classics [the 
Confucian procedure], but also for knowledge of international relations 
and environmental science. To ensure that the interests of nonvoters 
are not systematically marginalized in the political process, the 
meritocratic house could have veto power over any policies that it 
judges harm the interests of future generations. (Bell, 2015, p. 51) 
However, as Bell acknowledges, veto power for such a house would be impossible 
to implement in a democracy (hence his interest in autocratic regimes such as 
China). In the absence of Confucian scholars, autistic savants and other specially-
endowed empathetic listeners, the need to represent the interests of nature, non-
human animals and the unborn has led to the call for ‘proxy’ spokespersons for 
non-human species and future generations,21 who would be elected from 
campaigning and lobby groups by a randomly-selected subset of all voters 
(Dobson, 1996, p. 133).22 Proxy or trustee representatives would have clear 
advocacy and initiative rights and the reference to ‘lobbyists’ is a clear indication 
that this topic falls under the remit of the current chapter, but it remains unclear as 
to how such a proposal would work in practice.  
If the audience for the representative claims of proxies for non-human animals, the 
environment and the unborn finds a claim persuasive it will need to convert the 
claim into the manifesto commitments of a political party (either Green or of a more 
traditional colour) in order to demonstrate the requisite level of statistical 
proportionality that the claim presupposes. John Burnheim’s proposal for 
                                            
21 A number of theorists still share Burke’s Confucian view of society as a compact 
between the living, the dead and unborn generations. (Bergstrom, 2005; T. Mulgan, 1999) 
22 Also of relevance is Hubertus Buchstein’s proposal for an ‘Aleatory Kid’s Vote’, which 
leaves the child’s actual representative up to chance. As Buchstein acknowledges, the 
normative case for such a form of representation ‘is based on the republican belief that a 
voter who receives the right to represent the “will” of a child unknown to her or him 
develops more openness to participate in the public debate about what is good for children 
and their future before he or she casts the vote as a children’s representative’ (Buchstein, 
forthcoming, p. 10 [proof]). Given that this might require the ‘Kid’s voter’ to decide against 
her own immediate interest, this might well prove somewhat optimistic. 
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demarchic councils (discussed in section 7.4.2, below) is better suited to address 
the concerns outlined in this section than the election of proxy representatives. The 
geographical extent of each specialist council would be determined by its remit – 
thus representation on a demarchic committee for the environment would extend a 
long way beyond the territorial boundaries of the Westphalian state. And the 
voluntary principle would enable the participation of a wide range of experts and 
activists (winnowed down to a workable deliberative forum by the sortition-based 
sampling involved). As the committees are firmly located in the informal sphere of 
public opinion (they would have no legislative powers), there would be no risk of 
undermining the isonomic equality of all citizens and Burnheim makes no claim 
that demarchic councils perform a representative function (in the political sense of 
the word). (Burnheim, 2016) 
7.3.3.2  Rights, duties and constitutional safeguards 
The language of rights assumes the entities under consideration are ‘beings with 
interests of their own’, presupposing, ‘at least rudimentary cognitive equipment [as] 
interests are compounded out of desires and aims’ (Feinberg, 1974, p. 52). This 
analysis encourages Feinberg to argue that the language of animal rights is at 
least coherent. But how animal rights are best instantiated is a non-trivial question 
– the rights of minors and the mentally incompetent can be represented by 
principal–agent trustee relationships as it is possible to anticipate how the principal 
might choose (or have chosen) given the similar cognitive equipment possessed 
by the agent. But the argument doesn’t apply to non-human animals (except, 
perhaps, in the Temple Grandin example given above) and, although perhaps 
applicable to individual unborn foetuses, the application to hypothetical ‘future 
generations’ is complicated by the ‘paradox of potentiality’ (ibid., pp. 67-8). This 
leads Feinberg to the modest conclusion that we have ‘duties to future human 
beings, duties derived from our housekeeping role as temporary inhabitants of this 
planet’ (ibid., p. 56, my emphasis). 
It’s hard to disagree with this commonsense claim, but the shift from the 
representation of rights to the language of duties would suggest that the protection 
of the interests referred to in this sub-section would best be achieved by 
constitutional checks and balances: 
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Underage heirs, incompetent elders, and princes away on crusades 
all have rights deserving of protection, even though they are practically 
or legally unable to press these claims for themselves. We standardly 
assign guardians or trustees to protect their interests . . . Guardians or 
trustees can [subject to the aforementioned caveat] speak for the 
great apes [or other non-human species, nature in general, and future 
generations] in similar fashion. (Goodin, Pateman and Pateman, 
1996, p. 838) 
Although this is couched in terms of speech acts (‘speaking for the great apes’), it 
is as misleading to view this as a form of political representation as it is to speak of 
the relationship between a lawyer and her client as a political one, hence my 
conclusion that trustees for nature, non-human animals and future generations are 
best understood in terms of extra-democratic constitutional safeguards. 
While much of the focus on the need to safeguard the rights of unborn generations 
has been on environmental degradation, of equal concern is the current practice of 
all but the most fiscally prudent (i.e. German) governments to run a long-term 
(structural) budget deficit, aided and abetted by all-time-low interest rates. Such an 
approach could well be viewed as financing current expenditure by mortgaging our 
children’s and grandchildren’s future. The intention of the (UK) Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (Labour), the Office for Budget Responsibility (Lib/Con Coalition) 
and the Charter for Budget Responsibility (Conservative) is to bind the hands of 
elected politicians by quasi-constitutional legislative safeguards to ensure that 
governments run a surplus in ‘normal’ times. Unfortunately the first principle of the 
UK ‘constitution’ is that no government can bind the hands of future governments, 
so such developments have rightly been greeted with skepticism – and this has 
been borne out by the decision of the Conservatives in 2017 to postpone the 
balanced budget target until 2025. 
However the US Constitution has shown itself (for better or worse) to be a highly 
effective way of entrenching fundamental principles, and there is no reason why 
medium-term fiscal balance should not be one of them. Another such safeguard 
might well be the ‘precautionary principle’, beloved of environmental activists (Mills 
& King, 2000). Constitutional safeguards clearly have no obvious relevance to 
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isegoria (equal speech), so will be discussed further in Chapter 8, on the ‘mixed 
constitution’. 
7.3.4  Direct-democratic initiatives 
In the fifth-century Athenian democracy, any citizen who wished to could speak at 
the meetings of the general assembly although, in practice, the right to speak was 
only taken up by a small minority. Similarly any citizen could propose a new law or 
decree – although this was generally via the mediation of the council, this was 
because the council was the secretariat for the assembly and recorded the agenda.  
Elements of this aspect of direct democracy have been replicated in the modern 
age. The ‘progressive era’ reforms in the USA (1890s to 1920s) included ‘citizens’ 
initiative’ measures – in 1902 Oregon became the first state to introduce the 
initiative and referendum process whereby any citizen could propose new state 
laws or constitutional amendments, followed in 1911 in California with Governor 
Hiram Johnson’s ‘Initiative, Referendum, and Recall’. Similar reforms were 
introduced in other states and now approximately half of US states have some 
form of direct-democratic provision. 
The Swiss federal constitution – a mixture of representative and direct democracy 
– has long included a popular initiative (Eidgenössische Volksinitiative) provision, 
and between 1893 and 2014 approximately 11% of the petitions that achieved 
100,000 signatures were adopted at the subsequent ‘votation’ referendum. A 
similar principal applies at the canton and municipal level.  
The government of the Canadian province of British Columbia passed the Recall 
and Initiative Act into law in 1995, but the high initial threshold (the signatures of 
10% of all registered voters) has meant that only one referendum has been held as 
the result of a successful citizen initiative. Many other countries – including Finland, 
France (at the local assembly level), Germany (at the state but not the federal 
level), New Zealand and the Philippines have some sort of procedure for citizen 
initiatives. 
In the EU the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon introduced the European Citizens’ Initiative 
(ECI), designed to address the perceived democratic deficit of the EU institutions, 
which enabled petitions attracting in excess of one million signatures over seven 
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member states to call directly on the European Commission (which has the right of 
initiative) to implement a legislative proposal in areas where the member states 
have conferred powers. As of the time of writing there have been fourteen 
successful initiatives but there is little evidence at this early stage that ECIs have 
had any impact on EU legislation. 
Developments in internet technology have led to a growth in email and web-based 
e-petitions, including the Scottish Parliament’s e-Petitioner system (1999), the 
German Budestag’s Petitionen portal (from 2005) and the Obama administration’s 
We The People platform (2011). In 2011 the UK Coalition Government relaunched 
the e-petitions system it inherited from the previous administration – from that time 
on a petition that garnered 10,000 signatures would receive a response from the 
government, with petitions exceeding 100,000 signatures ‘considered’ for a debate 
by the petitions committee (composed of eleven backbench MPs).  
As this is a thesis in political theory rather than comparative political science I have 
only provided a brief outline of the citizen initiative in the modern era, my goal 
being merely to indicate that this is an instrument of direct-democratic isegoria that 
is already in widespread use, albeit with limited efficacy. The criticisms of the 
citizen initiative have much in common with criticisms of direct democracy in 
general, including the ease of participating (leading to casual and poorly-
considered enrolment), the ability of well-resourced lobby groups and activists to 
hijack the agenda, and the lack of consideration of externalities – i.e. how single 
issues fit into the overall ecology of governance, including fiscal considerations. A 
successful initiative in the State of California can cost well in excess of $1 million 
(largely the cost of employing ‘mercenary’ signature gatherers and soft-focus TV 
advertising). In addition there is unease that when the petitions system is being 
hosted by the government itself that this is little more than a public-relations 
exercise. The most effective petitions have been organized by independent 
campaigning organizations like change.org or 38 Degrees, whose online petition 
led to the reversal of UK government policy on forestry ownership. 
The above criticisms would suggest that the citizen initiative could only play a 
supplementary role in isegoria and that significant checks and balances would be 
required. The practical proposal outlined in Chapter 8 includes a direct-democratic 
initiative system loosely modelled on the UK government e-petition system, with a 
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threshold of 100,000 signatures. In order to prevent the hijacking of the legislative 
agenda by activists, popular media and pressure groups the next step would 
involve a Swiss-style ‘votation’ in which all citizens rank their choices from the 
successful e-petitions received during that year. The top x selections in the annual 
votation would then be converted into parliamentary bills and subject to the same 
isonomic legislative scrutiny as bills arising from political parties. Only direct-
democratic initiatives that pass the necessary threshold in the public votation would 
constitute a validated representative claim. 
7.4  Agora: The informal public sphere 
This section is devoted to forms of representative isegoria that have no formal 
proposal and advocacy rights in the legislative system outlined in Chapter 8. The 
mass media, ‘demarchic councils’, and discursive and (public sphere) deliberative 
democracy can only (legitimately) influence public opinion indirectly, rather than 
having a formal constitutional prerogative. Where a formal right is claimed (as in 
the case of associational democracy and ‘agenda councils’) this will be seen to be 
democratically wanting. Nevertheless the formation and representation of public 
opinion is an essential component of a well-functioning democracy, so deserves to 
be discussed in a chapter devoted to representative isegoria. Indeed, to Nadia 
Urbinati, democracy is ‘government by means of opinion’ and the rightful domain 
for isegoria is ‘the extrainstitutional domain of public opinion’ (Urbinati, 2014, p. 2, 
my emphasis). Urbinati, like the early Habermas, focuses on opinion in the informal 
public sphere and the ‘disfigurations’ of democracy that her book outlines include 
‘power concentration in the sphere of political opinion formation’, along with 
‘polarized forms of consensus’ (ibid., p. 3). 
7.4.1  The ‘Fourth Estate’ 
There were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery 
yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all.23 
                                            
23 Attributed to a 1787 parliamentary speech by Edmund Burke. (Carlyle, 1841) 
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Partisan media are the lifeblood of any deliberative system designed 
along adversarial lines to advance the flow of information and insight 
through the marketplace of competition in ideas. (Mansbridge et al., 
2012, p. 20) 
Saward’s book is strangely silent on the representative claim of the media, even 
though the ‘fourth estate’ has often been viewed in the UK as a more effective form 
of political advocacy than the parliamentary variant. The word ‘media’ does not 
feature in the index to The Representative Claim, and references to the media in 
the text are primarily disparaging – for example Manin’s claim that ‘in contemporary 
media-driven politics “the electorate appears, above all, as an audience”’ (Saward, 
2010, p. 55). The discussion of new media technologies is focused on the (top-
down) ability of ‘statal’ political parties to get their message out to targeted 
audiences (p. 133), rather than as a (bottom-up) form of representative isegoria – a 
good example of the excessively long tail of Harold Lasswell’s propaganda-based 
model of media power (Lasswell, 1949), which still appears to exert a strong 
influence on the views of political theorists. Given Saward’s effective dismissal of 
the representative claims of the mass media, this topic would need to be discussed 
in much greater depth than other, less controversial, forms of representative 
isegoria. The theoretical perspective of this thesis, broadly speaking, is that 
newspapers, in particular, do more to represent public opinion than to create it, and 
that, as such, the media have (or should have) an essential role to play in 
representative isegoria. The essential role of the competitive media in 
representative isegoria is primarily a normative claim – based on the Miltonian 
doctrine (see p. 243, below) – and it is hard to conceive of a well-functioning 
democracy in the absence of such a feature. Although some tentative evidence is 
introduced to illustrate this claim, formal evaluation of the degree to which existing 
media adequately perform this function is beyond the remit of a thesis in political 
theory. 
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7.4.1.1  UK media – competitive and marginally profitable 
The argument for the fourth estate as a maker of representative claims assumes 
the commercial needs of newspaper and other media companies to enhance 
circulation.24 The model used here relies on Richard Epstein’s general thesis that 
competitive markets pressure people to do what is cost-effective, which generally 
means selling to any willing customer who is able to pay. The hypothesis is that 
over time competitive markets tend in a rough and ready way to come close 
enough to satisfying formal equality of opportunity. (Epstein, 1995, Chapter 1) 
According to this thesis, the political apostasy of the Sun in 1997 (when the paper 
switched its support from the Tories to New Labour) was ‘based on Murdoch’s 
commercial considerations rather than political affinities’ (Norris, Curtice, Sanders, 
Scammell, & Semetko, 1999, p. 26) – and presupposes that newspapers will be 
motivated, for business reasons, to modulate their editorial policies to better reflect 
the views of their readers: 
Perhaps The Sun's change of allegiance [in 1997] was a response to 
a change of mood that had already occurred amongst its readers, and 
was designed not in the hope of persuading readers to change their 
vote but because of a fear that otherwise they might stop reading the 
newspaper. (Curtice, 1999, p. 11) 
According to this (bottom-up) perspective ‘the media, like elections, constitute an 
important sluice between public opinion formation and state “will formation”’ (Baker, 
2007, p. 7). Note that the word ‘sluice’ presupposes a mediating role between 
public opinion and will formation as opposed to the media being an independent 
                                            
24 A good example of Bernard Mandeville’s argument that public benefits are to be derived 
from private vices like greed (Mandeville, 1732). According to the Mandevillian perspective 
it is because Rupert Murdoch is a ‘Dirty Digger’ that his publications can be relied on to 
mirror the preferences and beliefs of their readers. No doubt the inhabitants of Fleet Street 
would retort that workers in the marketplace of ideas operate more in accordance with 
Adam Smith’s notion of virtuous self-interest but, given the low public regard for ‘hacks’ (as 
opposed to the butcher, the brewer, the baker or the candlestick-maker), they might be 
better to rely on Mandevillian cynicism. 
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causal factor.25 Baker’s perspective is a modern gloss on Herodotus’s claim that 
isegoria is an equal prerequisite alongside isonomia in the constitution of a form of 
government that qualifies as democratic: ‘a country is democratic only to the extent 
that the media, as well as elections, are structurally egalitarian and politically 
salient’ (ibid.), making Saward’s silence on the role of the media in representative 
claim-making even more puzzling.26  
Curtice’s analysis of the data from the 1997 British Election Campaign Study leads 
him to the conclusion that newspapers merely shifted their support to better 
represent public opinion, as ‘readers choose to read a newspaper that chimes with 
their own views’. (ibid., p.4). This view of the 1997 election result is shared by 
analysts including Pippa Norris – ‘The Sun’s conversion did not evidently bring the 
Labour Party new recruits . . . the ability of the press to switch their readers’ 
political leanings are extremely limited’ (Norris, et al., 1999, p. 168; 184).  
The attempt by the Express to transform itself from a right-wing tabloid into a left-
wing ‘voice of the new millennium’ under the ownership of Labour-supporting Lord 
Hollick (and the editorship of Rosie Boycott) failed dismally, forcing the sale in 2000 
to right-wing UKIP supporter Richard Desmond. If the popular press is 
predominantly Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant this is better explained as a 
reflection of the preferences of its readers. In the light of the political earthquake 
resulting from the triumph of UKIP in the 2014 European parliament election (and 
the Brexit results), Saward might well choose to modify his dismissal of Tory leader 
Michael Howard’s 2005 anti-immigration ‘dog-whistle’ politics as ‘misguided’. 
Although Howard’s representative claim may not have led to election victory, this 
was more likely because the claim was crowded out by other factors deemed more 
                                            
25 The Sun’s former political editor told the present author that both he and his proprietor 
regretted the newspaper’s claim that it was ‘The Sun Wot Won It’ for John Major in 1992. 
The claim was not just hubristic but factually incorrect. (Kavanagh, 1995) 
26 Exactly how the mass media in large modern states can be ‘structurally egalitarian’ is a 
non-trivial problem that Baker’s book fails to adequately address. Arguably this is an 
impossible demand and, given the proportional equality entailed in the concept of isegoria, 
inappropriate as well – (structural [numerical] equality being the defining characteristic of 
isonomia). 
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salient by voters rather than being rejected by a large part of the audience (Saward, 
2010, p. 46). 
Note that the skeptical tone of this section is limited to the ‘Lasswell thesis’ (the top-
down influence of newspaper propaganda on voting behaviour); the positive focus 
of this section is on the media as a form of representative (i.e. bottom-up) isegoria. 
Given J.S. Mill’s view of the key role of newspapers (the only relevant broadcast 
medium in 1861) in extending the democratic forum beyond those able to hear 
directly the cry of the polis herald (Mill, 1991, p. 210), it is puzzling that Saward 
appears to view the media as the problem rather than an important part of the 
solution. The theoretical perspective of this thesis is that the media are (or at least 
should be) the most important source of representative isegoria in modern 
democracies and that the commercial factors leading to the catastrophic decline of 
a vibrant and competitive free press pose a serious danger to representative 
isegoria.27 Would governments be as (rightly) terrified of a bad headline in the 
Daily Mail if the newspaper did not provide representative isegoria for some 
3,833,000 weekly readers28 (most of whom fall into the demographic that are likely 
to vote in elections)? Although the Mail reports extremely healthy traffic on its (free) 
website – hence its relative attractiveness to advertisers – how many of the 
13,635,561 daily online browsers29 (primarily of its TV and Showbiz celebrity 
gossip section) even notice the political headlines (unavoidable with the paid-for 
print edition)? If he who pays the piper calls the tune, then the imperatives of 
advertisers to maximize their audience will trump the political preferences of 
internet browsers. Peter Oborne’s resignation in February 2015 as chief political 
commentator for the Daily Telegraph over the influence of HSBC advertising 
revenue on editorial policy is an indication of the decline in representative isegoria 
resulting from the internet-fuelled subscription crisis in the newspaper industry. 
                                            
27 According to the Office for National Statistics’ 2017 Prodcon report, the sales value of 
UK daily newspapers declined from £445.8 million in 2008 to £137.6million in 2014 and to 
£122.0 million in 2015.  
28 https://media.info/newspapers/titles/daily-mail/readership-figures 
29 http://mailadvertising.co.uk/uploads/files/MailOnline-ABC-June-2015.pdf 
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When he purchased his daily newspaper the man on the Clapham omnibus was 
adding his own voice to his chosen vehicle for representative isegoria – not so with 
those casually browsing the world-wide web. A positive gloss on A.J. Liebling’s 
sarcastic remark that ‘freedom of the press belongs to those who own one’ might 
be that the freedom extends to each of the millions of subscriber ‘owners’ who pay 
the cover price for their chosen newspaper (assuming a healthily competitive 
media marketplace in which the customer calls the shots). As Baker puts it: 
‘members of all groups [should] experience themselves as being served and 
represented by mass media that are in some sense “their own”’ – the scare quotes 
around ‘their own’ and emphasis on ‘service’ and ‘representation’ indicating that 
this desideratum undermines the subtitle of his own book (‘why [proprietory] 
ownership matters’). So long as the newspaper represents the views of its readers, 
what does it matter who the proprietor is?30 
Given the need for representative isegoria in large-scale societies, talk of the web 
democratizing the freedom of speech is entirely misleading – although the 
Athenian ho boulomenos principle is fully respected by the world wide web 
(anyone who wishes to may now speak), the relevant issue is who gets to be 
heard. The vast majority of amateur online blogs and tweets have negligible 
readership levels and are somewhat akin to mounting a soap-box in the middle of 
the Sahara Desert rather than at Speakers’ Corner in London’s Hyde Park: 
The Internet is likely to lead to much more diverse content being more 
easily available to those who seek it and to many more sources of 
information (and opinion), but overall, concentration of audiences in 
the Internet world will be great and likely to be even greater than in the 
older offline world. (Baker, 2007, p. 105, my emphasis). 
                                            
30 An interesting gloss on the focus on media ownership is that in the 2016 EU 
Referendum campaign the Times backed remain and the Sunday Times leave (both 
newspapers were owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp); whereas the Daily Mail 
backed leave and the Mail on Sunday remain (both owned by Lord Rothermere’s DMGT). 
It might be stretching Machiavelli too far to argue that this was a deliberate attempt by both 
media moguls to hedge their bets, especially as subscribers to the weekly and Sunday 
publications would have been irritated by the inconsistency. 
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During the 2016 US presidential election an increasing number of voters relied on 
the internet and social media to inform themselves on political issues and most of 
these were highly partisan in nature.31 Whereas newspapers have generally 
attempted to create a patina of impartiality, ‘alt-right’ media sites like Breitbart 
News pride themselves in their partisan affiliations and make no attempt to offer 
any sort of balanced assessment. Hillary Clinton’s supporters have gone so far as 
to claim that the election was stolen by a combination of ‘fake news’ reports on 
Facebook sites, internet trolls and manipulation by external parties (especially 
Russia) with an interest in securing the victory of the Republican candidate. By 
comparison with this, the partisan commercial media (MSM) – who have to draw 
readers from a wider political spectrum (in order to be financially viable) and are 
subject to various forms of regulation – would appear to be relatively benign. 
In addition to reflecting and (ideally) refining and enlarging the political preferences 
of their readers, newspapers also have a key role to play in investigative journalism 
(as we are reminded by the 2018 Steven Spielberg movie on the role of the 
Washington Post in exposing decades of government dishonesty regarding the 
Vietnam War).32 For a comparable UK example, The Sunday Times (along with 
the now-defunct News of the World) has a long-established reputation for in-depth 
(and expensive) investigative journalism. The newspaper was responsible for 
bringing the attention of the public (and the US and Swiss prosecuting authorities) 
to the possibility that FIFA decisions on hosting the (football) World Cup have been 
                                            
31 According to the 2016 report of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 28% of 
the UK 18-24-year-olds surveyed cited social media (primarily Facebook) as their main 
news source, compared with 24% for TV. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36528256 In 
terms of overall users the first news source for UK smartphone users was 33% social 
media (the corresponding figure for the US being 48%). This is particularly alarming in the 
light of Facebook’s January 2018 decision to overhaul its algorithm thereby reducing the 
percentage of news posts from 5% to 4% of each user’s customized News Feed. Given 
the reluctance of users – especially women and young people – to pay for online news 
content (ibid.), it’s hard to be optimistic for the future of democracy based on well-informed 
voters. 
32 The resignation of Richard Nixon as a result of the Watergate affair can also be indirectly 
attributed to the Washington Post, and applications for journalism schools reached an all-
time high in 1974 (the year of Nixon’s resignation). It is, of course, far to early to assess the 
role of the mainstream media in holding to account the Trump presidency. 
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heavily influenced by bribes. The newspaper was also responsible for revealing 
doping scandals in cycling and athletics and for exposing the fraudulent research 
underlying the connection between the MMR vaccine and autism. Important earlier 
features included in-depth investigations of the double agent Kim Philby and the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons by Israel, along with a campaign for 
compensation for thalidomide victims. As such Baker’s hypothesis that ‘dispersed 
ownership results in owners who are more likely to devote a significant portion of 
these profits to media products that produce valuable positive externalities rather 
than maximize the bottom line’ (Baker, 2007, p. 73) is not confirmed, given that 
there is no sign that the output of the Insight team of investigative journalists 
decreased after the acquisition of the newspaper by Rupert Murdoch’s 
conglomerate in 1981.  
The principal challenge to in-depth investigative journalism is the drop in 
subscriptions and advertising revenue, unrelated to the issue of the concentration 
of media ownership: ‘the consumer shift to Internet access to news could reduce 
the resources available to support serious commercial journalism’ (ibid., p. 116) as 
‘the economic base supporting the most difficult and expensive journalistic 
undertakings is eroding’ (Attitudes, 2005). This is largely because there is a 
‘relatively fixed pot of advertising revenue’, the vast bulk of the online share going 
to internet search engines and social media platforms rather than content providers 
(Baker, 2007, pp. 117-8). Since 2005, 189 local newspapers have closed in Britain, 
whereas US newspaper publishers have lost more than half of their employees 
since 2001, while industry turnover has also halved. Ninety-nine percent (sic) of US 
advertising growth in 2016 was soaked up by the Google/Facebook duopoly33 – 
the income for the latter growing 51% in the first quarter of 2017 to $7.9bn.34 
In addition to investigative journalism, newspapers could also claim to provide a 
related form of representative isegoria. Given that the Sunday Times has been for 
                                            
33 ‘We’re the free fuel powering Facebook’, Sunday Times Business Supplement, July 30 
2017, p. 12. 
34 ‘Have they got news for Facebook!’, Sunday Times Business Supplement, May 7 2017, 
p. 5. 
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some time the UK’s top-selling Sunday broadsheet, its subscribers may well 
choose to believe that campaigns by the newspaper are a democratically-valid way 
of influencing government policy – i.e. that the newspaper is making a bona fide 
‘representative claim’ on their behalf. For example the newspaper has campaigned 
vigorously for a 24/7 National Health Service to replace the current arrangements 
under which doctors, including hospital consultants, are able to opt out of weekend 
working, leading to significantly higher mortality rates for patients admitted at 
weekends. NHS medical director Sir Bruce Keogh applauded the newspaper’s 
campaign,35 and legislation proposed by the Conservative government in 2015 has 
closely mirrored the newspaper’s recommendations. This is a clear example of 
media isegoria leading directly to legislative change36 – whether the government 
was convinced by the newspaper’s arguments or encouraged by the subscription 
figures (or a combination of the two) is open to conjecture. Camilla Cavendish, the 
columnist who campaigned most forcefully on this topic, was appointed head of the 
prime minister’s policy unit in May 2015 (and ennobled in 2016).  
The ABC circulation figure of a newspaper is clearly an important factor in its 
influence – all governments are said to be terrified of a critical headline in the Daily 
Mail, but more relaxed about the editorial priorities of The Morning Star (circulation: 
c. 13,000). The editorial policy of the larger-selling tabloids, in particular the Mail 
and the Express, has been a serious constraint on the socially-liberal 
cosmopolitanism espoused by many members of the political class. However 
representative isegoria is a form of proportional, as opposed to numerical equality 
(in the Aristotelian sense), so even a newspaper with a relatively small subscription 
base has a rightful claim to a representative voice – for example the success of the 
Guardian and Independent in championing the rights of minorities and other 
totemic liberal causes is entirely at odds with their modest circulation figures. 
                                            
35 ‘Sir Bruce Keogh praises the media as Sunday Times claims victory in campaign for 
seven day services’ http://www.england.nhs.uk/2013/10/28/keogh-7ds/ 
36 It would be hard to make the case that the newspaper was merely acting in the interests 
of its proprietor and/or senior editorial team, who would have had easy access to private 
healthcare services, neither was the newspaper acting as an advocate for the private 
sector as the campaign was over the contracts of NHS employees. 
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Compared to the US – which tends to be dominated by local monopolies – the UK 
has a vibrant and competitive national newspaper industry. Given the migration of 
significant advertising (both display and classified) revenues online, the 
commercial fortunes of UK newspapers depend on maintaining subscription levels. 
Profitability is, at best, marginal – Times Newspapers Ltd. posted a £1.7m 
operating profit (but pre-tax loss) for the year ending 30 June 2014, but it was the 
first profit recorded in thirteen years. The Guardian and Observer made a loss of 
£30.6m in the year to April 2014 and exist on the revenue strength of other GMG 
assets and the beneficence of the Scott Trust; annual losses at the late-lamented 
Independent being around half that of the Guardian. The only UK broadsheet 
publisher that is consistently profitable is the Telegraph Media Group.37 
The fortunes of the broadsheets are mirrored by the decline in tabloid subscriptions, 
operating profits at Rupert Murdoch’s Sun declining from £62.1m (2013) to £35.6m 
(2014). At the Mirror Group, substantial cost-cutting and growth in digital revenues 
helped offset an 11.6% drop in publishing revenue, so that pre-tax profits only 
declined by 2.5% in 2015.38 The Mirror is clearly following the lead of DMGT, 
whose Mail Online website income increased 50% in the year to September 2013 
and who boasted nearly 200,000,000 unique monthly visitors in December 2014.  
From the viewpoint of representative isegoria, the shift from print subscriptions to 
free online access is a retrograde step, as uncommitted casual internet browsing 
cannot be taken as an indication of readers’ endorsement of the editorial position 
of the publication, entirely supported as it is by advertising revenue. Only readers 
who are prepared to ‘put their money where their mouth is’ can claim ‘ownership’ of 
the medium from the perspective of representative isegoria – in the absence of a 
subscription commitment, the speech acts of the publication are under the control 
of the advertisers. If this is the case, then newspaper groups that have an online 
paywall policy could continue to make a representative claim on behalf of their 
                                            
37 http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/telegraph-cements-place-only-profitable-mainstream-
quality-daily-%C2%A3584m-surplus-2012 
38 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-33755674 
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subscribers (not so with those offering free online access), so there is no reason in 
principle for the isegoria role of the press to disappear in the digital age. If editors of 
online publications with significant news value (as opposed to celebrity tittle-tattle, 
schadenfreude and voyeurism) depend on a loyal subscription base, then they will 
be motivated to reflect the preferences, beliefs and ideologies of their target 
audience rather than the dictates of advertisers, i.e. ‘the threat to press 
performance and to distortion of its contents resulting from the press’s dependence 
on advertising support’ (C. E. Baker, 2007). In a similar vein the revenue model for 
the open-access BBC News website (the licence fee) means that content is 
dictated by the editorial priorities of the journalists and their managers, so no 
representative claim can be derived from the large number of visitors (see section 
7.4.1.3, below for a sceptical reading of the claim that public-service broadcasters 
are in possession of a dispassionate ‘god’s eye’ perspective). 
7.4.1.2  American [and Italian] exceptionalism? 
However the intense competition and marginal profitability of UK national 
newspapers is not mirrored in the US. With the exception of USA Today, Wall 
Street Journal, New York Times, and Washington Post, most newspapers are 
primarily local in nature,39 and are often natural monopolies, on account of 
geographical constraints on subscription and advertising markets – ‘geographically 
dispersed media entities . . . do not compete against each other for audiences’ 
(Baker, 2007, p. 13): 
[T]he nature of monopolistic competition sometimes means that only 
one can succeed. The most obvious example of this is in respect to 
daily newspapers, which in most American cities constitute a local 
monopoly. The town will usually support only one daily newspaper, no 
matter whether it has a Republican or Democratic orientation – leaving 
the choice of orientation to the owner. (ibid., p. 92) 
                                            
39 American publications clearly did not feel the need to follow the example of the 
(Manchester) Guardian in dropping the prefix when it went national. Although the Los 
Angeles Times has a higher circulation than the Washington Post, it still predominantly 
services a Californian, rather than national, readership. 
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The other difference is that in the US ‘newspapers are [or were] overwhelmingly 
profitable . . .  the newspaper industry had average profit margins [in 2005] of 19%, 
double that of the Fortune 500’ (ibid., pp. 32-3). Both these factors (local 
monopolies and high profitability) insulate newspaper proprietors from the need to 
mirror the beliefs, values and preferences of their target readership, leading to a 
diminution of the isegoria function of the mass media. 
Baker’s response to this problem is that media ownership should be as widely 
dispersed as possible. However, although this would clearly operate as a 
‘structural safeguard’ against the ‘Berlusconi effect’40 (ibid., pp.18-19), it is not 
entirely clear how ownership dispersal per se would help. Consumers in domains 
as varied as mobile telephony and grocery provision benefit from the intense 
competition between a tiny number of huge corporations and the same applies, in 
principle, to the marketplace of ideas. Baker acknowledges that: 
An egalitarian distribution of actual communicative power is 
inconsistent with the very idea of a ‘mass media’, which almost 
inevitably contemplates a limited number of entities, a limited number 
of speakers, communicating to many. (Baker, 2007, p. 10) 
If this is true then the meaning of Baker’s ‘democratic distribution principle for 
communicative power’ (ibid., p. 7) is unclear in any respect other than the structural 
safeguard (against the Berlusconi effect) sense. In a state comprising (say) sixty 
million citizens, it makes little difference whether the ownership of media is 
distributed between five, five hundred or five thousand proprietors – it will still be 
only a tiny proportion of all citizens who have a (proprietorial) voice. And there is no 
good reason to believe that there is a necessary relationship between the number 
of media outlets/proprietors and benign epistemic outcomes: ‘I am not aware of 
any systematic study of the proposition that “truth” is more likely to emerge from 
                                            
40 ‘Silvio Berlusconi, apparently Italy’s richest individual, formed his own party, Forza Italia, 
and used massive media power – his Mediaset controls about 45 percent of national 
television along with important print media – to catapult himself into the Prime Minister spot 
in 1994 and then again in 2001, heading Italy’s longest lasting government since World 
War II’ (Baker, 2007, p. 18). 
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debate among a greater number of speakers than from fewer’ (Owen, 2004, p. 10). 
If this is the case, then – assuming a robustly competitive marketplace of ideas – a 
small number of media outlets can make competing representative claims, their 
success (like political parties) being dependent on the extent to which they reflect 
the preferences and beliefs of the audiences that they are competing for – 
‘members of groups who can experience themselves as being served and 
represented by mass media that are in some [non-proprietorial] sense “their own”’ 
(ibid., p. 11). Considerations of scale necessitate that politics in a mass society is 
representative and one might well anticipate a correspondence between the 
number of political parties and the range of newspapers available for subscription – 
although the latter would likely be at least twice the former, due to the need to cater 
for both highbrow and lowbrow sensibilities. This is roughly true in the case of 
England (the other nations of the United Kingdom having their own media). 
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, a comparison with a country with a 
proliferation of tiny parties (Israel, for example) might well predict a larger array of 
media to reflect the isegoria needs of a very different form of democratic 
representation.  
Although an extensive range of media might well be empirically associated with a 
wide ownership base, the issue of proprietorship is secondary – the claim of the 
market-based approach of this thesis being that, given a lack of local monopolies, 
and marginal levels of profitability, media will naturally tailor their products to the 
interests, beliefs and preferences of their target readership. Baker refers to the 
(liberal) marketplace of ideas approach to the problem of representative isegoria as 
the ‘Miltonian’ doctrine, a reference to John Milton’s petition to the Long Parliament 
seeking repeal of its censorship laws: 
[T]hough all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the 
earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and 
prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; 
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who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open 
encounter?41 
A key advocate of the Miltonian doctrine is Stanford economist Bruce M. Owen, 
who builds on the classical origin of the name of Milton’s petition (the Areopagus 
was the hill on which the Athenian court responsible for censorship was located): 
Competition among ideas means that ‘speakers’ make their views 
available to others as if in the Athenian agora (marketplace), hoping to 
attract audiences and perhaps adherents. In the modern world the 
agora must be metaphorical but the metaphor remains useful. (Owen, 
2004, p. 10) 
This citation indicates a clear parallel between the Athenian isegoria principle – 
where rhetores and demagogoi exercised their democratic speech rights to 
persuade their fellow citizens in the physical marketplace (agora) and assembly 
(ecclesia) – and the modern ‘marketplace of ideas’, where media owners and 
editors seek to persuade citizens that their own publication best represents their 
readers’ voice. As in Athens, this right should be available to ho boulomenos, but 
Owen is perhaps a little over-zealous in his claim that ‘evidence that people do in 
fact use the Internet to acquire ideas and information effectively ends the 
discussion of the media concentration problem from a political perspective’ (ibid., p. 
21). Unlike in a direct democracy, representativity is the relevant principle for 
isegoria in large-scale societies and, as Baker rightly argues, the internet – with its 
vast array of sources that nobody reads – may well serve to reduce this, the other 
problems being that internet usage today tracks the usual class patterns: 
[W]e have found little evidence that the association between SES 
[socio-economic status] and political activity is any different on the 
Internet . . . among Internet users, there is a strong positive 
relationship between SES and – with the possible exception of political 
                                            
41 John Milton, Areopagitica (1644). 
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social networking – every measure of Internet-based political 
engagement we reviewed. (Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2010) 
Moreover the new technologies ‘facilitate niche or echo-chamber communication’ 
in which the like-minded only talk with one another (Sunstein, 2002). Given that 
both Baker’s and Saward’s books were written long before the era in which many 
American voters obtain their political information from ghettoised social media 
(including the President’s own hyperactive Twitter feed), they might now view the 
partisan nature of the mainstream commercial media as the lesser of two evils. 
7.4.1.3  Public media 
Baker, however, is unimpressed by agonistic market- and profit-based arguments 
for media diversity, with their associated (negative) ‘externalities’ (the elimination of 
‘socially desirable’ expenditures). His preference is the Habermasian model of 
‘public’ media devoted to the pursuit of the ‘common good . . . an inclusive 
discourse, involving the whole society’, his model for ‘inclusive’ discourse being the 
‘democratic remit of the BBC’ (ibid., pp. 8-9). This would certainly correspond to the 
original Reithian ideal of the BBC – that broadcasting should ‘educate, inform and 
entertain’, entirely free of commercial considerations – but updated for a more 
demotic age. However a recent book by Roger Mosey, former head of BBC 
television news and editor of Radio 4’s Today programme and now master of 
Selwyn College, Cambridge, confirmed many of the suspicions of right-wing critics 
of the BBC – that although the corporation strives to be impartial, the 
predominately liberal metropolitan/cosmopolitan mindset42 of the Oxbridge-
educated management and editorial team43 tends to view populist and 
                                            
42 In the terminology of David Goodhart’s The Road to Somewhere, such people are 
‘anywheres’ rather than ‘somewheres’ – representing, at best, 25% of the UK population 
(Goodhart, 2017).  
43 A July 2017 socio-economic census of the BBC found that 17 percent of all staff 
attended fee-paying schools and 61 percent had parents in the ‘higher managerial and 
professional occupations’. Ofcom chief executive Sharon White told the Royal Television 
Society convention in Cambridge: ‘It’s a really important issue because you want diversity 
of thinking not just visible diversity. We are in a creative industry where you want great 
ideas from people of different backgrounds, different classes, different colours, different 
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conservative perspectives on topics like immigration, gay rights and the EU as 
simply beyond the pale: 
I believe most people in the BBC are fair-minded individuals, and 
journalists in particular have a professionalism that means they steer 
well clear of any party political bias. I have never had the problem of 
an editor who skewed an agenda in favour of Conservatives, Labour 
or any other party. But there can be a default to ‘groupthink’ – a set of 
assumptions that seem reasonable to everyone they know. (Mosey, 
2015) 
This groupthink often led to the winnowing out of vox pop interviewees who 
expressed politically-incorrect opinions at the editing stage, leading in one 
immigration-related example to ‘an unacceptably sanitized piece of reporting . . . a 
textbook example of how not to put together a report with vox pops’ [deleted copy] 
(ibid.). Rod Liddle, Mosey’s successor as editor of the Radio 4 Today programme 
(1998-2002) pulls even fewer punches than his predecessor: 
This [liberal bias] is perhaps even more true of the BBC today than it 
was 20 years ago. . . It treats with hostility and contempt any individual 
or organisation who might dare to suggest that diversity is anything 
other than a bloody good thing. Its attacks on UKIP during the election 
campaign — no other party warranted such treatment, remember — 
were an utter disgrace and, I would suggest, in breach of its charter.44 
Even after discounting Liddle’s rhetorical excesses, it would appear that the 
‘inclusive’ discourse of the public-service broadcasting model is a less reliable 
                                                                                                                                
 
parts of the country, Scotland as well as north London.’ (Matthew Moore, ‘Middle-class 
BBC ordered to reveal social background of its staff’, Times, September 15 2017) 
44 http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnists/rod-liddle/9565052/roge.r-mosey-and-the-
questions-you-dont-ask-at-the-bbc/ 
247 
source of representative isegoria in a diverse modern society than the competitive 
agonism of the commercial marketplace of ideas: 
[H]ighly partisan rhetoric, even while violating some deliberative ideals 
such as mutual respect and accommodation, may nonetheless help to 
fulfil other deliberative ideals such as inclusion . . . Some politically 
partisan media are of low deliberative quality, but in conjunction with 
other media of equally low deliberative quality bring out information 
and perspectives that television stations or newspapers aiming at the 
middle of the road do not raise or address. (Mansbridge, et al., 2012, 
pp. 3, 7) 
Public attitudes on the issues that Mosey and Liddle highlight (immigration, 
multiculturalism and the EU) have been better championed by the so-called Red 
Top ‘gutter press’ than public-service broadcasters like the BBC, who’s editorial 
policy committee claimed that public prejudice against asylum-seekers was ‘being 
led by an angry tabloid agenda and extreme right-wing views’, to which Mosey 
responded in an email that ‘the asylum debate is one where we’ve done rather 
badly in reflecting the concerns of our audiences’ (Mosey, 2015). When he saw 
Mosey’s email, former BBC business editor Jeff Randall commented: 
‘Does anyone in the BBC's policy unit/Thought Police read [Mail 
columnist] Richard Littlejohn? They should. He reflects popular 
opinion far more accurately than the views of those whose idea of a 
good night out is reading the Indy [Independent] over a vegetarian 
meal in a Somali restaurant.’ (Mosey, 2015) 
Whilst this subsection does not offer any quantitative assessment of political 
impartiality at the BBC, it’s important to recognise that the criticisms come from 
their own senior editors and journalists, Newsnight’s former long-serving presenter, 
Jeremy Paxman, sharing a similar perspective: 
‘There is political correctness at the BBC. . . Why is the story always 
about the disabled refugee from Syria, rather than the demands that 
the disabled refugee from Syria might make upon our taxpayers? It’s 
all too common. It’s a metropolitan-elite problem.’ (quoted in Liddle, 
2017, p. 10) 
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                                                                   * * * 
To summarise the argument of this section, isegoria in large modern states 
requires a representative mechanism and, as J.S. Mill argued, the mass media 
have a vital role to play. Although the notion that the appropriate media for the 
‘public sphere’ are dispassionate and inclusive ‘public service’ broadcasters is at 
first sight attractive, the example of the BBC might suggest that commercial 
subscription-based media better reflect (in aggregate) the multiple voices that 
characterize large modern states. Although one of the pathologies of partisan 
media is the likelihood of misinformation and fact-bending, ‘the partisan media may 
contain their own partial corrective to this pathology, as the other side is always 
looking for the false move of its adversary’ (Mansbridge et al., 2012, p. 21). The 
existence of local media monopolies in the US and national ones in Italy does not 
negate the principle of the representative claim of mass media, and the example of 
the robustly competitive (and marginally protitable) British newspaper industry 
demonstrates that the principle can work in practice. The recent growth of free-
access internet news sites (both commercial and public service) may well be 
harmful to the process of representative claim-making, as they undermine the 
working of the media marketplace, where proprietors and editors are obliged to 
attract a broad following for purely commercial reasons. The effective impartiality of 
public service broadcasters is open to question and, more recently, many voters 
are informed more by highly partisan social media platforms, many of which have 
been accused of disseminating ‘false news’ and other forms of disinformation.  
The criterion of statistical proportionality would suggest that the representative 
claim of the Sun should count for more than that of the (now deceased) 
Independent. Nevertheless the sensibilities of the educated political class in 
general are likely to favour the latter (along with the Guardian) and this brute fact 
will automatically ensure that less populist voices continue to be disproportionately 
influential. While this may (arguably) be of epistemic benefit to the overall body 
politic, it has undoubtedly led in the past to a consensus within the political class (in 
the UK regarding issues such as immigration and relations with the EU) that has 
failed to reflect popular preferences and beliefs. Given that, under the constitutional 
proposals outlined in Chapter 8, ultimate decision power would be in the hands of 
a randomly-selected minidemos, it could be argued that it is possible to be more 
relaxed regarding the disproportionate influence of media with a modest circulation 
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than with our existing forms of governance in which the political class judges its 
own speech acts. The argument for the essential role of commercial media in 
representative isegoria (the ‘Miltonian doctrine’) is a normative one and the 
examples are chosen for purely illustrative purposes – a comprehensive study of 
the empirical literature being beyond the remit of a thesis in political theory. 
7.4.2  Randomly-selected demarchic committees and agenda panels 
One of the early milestones in the renaissance of interest in sortition was John 
Burnheim’s 1985 book Is Democracy Possible? (Burnheim, 2006 (1985)). 
Burnheim’s proposal is for policy-making by small ‘demarchic’45 committees 
focused on specific functional domains (the principle underlying departmental sub-
committees in the UK parliament), comprised of persons selected by lot from all 
those whose interests are directly affected by the particular issue under 
consideration. The principle of ‘all affected interests’ would be operationalized by 
stratified sampling from a pool established by a combination of self-nomination and 
delegation from civil society and advocacy groups operating in the particular policy 
domain. As many issues in the modern, globalized world transcend national 
boundaries, the composition of each committee would vary depending on the 
outreach of the issue under consideration.46 The demarchic principle involves a 
‘representative sample of the people concerned’ (ibid., p. 7), but does not 
presuppose a statistically-accurate sampling of the target population, due to its 
focus on the principle of ‘all affected interests’. The role of sortition is to ensure the 
impartiality of the sampling process rather than to achieve a statistically-accurate 
microcosm, thereby relying on the principle of the ‘blind break’, rather than the 
‘invisible hand’ of stochation (see Appendix II, below). In any case the voluntary 
principle inevitably makes it a selective sample, assuming that many people 
would not want, or be able, to give up a substantial amount of time to an 
exercise of this sort.  
                                            
45 Although the term is taken from Hayek’s Law, Legislation and Liberty, Burnheim’s usage 
is somewhat different. 
46 Although Burnheim has no particular regard for the nation state, his voluntarist 
sensibilities are closer aligned to anarchism than Kantian cosmopolitanism. 
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Statistically-accurate sampling would be impossible with a small committee and 
also undesirable in that the force of arguments would be overruled by the weight of 
numbers. Demarchy is a compromise between these two principles in that, while 
the deliberative style is discursive, the focus is on achieving a working compromise 
between the competing interests represented on the committee. In political parties 
and coalitions, policies are normally the result of deals between factions or interest 
groups in which support for policies is bought and sold in exchange for support on 
other matters that are quite irrelevant to the merits of the policy for which support is 
sought. Also, politicians are constrained to pay special attention to key segments of 
voters and financial supporters, often at the expense of more diffused interests. 
Since each demarchic committee is only concerned with one specific problem area, 
and the members have no political careers at stake, the only concessions they can 
offer each other are relevant to the issues. The committees claim no authority in 
virtue of their constitution. Their only claim to acceptance is that they conduct all 
their discussion in public, mostly online, and produce a set of recommendations 
that has a clear claim to take full account of the considerations people put to it. The 
point of their work is to arrive at the best solution they can devise to the problems 
they address by a transparent process of deliberation. The point of having a 
predominance of people who are directly affected is to bring the theorists and 
dreamers down to earth and ensure that the solutions they advocate are 
acceptable to those who have to bear their consequences. They are not there as 
advocates of particular interests, although their being strongly affected will 
contribute to their capacity to assess the practical effects of proposals. In this 
connection it is important to recognise that on most matters of public policy people 
do not have a single interest, but share competing or conflicting interests. Once 
they realise this, they should come to see that the problems they face are shared 
problems, and that their overriding interest is in getting as good a solution to them 
as possible. In any case, the process presupposes a lively public debate and their 
conclusions can have no standing except in so far as they represent a plausible 
adjudication of the merits of the considerations brought forward in that debate. 
Demarchic committees attempt to derive a practical conclusion from an 
extensive public discussion, putting it forward on that basis.  
In his latest book (Burnheim, 2016), the author makes clear that demarchic 
committees are an aspect of civil society, rather than the machinery of government 
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– their role being the (early) Habermasian one of developing well-informed opinion 
in the public sphere (i.e. opinion rather than will) – so, in the terminology of this 
thesis, they are an aspect of isegoria, rather than isonomia. Burnheim’s hope is 
that as a result of their composition (a stratified sample of all affected interests) 
they will be seen to be impartial (or at least balanced) and that the policy outcomes 
will be of high epistemic value. The role of elected politicians will be to take up the 
more successful representative claims of demarchic committees and to convert 
them into legislative proposals that would be subsequently judged according to the 
isonomic criteria outlined elsewhere in this thesis. Given the intermediation by 
elected politicians, Burnheim’s proposal for representative isegoria by demarchic 
committee is fully compatible with the mixed system of governance championed by 
this thesis. The only power that these committees would have would arise from 
their procedures becoming an accepted feature of public life, with the result that 
there could be strong community pressure, particularly from swing voters, on 
politicians to embrace their recommendations. Burnheim envisages them as 
being financed and organised by public foundations supported by voluntary 
contributions, with a well-established reputation for transparency and 
experience in this kind of work. 
A similar proposal has been made by Terry Bouricius as part of his model for 
‘democracy by multi-body sortition’ (Bouricius, 2013). The proposal includes 
agenda councils, interest panels, review panels and policy juries, along with rules 
and oversight councils. Each body (with the exception of interest panels) is 
constituted by random selection, but the term of office and the selection principle 
(voluntary or quasi-mandatory) varies according to the role of the particular body. 
One of the principal agents of isegoria in Bouricius’s proposal is the agenda council, 
constituted by a ‘two-tier lottery system of the willing’ (ibid., p. 9). This is described 
as a ‘meta-legislative body’ in that its role is to ‘seek out problems needing 
attention, rather than merely react to media or special interest group pressures’. 
Bouricius’s proposal also allows for public petitions ‘in the spirit of isegoria’ that 
would provide ‘an alternate means for agenda setting’ (ibid.), along with ‘interest 
panels’ open to anybody who wished to join one on any issue and try to help 
craft a proposal in a small group to offer to a review panel. Interest panel 
members would not be chosen by lot, but would either be ‘self-organized 
groups’ or volunteers who could be randomly combined into a group (to 
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enhance diversity).47 There would be as many interest panels as the number of 
volunteers required (each having perhaps no more than a dozen people) and, 
as such, offer a modern analogue of the classical principle of ho boulomenos. 
Such a proposal would clearly be compatible with direct democracy, and appears 
to have its origins in the institutions of Athenian politics. However it’s not clear that 
it fulfills the requirement for large-scale representative isegoria, as Bouricius’s 
proposal for multi-level voluntary and sortition bodies makes no provision for mass 
endorsement by election, votation or public referenda and, as such, there is no 
way of checking whether the proposals generated adequately reflect the raw 
preferences of the wider public. Without such checks, Bouricius’s model is likely to 
lead to policymaking by activists, as there is nothing to prevent the domination of 
the agenda and interest committees by self-organised extremist groups like the 
Tea Party, NRA, Occupy etc. Isegoria in classical-era Athens was equally partisan, 
but all citizens (in principle) would have judged the competing claims directly in the 
assembly, a mass-democracy filter that is rejected in Bouricius’s proposal. 
The focus on voluntarism makes Bouricius an unwitting fellow-traveller with 
Madison’s project for the ‘total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity, 
from any share in [American governments]’ (Federalist Papers, No.63). Madison 
was making the positive case for (electoral) representation, rejected by Bouricius 
on account of being susceptible to domination by powerful interests (primarily 
financial and media). Bouricius might well retort that final decision-making by 
quasi-mandatory policy juries fulfills the need for representation by stochation. But 
this only applies to the isonomic aspect of democratic decision-making and the 
argument of this chapter is that isegoria in large modern states needs to be equally 
representative. This function is fulfilled in Burnheim’s proposal by the 
intermediation of elected politicians (responsive to public pressure); not so in 
Bouricius’s combination of voluntarism and ‘pure’ sortition. This is clearly 
incompatible with the ‘mixed’ constitution advocated by this thesis and, given the 
                                            
47 (Bouricius, private communication, 4th October 2015). This aspect was dropped from the 
published article on account of space considerations. 
253 
long and bloody struggle for universal franchise, might well be seen as both 
undesirable and unachievable. Although Bouricius provides some very important 
insights into the dysfunctions of electoral and direct-democratic systems, his 
proposal for ‘pure’ sortition would have to be viewed as ideal-typical, if not entirely 
utopian. This being the case, then demarchic committees, but not agenda panels, 
would pass the overall representative isegoria test. 
7.4.3  Deliberative, discursive and associational democracy 
7.4.3.1  Deliberative democracy 
The extensive criticisms of deliberative democracy in Chapter 5 of this thesis have 
focused on the constraints on deliberative style that would be necessary for 
randomly-selected bodies that exercised an institutional role in the legislative 
process. This is on account of the need to ensure that randomly-selected 
legislative bodies retain their descriptively-representative mandate – the conclusion 
being that this presupposes a highly constrained deliberative style that is a long 
way removed from the ideal speech situation that provides the normative ideal for 
most theorists working in the field of deliberative democracy. However most of the 
work in deliberative democracy is concerned with deliberation in the informal public 
sphere, so the focus of this section is on public deliberation as a democratically-
legitimate way of enriching the formation of public opinion, where the outcome of 
the deliberations do not directly affect the process of political will formation. While 
Habermas’s later theory of deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1996) is dualistic in 
that it concerns itself both with deliberation in the informal public sphere as well as 
elite deliberation in parliamentary bodies, the focus here is on the former. The 
connection between public deliberation and political will formation is indirect in so 
far as it is mediated by the standard mechanisms of electoral democracy: 
Informal public opinion-formation generates ‘influence’; influence is 
transformed into ‘communicative power’ through the channels of 
political elections; and communicative power is again transformed into 
‘administrative power’ through legislation. (Habermas, 1994, p. 8) 
As this model clearly respects the diarchy of opinion and will formation (as one 
would anticipate from the author of The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere), then deliberative democracy in the pubic sphere clearly has an 
254 
uncontroversial role to play in the field of isegoria. Serious questions remain 
regarding the privileging of those possessing the requisite rhetorical skills to 
participate in the ‘university seminar’ mode of discourse underlying the deliberative 
democracy model (Budge, 2000, pp. 197, 200), but these have already been 
covered in Chapter 5 (above).  
7.4.3.2  Discursive democracy 
Although Habermas frames his model of public deliberation in terms of ‘discourse 
theory’ (Habermas, 1994, p. 8), John Dryzek seeks to distance himself from the 
later ‘liberal constitutionalist’ Habermas by staking a prior claim to the term – ‘given 
that I coined the term “discursive democracy” (Dryzek, 1987, 1990), I now claim 
proprietorial rights’48 (Dryzek, 2000b, p. 78). Whilst acknowledging Habermas’s 
earlier contribution to discourse theory in his account of communicative action 
(Habermas, 1984, 1987), Dryzek dismisses the later Habermas (exemplified in the 
1994 citation above) as a ‘sellout to liberal constitutionalism’: ‘a very conventional 
model of democracy; not so distant from a cardboard cut-out, civics-textbook 
version of how democratic government should work’ (Dryzek, 2000, p. 82). He is 
also alarmed at Habermas’s refocusing of deliberation away from the public sphere, 
‘constituted in large part by social movements and actors in confrontation with the 
state’ to ‘authentic deliberation within the institutions of the liberal state’, ‘notably 
courts and legislatures’ (ibid., pp. 81, 82).  
Insofar as the focus of this section is on isegoria – opinion in the public sphere – 
Dryzek’s arguments are persuasive, the only rider being that the Frankfurt School 
emphasis on social movements in confrontation with the state might suggest that 
the resultant isegoria would, on the whole, be unrepresentative of public opinion –
which tends to reflect the hegemonic values of the centre ground, as opposed to 
the ‘subaltern’ discourses privileged by critical theory: 
                                            
48 Dryzek does not go quite so far as James Fishkin, with his decision to trademark the 
term ‘Deliberative Polling’. 
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Subaltern counter publics . . . parallel discursive arenas where 
members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter 
discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, 
interests and needs (Fraser, 1992, p. 123) 
Whereas Fraser classifies interaction in the public sphere as a contestation of 
publics, Dryzek argues that public deliberation is mediated to the state not through 
voting but through the contestation of discourses: 
We can step back and ask whether democracy does indeed require 
counting heads. I would argue that a logically complete alternative 
exists based on a conceptualization of intersubjective communication 
in the public sphere as a matter of the contestation of discourses. 
(Dryzek, 2000b, p. 84)  
Dryzek is right to argue that the representation of discourses and perspectives 
(isegoria in the parlance of this thesis) is not subject to arithmetic calculations 
(‘counting heads’), although the language he employs is derived from Burke’s 
doctrine of virtual representation, not Aristotle’s distinction between proportional 
and numerical equality: 
The key consideration here is that all the vantage points for criticizing 
policy get represented – not that these vantage points get represented 
in proportion to the number of people who subscribe to them. When it 
comes to representing arguments, proportionality may actually be 
undesirable because it can pave the way to groupthink and the 
silencing of uncomfortable voices from the margins or across divides 
… For policy-making rationality, then, all relevant discourses should 
get represented, regardless of how many people subscribe to each. 
(Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008b, p. 482) 
(Note that Plato would have considered this an example of proportional equality, in 
the sense that discourses are included on the strength of their discursive merit, 
rather than their numerical support.) The problems with this approach are two-fold: 
a) who gets to decide which discourses to include? and b) how is the outcome of 
the discursive deliberation determined? The first problem is caused by the reliance 
on social science Q methodology questionnaires and in-depth interviews, often 
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used by those seeking to ensure that recruits for deliberative minipublics 
adequately represent particular discourses (B. B. Davies, K., & Rauschmayer, 
2005). But who gets to choose the survey questions or, as Juvenal put it, who 
guards the guards? This is particularly problematic in areas such as environmental 
activism (see above, section 7.3.3.1) in which the sheer proliferation of discourses 
may serve to drown out the views of the silent majority who may well privilege 
economic and human interests over the interests of the environment (Dryzek and 
Niemeyer, 2008b, p. 487). As the authors acknowledge: 
In most theories of representation, those represented somehow 
authorize the representation. The method we have described seems 
to substitute social science for political process, with the risk of 
empowering an unaccountable social scientific elite. (ibid.) 
The arcane language employed by discursive theorists – ‘conceptualization of 
intersubjective communication in the public sphere as a matter of the contestation 
of discourses’ – bears witness to the Habermasian understanding of the origin of 
the ‘public sphere’ in the chatterings of the bourgeois educated classes; such a 
theory (assuming they could make sense of it) would certainly not have been seen 
as democratic in classical Athens. For the purpose of this thesis, democracy does, 
in the final analysis, get down to counting heads, as it’s hard to imagine any other 
way of operationalizing the power of the people. Even if we accept the terms of 
Dryzek’s project, the ‘contestation of discourses’ has to be resolved by a decision 
rule and, absent consensus, the rule requires the counting of votes, and 
democratic isonomia presupposes all votes to be of equal value. The proportional 
equality characterised by the ‘contestation of discourses’ needs to be judged by the 
numerical equality of the statistically-representative minipublic, otherwise the 
outcome may well be perceived as no more democratic than the judgment of Zeus 
(Plato’s way of discerning the merits of different claims for proportional equality).49 
                                            
49 Plato, Laws, VI.757 b-c. 
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Ian Budge argues that Dryzek’s ‘“contestation of discourses” – in so far as it can be 
pinned down, seems not very different to newspaper and media discussion of 
issues at the present day’ (Budge, 2000, p. 196), although critical theorists might 
well point to the hegemonic clustering of the mainstream media (MSM) around the 
centre ground. Conservatives might also question whether the profound social and 
cultural changes undergone by Western societies partly as a result of the 
disproportionate influence of the Frankfurt School have received a democratic 
mandate. But given that discursive democracy is firmly rooted in the sphere of 
public opinion formation, it clearly merits inclusion in the scheme of representative 
isegoria.  
7.4.3.3  Associational democracy 
Dryzek applauds experiments with deliberative policy forums, insofar as they fall 
outside the liberal constitutional state (i.e. are firmly positioned in the domain of 
public-sphere isegoria): 
[The] distance between deliberative polls and citizens’ juries on the 
one hand and liberal constitutionalism on the other is perhaps secure 
to the degree that they remain advisory, rather than authoritative, 
policy-making bodies.50 (Dryzek, 2000, pp. 82-3) 
Radical theories of ‘associational’ democracy seek to straddle this divide by 
claiming that ‘mediating forums’, representative of civil society associations, might 
well perform both a deliberative (opinion) and legislative (will formation) role (Elstub, 
2008). Such bodies would not be constituted by random selection but would be 
comprised of delegates of secondary associations51 representing those who would 
be most affected by legislation in a particular policy domain as there is no good 
reason why the agency concerned with regulating nuclear power should be the 
                                            
50 In this respect the perspective of Dryzek and this thesis are inverted as the thesis 
explores the potential of minipublics in terms of representative isonomia (judgment and 
will-formation), rather than isegoria. 
51 ‘Secondary’ associations are purposive, voluntary and located in civil society (as distinct 
from the state and the productive economy). 
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same agency that deals with food additives, the education system and road 
networks. (Hyland, 1995, pp. 263-264) 
One of the principal benefits that secondary associations can bring is the provision 
of information (isegoria should ideally be well informed): 
[D]ue to their close involvement with their members, associations can 
provide information that would otherwise be unavailable to the state, 
such as experiential knowledge (J. E. Cohen & Rogers, 1995, p. 43; 
C. Davies, 2007, p. 56), which is vital to ensuring inclusion in the 
deliberative process (Sanders, 1997; Young, 1996). Through these 
capacities associations can make important contributions to external 
rationality necessary for autonomous preference formation and 
decision-making. (Elstub, 2008, p. 123) 
The contribution of secondary associations to informed deliberation in the public 
sphere is uncontroversial: 
In exchanging, representing and communicating ideas, information, 
beliefs and preferences, secondary associations generate deliberation 
and form a generalized debate in the informal public sphere . . . many 
try to influence the preferences of the general public by representing 
and voicing the views and interests of their members, trying to 
convince these other actors in the informal public sphere of their 
validity. (Elstub, 2008, p. 125) 
So far so good, it is hard to think of a democratic theorist who would take issue 
with such a perspective. Where Elstub arguably goes beyond the pale is in his 
radical proposal for ‘mediating forums’, comprised of delegates from secondary 
associations representing all those who might be affected by policymaking in a 
particular domain. Mediating forums bear a close resemblance to John Burnheim’s 
demarchic committees (see section 7.4.2), although members are delegated by 
secondary organisations, as opposed to being selected randomly. But the radical 
difference is that, unlike Burnheim’s proposal for demarchic committees to have a 
purely indirect influence (via the response of elected politicians to public opinion), 
Elstub proposes arrogating legislative rights in the particular policy domain to the 
relevant mediating forum. Such a move would not just compromise liberal 
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constitutionalism, it would be more of a coup d’état and is a clear breach of the 
numerical equality that constitutes democratic isonomia – especially as secondary 
organisations with huge membership levels would have exactly the same number 
of delegates as tiny groups of self-selecting activists (Elstub, 2008, pp. 159, 166). 
Whilst one might hope that the legislative output of the mediating forums would be 
based entirely on the best arguments (as opposed to the aggregation of 
preferences) it would be a relatively simple matter for campaigning groups to 
establish any number of small secondary organisations in a particular policy area in 
order to dominate the legislative agenda of the mediating forum in an entirely 
disproportionate way. Even if such entryism could be avoided, Elstub 
acknowledges that ‘inequalities in power and money are perpetuated in 
associational membership’ and ‘informal public spheres are plagued by inequality 
of access . . . enabling the discourses of the powerful to dominate’ (ibid., pp. 132, 
133) and ‘crowd out everyone else’ (Mansbridge, 1992, p. 48). Whilst that is an 
inevitable factor of the proportional equality that characterises isegoria, it is a clear 
breach of the numerical equality that is the defining characteristic of isonomia, 
hence my agreement with Dryzek (albeit for entirely different reasons) that opinion 
and will-formation should be kept separate.  
In summary, deliberative, discursive and associational democracy have an 
important role to play in opinion formation but the role should be quarantined to the 
informal public sphere. Any move beyond to the domain of democratic will-
formation is a contravention of the representative isonomia that lies at the heart of 
democratic equality. A resolution of Elstub’s ‘Weberian dilemma – how to ensure 
that deliberation and democracy are effectively combined so that citizens actively 
engage in deliberation while ensuring the results of the deliberations are actualized 
into binding decision’ (Elstub, 2008, p. 173) – requires a clear functional distinction, 
and institutional separation, between deliberation (isegoria) and decision making 
(isonomia). This being the case then deliberative and discursive democracy would 
pass the test for representative isegoria, in so far as they were limited to the 
informal public sphere; not so in the case of any form of associational democracy 
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that sought to extend its remit into the formal arena of democratic governance. This 
is because different (and less exacting) standards are appropriate for informal 
arenas (Estlund, 2008, Chapter X), Habermas accepting Marcuse’s52 argument 
that discourse in the informal public sphere should be ‘wild’, ‘anarchic’ and 
‘unrestricted’ (Habermas, 1996, pp. 307-308) – a long way removed from the ideal 
speech situation and the unforced force of the better argument (ibid., p. 306). 
7.5  Reception and evaluation of representative claims 
Saward’s conception of democratic legitimacy (claim-reception), explored at length 
in Chapter 6 of his book, is as constructivist as his notion of democratic claim-
making. ‘Democratic legitimacy in the book is understood as “perceived legitimacy”’ 
(Saward, 2010, p.84). However if that’s the case, then it’s not clear what the 
distinction is between democratic and other forms of legitimacy. When the 
Athenian assembly decided in 411 to abolish itself in favour of an oligarchy, did 
that make the outcome of the decision democratically legitimate? To the Athenians, 
democracy (rule of the people) required the formal ongoing equality of all citizens 
in the decision-making process, in which every vote carried equal weight so, 
although the oligarchy was perceived as legitimate by Athenian citizens, its rule 
could not be defined as democratic. No doubt seventeenth-century Englishmen 
perceived the restoration of the monarchy as legitimate but could that outcome be 
described as democratically legitimate (assuming they had voted for it under 
universal suffrage)? Note that ‘perceived legitimacy’ to Saward is not just that the 
original social contract should have been determined democratically (i.e. by equal 
votes in some form of plebiscite, it is ‘the acceptance of claims over time by 
appropriate constituencies, under certain conditions’ (ibid., my emphasis), i.e. 
ongoing legitimacy. In which case, had the Stuart restoration survived, this would 
be, according to Saward, an example of democratic legitimacy if it was perceived 
as such by His Majesty’s loyal subjects. The governance of the People’s Republic 
                                            
52 Needless to say Marcuse would have had no time for my argument for representative 
isegoria via (capitalist) media as this would be merely an indication of false consciousness 
on the part of the subscribers. 
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of China involves an evaluation of the representative claim of the Chinese 
Communist Party, perceived as legitimate by most Chinese citizens, but we would 
be hard pressed to describe the legitimacy as democratic in nature. This would 
suggest that formal ongoing isonomia (mathematical equality), rather than 
‘perceived legitimacy’ is the factor that distinguishes democratic from other forms 
of political legitimacy. Democracy is a political institution in which the people have 
power (formally speaking), not a ‘perception’ or attitude of mind. It is perfectly 
possible for citizens of a working democracy to view their system of government as 
entirely lacking in perceived legitimacy (for epistemic and other reasons), but this 
would not mean that it was any less democratic. Saward’s final definition of 
democratic legitimacy is as follows: 
[P]rovisionally acceptable claims to democratic legitimacy across 
society are those for which there is evidence of sufficient acceptance 
of claims by appropriate constituencies under reasonable conditions of 
judgment. (Saward, 2010, p. 145). 
In line with his constructivist premises, the political theorist ‘or any other observer’ 
is denied any privileged perspective as to what constitutes an ‘appropriate 
constituency’ as the ‘ultimate judge’ is the constituency itself (ibid., p. 145). This is 
partly a consequence of the emphasis of deliberative theorists on the need to 
include ‘all affected interests’ (which has the potential to extend constituencies a 
long way beyond both the territorial limits of the Westphalian state), as against the 
(classical) notion of citizenship as a territorial birthright or earned privilege. In an 
increasingly cosmopolitan world this brings into conflict the rights and interests of 
different groups of empirical individuals. 
If constituencies are left to self-define, then who is to adjudicate between any clash 
of definition? Although the outpouring of charitable giving in response to Live Aid 
and other calls to address the needs of the people of Africa might give some 
credence to the representative claims of Geldof and Bono, nevertheless in times of 
fiscal austerity these have to be set against the competing claims of UK territorial 
constituents (i.e. taxpayers) and it is hard to see how these competing claims can 
be adjudicated purely on the basis of (self-defining) ‘appropriate constituencies’. 
UK citizens who contribute towards the 0.7% of GDP international development 
levy might well argue that their own citizen rights should trump all affected interests.  
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Another problem with the representative claim model is the underwriting of existing 
patterns of passive political behavior: 
Normatively, the risk is that the ‘representative claim’ ends up 
justifying audience-based conceptions of democracy, something that, 
even if thought inevitable, we ought to resist. (Castiglione, 2012, p. 
122) 
7.5.1  Justification of anti-democratic practice 
Lisa Disch (2014) is happy to endorse Saward’s constructivist approach to 
representative claim-making but is sceptical regarding his criteria for judging the 
democratic legitimacy of the claim. Her argument is that the representative claim 
approach only applies to the subject matter of this chapter as opposed to the other 
component in the democratic diarchy: 
constructivists . . . pose these problems not with respect to the 
exercise of what Urbinati (2013) calls ‘decision’ [isonomia] but rather 
‘opinion’ [isegoria] (ibid, p. 1). 
Prior to the ‘constructivist turn’ in political representation (Disch, 2014), political 
representation was viewed in constitutional as opposed to constitutive terms53 – ‘a 
constitutional mechanism by which to connect the will of the people with the 
decisions of representatives. . . . It is the constitution that guarantees political 
equality in many countries’ (Nasstrom, 2011, p. 505). But if one cannot fall back on 
a legitimate constitution (because it is in a process of real-time construction) then: 
it becomes crucial to know how political equality among the actors is 
to be guaranteed. If not constitutionally, then how? How can we make 
sure that money, status, gender, race and access to time do not 
create inequalities among the makers of politics [representative claim-
                                            
53 The difference being purely one of tense – ‘constitutional’ referring to early constitutive 
acts. 
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makers], and insofar as they do, can be detected and judged as such? 
(ibid., p. 507) 
In practice some claim-makers are a lot more equal than others – the 
representative claims of celebrities like Russell Brand, Charlotte Church, Bono and 
Bob Geldof being substantially better-resourced than most of their fellow citizens. 
In the same way that UK citizens are concerned that the Prince of Wales may have 
undue influence over government ministers,54 why should it be that the actress 
Joanna Lumley should effectively dictate an amendment to UK immigration policy 
(over the right to settle of Gurkha veterans)? Celebrity thespians like Hugh Grant 
had considerable influence over government media-regulation policy in 
establishing the terms of the Leveson Enquiry (M. Hume, 2012). The danger of the 
representative claim approach is to provide a patina of democratic legitimacy to 
blatantly undemocratic behaviour. More importantly, who is to determine what 
amounts to ‘reasonable conditions of judgment’ for the acceptance of 
representative claims – the political theorist or the ‘appropriate constituency’? If the 
latter (Saward is always reluctant to privilege the judgment of his own peers), and if 
the constituency is being constructed in real time then we are in danger of begging 
a very difficult question (Nasstrom, 2011, p. 505). Unlike the great political 
philosophers who wrote on democracy, we can no longer ‘take for granted that a 
people has already constituted itself’ (Dahl, 1990, p. 46). 
One of the principal criticisms of a supra-national institution like the EU is the lack 
of democratic legitimacy – for the simple reason that the EU lacks its own demos in 
anything other than the purely formal sense. EU elections generally attract low 
participation levels and votes are often cast on the basis of extraneous and largely 
irrelevant factors, in particular in countries with a semi-detached or even hostile 
relationship with the EU, such as the United Kingdom. The institutions and culture 
                                            
54 The reference here is to the hand-written ‘black spider’ letters from the heir to the throne 
to government ministers exhorting them to follow the Prince’s own agenda on politically-
contentious topics including the funding of alternative therapies by the cash-strapped NHS. 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ng-interactive/2015/may/13/read-the-prince-charles-
black-spider-memos-in-full 
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of the EU mean that elected government is often superseded by ‘governance’ and 
political decision-making by ‘ad hoc formations, including specialized and expert 
bodies, and informal networks’ (Lord & Pollak, 2010, p. 129): 
The community that was imagined as Kant’s dream has proven to be 
Arendt’s nightmare, a public space so entirely overgrown by 
administration as to be a domain of ‘policies without politics.’ (Disch, 
2014, p. 14) 
According to Peter Mair, the EU is ‘a political system that has been constructed by 
national political leaders as a protected sphere in which policy-making can evade 
the constraints imposed by representative democracy’, ‘safe from the demands of 
voters and their representatives’ (Mair, 2013, pp. 99, 109). The EU lacks the third 
of Dahl’s prerequisites for democratic governance (Dahl, 1966, p. xiii) – i.e. an 
official opposition to the governing institutions (Mair, 2013, p. 138). 
Since the Lisbon Treaty, EU officials have enthusiastically taken up Saward’s 
Representative Claim and other constructivist models in order to counter the 
perception of the democratic deficit at the heart of their institutions of governance. 
The goal has been to legitimize the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) within 
the decision-making structure of the union. Whereas the role of political 
representatives according to the ‘standard model’ (Castiglione & Warren, 2005) is 
the transmission of citizens’ opinions and preferences, the constructivist view is 
that representation ‘anticipates’ or ‘articulates’ such preferences, ‘so as to form a 
constituency that does not yet (and may never) exist’ (Disch, 2014, p. 15). The 
purpose of such ‘societal representation’ is to foster a ‘perception of participatory 
governance’ to increase the likelihood that policies will be ‘regarded as legitimate’ 
by those affected by them (Bellamy & Castiglione, 2011, p. 117, my emphasis). 
Note the (disapproving) allusion here to Saward’s definitional claim that 
‘democratic legitimacy . . . is understood as “perceived legitimacy”’ (Saward, 2010, 
p.84). 
Although ‘societal representation’ might well be a democratically-valid term for the 
interaction between the autonomous groups that compose civil society and 
governmental institutions, since the Maastricht Treaty, EU CSOs ‘have been 
solicited and funded by the European Commission itself’ (Disch, 2014, p. 15). In 
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‘representative claim’ parlance, the intended audience (the Commission) is also 
the claim-maker that commissions (pun intended) the subject (the CSO), which is 
defined in terms of the object (civil society). The only independent element is the 
supposed referent (the demos), the ongoing democratic deficit being the distance 
between the CSO and the (nonexistent) demos that it claims to represent 
‘societally’. The judge of the fit between the CSO and the referent is the same body 
that commissioned (and funded) it in the first instance. Disch (citing Lord and 
Pollock, 2010, p. 131) goes so far as to describe this notion of representation as 
‘Orwellian’: 
in that the notion of ‘sufficient collective representativity’ (which 
permits EU decision-makers to exclude the European Parliament from 
decision-making if they ‘judge that citizen’s interests have been 
“sufficiently” represented by the CSOs whom the decision-makers 
themselves selected for inclusion in the process), unelected interest 
groups are recognized as and fully empowered to substitute for 
elected representation at the discretion of the decision-makers. (Disch, 
2014, p. 16) 
This leads Disch to conclude that ‘constructivist accounts of representation could 
be seen as at once descriptively accurate and normatively troubling’ (ibid.), a 
‘caricature’ of constitutive representation: 
Political ‘institution of the social indeed! It is quite literally 
commissioning – calling for proposals, disbursing funds, and then 
consulting with – the social forces that it claims to represent while at 
the same time invoking these forces as ‘spontaneous’ evidence of an 
emergent European sociality/popular constituency. (ibid., p. 17). 
The critique of the democratic legitimacy of bodies appointed by non-elective 
means is by no means restricted to the European Union. In global politics the 
‘advocacy of difference’ by NGOs is in the name of ‘stakeholders’ – i.e. those who 
have a stake in or are affected by a certain issue. The problem is that under 
present conditions 
the activity in favour of stakeholders is not matched by numerical 
equality [isonomia] and it is difficult to see how such a system is going 
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to crystallize in the foreseeable future. The most powerful actors 
therefore have free rein to voice their interests at the expense of the 
many who lack a voice in global politics. (Nasstrom, 2011, p. 508) 
No doubt Saward would view the EU example discussed above as a gross 
distortion of the representative claim model but it is a valuable indicator of the need 
for a clear empirical separation between those who make the claim and the 
audience/constituency that judges it, as well as an illustration of the question-
begging involved in viewing the constituency in constructivist (constitutive) as 
opposed to constitutional terms. Bono can make a valid claim to represent a 
discourse on Africa (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008a, p. 481), but his claim to represent 
‘a lot of people in Africa’ should be judged by a constituency (such as a 
representative sample of the people of Africa) as opposed to an audience 
(Western donor governments or the audience of a televised pop concert). As 
Saward himself put it in an earlier work: ‘Ultimately, can democratic legitimacy exist 
absent popular voting on the basis of universal adult suffrage?’ (Saward, 2000, p. 
69). His answer in 2000 was a clear ‘no’, but ten years later he appears to have 
distanced himself from his earlier conservative scepticism. 
7.6  Conclusion 
Michael Saward’s representative claim model has been adopted in this chapter as 
a loose template to accommodate the speech acts of a wide variety of political 
agents. However the model fails to provide an adequate standard to evaluate the 
democratic legitimacy of the claim making. The representative claim model is 
composed of six variables (maker, subject, object, referent, audience and 
constituency) and these variables have been shown by the EU example to be 
anything but independent. Simple binary distinctions – between isegoria and 
isonomia (classical Greece), opinion and will (Habermas and Urbinati), opinion and 
decision (Disch), advocacy and judgment (Madison) – are less open to corruption. 
They are also more suitable for a democracy – in which all citizens should be able 
to understand the rules under which they are governed, as opposed to restricting it 
to political philosophers with a sophisticated understanding of arcane analytic 
terminology. This is not to deny the great value of The Representative Claim in 
broadening the domain of the representation of opinion to include a richer variety of 
sources over and above elected politicians, merely to agree with Urbinati and 
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Disch’s argument for a categorical distinction between opinion and decision, 
quarantining the representative claim to the former (the subject matter of this 
chapter). Saward appears at times to agree – for example with his 
acknowledgement that his perspective on the judgment and assessment of 
representative claims centres primarily on the notion of the ‘open society’ rather 
than democracy:  
because [the open society] is a concept that pivots around openness 
of criticism, claim and response, whereas democracy pivots around 
comparatively specific institutional arrangements. (Saward, 2010, p. 
154, my emphasis) 
Quite. However it is democratic legitimacy that is the topic of the chapter from 
which this quotation is taken (arguably the weakest chapter in Saward’s book). The 
thrust of the chapter (Chapter 6: Representation, Legitimacy, Democracy) is an 
appeal for an open society with the widest opportunities for representative isegoria 
possible. Citizens should be ‘free to advocate, organize, and lobby and to claim to 
stand for, or speak for, interests broader than their own’ (ibid., p. 166); ‘particular 
options or policies will have their champions, advocates or “representatives”’ (ibid., 
p. 161). But there is no necessary connection between the open society and 
democracy – the connection is contingent as the description of citizen rights in the 
previous sentence could (in principle) be just as pertinent to a liberal monarchical 
or oligarchic regime. The categorical distinction between monarchy, oligarchy and 
democracy55 is the numerical constitution of the sovereign – who gets to decide? 
(the one, the few or the many), not the extent of isegoria rights. The principal 
weakness with The Representative Claim is the conflation of these two distinctions 
(both equally necessary to a properly functioning democracy). 
Saward acknowledges that the open society bears a closer resemblance to 
polyarchy than democracy (ibid., p. 155), but polyarchy, although a hybrid of liberal 
                                            
55 Strictly speaking, the comparable term would be demarchy, as at issue is the number of 
archons (rulers). For the people to have power (democracy) it is necessary for them to 
have numerical equality (isonomia) along with the equal advocacy rights (isegoria). 
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and democratic institutions, is still grounded in the view that the will of the people 
finds its expression in the equal counting of votes in demographically balanced 
constituencies (isonomia). Polyarchy is a descriptive rather than a normative 
project and the goal of this thesis is to find a more effective version of isonomia 
than the institutions of polyarchy/mass democracy. 
The sheer variety of representative claim mechanisms opened up by Saward’s 
model can only enrich democratic isegoria, but democratic isonomia presupposes 
the equal numerical voting rights of citizens in pre-existing geographical 
constituencies (‘specific institutional arrangements’ in Saward’s terminology). 
Although the counting of heads (and their underlying preferences) may offend the 
(Kantian) internationalist and/or republican sensibilities of radical exponents of 
‘discursive democracy’, this is a sine qua non for any system of political institutions 
that bears the name handed down from the Athenian demokratia. Deliberation 
(isegoria) has always been an elite function and perhaps always will be: ‘Perhaps 
an ideal deliberative procedure is best institutionalized by ensuring well-conducted 
political debate among elites’ (J. Cohen, 1996, p. 107). However ‘crucial recent 
innovations in governance modes and policy-making are indeed deliberative, but 
undemocratic’ (Papadopoulos, 2012, p. 129). This is because the decision rule (as 
opposed to mechanisms of policy advocacy) constituting democracy has always 
been quantitative rather than qualitative, so advocates of alternative systems of 
political decision-making should use another word, rather than hanging on to 
‘democracy’ purely for the sake of the ‘commendary force’ of the term (Skinner, 
1973, p. 301). Andrew Rehfeld (forthcoming) is clearly right in extending the 
Skinnerian critique to the analysis of the concept of representation by seeking to 
strip it of the normative (liberal democratic) baggage with which it has been 
associated in, for example, the work of Hanna Pitkin. But there is a danger that this, 
alongside the constructivist turn in representation studies, will provide sustenance 
to the growing number of political activists who rule out the very notion of electoral 
representation as intrinsically undemocratic (and, conversely, the growing number 
of political theorists who view electoral representation under universal suffrage as 
epistemically unattractive (Brennan, 2016)). 
The thesis so far has attempted to bring some theoretical clarity to the conceptual 
diarchy of isonomia and isegoria; the final chapter is a very tentative exploration of 
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some options as to how the diarchy might be implemented in the constitutional 
arrangements of a large modern state. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
8.		From	Theory	to	Praxis	
Appendix I of this thesis reproduces an article that I published on Open Democracy 
calling for a sortition-based alternative two months before the actual ‘Brexit’ 
referendum. The surprise result of the referendum vote has led to considerable 
wailing and teeth-gnashing within both academia and the commentariat regarding 
the (alleged) ignorant xenophobia of voters – including some calls to consider 
sortition as a better way to sample well-informed public opinion (Van Reybrouck, 
2016b; Whittam Smith, 2016). Others even go so far as to question the wisdom of 
universal suffrage, a prime example being Jason Brennan’s Against Democracy 
(Brennan, 2016), a Platonist polemic on the danger of putting excessive political 
power in the hands of hoi polloi. My proposal for a sortition-based alternative to the 
Brexit referendum was originally floated in the Spectator in June 2013, three years 
before the event: 
If David Cameron wants the people to decide whether or not to remain 
in the EU, he should institute an adversarial public enquiry. However, 
rather than leaving the verdict to a Lord Justice, it should be decided 
by a randomly selected citizen jury, several hundred strong. There is a 
growing body of evidence indicating that such juries are capable of 
deciding complex issues in a sensible way and, crucially, that the 
majority verdict would represent the considered judgment of us all.1 
If the proposal had been taken up at the time it would certainly have ensured a 
high impact factor for my research. This thesis is, however, a work of analytical 
political theory, intended primarily to clarify the meaning of, and normative case for, 
descriptive and active representation and it is therefore with considerable 
trepidation that I trespass into areas of political and constitutional reform. The 
                                            
1 http://www.spectator.co.uk/2013/06/letters-285/ 
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thesis, however, clearly does have implications beyond the ivory towers of 
academe and its publication is timely, given the widespread view that electoral 
democracy is undergoing a crisis – both from an epistemic and legitimacy 
perspective (Brennan, 2016; Crouch, 2004; della Porta, 2013; Hayward, 1996; 
Norris, 2011; Papadopoulos, 2013; Tormey, 2015; Van Reybrouck, 2016a). 
This final chapter, therefore, is an attempt to speculate – albeit somewhat wildly – 
about possible ways of implementing sortition in the real world. If this looks like kite 
flying then it probably is. The principal focus of this chapter is the UK – as it is not 
an exercise in comparative institutional analysis, it would then be up to others to 
judge whether or not my proposals would be modifiable for other polities. 
Published advocates of the political potential of minipublics tend to be all or [next 
to] nothing – either (8.1) sortition is viewed as an alternative balloting mechanism 
for selecting political representatives, who would then exercise identical powers to 
elected politicians, or else (8.2) the role of minipublics is purely advisory – i.e. 
‘exercises in “reformist tinkering” rather than “revolutionary reform”’ (Fung, 2003, p. 
339). This thesis pursues a via media between these two extremes – (c) stochation 
could, if carefully augmented with existing electoral institutions, lead to significant 
improvements in both democratic legitimacy and governance outcomes, but it is – 
pace David van Reybrouck and other ‘sortinistas’ – no magic bullet. In tribute to 
Robert Dahl I refer to my proposed hybrid of electoral, direct-democratic and 
sortive institutions as Polyarchy III (See Section 8.3, below). 
8.1  Sortition as an alternative way of selecting political 
representatives 
I include in this category theorists who envisage allotted and elected chambers 
operating in parallel as there is no acknowledgement of Hanna Pitkin’s analytic 
distinction between the entirely different (and complementary) functions of 
descriptive and active representation (see Chapter 4, above). Dahl, for example, 
envisages two minipopuli – one to decide on the agenda of issues and another to 
judge the outcome as ‘the judgment of the minipopulus would “represent” the 
judgment of the demos’ (Dahl, 1989, p. 340). This thesis would agree with Dahl 
regarding the latter claim (assuming a large and quasi-mandatory statistical 
sample) but would argue that an agenda-setting minipopulus would contravene his 
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own requirement that ‘the demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide 
how matters are to be placed on the agenda’ (Dahl, 1989, p. 113), on account of 
the imbalances introduced by the differences in the perlocutionary outcome of the 
speech acts of persons selected at random. A study of widely divergent 
participation levels in the small-group sessions of Deliberative Polls found that: 
[t]hose who participate may not be able to participate on an equal 
footing. The garrulous, those strongly attached to their views, those 
who think the issue is important, the self-righteously knowledgeable, 
among many species, all prefer talking to listening, often at the 
expense of giving the others the chance to air their views. Then there 
are those who, even when they have the opportunity to talk, talk very 
little. (O'Flynn & Sood, 2014, p. 46) 
As a consequence, different allotted samples would almost certainly come up with 
different agendas – the outcome would be random in the pejorative sense – so 
there would be no way of knowing which agenda represented the informed and 
considered preferences of the target population. If Dahl had read Pitkin and Austin 
more carefully he might have designed his proposal – which was little more than 
an off-the-cuff footnote to Democracy and Its Critics – with greater precision.  
Other sortinistas seem to be blissfully unaware of Pitkin’s distinction – Callenbach 
and Philips’ Citizen Legislature (2008), Kevin O’Leary’s Saving Democracy (2006) 
and David Van Reybrouck’s Against Elections (2016) all argue for parallel 
chambers with identical powers.2 It is assumed that allotted and elected 
representatives would perform the same functions, merely being selected by, 
respectively, ‘democratic’ and ‘aristocratic’ mechanisms. The (interim) preservation 
of elected chambers is largely for prudential or tactical3 reasons. 
                                            
2 Brett Hennig’s The End of Politicians: Time for a real democracy takes this approach to 
the logical extreme, as the title indicates. (Hennig, 2017) 
3 Given that (elected) turkeys are highly unlikely to vote for Christmas, these ‘entryist’ 
authors prefer the Ashanti tactic of caution and guile – ‘softly, softly, catchee monkey’. 
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There have, however, been a number of proposals for allotted second chambers 
that would perform a purely checking or monitoring function, as is the case with the 
delaying, revising or veto role of current upper houses. The majority of such 
proposals are from journalists or online bloggers, the principal exception being 
Anthony Barnett and Peter Carty’s The Athenian Option: Radical Reform for the 
House of Lords (2008), which is based on the authors’ submission to the Royal 
Commission for House of Lords Reform in 1998.4 In many respects concrete 
proposals for House of Lords reform are pushing at an open door seeing as, since 
the birth of the American republic, there is little agreement over how upper houses 
should be constituted, given the perceived illegitimacy of the hereditary principle 
(Wood, 1998, Ch. VI). 
Barnett and Carty’s proposal does respect Pitkin’s distinction, as the right to initiate 
and argue for or against legislative proposals is limited to the (elected) lower house, 
the House of Lords possessing only the right to assess legislation – ‘a chamber of 
scrutiny unable to challenge the legislative will of the Commons’ (Barnett and Carty, 
2008, p. 17). This would ‘preserve the existing relationship between the two 
houses of parliament, and it would do so in a creative and democratic fashion’ 
(ibid., p. 18). 
There is a similarity between Barnett and Carty’s model and Harrington’s bicameral 
legislature, the only difference being the inversion of terminology. For Harrington 
the (elected) Senate had the initiative rights whereas the (part-allotted) lower 
house (the Prerogative Tribe) determined the outcome. I originally rejected Barnett 
and Carty’s proposal as it struck me as confusing for a lower house to be 
constituted by an aristocratic method (election) and an upper house by a 
democratic method (sortition). But this is just a quibble over nomenclature and an 
upper house of ‘People’s Peers’ or ‘Peers in Parliament’ (PPs) constituted by 
sortition would be relatively easy to institute in the current political climate in 
                                            
4 Similar proposals have been made in Belgium, France and Canada. 
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parliamentary democracies like the UK (ibid.).5 Needless to say the term of office of 
PPs appointed by sortition would be extremely short (to stop them from ‘going 
native’), although overlapping terms of tenure would be necessary in order to 
ensure adequate familiarity with the legislative process. Although my own 
proposals go much further than Barnett and Carty, theirs would make for an ideal 
(and relatively low-risk) testing ground for the experimental implementation of 
sortition. 
8.2  Advisory bodies 
However most experiments with minipublics – whether planning cells, citizens’ 
juries or consensus conferences – are for purely advisory bodies: ‘mini-publics 
have typically been initiated by policy-makers as ad hoc consultative bodies’ 
(Gronlund, et al., 2014, p. 3). Of the four types of minipublic catalogued by Archon 
Fung in his 2003 survey article, only one – ‘participatory democratic governance’ – 
seeks to incorporate direct citizen voices in the determination of policy agendas 
(Fung, 2003). Unfortunately neither of the examples provided by Fung under this 
category – participatory budgeting in various Brazilian municipalities and the 
Peoples’ Campaign for Democratic Decentralization in Kerala, India – use sortition 
as a selection method. 
The Deliberative Polling programme is even less ambitious – ‘deliberative polls are 
not designed to substantially advance popular control over state action or to 
improve policy’ (Fung, 2003, p. 355); Deliberative Polls are the only entry in the 
‘most restrictive’ category of minipublic (Ryan & Smith, 2014, p. 15). Although 
Fishkin makes the theoretical claim that the decision outcome of a Deliberative Poll 
would constitute ‘reason-based public-will formation by the people themselves’ 
(Fishkin, 2014, pp. 30-31), in practice the DP is little more than a (well-informed) 
public opinion survey with no direct public-policy entailments at all.6 Whether the 
                                            
5 Less so in presidential systems like the US where the Senate and Congress possess 
overlapping prerogative powers. 
6 The only recorded instance of the decisions of a DP being converted into public policy is 
the Zegou poll in the People’s Republic of China (Fishkin, 2009, pp. 106-111). 
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modest claims of the DP programme reflect the reluctance of the bodies that 
sponsor the polls to undermine their own power, or the marketing strategy of 
Stanford’s Center for Deliberative Democracy (the two factors may be interlinked 
as Deliberative Polling® is a registered trade mark) is hard to say but, given that 
Fishkin was a student of Dahl at Yale, this modesty is hard to understand.  
The aim of this chapter is bolder – what follows is an attempt to develop Dahl’s 
vision of Polyarchy III (Dahl, 1989, Ch. 23) – a ‘sketch for an advanced democratic 
country’ – based on a hybrid of electoral, direct-democratic and DP-style 
institutions. Given Fishkin’s intellectual debt to Dahl (and my own to Fishkin), I 
hope that my attempt to flesh out Dahl’s back-of-the-envelope proposal will be 
sympathetically received. 
8.3  Polyarchy III 
Let’s begin by reminding ourselves of the democratic diarchy according to Dahl: 
The process for making binding decisions includes at least two 
analytically distinguishable stages: setting the agenda and deciding 
the outcome. (Dahl, 1989, p. 107) 
For the decision process to be considered a democratic one, this presupposes that 
in the first stage: 
The demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how 
matters are to be placed on the agenda of matters that are to be 
decided by means of the democratic process. (ibid., p. 113) 
Whereas at the second stage: 
At the decisive stage of collective decisions, each citizen must be 
ensured an equal opportunity to express a choice that will be counted 
as equal in weight to the choice expressed by any other citizen. In 
determining outcomes at the decisive stage, these choices, and only 
these choices, must be taken into account (ibid., p. 109, my emphasis)  
According to this thesis Dahl’s democratic diarchy is best characterized in terms of 
the classical Greek concepts of equal political freedom – isegoria for agenda-
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setting and isonomia for judging the outcome, the only difference in large modern 
states being the need for representative mechanisms at both stages. 
8.3.1  Representative isegoria (agenda setting) 
As discussed above (and in detail in Chapter 4), Dahl is wrong to believe that a 
minipopulus could be responsible for democratic agenda-setting as there is no way 
to ensure the representativity of the speech acts of randomly selected individuals. 
Unlike in ancient democratic city-states, where every citizen had the right to speak, 
large modern states require representation mechanisms to institute isegoria, so 
Chapter 7 proposes a combination of election and direct-democratic initiative. In 
the former case the winning party/ies in an election would have the right to set the 
political agenda according to the electoral formula in place. In first-past-the-post 
systems the right would be limited to the party that gains a simple plurality of the 
votes, whereas in PR systems political parties would be authorized to introduce 
proposals in proportion to their share of the total votes. (The argument here refers 
to election manifesto commitments;7 for legislative needs arising from 
contingencies that occur between elections, along with statutory instruments, see p. 
299, below.) As agenda-setting by preference election is entirely familiar to modern 
readers there is no need to devote any further space to elaborating or justifying it, 
over and above re-emphasizing that those who set the agenda should not be the 
same as those who judge the outcome (as is currently the case in modern electoral 
democracies). 
Regarding direct democracy, citizen initiatives that received a minimum of 100,000 
online votes would be put on the ballot paper for an annual public votation, 
whereby all citizens indicate their preferred initiatives, with the top x being accepted 
for deliberative scrutiny in the decision-making forum. This is a direct analogue of 
the 4th-century Athenian legislative process, whereby the assembly decided (by 
                                            
7 Which would need to be couched in quasi-formal terms, as opposed to vague 
generalities (Cowley & Ford, 2016), thereby supporting Lord (Alan) Sugar’s argument that 
manifesto commitments should be subject to corporate-style audits and subject to the 
criminal law (‘Manifesto lies must mean jail, says Sugar, Sunday Times, 30 July 2017, p. 
12) . 
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show of hands) which isegoria-derived proposals were to be referred for scrutiny 
by the nomothetai (allotted legislative panels), and which did not merit further 
consideration.  
Athenian democracy did, however, reserve a role for the allotted boule (Council of 
500) in the agenda-setting process. As the secretariat for the assembly the council 
was responsible for drawing up the agenda for meetings, including allocating time 
for debating new legislative proposals. Modern schemes for the use of allotted 
bodies to approve or reject popular initiatives are modelled on the Athenian council, 
a recent example being the 2011 What’s Next California randomly-selected panel 
for the deliberative review of citizen initiatives: 
A mini-version of the population can engage in extensive face-to-face 
discussion and weigh the reasons for any proposal being important 
enough to bring to a public vote. In Ancient Athens, the Council of 500, 
chosen by lot, set the agenda for everyone’s votes in the Assembly. In 
this case, a representative group of 412 Californians, chosen by lot, 
set the agenda for everyone’s votes in ballot propositions. (Fishkin, 
2014, p. 37) 
However modern proposals based on the Athenian boule overlook the fact that the 
council was a collegial magistracy (administrative agency), not a representative 
decision-making body (Manin, Urbinati & Landemore, 2008) and its primary role 
was to protect the sovereignty of the assembly (Headlam, 1891, p. 63): 
The council was not, as we are apt to think, a dignified deliberative 
body, where men met together quietly in order to discuss and prepare 
schemes for the public welfare . . . It was not deliberative, but an 
executive body; it was concerned not with policy, but with business. 
(ibid., p. 57) 
It was also the case that most Athenian citizens would have served on the council 
at least once during their lifetime and everyone would have known someone 
currently serving, on account of the tribal basis of the sortition pool. In addition, all 
citizens could vote on legislative proposals in the assembly, so the role of sortition 
in the agenda-setting process was of a purely administrative nature and sortition 
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advocates (and deliberative democrats in general) are wrong to use the council as 
a template for a representative agenda-setting body. 
It might well be objected that both forms of agenda-setting (electoral and direct-
democratic) are open to domination by political, financial and media elites. This is 
undeniably true (in the case of political elites, tautologically so). However the 
primary currency of electoral politics is votes, not dollars, and political parties that 
consistently ignore the preferences of the electorate will, over time, fail. In 2016 all 
three mainstream political parties in the UK received a bloody nose for ignoring 
voters’ concerns over immigration, and Dahl might well have moderated his anxiety 
over the power of intellectuals to dominate the policy agenda in the light of Brexit, 
UKIP, The Tea Party and the Trump phenomenon (Dahl, 1989, pp. 332-5).8 Elites 
are currently taking an electoral bashing in most developed economies and the 
devolution of the decision function to a representative sample of ordinary citizens 
might well prove to be the final nail in the coffin of classical Mosca/Pareto/Michels 
ruling class theory. Besides which, the key prophylactic against elite rule is the poly 
in ‘polyarchy’ – it should not be forgotten that the original demokratia was the 
accidental by-product of a conflict between different aristocratic factions. 
Cleisthenes may well have ‘recruited the people into his own faction’ (Hdt. 5.66.2) 
but the democratic tail ended up wagging the pedigree dog. In the modern-day 
Crufts the people are the judges and will pick their own champions according to 
whatever criteria they deem appropriate.  
8.3.2  Representative isonomia (judgment) 
At the decisive stage of collective decisions, each citizen must be 
ensured an equal opportunity to express a choice that will be counted 
as equal in weight to the choice expressed by any other citizen. (Dahl 
1989, p. 109) 
                                            
8 These Anglophone developments are closely paralleled in other mature democracies, for 
example the support for Marine Le Pen’s Front National in France, the Alternative fuer 
Deutschland in Germany and the Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands. 
280 
In the restored Athenian demokratia decisions by large randomly-selected juries 
were considered a better form of nomothesia than the show of hands in the 
assembly. Whilst the change was largely for administrative convenience it was also 
considered to have epistemic merit (on account of the lengthy exchange of 
reasons between advocates, the higher age qualification and the swearing of the 
Heliastic Oath). Although the claim that the allotted jury constituted a 
representative sample of the citizen body might well be anachronistic, there is 
certainly no contemporary evidence that the fourth-century approach to lawmaking 
was seen as undermining democracy (Cammack, forthcoming). In fact the switch 
from everyone voting (in the assembly) to a sample of citizens (in the nomothetai) 
drew very little comment – Aristotle not even bothering to mention it in Ath. Pol. 
There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the move to legislative decision-
making by allotted jury was viewed as undermining the sovereignty of the demos. 
A model for Polyarchy III might well benefit from this ancient precedent, along with 
the relatively high level of confidence in the modern world that the randomly-
selected jury is (at minimum) the least-worst procedure for determining the 
outcome of a judicial trial. If the Athenians decided to extend the procedure of the 
law courts (dikasteria) to the ‘trial’ of new laws, then why not follow the example for 
the trial of laws in the High Court of Parliament? A reincarnated nomothetai system 
would also benefit from the modern understanding of proportional sampling 
methodology in terms of the relationship between the absolute number of jurors 
and the decision threshold necessary to establish sufficient (statistical) confidence 
in the reliability of the decision vis-a-vis the target population. A number of criteria 
would need to be applied in order to ensure stochastic representativity: 
• Participation would be quasi-mandatory, as is the case with (UK) trial 
jurors. A generous stipend would be necessary along with child-care and 
travel allowances. Employers would be expected to permit attendance in 
the vast majority of cases (see Chapter 4, above). 
• The default position regarding exclusion from the sortition pool would be 
non-citizens and those sectioned under the Mental Health Acts of 1983 
and 2007. For consideration regarding convicted felons, see p. 163, 
above. 
• The default minimum age for selection would be 18, as is the case with 
voting rights. In an earlier work (Sutherland, 2008, p. 148), I argued for a 
281 
higher minimum age, based on the fourth-century Athenian argument 
that lawmakers should be drawn from the ranks of mature citizens, but it 
would be hard to argue that this would not discriminate against the 
interests of younger people, already comparatively disadvantaged in 
comparison to their baby-boomer parents. (Willetts, 2011) 
• My earlier proposal also (controversially) included a minimum IQ test 
(Sutherland, 2008, pp. 143-4). The minimum age threshold is an implicit 
form of political competence testing, but whereas there is a minimum age 
requirement for a driving licence, drivers are also required to learn the 
Highway Code and pass a demanding test before being allowed behind 
the wheel of a car (Graham, 2002, p. 38). If so, then surely legislative 
jurors should be tested to ensure they can at least understand the topic 
that they are being asked to rule over? I have since been persuaded that 
such a proposal suffers from serious democratic flaws and that – given 
universal secondary education – the presence of a few idiotes as 
statistical outliers is unlikely to significantly affect the outcome. 
• It’s a sign of our meritocratic times that elitists like Gordon Graham now 
propose terms like ‘competence’ as a prerequisite for the franchise 
whereas Gladstone spoke of moral qualities like ‘self-command, self-
control, respect for order, patience under suffering, confidence in the law 
. . .’ (Gladstone, 1864, col. 324-5). Given the obvious difficulties involved 
with a test for moral competence, a case could be made for a modern 
equivalent of the Heliastic Oath (see p. 60, above).  
• The role of the juror is, in Dahl’s words ‘to express a choice that will be 
counted as equal in weight’. The role of the jury is to determine the 
outcome via a secret vote – speech acts would be limited to asking 
anonymous written questions, as in current juridical practice (see 
Chapter 5, above). Unlike in current parliamentary democracies where 
most MPs only enter the chamber on hearing the division bell, 
attendance throughout the debate would be mandatory. 
• The term of service should be as short as possible. Some modern 
proposals for allotted assemblies consider terms of 1-3 years (in order to 
ensure an adequate level of experience and continuity), but this assumes 
that an allotted parliament/congress would operate in a similar manner to 
an elected one. However the Athenian nomothetai – the preferred model 
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for this thesis – were ad hoc (a different panel was selected every day for 
each new law). Such a model assumes exogenous information/advocacy 
and that the continuity and accountability requirements of governance 
would be provided by different agents/institutions (see section 8.3.5, 
below). 
• The size of Athenian juries varied from 501 to 5001, depending on the 
importance of the case or the law under consideration. There is no 
evidence as to whether numerical considerations were related to fears of 
jury-tampering or pretheoretical intuitions regarding the accuracy of a 
proportional sample.9 Dahl proposed that a minipopulus should comprise 
‘perhaps’ 1,000 citizens (1998, p. 340) and this approximates to the 
minimum advocated by statisticians with a research interest in sortition.10 
Deliberative polls, on the other hand, are generally composed of only 
200-300 persons and legislative assemblies 500-600. Leaving aside 
issues of cost, clearly the larger the sample, the more accurate the 
descriptive representativity, until the threshold for rational ignorance is 
exceeded – at which point participants cease to perform the role of an 
‘attentive’ (mini)public as the power of their individual vote to determine 
the outcome is reduced. 
• Allied to the sample size is the decision threshold – a simple majority 
threshold would require an exponentially larger sample than (say) a 
60/40 supermajority. Consistency of decision outcome between different 
samples of the same population would be essential if the minidemos 
were viewed as a proxy for ‘what everybody would think under good 
conditions’, so a close decision on an important issue (the UK Brexit vote 
was 52/48) might well require replication over a number of different 
samples, either synchronically or diachronically.  
                                            
9 Although there was no notion of mathematical probability in the pre-modern world, every 
cook knows that in order to reliably sample all the ingredients in an unhomogenized soup a 
large ladle is likely to be more accurate than a teaspoon. 
10 https://equalitybylot.wordpress.com/2015/04/01/sortition-and-the-need-for-internal-
deliberation/#comment-15835 
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As a work of political theory this thesis is only concerned to draw attention to these 
issues, rather than make any firm recommendation on sample size and decision 
threshold. If the conceptual distinctions are sound then it is for others with the 
relevant disciplinary qualifications to flesh out the numbers. Nevertheless some 
purely illustrative calculations will require a brief foray into statistical theory. 
Two factors need to be considered when it comes to calculating the necessary 
sample size and decision threshold for a proportionately representative body. A 
‘confidence interval’ (margin of error) is a range of values that is likely to contain an 
unknown population parameter. If you draw a random sample many times, a 
certain percentage of the confidence intervals will contain the population mean. 
This percentage is the confidence level. For example, suppose all possible 
samples were selected from the same population, and a confidence interval were 
computed for each sample, a 95% confidence level implies that 95% of the 
confidence intervals would include the population parameter.11 
Given that it would be essential for a legislative minidemos to be an accurate 
portrait-in-miniature of the target population, the most demanding confidence level 
of 99.9% is assumed in the following calculations12 of sample size and decision 
threshold for a target population the size of the UK electorate (37,831,600) or US 
electorate (235,248,000): 
Margin of error Decision threshold Sample size 
2% 52/48 6,766 
5% 55/45 1,083 
10% 60/40 271 
Table 8.1: Margin of error, decision threshold and sample size 
                                            
11 http://stattrek.com/statistics/dictionary.aspx?definition=confidence_level 
12 Computations from the online calculator at https://www.mccallum-
layton.co.uk/tools/statistic-calculators/sample-size-calculator/. The absolute size of the 
target population is unimportant (if it is a very large number). Other sample size calculators 
give slightly different results (for example https://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm), but 
the concern of this thesis is only the statistical principle involved, not the absolute numbers. 
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It must be emphasized that the sample size calculations presuppose the full 
independence of each sample member (i.e. active participation limited to voting in 
secret) and quasi-mandatory selection – any deviation from these principles would 
involve a sharp decrease in the (statistical) confidence level. The sample sizes 
involved are in the same ballpark as the Athenian legislative juries and the ancient 
argument that more important cases required larger juries would certainly pertain, if 
only for reasons of budgetary constraints –vs– (public) confidence. A minor bill 
would only require a sample of several hundred, but if the resultant vote fell outside 
the margin of error for that jury size (10%), a ‘retrial’ would be necessary in front of 
a larger jury. The Brexit result (52/48) would suggest that a jury of well over 6,000 
would have been necessary for accurate representation, possibly divided between 
a number of parallel sittings. If (say) eight or ten juries of 1,000 had listened to 
identical balanced briefings from the advocates of the Remain and Leave 
campaigns and then voted, the aggregate vote could well be taken to indicate the 
considered will of the whole electorate. If the outcome were closer than 52/48 this 
would trigger a full public referendum (or, as the precautionary principle might 
suggest, the maintenance of the status quo). 
The adoption of larger juries (1,000+) with mandatory participation would almost 
certainly preclude the need for stratified sampling, but juries for minor legislative 
bills, that might only be felt to merit a sample of 200-300 might well require 
stratification in order to ensure a crudely representative sample. If so then standard 
polling industry practice would determine the relevant strata (age, gender, census 
category etc). 
8.3.2.1  Advocacy (for and against the legislative proposal) 
Fourth-century legislation required new laws to be proposed (twice) in the general 
assembly, during which any citizen could speak in favour or against the 
appointment of a nomothetic panel. If the majority assembly decision went in 
favour of appointing nomothetai then the proponent of the new law – if necessary 
with the assistance of paid logographoi (speech writers) – would argue his case in 
front of the legislative jury, five defenders of the existing law being elected by the 
assembly. The time allocated to each party was carefully balanced, after which the 
jury would return its verdict and the new law would either be accepted or rejected, 
hopefully on the basis of the ‘forceless force of the better argument’. 
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What might a reincarnation of such a system for a large modern state look like? 
The representational equivalent of the proposal function is clearly the electoral and 
direct-democratic procedures described in Chapter 7, with the advocates for new 
laws drawn from the winning political party/ies and proponents of direct-democratic 
initiatives that received sufficient support in online votes and public votation. But 
what about advocates for the defence?  
The obvious defenders of the status quo would be the ministers from the relevant 
department(s) who would be duty bound (often reluctantly) to put the new law into 
practice – Brexit being a good example. Ministers would be briefed by civil servants 
within the departments as to the expected costs and likely entailments for other 
aspects of public policy. The ‘forces of conservatism’ (Tony Blair) or ‘the blob’ 
(Michael Gove) would certainly not go unrepresented.  
In my earlier work, A People’s Parliament, I also floated the idea of a permanent 
house of advocacy – a true aristocracy of merit – to replace the existing House of 
Lords: 
There is no attempt made in this essay to camouflage the fact that the 
estate of the Lords Advocate would be unashamedly elitist in its 
composition – a body of the great and the good. But, at the same time 
it would be pluralistic and representative of the range of interests and 
the key professions necessary to comment on the issues that 
legislation is likely to cover. And the notion of an elite – a true 
aristocracy of talent, experience and merit – is perfectly compatible 
with a quota system. Thus quotas would need to be specified for 
business and the trades unions, science and its environmental critics, 
transport advocates and countryside conservationists, religion and the 
military, education, law, health, finance, culture, sport and all the 
myriad professions that might have something useful to contribute to 
the national debate. (Sutherland, 2008, p. 137)  
To this I would now add think tanks such as the Institute for Fiscal Studies and 
independent agencies such as the Office for Budget Responsibility. In some 
respects the proposal would be analogous to the system whereby members of a 
college or professional body recommend the appointment of new fellows but, as in 
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the case of the legislative process, the appointment would be subject to ratification 
by the allotted parliament. Given the essential role of the dissenter, the maverick 
and the whistle-blower in public life, the position of Lord Advocate should be held 
for life. Parliament should not be in a position to silence the voice of dissent, 
however uncomfortable that might prove, except in the case where the Advocate 
was convicted of having acted in a corrupt manner. Given that Advocates would 
clearly be targeted by lobbyists, a strictly-policed register of interests would be 
essential. 
A similar approach to Lords reform has been made by the veteran MP Frank 
Field.13 Field points out that, from earliest times, the House of Commons primarily 
represented group interests.14 However, the sleaze scandal of John Major’s 
government – leading to the Nolan Report of 1995 – followed by the MPs’ 
expenses scandal of 2009, has effectively barred the representation of interests in 
the lower house. According to Field this is ‘absurd’, as ‘nations are made up of 
group interests’. Field argues that House of Lords reform should put the 
representation of group interests on a formal basis, using the Law Lords15 and 
Anglican bishops as a prototype. Field’s new aristocracy of merit would be very 
similar to my own proposal outlined on the previous page: 
A radical Lords reform would seek the representation of all the major 
legitimate interests in our society . . . women’s and children’s 
organisations and interests; the interests of trade unions, employers, 
industrialists and businesses; the cultural interests of writers, 
composers and communicators; the interests of the professions, and 
of local authorities so that regions are represented. . . Reform along 
these lines would ensure that power stays with the electorate – 
                                            
13 Labour MP for Birkenhead since 1979. 
14 A reference, presumably, to the Burkean notion of ‘virtual representation’ (see p. 99, 
above). 
15 Field views the quarantining of the Law Lords to the Supreme Court as a highly 
regressive move, as their expertise is no longer incorporated directly into the legislative 
process. 
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through group membership – and is not hived off into the political 
parties. (Field, 2011) 
Given the wide range of areas covered by legislation and the highly pluralistic 
nature of the Lords Advocate – including a majority still in full time employment – 
one would expect a great variation in the input that individual peers made to 
different legislative bills, as is the case in the House of Lords as currently 
constituted. Thus there would be no full-time salary, although generous payments 
would be made on a per diem basis for Advocates participating in a debate. A 
general research and correspondence secretariat would be made available to 
occasional Advocates who would not be able to justify the expense of their own 
personal office. Access to government information would be granted to Advocates 
and their civil service staff on the same basis that the prosecution is obliged to 
disclose evidence to defence lawyers in a trial. 
If this is (rightly) seen as little more than hand-waving, I would once again 
emphasize that this is a thesis in political theory, not constitutional design. I would 
also point to the ability of the UK political system to evolve by ‘informal 
constitutional convention’, whereby institutions like the BBC, TUC, CBI and LGA 
were assimilated into the ‘administrative scheme’ via osmosis rather than formal 
design (Jennings, 1933). As is the case with quantitative easing, such an approach 
‘works in practice, but not in theory’. It should also be remembered that the House 
of Advocates would have no proposal or voting rights, its function being purely the 
conservative one of defending the existing laws, so in this respect the role of Lords 
Advocate is not dissimilar to that of barristers and other hired professionals in the 
judicial process. The Brexit campaign has also shown the ability of advocacy 
groups to self-organise over high-stakes decisions. 
8.3.3  Parliamentary committees 
Randomly-selected laypersons, with a short term of service, would not possess the 
skills and experience necessary for the detailed scrutiny of parliamentary bills (the 
remit of standing committees) or the monitoring of government departments (select 
committees), so these committees would be composed of elected members and 
Lords Advocate. Regarding the latter, a study group of the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association concluded that the Lords 
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offered the only really deep analysis of the issues that is available to 
the parliamentary representatives  . . . The Lords’ reports are far more 
informative and comprehensive than those produced by the 
Commons committee on European legislation. (Grantham & Hodgson, 
1985) 
Nevertheless, given the risk – indeed likelihood – of the popular will being 
undermined at the committee stage of the bill, a subset of the allotted house could 
well be included to monitor proceedings, and the same principle would also apply 
to departmental oversight – where the danger is the growth of executive power 
absent the constraints of elected governance. Note that the ‘impartial oversight’ 
potential of sortition is advocated by authors who align themselves closer with the 
‘Blind Break’ school of sortition (see Appendix II, below) rather than those arguing 
the case for stochation (descriptive representation via sortition). 
8.3.4  Constituency affairs 
Modern MPs spend most of their time dealing with the affairs of their constituents 
rather than holding the government to account and there is no reason to imagine 
this would be changed by sortition-based legislative decision-making. In addition to 
MPs’ constituency ‘surgeries’ (which Winston Churchill scathingly referred to as 
‘setting up in the medical business’), in 2008 some 40,000 letters came in to the 
Palace of Westminster every day and the switch to (cost-free) email 
communication will have increased this volume exponentially. Most of this 
correspondence is from constituents and deals with local matters such as housing, 
welfare, planning etc. MPs’ influence in these matters is largely confined to writing 
to local authorities and ministers on behalf of their constituents and there is no 
reason for the introduction of sortition-based lawmaking to alter this arrangement.  
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8.3.5  Accountability, consistency, fiscal responsibility and executive 
governance 
The obvious criticism of law-making by ad hoc amateur bodies is that it would be a 
recipe for chaos, as no single and accountable agency would be responsible for 
ensuring that the laws were consistent with each other,16 that there were sufficient 
funds to pay for them all and other considerations relating to ‘joined up’ 
government. As the dramatists of the classical era pointed out, the allotted juror 
was in possession of the harlot’s prerogative17 (power without responsibility) and 
the buck had nowhere to stop. In Aristophanes’ Wasps, the juror Philocleon tells 
his son: 
‘As far as our power is concerned it is nothing less than a kingship 
[basileias]. What creature is there today more happy and enviable, or 
more pampered, or more to be feared, than a juror?’ The jurors are 
supplicated to give certain verdicts, but Philocleon insists that they are 
able to decide whatever they want, as their power is entirely 
discretionary. Thus everyone fears them and they fear no one. ‘Do I 
not wield great rule [megalēn archēn archō], in no way inferior even to 
that of Zeus?’. . . The jurors hold all others to account, but they are 
themselves unaccountable: ‘And for doing this we cannot be called to 
account [anupeuthunoi] – which is true of no other public authority 
[archē]. (Hoekstra, 2013, [p. 35, m/s]) 
It is also the case that most modern legislation consists of a vast number of dreary 
minor regulations that never appear in big-ticket manifesto commitments and that 
practical governance has more to do with responding to contingencies in real time 
(‘events, dear boy, events’, as Macmillan put it), rather than realizing visions of the 
New Jerusalem. On top of this there is Socrates’ famous objection to appointing 
                                            
16 Although the original remit of the boards of nomothetai appointed in 403/2 was the 
revision and codification of the law, I am not suggesting that a corresponding task in a 
large modern state would be suitable for randomly-selected amateurs. 
17 An accusation also levelled by Stanley Baldwin at press barons Lords Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere. 
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pilots and flute-players ‘by bean’. If this were true in a small primitive polis, then 
how on earth could a modern large-scale democracy-by-lot be expected to work? 
The answer of course is that it would be a disaster – sortition could only ever play a 
part in a mixed constitution that arrogated administrative powers to fully 
accountable agencies appointed by other means. Arguably it was always thus – 
Rousseau’s supposedly ‘sovereign’ assembly of the people spends most of its time 
fast asleep, leaving the delegated government in charge (Tuck, 2016), and this 
would certainly be the case with a sovereign legislature appointed by lot.  
The focus of this thesis is democratic law-making as opposed to governance, but 
the system of lawmaking inevitably has entailments for the executive office. In 
presidential systems the barrier (albeit constructed of wafer-thin and highly porous 
parchment) between the executive and legislature is such that changes to the 
system of lawmaking would not – at least in theory – have a significant impact on 
executive governance. But it would be a serious problem in parliamentary systems, 
where the government is composed of the largest party(ies) in parliament and 
would no longer be able to ‘get its business’ as a direct consequence of the 
parliamentary arithmetic. 
As Rousseau pointed out, there is no necessary connection between the 
appointment method for governments and legislatures. As far as he was 
concerned a democratic legislature would need to be composed of all citizens (I 
argue elsewhere that a large descriptively-representative sample would not in fact 
contravene this principle (Sutherland, 2012)). A democratic legislature, however, 
does not mean that an executive could not be constituted by other methods – 
aristocratic (electoral) or monarchical (appointment).  
8.3.5.1  Elected (aristocratic) executive governance 
The immediate aftermath of the Brexit referendum has demonstrated that an 
elected government can, in principle, implement policies determined directly by the 
sovereign demos, even when the prime minister and leading members of the 
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cabinet (including the Chancellor) campaigned against those policies.18 Given that 
negotiations to leave the EU would be the principal task of government ministers 
for the next few years, the decision by the Conservative government to call a 
general election in June 2017 was presented as an opportunity for citizens to 
decide which of the two leading political parties (or, more specifically, their leaders) 
was most competent to execute policies with which they both disagreed – an 
outcome that Rousseau would have found entirely congenial:19  
[The EU Referendum] has been responsible for the introduction of a 
new principle into the British constitution — the principle of the 
sovereignty of the people, a principle that supersedes the sovereignty 
of parliament. It means that parliament, for perhaps the first time in its 
history, is being required to carry out a policy to which it is radically 
opposed. (Bogdanor, 2016) 
Note that in the case of the Brexit referendum, MPs voted by a margin of six to one 
to abolish parliamentary sovereignty.20 The foreign secretary, Philip Hammond, 
proposing the European Union Referendum Act 2015, closed his speech with the 
argument that  
the decision about our membership should be taken by the British 
people, not by Whitehall bureaucrats, certainly not by Brussels 
                                            
18 There is a parallel here to the events of 1782, when George III was obliged (by 
parliamentary arithmetic) to accept a government that he did not like, although the modern 
reference is to policies rather than persons. (Hansen, 2010, p. 514) 
19 Rousseau would also have approved of the fact that the referendum was decided on the 
basis of moral intuition (aka prejudice), with the deliberative exchange being for the most 
part entirely ignored by voters. 
20 In order, paradoxically, to repatriate it from Brussels to Westminster. The word ‘abolition’ 
is employed somewhat rhetorically as, from a legal point of view, the UK parliament 
remains the sovereign power. Nevertheless if the government had refused to accept the 
referendum decision there is a high probability that it would have been voted out of office at 
the next election. So from a Bagehottian perspective, ‘efficient’ power (on this matter) 
passed from parliament to the people, and both Bogdanor and the UCL Constitution Unit  
view this as an (effective) transfer of sovereignty. 
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Eurocrats; not even by Government Ministers or parliamentarians in 
this Chamber.21 
The UCL Constitution Unit agrees with Vernon Bogdanor that the Brexit 
referendum may well be the prelude to a new era of popular sovereignty: 
First, the referendum and its aftermath demonstrate that popular 
sovereignty, not parliamentary sovereignty, is now the central principle 
of the UK constitution. The doctrine that parliament is the ultimate 
sovereign power in the UK (or, at least, in England – Scottish 
nationalists discern a different heritage north of the border) was 
asserted by the nineteenth-century constitutional theorist A.V. Dicey. 
The emergence of referendums since the 1970s had eroded that 
principle. The referendum in June, however, was the first in which the 
popular vote went against the clear will of the majority in the House of 
Commons. That most MPs feel bound to accept that decision shows 
where ultimate power in UK politics actually lies. There has been great 
debate over the summer as to whether parliamentary approval is 
needed to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and begin formal talks 
on Brexit. But this has been something of a sideshow: even if the 
courts deem that parliament’s consent is needed, it is all but certain to 
be granted. (Unit, 2016) 
Given that legislative decision-making by sovereign minidemos would function in 
the same way as a referendum (except that the decision would be a) binding and 
b) better informed), could such a potentially agonistic relationship between 
sovereign and government apply in the general case? The principal lawmaking 
role of the government would be to explain to the allotted legislature the fiscal 
implications of changes in the law and the effect of one law on the existing body of 
statutes. The decision whether or not to build a new commercially-funded nuclear 
                                            
21 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm150609/debtext/150609-
0001.htm#15060939000001 
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reactor has clear financial (if not fiscal) implications and has consequences for both 
the security of energy supply and climate-change policy. The government 
departments involved would advocate their various positions to the allotted 
sovereign, and there would be no shortage of advocates against any pro-nuclear 
policy. So there is no reason in principle why such a policy should not work. 
George Osborne’s Treasury (rightly) played a key role in arguing the conservative 
case against Brexit, but it simply failed to persuade. So there is no inherent reason 
why an executive appointed by election should not be able to work in tandem with 
a sovereign allotted parliament. US presidents have more often than not had to 
work with a legislature dominated by their political opponents, so there is no reason 
in principle why a popularly-elected executive should not be able to work in tandem 
with a legislative assembly selected by lot. 
As this is a thesis on lawmaking rather than governance, it could well afford to be 
agnostic regarding the best way of selecting government ministers (election or 
appointment). However, recent experiences in both the US and UK increasingly 
suggests that election is a sub-optimal way of selecting talented executives to 
implement the popular will. Given my defence of the mixed constitution (see 
section 8.4, below) it might well be argued that a modern equivalent of the 
(monarchical) principle of appointing government ministers on merit alone should 
be considered. This is for two reasons – first of all most modern politicians have, as 
Denis Healey put it, little or no ‘hinterland’ in the world of business or public affairs 
outside politics. The House of Commons in Healey’s day reflected a wide range of 
occupations (MPs viewing their job as effectively part-time) – my own constituency 
MP for twenty years also worked as the chairman of a motel company. But since 
then politics has become increasingly professionalized, with many MPs following 
the career path of Oxford PPE followed by a period as a personal advisor to a 
serving MP. Leaving aside John Prescott’s job as a steward on a merchant ship, 
one of the few members of Tony Blair’s cabinet to have had significant outside 
working experience was Alan Milburn, who for a short time was the manager of a 
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Marxist bookshop called Days of Hope.22 Milburn went on to run the NHS, second 
only in its number of employees to the Indian railways. Election might well have 
been the best way to fill Athenian magistracies where skill and experience were 
held at a premium but it is an increasingly suboptimal mechanism for uncovering 
competent ‘aristocrats’ (i.e. those most competent for the job) in the modern world. 
The other reason for growing scepticism with popular election as the way of 
selecting government executives is whether or not voters a) have the appraisal 
tools to distinguish between genuine talent and purely presentational skills and b) 
will make the choice based on competence rather than other cues. The 2017 UK 
general election was initially fought over which party leader was deemed more 
competent to conduct Brexit negotiations. The electorate, however, rejected the 
(supposedly) ‘strong and stable leadership’ offered by Conservative leader 
Theresa May and deprived her of a parliamentary majority,23 by voting in 
unexpectedly large numbers for the policy proposals of a Labour Party team that 
contained few candidates with any kind of ministerial experience. It was also the 
case that the ‘unassailable’ polling lead enjoyed by May turned negative over a few 
weeks on account, in part, of presentational failures – political executives are 
judged not by what they do but what they say (and how they say it).  
The conflation of policy and competence issues is (paradoxically) even more 
marked in presidential systems – Donald Trump may well have garnered support 
through presenting himself as the Dealmaker-in-Chief – the government CEO who 
would get things done – but a lot of his support was on account of his populist 
legislative policy proposals. Election as a way of choosing government executives 
will inevitably conflate policy and (apparent) competence so it is worthwhile at least 
considering the pre-modern alternatives for ministerial selection (even though 
executive governance is not the principal concern of this thesis). A mixed 
constitution is only as good as its weakest link, and the radical changes proposed 
                                            
22 Known to its patrons as ‘Haze of Dope’. 
23 In fact the Conservatives could have achieved an absolute majority with an additional 
794 votes ‘in the right place’ (Laura Kuenssberg, The Triumph that Wasn’t, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/General_election). 
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to the legislature will require rebalancing in other areas, hence this brief foray into 
the field of executive governance. 
8.3.5.2  ‘Monarchical’ (appointed) governance 
In addition to the problem of competence some scholars have argued that the 
power of modern political executives would be better described as monarchical 
than aristocratic: 
In a modern democracy the prime minister, in the USA and France the 
president, has powers that in some respects equal the powers wielded 
by an absolute monarch in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Prime ministers have full power to appoint the ministers they want to 
have in their government and to depose them again if they do not live 
up to the prime minister’s expectations. . . . If it had not been Tony 
Blair who was prime minister in 2003, Britain would not have joined 
the USA [in the 2003 Iraq war]. And if the president of the USA had 
not been George Bush, there might not have been a war at all. 
(Hansen, 2010, pp. 524-5) 
The UK political system has been described as an ‘elected monarchy’ (Benemy, 
1965; Vile, 1967, p. 340) or even an ‘elective dictatorship’ (Hailsham, 1978). And 
the analysis is by no means limited to the UK – the term ‘delegative democracy’ 
refers to any state with a strong popularly-elected president: ‘whoever wins election 
to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she thinks fit, constrained 
only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited 
term of office’ (O'Donnell, 1994, pp. 59-60). This analysis lends support to 
Rousseau’s view that citizens of such states have little (political) liberty in between 
elections. From the perspective of the separation of powers this is entirely 
appropriate, given that Montesquieu’s de l’Esprit des Lois (published in 1748) was 
based on an idealized and highly abstracted description of the English constitution 
in which the executive power was vested in the king (and his appointed ministers). 
The American founders opted for an elected president rather than a hereditary 
monarch but the use of a common mechanism (preference election) to fill both the 
legislative and executive powers should not be allowed to confuse the doctrine of 
the separation of powers (and persons). Whilst elected legislators could be 
described as (time-limited) oligarchics, elected presidential power is essentially 
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unitary (i.e. mon-archical) – the US president is commander-in-chief and hires and 
fires his own ministers at will (subject to Senate confirmation). The president is an 
elected monarch, although only for a defined period and without the right to pass 
on the baton of power to his own dynasty.24  
According to Hansen (2010, p. 526), following the lead of (Foley, 2001), UK prime 
ministerial power became increasingly presidential towards the end of the twentieth 
century.25 Given the (effectively) monarchical nature of this power and the limited 
pool of talent and experience available to the electoral process (where the 
candidate’s presentational and thespian skills tend to count for more) would it not 
be better just to acknowledge this? In the UK all ministers are appointed in the 
name of the crown, rather than the governing political party, so the British 
constitution would lend itself better than most to the appointment of crown 
ministers on merit, as opposed to election. The convention that government 
ministers must always be members of the Commons or the Lords stands on no 
firmer basis than an exchange of correspondence between Peel and Wellington in 
1835. In fact the only formal requirement is that cabinet ministers should be 
members of the Privy Council – and this is only because the cabinet is in effect a 
committee of the Privy Council. So crown ministers appointed on merit alone would 
involve simply taking the hybrid notion of the ‘Crown-in-Parliament’ more literally. 
This should not be read as a suggestion that reigning monarchs should revert to 
choosing their own ministers (although the idea might well appeal to a future King 
Charles III). Given that the executive function in the hybrid constitution suggested 
in this chapter would be non-political (i.e. implementing, rather than advocating 
[e.g.] Brexit) there is no reason, in principle, why the standard tools of executive 
recruitment (headhunters, competitive examination, sits. vac. advertising etc) 
should not be employed for government ministers. The shortlist would be drawn up 
                                            
24 This founding ideal was immediately confounded – the election for the second 
presidency being highly politicized and the return of John and then John Quincy Adams 
being an early precursor of twentieth- and twenty-first century dynastic developments. 
25 Michael Foley, The British Presidency (Foley, 2001); c.f. Graham Allen MP, The Last 
Prime Minister: Being honest about the UK presidency (Allen, 2003) 
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by the recruitment agency appointed by the permanent secretary of the 
department in question, and the candidates would present their case to an allotted 
minidemos convened for the purpose of making the final selection. 
This is not, in fact, a radical departure from current practice. The lack of talent and 
experience in the electoral gene pool has led in recent years to a ministerial 
appointment process that increasingly resembles the American spoils system. New 
Labour ministers Estelle Morris and Ruth Kelly discovered that, notwithstanding 
their grand title ‘Secretary of State for Education and Science’, policy was really in 
the hands of Lord Adonis (never elected and of Liberal Democrat provenance). 
Meanwhile McKinsey consultants – the ‘Jesuits of capitalism’ – took over many of 
the tasks that were once the responsibility of elected politicians. McKinsey partner 
David Bennett was put in charge of appointing the head of the civil service, Adair 
Turner was put in charge of pensions policy and Nick Lovegrove forward strategy, 
leaving the arch-Jesuit John Birt responsible for ‘blue skies’ thinking at No. 10.  
Gordon Brown appointed ex-CBI chief Sir Digby Jones as trade promotion minister 
(even though he almost certainly voted Conservative) and included Liberal 
Democrat peers Baroness Neuberger and Lord Lester in his team alongside 
former Metropolitan Police chief Lord Stevens (international security adviser) and 
former Navy chief Sir Alan West. What any of this has to do with party politics is 
unclear but if Tony Blair was going to have a big tent, Brown’s was going to be 
even bigger. 
The 2017 Conservative party election manifesto was written by Theresa May’s two 
unelected advisors, Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill,26 and then presented to the 
cabinet, MPs and party as a fait accompli. When the manifesto was found to be 
alienating core Conservative supporters, the revisions were contracted out to the 
Australian political consultant Lynton Crosby. The role of the party, MPs and 
cabinet in the manifesto was practically non-existent. Government policy in the 
Blair era was largely crafted in the PM’s snug by the triumvirate of Blair, PR-chief 
                                            
26 With the assistance of junior minister Ben Gummer MP (status: ‘also attends Cabinet’), 
who subsequently lost his seat in the 2017 election. 
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Alastair Campbell and polling guru Philip Gould; whereas in the Cameron era it 
relocated to dinner parties in Notting Hill and in the May era to the (unelected) 
intellectual progeny of Joseph Chamberlain.  
There has also been a quiet revolution in (UK) public administration since the 
introduction of so-called ‘Next Steps’ government agencies (Child Support Agency, 
Prison Service, Passport Agency etc), headed by ‘chief executives’ recruited, 
primarily, from business rather than politics. As the agencies are not headed by 
political ministers they are not (directly) accountable to parliament yet provide 
employment for three out of five members of the civil service (Bogdanor, 2003b, p. 
268). Government ministers have, in effect, already been moved over to what 
Bagehot referred to as the ‘dignified’ side of the constitution, as public 
administration is increasingly being conducted outside of the ministries. My 
proposal is simply to accept this de facto development and ensure that the heads 
of these executive agencies are given ministerial status and appointed and held to 
account directly by parliament. This is in line with Diana Woodhouse’s proposal 
that officials heading Next Steps government agencies, although not elected 
politicians, should be responsible to select committees on their own behalf for the 
responsibilities delegated to them. (Woodhouse, 2004, p. 328) 
It might well be argued that it would be hard to distinguish between the proposed 
new-style ministers and senior civil servants, but the principal difference would be 
that the former would possess the necessary presentational and advocacy skills to 
argue the department’s case to the legislative assembly. Unlike career civil 
servants they would not be steeped in the technical knowledge specific to each 
department of state, but would be more likely to be drawn from industry, commerce, 
academia or law – although the post-Fulton civil service, replete with business and 
technical secondments is not so dissimilar (Bogdanor, 2004, p. 266). However, 
unlike in the Yes Minister scenario, the Minister for Administrative Affairs and his 
permanent secretary would most likely be united in their opposition to initiatives 
proposed by here-today, gone-tomorrow political advocates and direct-democratic 
wheezes from hoi polloi. But, as the Brexit referendum demonstrated, this does not 
mean that they would necessarily win the argument – this would be for the 
(mini)demos to decide. If the minidemos decided in favour of the new law then both 
the minister and her mandarins would have no choice but to put it into effect. 
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What about the constant stream of minor regulations that proceeds from both the 
government and the EU? 
Much legislation takes the form of framework laws that leave important 
details to be filled in by subsidiary government regulations. . . .This 
kind of delegated or subordinated legislation is called ‘statutory 
instruments’ in Britain, ‘Erlasse’ in German and ‘décrets-lois’ in 
France. (Hansen, 2010, p. 515) 
Statutory instruments are currently issued by government departments without any 
form of parliamentary scrutiny. Although this clearly constitutes ‘une violation 
flagrante du principe de separation des pouvoirs’ (Chantebout, 2009, p. 292), the 
issue is orthogonal to the argument of this thesis. Delegated/subordinated 
lawmaking amounts to a substantial proportion of the legislative casebook (half of 
all new statutes are EU regulations) and this would remain unchanged by the 
constitutional proposals outlined in this chapter (irrespective of whether the 
regulations originated in Brussels or Whitehall).  
So where would the buck stop? New-style ministers would meet in cabinet and the 
likelihood would be that history would repeat itself and the First Lord of the 
Treasury would assume the title of ‘prime’ minister, as fiscal considerations are the 
common denominator between ministries. It is also hard to see how such a 
random and highly distributed system of ad hoc lawmaking could function without 
some sort of fiscal compact, legally obliging ministers to balance the government’s 
books over the economic cycle. This was the policy of both principal UK political 
parties in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis – the intention of the (UK) Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (Labour), the Office for Budget Responsibility (Con-Lib Coalition) 
and the Charter for Budget Responsibility (Conservative) was to bind the hands of 
elected politicians by quasi-constitutional legislative safeguards to ensure that 
governments run a surplus in normal times – ‘fixing the roof while the sun shines’. 
So there’s nothing new there – the government would be legally obliged to achieve 
fiscal parity over the economic cycle, so the cost entailments of any proposed law 
would have to be presented to the minidemos. If a law required an increase in 
funding then the allotted parliament would have to agree to an increase in taxes or 
a reduction of spending in other areas. The government would still introduce an 
annual, or even six-monthly budget, constrained by the requirement for parity 
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between income and expenditure over the medium term. The only power ministers 
would have to enforce the fiscal compact would be the threat of resignation – either 
individually or en masse and such a resignation threat might well trigger the 
dismissal of the budget minidemos and a new sortition. In line with current 
business practice, ministers might also be rewarded with substantial bonuses for 
achieving departmental targets (fiscal and otherwise). 
Ministerial liability 
As is currently the case, ministers would be jointly and severally (individually) liable 
for the performance of their department, and subject to removal by confidence 
motion. The motion would be initiated by a member of the House of Advocates and 
the minister’s fate determined by an allotted court convened for the purpose. Given 
that this could result in somewhat shaky tenure, the confidence motion might well 
require a supermajority to come into effect. It could also be argued that the 
confidence motion should pass a minimum threshold of support in the House of 
Advocates before an allotted panel was convened in order to ensure an 
appropriate balance between accountability and ministerial stability. 27  
Even at the high point of parliamentary democracy the record of the House of 
Commons in respect to the doctrine of several ministerial responsibility is patchy 
and retrospective – there having been only seven ministerial resignations between 
1855 and 1914 which could be attributed to the doctrine (Bogdanor, 2003a). 
A minister may have cost the country thousands of lives and millions 
of pounds, by launching an ill-arranged expedition into the heart of a 
distant continent, too late for it to be of any use; and his defeat may 
eventually be brought about because his colleagues have decided – 
                                            
27 For ongoing electoral accountability (whereby political parties are rewarded and 
punished on the epistemic outcomes of their policy proposals), see Chapter 7.3.1. To 
repeat my earlier disclaimer, the exercise of executive power is not the subject of this 
thesis – it would make little difference to the overall argument for the introduction of 
sortition into the lawmaking process whether government ministers were elected or 
appointed. 
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perhaps in opposition to his own wishes – to put an unpopular tax on 
beer or bread. (Low, 1904, p. 148) 
The reason for this was the growth of the party system and the increasingly clearly-
marked opposition between the parties (Bogdanor, 2004, p. 14). As a result joint 
responsibility has become greater and several responsibility far less. In Bogdanor’s 
view this was just as true at the end of the twentieth century. The separation of 
political party and government proposed in this thesis would bring about the 
reversal of this position – incompetence in one department of state would not bring 
down the entire government, but the minister heading the department (or executive 
agency) would be vulnerable to a censure motion.  
It might also be thought that, in the absence of a strong party system, ministers 
would get an easy ride. But recent experience has shown that government duplicity, 
incompetence and malpractice is more often than not first highlighted by the press. 
In the case of the 1997 Blair government it was claimed that the fourth estate was 
the real opposition. Government ministers are more troubled by the prospect of a 
savaging by the BBC’s John Humphrys or Jeremy Paxman than, as Denis Healey 
put it, the dead sheep on the opposition benches. The role of the Lords Advocate 
(who would call the censure motion) would very often be to follow up media-
inspired lines of enquiry, making the establishment of a pluralistic print and 
electronic media even more vital (see Chapter 7.4.1, above). 
The changes suggested in this section would lead to a sharp increase in the power 
of unelected agencies and this would (arguably) be necessary in order to 
counterbalance the power and (lack of) accountability of ad hoc minidemoi and 
new-style ‘advocacy’ parties. It would be difficult to describe the resulting 
constitutional arrangements as anything other than decidedly mixed. But then, if 
Hansen and Manin are right, this is already the case with existing ‘democracies’. 
8.4  Popular sovereignty – vs - the mixed constitution  
An equal commonwealth is a government founded upon balance . . . a 
senate debating and proposing, a representative of the people 
resolving, and a magistracy executing. (Harrington, 1986, p. 407) 
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In a mixed constitution where the mixture is perfect, wrote the 
Philosopher, one should be able to see both democracy and oligarchy 
– and neither. Genealogical scrutiny discerns in representative 
government the mixed constitution of modern times. (Manin, 1997. p. 
238) 
The idea of the mixed constitution (memigmenē politeia) is one of the central ideas 
of Aristotle’s Politics: 
Aristotle thought that, by synthesizing democratic and oligarchic 
arrangements, one obtained a better constitution than regimes that 
were all of a piece. Various combinations of lot, election, and property 
qualifications allowed just this kind of synthesis. One might, for 
example, decide that magistracies should be elective (rather than 
assigned by lot) but that everyone, regardless of any property 
qualification, could vote or stand for election. (Manin, 1997, p. 27; 
Arist. Pol., IV, 9, 1294b 11-14) 
The last sentence is an accurate description of modern ‘democracies’, the only 
difference being that Mogens Hansen views modern ‘republican’ arrangements as 
including a key ‘monarchical’ element28 (monarchy was not widespread in Greece 
at the time of Aristotle). The later threefold perspective on the mixed constitution is 
derived from the Greek writer Polybius, living in Rome in the second century BC, 
who described the Roman political system as a mixed constitution: 
The government of Rome, Polybius argued, was a combination of 
monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic features. The consuls, and 
magistrates in general, constituted the monarchical element, the 
Senate the aristocratic element, and the popular assemblies (comitia) 
the democratic element. According to Polybius, it was the balance of 
these three institutions that gave Rome its exceptional stability. The 
three powers checked and balanced each other, thus avoiding the 
                                            
28 Cf. (Hitchens, 2000). 
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abuses of power that afflicted all pure constitutions (monarchy, 
aristocracy or democracy). (Manin, 1997, pp. 44-5) 
The mixed constitution was superseded in the early-modern era by the doctrine of 
unitary sovereignty. The modern narrative of democratic governance qua popular 
will has its origins in Bodin’s vision of absolute sovereign power, re-theorised by 
Hobbes and then democratised by Rousseau: 
The revolutionary experiences of the 17th and 18th centuries 
challenged [the mixed constitution]. The English civil war had 
convinced Hobbes that sovereignty, hence the authorized 
representative embodying the state, but also the form of government, 
could not be divided, if not with great peril for the efficacy of political 
power, and for the security of the social body. Both Gordon Wood and 
Bernard Bailyn in their reconstructions of the political debates in 
colonial America from the 1760s to the 1780s insist on how the 
revolutionaries abandoned the classical trope of mixed government 
and a balanced constitution, so central to the English monarchy, to 
move towards a democratic republic founded on the principle of 
representation, or in the words of Madison an ‘unmixed and extensive 
republic’.  (Castiglione, 2017, p. 1, (English m/s)) 
A parallel development occurred in France with Sieyès’ version of unitary 
representative sovereignty opting for Hobbes’s logical possibility that the 
‘Representative’ could be the ‘assembly of all’ (K. M. Baker, 1990):  
‘Representative sovereignty is postulated on the unity of the nation 
and its capacity to act as a unitary agent. Such a capacity for political 
action, however, like for Hobbes, requires a representative, which at 
the time of the Revolution he identified in the National Assembly: ‘it 
belongs to it, and to it alone, to interpret the general will of the nation’. 
(Castiglione, 2017, pp. 16-17 (English m/s)) 
But is ‘popular sovereignty’ an oxymoron? According to Judith Shklar 
the word sovereignty has scarcely any meaning at all apart from 
absolute monarchy. It is the chief attribute of the man who can say tel 
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est mon plaisir, and make it stick. . . The ‘sovereignty of the people’ is 
a [mere] metaphor containing a negation’. (Shklar, 1969, p. 168)  
Since the dawn of Athenian democracy, concerns have been raised that popular 
rule merely replaces a single tyrant with demos tyrannos (Hoekstra, 2013) – 
perhaps that’s the reason why democratic periods were always preceded by 
tyrannies, rather than moderate constitutionalism. This was why the early-modern 
critics of democracy argued that mixed government was the best defence against 
tyranny – the claim of Charles I’s Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of 
Parliament (1642). Hansen’s 2010 paper relies on a similar argument. 
The revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries led to the replacement 
of the ancient doctrine of the mixed constitution with the modern theory of popular 
sovereignty (Cromartie, 2013), Montesquieu’s separation of powers being adopted 
as the template to slice and dice unitary sovereignty into balancing elements via 
the construction of ‘parchment barriers’ (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 2008, No.48). 
Montesquieu’s taxonomy met the rhetorical needs of the new breed of ‘democratic’ 
republicans, as it was no longer possible to appeal to the juxtaposition of the 
differing interests of the three ‘estates’ of the realm. 
However (Hansen, 2010) argues that both popular sovereignty and the separation 
of powers are illusions – the ancient theory of the mixed constitution being a more 
empirically accurate way to describe modern representative democracy:  
The separation of powers is an outdated theory. The doctrine of the 
separation of functions and persons has become so riddled with 
exceptions that it must be scrapped. Moreover, the subdivision of 
functions itself into legislative, executive and judicial is clear in theory 
but does not work in practice. (Hansen, 2010, p. 516) 
In addition to the empirical inaccuracy of the theory of the separation of powers, 
the case for the mixed constitution can also be made on functional or even 
normative grounds: 
The separation of powers is a theory about division between three 
different functions: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. The 
mixed constitution is a theory about cooperation between different 
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types of institution of which some are monarchical, some oligarchic 
and some democratic. . . . The idea is that every task of government 
requires the cooperation of at least two and often all three elements, 
and that none of the three elements can take action without the 
concurrence of the two others. (Hansen, 2010, p. 523, emphasis in 
original) 
The checks and balances of the separation of powers in the US political system 
frequently induce gridlock in the legislative system and can paralyze government 
via the so-called ‘fiscal cliff’, whereby Congress can simply withdraw funding to 
force the hand of a recalcitrant president. This is generally for partisan reasons and 
is most common when the legislature is controlled by one party and the presidency 
by another. Gridlock and paralysis is less of a problem in the mixed constitution as 
it is ‘a theory about cooperation between different kinds of institution of which some 
are monarchical, some oligarchic and some democratic’ (ibid.). Harrington 
illustrated the built-in tendency towards cooperation of his bicameral (part 
aristocratic, part democratic) legislature with the (proto-cybernetic) example of two 
girls dividing a cake equally, whereby the divider would be constrained to 
cooperate with the chooser by cutting the cake in a way that the chooser would 
find equitable: 
For example, two of them have a cake yet undivided, which was given 
between them: that each of them therefore might have that which is 
due, ‘Divide’, says one to the other, ‘and I will choose; or let me divide, 
and you shall choose’. If this be but once agreed upon, it is enough: 
for the divident, dividing unequally, loses, in regard that the other 
takes the better half; wherefore she divides equally, and so both have 
right. (Harrington, 1992, p. 22) 
The mixed constitution might well be described as a system that ensures 
cooperation via the self-interest of the parties concerned.  
Hansen goes on to describe the mixture of ‘monarchical’, ‘aristocratic’ and 
‘democratic’ elements in modern states but only devotes one short paragraph to 
the ‘democratic’ – the crumbs left under the table after the ‘monarchical’ and 
‘aristocratic’ feast. The take-home message of this thesis is that it would take a 
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revival of fourth-century Athenian election by lot (Hansen’s own area of expertise) 
in order to re-establish a genuinely mixed constitution, wherein all three ‘estates’29 
have equal powers, each constituted (ideally) by a unique selection principle, as in 
the following typology: 
 Executive Legislative 
Estate  Monarchical 
(Crown) 
Aristocratic 
(Lords) 
Democratic 
(Commons) 
Function Administration Policy Advocacy Legislative Judgment 
Selection mechanism Appointment Election Sortition 
Table 8.2: The mixed constitution30 
Let us examine Hansen’s argument in greater detail: 
8.4.1  Monarchical 
In a modern democracy the prime minister, in the USA and France the 
president, has powers that in some respects equal the powers wielded 
by an absolute monarch in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Prime ministers have full power to appoint the ministers that they want 
to have in their government and depose them again if they do not live 
up to the prime minister’s expectations . . . Louis XIV is quoted for 
saying ‘I am the State’. In 2003 Bush and Blair and [Danish prime 
                                            
29 For the Fourth Estate, see Chapter 7.4.1, above. 
30 The model follows Harrington’s neo-classical typology, which assigns advocacy rights to 
an elected senate and judgment rights to an allotted lower house, as opposed to Barnett 
and Carty’s (confusing) terminological inversion in their proposal for a House of Lords 
selected by lot (see p. 274, above). The medieval term ‘estate’ is delineated by scare 
quotes as some might view this as an inappropriate reification of the analytical distinction 
between the one, the few and the many. As to whether the usage is justifiable, is it not 
merely the case that modern ‘estates’ are constituted by principles other than heredity? 
According to Hansen it is still meaningful to refer to modern presidential and prime 
ministerial power in the same language as Louis XIV’s personifaction of state power; and 
Harringtonian and Madisonian references to elected politicians as members of an 
aristocratic estate draw on ancient provenance. Journalists are still referred to as members 
of the Fourth Estate and judges are clearly an estate in their own right. Of course this is all 
concealed by the democratic smoke-screen. 
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minister] Rasmussen could have uttered the same words. (Hansen, 
2010, pp. 524-5) 
Presidents and prime ministers are elected and can be peacefully deposed, 
nevertheless ‘it has become quite common among political scientists to describe 
the British political system as “elective monarchy” or even “elective dictatorship”’ 
(ibid., p. 525). The majority of the American founders (with the exception of 
Alexander Hamilton and Robert Morris) were opposed to hereditary monarchy but 
claimed that election was the best way to appoint a competent commander-in-chief 
(as in Classical Athens). The US presidential election and the UK party leadership 
crisis of 2016-17 have led many to question whether election serves this role 
adequately, hence the argument in section 8.3.5.2 (above) that the appointment of 
executives (as in monarchical systems) might be a more reliable strategy – subject 
to the checks of the other two ‘estates’ – the current balance of power being 
(effectively) tipped in favour of the rule of the one:  
In recent years the monarchical aspect of modern democracy has 
become more and more prominent. The democratic ideal that 
decisions which concern all members of society must be debated 
publicly and approved by the largest possible number of citizens has 
been replaced by the notion of the ‘strong leader’. Debates and 
hearings are increasingly perceived as causes of delay that can be 
avoided by leadership and top-down management. The autocratic 
form of leadership practiced in business is held up as an ideal which 
ought to be copied by the state . . . The rule of the one, viz., the prime 
minister or the president, has always been an element of modern 
democracy, but today is far more important and visible than it was a 
generation ago. (Hansen, 2010, p. 526) 
Prime ministerial power is, in many respects, ‘far greater than that of a US 
president’ (Gallagher, Laver, & Mair, 2006, p. 35). Ministerial appointments are not 
generally subject to approval by parliament and the will of the prime minister 
(and/or her unelected special advisors) generally prevails in cabinet. The prime 
minister represents the country in the European Council and in the UK ‘the 
monarchical element is further emphasized by the tradition that on some issues the 
prime minister represents the crown and possesses a number of prerogatives that 
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allow [her] to take action without asking parliament’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 524). In the 
words of Tony Blair, replying to a 2001 written question from Graham Allen MP: 
The Prime Minister’s role as head of Her Majesty’s Government, her 
principal adviser and as Chairman of the Cabinet are not defined in 
legislation. These roles, including the exercise of power under the 
Royal Prerogative, have evolved over many years, drawing on 
convention and usage, and it is not possible precisely to define them. 
The Government has no plans to introduce legislation in this area. 
(Quoted in Allen, 2003, p. vii.) 
According to the doctrine of the mixed constitution it is perfectly proper for 
presidential and prime ministerial executive powers to be viewed as monarchical; it 
would be much better, as Allen puts it in the subtitle to his 2003 book for us to be 
‘honest about the UK presidency’ and design the other estates in such a way as to 
balance this essentially monarchical role. Whilst competent ‘monarchs’ can be 
elected there is no reason in principle why they should not be selected by other 
means, including appointment on the basis of merit alone (see section 8.3.5.2, 
above). 
8.4.2  Aristocratic 
Since Montesquieu’s 1748 formulation: ‘suffrage by lot is natural to democracy, as 
that by choice is to aristocracy’, most political theorists have accepted the ancient 
argument that election is an inherently aristocratic appointments mechanism. This 
is little more than a tautology as aristoi is Greek for ‘the best’ and voters 
(presumably) give their votes to the best candidates, according to whatever criteria 
they deem apposite. Bernard Manin devotes a chapter of his Principles of 
Representative Government to the ‘principle of distinction’, whereby ‘elected 
representatives . . . rank higher than most of their constituents in wealth, talent, and 
virtue’ (Manin, 1997, p. 94). The chapter outlines the different ways that the 
principle of distinction was instantiated in England, France and the US at the time 
of the birth of representative government, and the rest of the book catalogues how 
the principle has been retained throughout the ‘metamorphoses’ of representative 
government – the parliamentary, party and finally ‘audience democracy’ stages. 
Hansen adopts a similar perspective: 
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the principle of representative democracy is that the people elect 
parliamentarians who are more skilled, more intelligent, more 
charismatic, more knowledgeable and more articulate than ordinary 
people. And elected politicians must [now] be more telegenic than the 
average citizen. (Hansen, 2010, pp, 526-7) 
Election to Harrington’s Senate was limited by a property franchise, but he also 
proposed radical agrarian reforms to ensure that talented citizens could more 
easily qualify for his proposed aristocracy of merit. John Adams was convinced 
that all societies grow aristocrats as automatically as a crop of wheat will grow 
some large ears and some small, and even Thomas Jefferson held that ‘the 
natural aristocracy’ was the most precious gift of nature (von Kuehnelt-Leddin, 
1990). Although the principle remains the same, the selection criteria for hoi aristoi 
have changed considerably since the eighteenth century and the founders of 
representative government might well have balked at the telegenic, thespian, 
demagogic and celebrity criteria privileged by voters in Manin’s age of ‘audience’ 
democracy, in which a display of ‘empathy’ and securing eye-catching newspaper 
headlines is deemed more important than ability for the job. 
Whilst this thesis acknowledges election as the appropriate mechanism for the 
selection of political advocates, the mixed constitution at its heart does have 
profound entailments for the ‘aristocratic’ estate. The division of functions (and 
persons) between the executive and legislature limits the role of elected politicians 
to policy proposals and advocacy. Voters would no longer judge elected politicians 
on the basis of their competence to implement policies but political parties would 
be punished for introducing policies with poor epistemic outcomes in subsequent 
elections. In addition, successful policy proposals would undergo deliberative 
scrutiny in the allotted parliament, so the power of elected aristoi in a new-style 
mixed constitution would be subject to serious constraints. 
8.4.2.1  The judiciary 
Whilst the judiciary is one of the three elements in the theory of the separation of 
powers it does not qualify as an independent estate in the mixed constitution. This 
is on account of the unitary title of ‘executive magistrate’ given to the person or 
persons with the monarchical role in the early-modern typology of crown, lords and 
commons. The ‘magistracy’ combined the role of both judge and executioner. 
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Although the judiciary originally evolved as a sub-set of the executive, Hansen 
argues that it is now an aristocratic estate, as Supreme Courts are the principal 
check on (both) executive power and popular (majoritarian) sovereignty. The 
aristocratic epithet is certainly true in the case of the UK, as the Supreme Court 
took over the judicial function of the House of Lords in 2009. But this is also true in 
general as  
since the Second World War almost all European countries have had 
a constitutional court in which the elite of the country’s legal profession 
pass judgment on whether the laws passed by the parliament respect 
the constitution and in particular the individual rights protected by the 
constitution. (Hansen, 2010, p. 527) 
This is a clear breach of the separation of powers, as it undermines the sovereign 
rights of the lawmaker – the judges are not elected by (or accountable to) the 
people, they are appointed by the crown or the president (hence traditionally being 
seen as part of the ‘monarchical’ estate). This is particularly the case in the United 
States where the Supreme Court (appointed by successive presidents) has, since 
1803, exercised judicial review of laws and thereby interfered with Congress’s 
power to legislate. However, once appointed, Supreme Courts are often a thorn in 
the flesh of those who appointed them (or their successors) in both presidential 
and parliamentary systems.  
The 1688 Bill of Rights led directly to the ‘long hibernation’ of judicial review with its 
abrogation of Coke’s 1610 dictum that ‘in many cases, the common law will control 
Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void’ (Dr. Bonham’s 
Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 114a C.P.) The judiciary only started to re-exercise its 
muscles towards the end of the twentieth century, leading Michael Beloff QC to 
argue that 
one of the most profound recent changes to the Constitution . . . 
results from the activities of the third branch of government, the 
judiciary, which have themselves infringed the sovereignty of 
Parliament – an impregnable given for those reared in the traditions of 
Blackstone and Dicey. (Beloff, 2000, p. x) 
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This was largely on account of the European Communities Act of 1972 which ‘gave 
English judges the right, for the first time since the seventeenth century power – 
whose legitimacy was beyond doubt – to hold that domestic primary legislation was 
invalid as incompatible with directly effective community law’ (ibid.). Fresh impetus 
was provided by the 1998 Human Rights Act, which ‘shifted the whole focus of 
public law from consideration of executive wrong to that of citizens rights’ (ibid., p. 
xii). As a result the judiciary is now intruding into both the executive and legislative 
domains. As a result ‘when judges become involved in decisions of a political 
character (even if not fairly characterized as political decisions), politicians will want 
to become involved in their selection’ (ibid., p. xii, xiii). This has long been the case 
in the USA, but the politicization of the judiciary is beyond the scope of the present 
thesis. 
Hansen’s decision to position the judiciary in the ‘aristocratic’ estate makes sense 
in terms of the modern typology of the mixed constitution. In this he agrees with 
Jeremy Waldron’s view that leaving it to the judiciary to decide such matters 
‘amounts to the people’s embrace of what Aristotle would call “aristocracy” – the 
rule of the few best’ (Waldron, 1998, p. 280). As this thesis does not include any 
proposal regarding the judicial function, I am content to follow their lead. Table 8.2 
on page 306 is only concerned with the aristocratic estate from the perspective of 
lawmaking, so includes no reference to the judiciary. It might even be argued that 
the modern judiciary is a separate estate on its own, but this is orthogonal to the 
main thrust of this thesis. For an examination of the essential role of constitutional 
checks and balances in the preservation of the rights and interests of minorities, 
future generations, non-human species and the natural world see Chapter 7.3.3.2, 
above. 
8.4.2.2  The media 
Although traditionally described at the ‘fourth’ estate, from the perspective of this 
thesis the media are a subset of the aristocratic estate as its primary role (as with 
elected advocates) is one of representative isegoria. For details see Chapter 7.4.1, 
above. 
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8.4.3  Democratic 
Hansen devotes four pages of his essay to the monarchical and aristocratic 
elements of modern ‘democracies’, but just one short paragraph to the democratic: 
To have periodic free and fair elections based on universal suffrage is 
indisputably a democratic aspect of modern representative 
democracy. It is also democratic that all citizens possess equal 
freedom of speech, equal freedom of assembly and equal access to 
the relevant information that will enable them to make a rational 
choice. Another democratic aspect is that a fairly small number of 
discontented citizens can form a new party and that they stand a 
reasonable chance of having one or more of their candidates elected, 
at least in countries that have adopted proportional representation. 
Also the citizens’ jury is a democratic aspect of the judiciary in many 
modern states. 
A single paragraph strikes me as meagre fare for a description of what should 
presumably be the principal estate in any political system that claims to be a 
‘democracy’. As a leading authority on classical-era political systems Mogens 
Hansen would be acutely aware of the difficulty of reconciling election with 
democracy. In his words, again: 
I suggest that the mixed constitution deserves to be revived as a 
necessary corrective to the prevailing view that Western states are 
pure democracies and that democracy is the rule by the people. 
Ancient political thought is remarkably modern or – rather – modern 
political thought has much to learn from the Greek and Roman political 
thinkers. (Hansen, 2010, p. 530) 
The take-home message of this thesis is derived from Hansen’s reference to the 
democratic potential of the citizen jury in modern states, and argues that modern 
‘democracies’ would need to undergo a similar development as fourth-century 
Athens, when legislative courts (nomothetai) were established along parallel lines 
to the people’s courts, with the final legislative decision devolved to a large citizens’ 
jury, selected by lot. 
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APPENDIX I 
The	Brexit	Lottery	
Like all referendums, the ‘Brexit’ vote will be a lottery. 
Why not go the whole hog and take the decision by lot? 
 by Keith Sutherland 
(originally published on Open Democracy, 18 April 2016)1 
On June 23, Britain will go to the polls to decide whether or not the country should 
remain a member of the European Union. David Cameron’s in–out referendum on 
EU membership is, ostensibly, about finding out what the people want. But there is 
a better, and more democratic, way. 
Britain has voted before on the question of EU membership but, judging from the 
press coverage, it seems many pundits and public figures are concerned that an 
emotional and uneducated public will give the ‘wrong’ answer this time. Back in 
2013, and again in 2104, Peter Mandelson complained that the prime minister’s 
plans to go to the public on the matter were misguided. Referendums are swayed 
by irrelevant issues, are “very blunt instruments” and the outcome would be “a 
lottery”, he said. In a sense, Lord Mandelson is right – the experience of countries 
like Ireland, where referendums are commonplace, suggests that they are often 
used to give the government of the day a kicking, rather than deal with the issue at 
hand. And yet a different kind of lottery could be more representative of [informed] 
public opinion than a referendum vote. 
If one takes the prime minister’s claim that the decision is up to the people of 
Britain at face value, then the question is: how can the decision procedure be 
sharpened up? We need a more reliable mechanism to allow the people to make 
an informed decision on such an important issue as EU membership. One option 
                                            
1 https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/keith-sutherland/brexit-lottery 
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would be a public enquiry with a large representative jury selected by lot. Public 
inquiries have, on the whole, a good track record – the Hutton Inquiry being 
praised for its balanced and open proceedings. The problem was the lack of 
democratic participation, as there was no jury to determine the outcome. The 
inquiry verdict (BBC guilty) was left to a Lord Justice who had cut his teeth in 
Northern Ireland’s jury-free Diplock courts and whose conclusions were coloured 
by his anti-media prejudice. The Leveson Inquiry can be criticised along similar 
lines, but its main flaw was the continental ‘examining magistrate’ inquiry protocol. 
Although the press was on trial (again), there was no counsel for the defence and 
Leveson decided the outcome himself (with a little help from Hacked Off). How 
different both inquiries might have been if they had followed standard Anglo-Saxon 
judicial procedure – adversarial exchanges followed by a jury verdict. 
Why not adopt this approach as an alternative to a referendum? There is nothing 
new about the juristic approach to policy-making. In 403 BC the Athenians, the 
inventors of democracy, established a system of legislative courts, and every new 
law had to run the gauntlet of adversarial debate in front of a jury of several 
hundred citizens selected by lot. The decision of the jury was deemed to represent 
the considered view of the entire citizen body. 
Although Aristotle was hostile to democracy he praised this ‘wisdom of crowds’, 
concluding that, under the right conditions, ‘the many’ (hoi polloi) judge certain 
matters better than individuals or groups of experts. The truth of his claim was 
demonstrated mathematically in 1785 by the Marquis of Condorcet in his ‘Jury 
Theorem’, which proved that a jury is increasingly likely to converge on the ‘right’ 
answer as its numbers increase (assuming balanced advocacy, secret voting and 
a minimal competence threshold). And there is a wealth of modern research 
showing that the ‘cognitive diversity’ produced by large randomly-selected juries is 
the best way to decide important issues. Election, by contrast, selects people of 
similar backgrounds (lawyers, Oxbridge PPEs, and policy wonks) who are often 
victims of ‘groupthink’. But referendums, as Mandelson pointed out, are a shot in 
the dark. 
Random selection generates a ‘mini-public’ that represents the entire population 
‘descriptively’ – a sample of just a few hundred would proportionately reflect the 
age, gender, political leanings and socio-economic composition of the country. And 
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this is not just a matter for classicists, political theorists and statisticians – Stanford 
University’s James Fishkin has conducted practical experiments with decision-
making by citizen juries for over twenty years. Fishkin’s ‘Deliberative Polls’ show 
that ordinary citizens can competently judge complex issues after receiving 
balanced advocacy and deliberating for a couple of days. The success of these 
experiments has led Fishkin to claim that ‘the microcosm offers a proxy for what 
would happen if everyone discussed the issues and weighed competing 
arguments under similarly favourable conditions.’ 
So why not just provide balanced information and advocacy to all voters before a 
referendum? The problem is ‘rational ignorance’: it makes no sense for voters to 
take the time and effort to inform themselves properly as their individual vote 
makes no difference to the outcome. Not so with a representative jury where every 
vote really does count. 
Fishkin’s polls have mostly been advisory; the only time the results were 
automatically adopted was in China. In 2005 the Communist Party in Zeguo 
province commissioned a random sample of 235 citizens to decide infrastructure 
priorities. Even though the preferences of the citizen jury were radically different 
from its own, the party leadership implemented them, leading Fishkin to salute the 
Chinese for developing a new model of democracy that “may set an example for 
public consultation around the world”. 
If we don’t want to be outdone by China in democracy, as well as everything else, 
we would do well to look seriously at these experiments, and it’s a shame we didn’t 
start with an issue as important as Brexit. Referendums can reflect poorly-informed 
preferences – much better to assemble a representative ‘mini-public’ and allow it to 
weigh the competing arguments on our behalf. No doubt political jury service would 
be as tedious as its judicial equivalent, but those of us who don’t receive a jury 
summons can happily leave matters in the hands of our proxies, confident that the 
majority decision would have been the same if we had ourselves participated. 
Keith Sutherland is a researcher on random selection in politics at the University of 
Exeter. His books The Rape of the Constitution? and A People’s Parliament are 
published by Imprint Academic. 
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APPENDIX II 
A2.	The	Blind	Break	and	the	Invisible	Hand	
A2.1  Overture: sortition and social theory1 
Sortition, or ‘the action of selecting or determining something by the casting or 
drawing of lots’ (OED), is a decision mechanism that has been in use since 
antiquity and has served a wide variety of purposes, comprehensively catalogued 
in Jon Elster’s Solomonic Judgements (Elster, 1989) and Peter Stone’s The Luck 
of the Draw (Stone, 2011). Archaic uses (category headings in bold print) include 
divination and the discovery of God’s will – ‘the lot is cast into the lap; but the 
whole disposing thereof is the Lord’s’ (Proverbs, 16:33), and an alternative to the 
ordeal and duel. According to the Puritan divine Thomas Gataker’s The Nature and 
Use of Lotteries (Gataker, 2008 (1627), pp. 73-74), divination was only legitimate 
when expressly commanded by God – for example detecting the guilty (Jonah’s 
disobedience to God’s will was revealed by lot) and dividing conquered land (Num. 
26: 52-6; Josh. 18: 6). (This latter use has survived into modernity (Wilms, 1974).) 
Selection of religious officials and the assignment of sacred offices was often 
decided by lot, leading to the claim that this was the origin of the juridical and 
political use of sortition in classical Athens (Fustel de Coulanges, 1984). According 
to Acts 1:26 sortition was also employed to select a successor to the apostle Judas, 
and God indicated his choice of scapegoat by lot (Lev: 16: 7-10). Gataker also 
cites Origen’s claim that angels were placed in heaven by lot, and recounts the tale 
of a Nestorian abbot who chose between his heretical monks and orthodox 
bishops by lot.  
Archaic (but non-religious) uses of sortition include the rotation of political 
officials (in classical Greece and medieval Italian city states), impartial allocation 
of unpleasant fates or tasks (decimation of hostages and treacherous soldiers, 
                                            
1 Readers who are only interested in the political potential of sortition are invited to proceed 
directly to the next section of this appendix. 
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choosing [during the siege of Masada] who should kill who, choice of victim(s) for 
cannibalization, selection of priests to visit the infected at the pest-house, and the 
choice of who to throw overboard from an overcrowded lifeboat). Lotteries are also 
widely used for the military draft and deciding job layoffs during an economic 
downturn. In addition to the intrinsic (and legal), need for impartiality in life-or-death 
decisions, drawing lots can have psychological benefits – if the title character in 
William Styron’s novel Sophie’s Choice (played in the film adaptation by Meryl 
Streep) had taken the agonizing decision of which of her children to sacrifice by 
flipping a coin, might she have been spared the guilt and mental anguish that led to 
her eventual suicide? It is interesting to speculate whether this psychological 
benefit supports the claim that the lot was religious in origin – especially given the 
reference by the Auschwitz official to Matt. 19:14 (‘Suffer the little children to come 
unto me.’) If Sophie had believed the choice was made by God then she might 
have been less inclined to blame herself for the fate of her daughter. 
Other archaic uses of sortition which have continued into modernity include the 
selection of trial jurors (primarily in English-speaking countries); choosing 
between equally legitimate alternatives (regulating inheritance, resolution of 
child custody disputes, and choosing between equally-qualified job and university 
applicants (Boyle, 2010; Pluchino, Rapisarda, & Garofalo, 2010)); allocation of 
scarce resources (assignment of land to till, distribution of charity, prime fishing 
spots, school and summer-camp places, concert tickets, kidney dialysis machines, 
experimental drug treatments, immigrant permits (‘green cards’), public housing, 
land allocation to settlers, procreation rights, broadcasting opportunities, oil-drilling 
leases, and slots for private members’ bills in the UK parliament; strategic 
decision making (hunting practices of the Naskapi Indians, randomized bluffing in 
poker, investment strategies (Biondo, Pluchino, & Rapisarda, 2014); reduction of 
decision costs (tiebreakers in some US state elections, resolving tied votes in the 
Swedish parliament, resolving cyclical majorities, interpersonal decisions ranging 
from the choice of marital partners to which restaurant to go to); equal 
opportunities/social justice (order of candidates on ballot papers, author name 
ordering in academic papers, and the guiding principle of the [fictitious] utopian 
community of Aleatoria (Goodwin, 2005)); sports and games (deciding who goes 
first, or who is drawn against who); spot checks (airport passenger screening, IRS 
investigations, vehicle inspections); participation in medical experiments 
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(treatment and placebo groups assigned randomly); selection of examination 
questions; and revenue raising (‘ordinary lotteries have their origin in the 
selection by lot of political representatives in Genoa. Initially people made bets on 
candidates, whose names were later replaced by numbers' (Elster, 1989, p. 36)).2 
A2.2  Sortition and political theory 
Although Solomonic Judgements touches briefly on the political potential of 
sortition (random timing of elections, random allocation of members to 
congressional committees, ‘lottery voting’ (Amar, 1984) and demarchic committees 
(Burnheim, 2006 (1985)) Elster’s principal concerns are social justice, equal 
chances and the limits of rational choice and Barbara Goodwin’s Justice by Lottery 
has a similar focus on social theory. This appendix, however, is primarily 
concerned with political issues. My understanding of the terms ‘political’ and ‘social’ 
is derived from Jeremy Waldron’s distinction between ‘political political theory’ 
(focusing on institutional issues like sovereignty, constitutionalism, representation 
and consent) and the current preoccupations of ‘political’ theorists with ‘applied 
moral philosophy . . . Rawls’s theory, the 57 different varieties of luck-
egalitarianism and global justice’ (Waldron, 2013, pp. 6, 21). The latter should 
really be the province of social theorists (Professor Waldron’s Oxford chair 
straddles both disciplines), notwithstanding its domination of politics departments 
for the last few decades.3 Although Solomonic Judgements includes a chapter on 
politics, the discussion of sortition is confined to the chapter dealing with decision-
making in social policy. The concern of this thesis is specifically the political 
potential of sortition – the random selection of citizens for public office (Dowlen, 
2008). The literature on the political potential of sortition falls into three distinct 
categories (detailed in the sub-sections below), the main thrust of this appendix 
being to clarify the analytical distinction between the three models. 
                                            
2 For full references for these applications, see (Elster 1989, Ch.II), and (Stone, 2011, pp. 
6-10)  
3 The term ‘social theory’ as used here should not be confused with the curriculum of 
sociology departments, where the focus is on the work of Parsons, Luhmann, Habermas, 
Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard, Giddens, Beck etc. I am grateful to Peter King for this point. 
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A2.2.1 The ‘Blind Break’ 
According to Oliver Dowlen and Peter Stone, the leading theorists of this school, 
the function of sortition is to protect the political appointment process from partiality, 
factionalism and corruption.4 This approach shares Jon Elster and Barbara 
Goodwin’s aleatorian concerns with impartiality, equality and social justice,5 as the 
‘blind break’ (Dowlen, 2008) established by the ‘lottery principle’ (Stone, 2011) 
guarantees that the selection process is devoid of reasons (and partial interests), 
so ‘one can count on not being able to count on the outcome’ (Elster, 1989, p. 67): 
The central feature of [the lottery] is the arational blind break. It 
represents a break in the chain of reasoned, planned thought and 
action that accompanies most decision-making procedures. Embodied 
in the lottery, therefore, is the idea of disconnection. We can think of a 
lottery decision as taking place in a special zone where it is insulated 
from the qualities that exist around it and which take place before and 
after it. (Dowlen, 2008, pp. 13-14). 
Because their outcomes are unpredictable, lotteries ensure that 
decisions are made without any reference to reasons. This includes 
bad reasons [partiality, factionalism, nepotism, corruption etc.]. And 
this is the primary virtue that lotteries have. Lotteries provide the 
sanitizing effect of a process independent of reasons. (Stone, 2011, 
pp. 35-6, emphasis in original). 
 
                                            
4 Stone’s book The Luck of the Draw: The role of lotteries in decision making (Stone, 2011) 
is, unlike Dowlen’s Political Potential of Sortition, primarily concerned with notions of 
impartiality in social (allocative) justice. Only one chapter is specifically devoted to the 
political potential of sortition, nevertheless that chapter is the focus of the discussion in this 
appendix. 
5 See also (Broome, 1984, p. 40; Williams, 1981). 
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The function of the blind break/lottery principle is to introduce indeterminacy, as the 
lottery inputs (four squares on left of figure A2.1, below) and the outputs (single 
square on right) are separated by the two vertical lines. 
 
Figure A2.1: The Blind Break (from Dowlen (2008), p. 13) 
Dowlen and Stone’s focus is on protecting the political system from ex-ante 
partiality and corruption (as opposed to Goodwin’s concerns with social justice and 
the equal rights of citizens), so the function of sortition is more prophylactic than 
egalitarian. Whilst it’s certainly true that sortition distributes the relevant 
goods/responsibilities (political offices) on an equal-chance basis, in large modern 
states the ratio between the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ of the lottery is so great that 
impartiality, rather than equality, is the relevant norm. Once the draw has taken 
place and the political offices have been allocated then, as Orwell put it, some 
animals will become vastly more equal than others, notwithstanding the impartiality 
of the selection process. This is in marked contrast with the isonomia (equal 
political rights) of fifth- and fourth-century Athens, where most citizens would have 
attained political office at least once in their lifetime, hence Aristotle’s claim that 
rotation by lot – where all citizens take turns to rule and be ruled – was the principal 
characteristic of democratic freedom (Arist., Pol., 1317a: 40-1317b13). In large 
modern states, however, political equality can only be achieved by representative 
mechanisms – the topic of the ‘invisible hand’ section (A2.2.2) of this appendix. 
Needless to say, sortition only protects the impartiality of the selection process – 
once the choice has been made, political officers chosen by lot will be just as 
subject to potentially corrupting influences as those selected by any other process. 
Indeed the lack of party discipline or the need to secure re-election might suggest 
an increased long-term risk of corruption, hence the Athenian institution of euthynai 
– the public prosecution that all magistrates (the majority of whom were selected 
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by lot) had to undergo at the end of their term of service (Hansen, 1999, p. 392). 
Reliance on police action, however, is a second-best approach to reducing 
corruption – compared to structural measures, such as party discipline and the 
need to secure re-election – and there is a significant risk that an impartial 
selection process could give rise to an increased risk of corruption over the full 
office-holding term: 
Having to think about re-election . . . is a form of accountability to the 
electorate without which the temptation to plunder the spoils of 
incumbency might be overwhelming. (Elster, 1989, p. 89) 
Given the problem with ex-post corruption and the impossibility of rotation in large 
modern states, Blind Break theorists like Dowlen and Stone limit themselves to 
modest proposals for the lot-based appointment of supervisory, monitoring and 
advisory bodies. 
A2.2.2  The ‘Invisible Hand’ 
The concerns of the competing ‘invisible hand’6 research school7 into the political 
potential of sortition are, however, very different. The mathematics of proportional 
sampling demonstrates that if a sample is of sufficient size then the ‘law of large 
numbers’ will introduce a reliable stochastic relationship between the random 
sample and the target population. For example, a sample of (say) 1,000 persons 
selected randomly from a population of several million would be likely to return an 
approximate 50/50 gender balance – if this were not the case, and gender balance 
                                            
6 Although the metaphor ‘the invisible hand’ was coined by Adam Smith, it is used here in 
an entirely different sense from Smith’s Wealth of Nations (or Mandeville’s (earlier) Fable 
of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits). 
7 (Barnett & Carty, 2008; Becker, Szep, & Ritter, 1976; D. Bennett, 2012; Buchstein, 2009, 
2010; Buchstein & Hein, 2010; Callenbach & Phillips, 2008; Carson & Martin, 1999; 
Chouard, 2012; Coote & Lenaghan, 1997; Crosby, Kelly, & Schaefer, 1986; Engelstad, 
1988; Fishkin, 2009; Goodin, 2008; Gronlund, et al., 2014; Guerrero, 2014a, 2014b; 
Hansen, 2005; Landemore, 2010; Levinson, 2010; Lieb, 2004; Lucardie, 2014; Mansbridge, 
2010; Mueller, Tollinson, & Willett, 1972; R. Mulgan, 1984; O'Leary, 2006; Schmidt, 2001; 
Sintomer, 2007, 2010a, 2010b; Smith, 2009; Sutherland, 2008; Warren & Pearse, 2008; 
Zakaras, 2010) 
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was deemed to be a salient factor, then the sample size would need to be 
increased (or stratified sampling adopted).8 If this is the case for gender, it can be 
assumed that the distribution of age, occupational category, socio-economic status, 
party membership, newspaper subscriptions or any other factor associated with the 
political preferences of the target population would also be captured by a random 
sample of a sufficient size (Carson and Martin, 1999, p. 34). The outcome is 
ensured by the ‘invisible hand’ of the law of large numbers (LLN). 
One of the criticisms of electoral democracy is that the persons returned by voting 
(stereotypically rich, white, male lawyers and ‘policy wonks’) have little in common 
with ordinary voters and, as such, suspicions are raised as to whether elected 
politicians may be legislating more in the interests of the ‘political class’ and/or 
affluent donors, than those of their constituents (Crouch, 2004; Gilens, 2012; 
Hacker & Pierson, 2011; Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000). This has led to calls for 
improved ‘descriptive representation’ to establish a legislature that would be 
(ideally) in John Adams’ words ‘an exact portrait, in miniature’, of the whole nation 
(Adams, 1951), and random sampling is one (or possibly the only) way to achieve 
it (Guerrero, 2014a). The other criticism of mass democracy is the problem of 
‘rational ignorance’ – voters are unlikely to invest the necessary effort into properly 
informing themselves on political issues as their single vote has negligible causal 
power (Downs, 1957). However the decisions of a randomly-selected microcosm – 
where each vote really does count – could well (given balanced information and 
advocacy) be better informed than the whole population (Fishkin, 2009). 
Dowlen argues that descriptive representation constitutes, at best, a ‘weak’ use of 
the lottery principle: 
if lot is used with the express purpose of creating some idea of 
balance or proportion, then this constitutes a weak use because such 
a task does not require arationality. In these circumstances there is a 
contradiction between the arational, random lottery, and the idea of 
                                            
8 The arbitrary figures chosen here are for illustration purposes only, as this is a work in 
political theory, as opposed to the mathematics of proportional sampling. 
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ratio expressed in the general notion of [proportion]. (Dowlen, 2008, p. 
18, emphasis in original).9  
However, this is only true in the tautological sense that sortition has been pre-
defined in terms of arationality. Dowlen’s book derives from his PhD, a work of 
political theory that draws on the historical evidence only in so far as it serves to 
illustrate his pre-ordained philosophical thesis. His methodology is similar to that of 
Gaetano Mosca, whose sweeping theory outlined in The Ruling Class (Mosca, 
1939) ‘subjects history to the test of his principles’ (Meisel, 1962, p. 62). Chapter 2 
of The Political Potential of Sortition analyses Athenian democracy in terms of his 
impartiality thesis (with Mosca it was the ruling class thesis), but acknowledges that 
the source literature, while clear on how lot was used is almost entirely silent on 
why (p.32), leaving theorists entirely at liberty to speculate in an unconstrained 
manner. Dowlen agrees with J.M. Headlam’s rejection of sortition as a way of 
revealing the will of the gods (Fustel de Coulanges, 1984). According to Headlam, 
the purpose of the lot – in particular the randomly-selected boule (Council of 500) 
was to protect the ecclesia (direct-democratic assembly) from domination by 
aristocratic or partisan forces. This was because, although all major decisions were 
(in the fifth century) taken by the assembly, it was the council that prepared the 
agenda, so a ‘weak’ council selected by lot was necessary in order to protect the 
primacy of the sovereign assembly (Headlam, 1891). Classical historians, for the 
most part, agree that the council was little more than a secretariat for the assembly 
(Manin, et al., 2008; Rhodes, 1972).10  
                                            
9 Peter Stone takes issue with Dowlen’s claim in his review of The Political Potential of 
Sortition (Stone, 2010), but argues that descriptive representation is a by-product of the 
general lottery principle. 
10 Josiah Ober puts more emphasis on the role of the council in Greek democracy, pointing 
to an Eritrean decree of 340 BC, ‘ordering all citizens to fight without waiting to receive 
orders if anyone tries to establish “some constitution other than a Council and a prutaneia 
(a subset of the Council) appointed by lot from all Eretrians” (Knoepfler 2001, 2002; 
translation from Teegarden 2007)’ (Ober, 2008, pp. 73-74). However, this is not 
incompatible with the key role of the lot-appointed council in defending the primacy of the 
assembly. 
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But is there any evidence that the Athenians viewed sortition as a procedure to 
protect the assembly from partisan forces? Aristotle viewed the lot in terms of 
democratic freedom and equality, secured by rotation – ruling and being ruled in 
turn: 
The underlying principle of democracy is freedom, and it is customary 
to say that only in democracies do men have a share in freedom, for 
that is what every democracy makes its aim. There are two main 
aspects of freedom: 1) being ruled and ruling in turn, since everyone is 
equal according to number, not merit, and 2) to be able to live as one 
pleases. (Arist., Pol., 1317a: 40-1317b13). 
Euripides also explains the allotted bodies of Athenian democracy in terms of 
rotation via the claim of Theseus, the mythical founder of the Athenian democracy, 
that ‘the people rules by turns through annual successions’ (Euripides, The 
Suppliant Women, vv. 406-407). The only other contemporary reference, Plato’s 
claim that ‘He on whom the lot falls is the ruler, and is dear to the gods’, supports 
Fustel de Coulange’s thesis on the religious origins of the lot (Plato, The Laws, III. 
690 vi 759).11 Whilst the functional explanation favoured by Headlam and Dowlen 
is not incompatible with religious ideologies,12 it tells us nothing about how the lot 
was actually conceived in the ancient world. Likewise, as the Greeks had no notion 
of mathematical proportionality, it was unlikely that they used sortition as a form of 
                                            
11 M.H. Hansen is sceptical regarding Plato’s connection between the use of sortition and 
divine choice, arguing that it refers to the selection of priests, not political officers (Hansen, 
1999, p. 51). Expelling a citizen chosen by the gods would have been a blasphemy; and 
screening before the lot would have avoided the scandal. But nobody minded, because the 
lot was not a religious procedure. Nevertheless, the idea of lot as divine choice was a part 
of traditional beliefs in the ancient world and, even if it was not a part of conscious 
democratic principles, it could provide subconscious support for sortition (I am grateful to 
André Sauzeau for this point). The Protestant fear of the blasphemous use sortition as a 
way of ‘tempting God’ (Gataker, 2008 (1627)) and the correspondence of election to the 
Calvinist notion of ‘the elect’ may also help to explain the demise of sortition in the modern 
world (see Chapter 3.1.6, above). 
12 The sociology of religion and the non-realist school of theology are devoted to functional 
explanations for religious belief (or, more accurately, the correlation between religious 
belief and social outcomes). 
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statistical representation:13 ‘the Council was not perceived as standing for the 
people. The boule was just a collegial magistracy’ (Manin, et al., 2008). The truth is 
we simply don’t know why the ancients used sortition for the appointment of 
political officers, so analytical and functional political theorists need to take on 
board the warnings from their historically-oriented colleagues about the danger of 
anachronism in the interpretation of evidence from the past. 
Dowlen argues that descriptive representation could better be achieved by 
stratified sampling (p. 23) and/or quotas to increasing the ‘politics of presence’ of 
hitherto marginalised groups (Phillips, 1995). However if politics is, as Michael 
Oakeshott contends, simply a matter of attending to the ‘general arrangements’ of 
a group of people thrown together by choice or necessity, then which strata/quotas 
are relevant? Anne Phillips’s choice of gender, ethnicity and sexual-orientation 
categories is somewhat arbitrary, largely reflecting the social categories privileged 
by the ‘New Left’ to replace the urban proletariat as the group most in need of 
emancipation from oppression. The ‘invisible hand’ of the law of large numbers, by 
contrast, ensures a proportionate representation of all politically salient categories 
(given a large enough random sample), including those of which we are entirely 
ignorant. This is an entirely rational use of the lot (it’s the ratio that we’re interested 
in), hence my agreement with Dowlen that the two models are ‘contradictory’ 
(Dowlen, 2008, p. 18). The invisible hand is a very different – indeed polar opposite 
– use of sortition to the blind break.14  
Dowlen’s insistence that stratified sampling, or ‘weighted’ lotteries, should be 
avoided at all costs on account of the introduction of the element of predictability is 
an indication of the divergence of these two approaches to the political potential of 
sortition. Dowlen defines a weighted lottery as follows: 
                                            
13 Accurate descriptive representation is less of a problem in small homogeneous poleis 
than in modern pluralistic and multicultural states. 
14 This is not to say that the two different functions will not be combined – a group selected 
by lot will be both statistically representative of the target population and, at the same time, 
chosen by an impartial mechanism. 
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We can distinguish between a weighted lottery and an ordinary lottery 
by the fact that in a weighted lottery the pool is divided into groups 
rather than consisting of individuals or individual options. Likewise the 
result is interpreted in terms of its group identity rather than as an 
individual entity. (Dowlen, 2014, p. 11) 
Sub-group predictability is, however, the only value of statistical sampling by 
random selection whereas, from the individualistic perspective of the blind break, it 
is counterproductive: 
Because the winner . . . is judged primarily by . . . group, and not by its 
status as an individual entity, the winner is not independent from the 
set to which it originally belonged. (Dowlen, 2008, p. 23) 
That may be anathema to blind break theorists but it’s the raison d’etre for 
proponents of the invisible hand. Sortition for the latter group of theorists is a 
technique for establishing an automatic weighted lottery (as the decisions as to 
which groups should be represented, and in what proportion, are executed by the 
‘invisible hand’ of the lottery process): 
Were [the members of each subgroup] all alike, there would be no 
reason for preferring sortition over any other method of selecting from 
that subgroup (or at least no reason connected to descriptive 
representation. (Stone, 2011, p. 134) 
Indeed, but the reason for using sortition is because we don’t know which sub-
group is relevant or the prevalence of that subgroup within the population, hence 
the need for the invisible hand of the lottery process. This is particularly the case as 
‘stratification presupposes a finite, determinate, and above all short list of relevant 
features for distinguishing subgroups.’ Random selection, by contrast ‘can ensure 
descriptive representation in accordance with any characteristics one might 
name . . . even those not currently deemed important’ (ibid., p. 135). ‘Sub-group’ is, 
in this context, a purely analytical construct, as what is of interest is really 
politically-salient characteristics – for example a 45-year old, female, churchgoing 
schoolteacher, married with two children, who subscribes to the Guardian 
newspaper and abstains from voting in elections could not be described as a 
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member of a distinct sub-group but combines at least eight politically-salient 
characteristics (along with other qualities that we are entirely ignorant of). 
Stone devotes a section of his book to descriptive representation (Stone, 2011, pp. 
132-140), but concludes that descriptive representation is a by-product of his 
overall ‘sanitizing’ lottery principle: 
Random selection can only accomplish this result [the descriptive 
representation of all characteristics, even those not currently deemed 
important] because it does not depend on reasons. A process 
independent of reasons can ensure (statistically, at least) that all 
group members are selected in the right numbers, whereas any 
process dependent on reasons cannot. (p. 136) 
Granted the general principle that it is ‘well-known (and trivial) that deterministic 
systems can be embedded in the framework of stochastic systems’ (Atmanspacher, 
2002, p. 69), Stone’s argument for subsuming a particular deterministic principle 
(descriptive representation) within a stochastic one (random selection) – 
subsuming therefore a positive principle within a negative (absence of reasons) – 
is unpersuasive. On top of Stone’s ‘lottery principle’ (arationality), accurate 
descriptive representation presupposes an additional mathematical theorem (the 
law of large numbers (LLN)), outlined in Jakob Bernoulli’s Ars Conjectandi (1713) – 
otherwise there would be no relationship between sample size and descriptive 
accuracy. The LLN comes in two forms: strong and weak, which differ in their 
convergence properties. The invisible hand theory of sortition presupposes the 
weak form, which specifies that the random variables converge stochastically 
toward their expectation value. Mathematically speaking, let X1, . . ., Xn be a set of 
n independent and identically distributed random variables with finite expectation 
value. The weak LLN states that their average converges stochastically to their 
expectation value as n → ∞. 
𝑆! ≔ 𝑋1 + . . .+𝑋!𝑛 
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It is true that human ‘reasons’ (such as a weighted lottery) will disrupt the outcome, 
but the sampling accuracy is the product of the LLN not the ‘lottery principle’. The 
absence of reasons is undoubtedly a necessary condition15 for the ‘descriptive’ 
representation achieved by statistical sampling (in the same way that juror 
independence is a necessary condition for the Condorcet Jury Theorem) but is not 
sufficient in the absence of the LLN (ditto for the Condorcet theorem). Although 
lotteries have been in use since antiquity, statistical proportionality is a modern 
discovery, hence my claim that ‘descriptive’ representation is orthogonal to Stone’s 
‘lottery principle’. In mathematical parlance the law of large numbers is a stochastic 
rather than a deterministic cause or reason, but it is, nevertheless, a ‘reason’. 
Indeed some recent authors have argued that stochastic processes, far from being 
indeterminate, are a form of ‘crypto-determinism’, derived via natural extensions or 
‘dilations’ of stochastic processes (Gustafson, 2002; Misra, 2002; Primas, 2002). 
Stochastic determinism was a hot topic among nineteenth-century mathematicians, 
philosophers and sociologists – the period when the ‘once unthinkable world of 
chance becomes subject to the laws of nature’ (Hacking, 1983, p. 455). In 1825 the 
French department of justice started to compile and publish statistics for different 
categories of crime and rates of conviction, leading Adolphe Quetelet to draw the 
attention of the public to ‘the terrifying exactness with which crimes reproduce 
themselves’ (quoted in Hacking, 1983, p. 469). We know in advance ‘how many 
men will bloody their hands with violent murders, how many will be counterfeiters, 
how many poisoners, just as one can enumerate in advance the births and deaths 
that will occur in a given year’ (ibid.). Although actual crimes are committed by 
individual persons, ‘society prepares the crimes and the guilty person is only the 
instrument . . . the victim on the scaffold is in some way an expiatory victim of 
society’ (Quetelet, 1832, p. 346). Unlike the slogan ‘It could be you’ accompanying 
the invisible hand poster for the (UK) National Lottery, stochastic determinism only 
                                            
15 This is why the Deliberative Polling methodology presupposes that (ideally) everyone 
included in the random sample should accept the invitation. In practice this is impossible, 
but organisers seek to maximise participation by going to great lengths to ensure that 
participants are adequately compensated for loss of earnings, child-care costs etc. 
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applies at the societal level, and tells us nothing about which individuals will be 
involved.16 
The term ‘the law of large numbers’ was introduced by the French mathematician 
S.D. Poisson in 1835, and plays a major role in his probability analysis of decisions 
by jury (Gelfand & Solomon, 1973). Poisson tried to model mathematically ‘how 
one could have stable probabilities of mass phenomena even when the 
probabilities for individuals are not constant’ (Hacking, 1983, p. 466). Poisson’s 
work led directly to Emile Durkheim’s notion of ‘social facts’ – ‘manners of acting, 
thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive 
power by virtue of which they exercise control over him’ (Durkheim, 1982 [1895]). 
Durkheim’s landmark study of suicide proved that even this most quintessentially 
individual act was social in origin, as the suicide rates of a population are 
stochastically determined by the invisible hand of the law of large numbers 
(Durkheim, 1951 [1897]). 
As this thesis is addressed to an audience in political, not statistical, theory the 
mathematics is only provided for illustrative purposes. Other factors, such as the 
existence of (finite) expectation values, the IID (independent and identically 
distributed variables) requirement, and ‘contextual emergence’ (Atmanspacher & 
beim Graben, 2009) also come into play, but are beyond the scope of this work. 
However this paper would definitely side with the (majority) view of mathematicians 
that the LLN, if it holds, is an epistemic criterion for the ontic stability of the system, 
out there in nature, rather than being purely descriptive (subject to the caveat that 
we do not see the ensemble directly but only in terms of a collection of individual 
samples – hence the ‘invisible’ status of the ‘hand’). The fact that repeated multiple 
casts of a fair die converge on 3.5 (Bernoulli’s Theorem) tells us something about 
the state of the universe, rather than being merely an epistemic claim. Hacking 
(1983) argues that the 3.5 outcome would not have been anticipated before the 
development of mathematical probability theory (i.e. it was epistemically 
                                            
16 The knowledge of which individuals were destined to commit each particular crime 
would have to await Philip K. Dick’s sci-fi short story, Minority Report (and the resultant 
Tom Cruise movie). 
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unavailable), but if the die-rolling experiment had been done in 400BC or 
1200AD the outcome (3.5) would have been the same. So this is an ontic claim, 
although our ancestors might have chosen to explain it in terms of divine 
equanimity rather than the LLN. This paper therefore agrees with Einstein’s 
preference that convergence to 3.5 should be a natural law rather than a 
'statistical law with definite solutions’ (Einstein, 1967). It’s also the case that if 
statistical sampling did not reflect ontic regularities in the target population then the 
public-opinion and polling industry would be put out of business, as their customers 
might as well consult the Delphic Oracle (Geer, 1996). My purloining of Adam 
Smith’s metaphor of the ‘invisible hand’ has the advantage of being amenable to 
both determinate (pre-modern) and probabilistic (modern) epistemic sensibilities. 
As stated above, the LLN comes in two forms, strong and weak, with ‘almost sure’ 
convergence restricted to the former. The invisible hand of sortition presupposes 
the weak form, which merely guarantees stochastic convergence, given a large 
enough sample and an acceptable margin of error. As to what constitutes an 
acceptable margin of error in political decision-making is a contested point: this 
thesis argues that if a decision made by a randomly-selected body is to be held to 
represent the considered verdict of the target population, this requires that a 
number of different samples of the same population would return the same verdict, 
within an agreed margin of error (see p. 284, above). This entails – in parallel with 
the above-mentioned constraints for the operation of the LLN – a number of 
exacting constraints on the deliberative mandate of the decision body, which are 
touched on briefly in the ‘entailments’ section of this appendix (A2.2, below). 
Elster’s (1989) meditation on lotteries is, like Stone and Downlen, unconcerned 
with statistical representation. The only reference to representation is in the context 
of trial juries, where Elster cites the American legal doctrine that ‘no defendant has 
a right to a representative jury, only the right to have a jury drawn from a 
representative cross-section’ (p. 96). Given that a trial jury is composed of only 
twelve persons, and the final selection from the initial ‘venire’ (randomly-selected 
jury pool) is distorted by challenges from both defence and prosecution advocates, 
such a small group could not be considered representative of the general 
population (or the ‘peers’ of the defendant). However if the jury consisted, as in 
Classical-period Athens, of 501, or even 5001 persons and there were no 
opportunity to challenge individual jurors, then the law of large numbers would 
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produce a representative sample of the citizen body. This demonstrates the need 
for both principles to establish a descriptively-representative sample – the 
elimination of reasons (no right to challenge jurors)17 coupled with (ideally) no 
reasons/excuses accepted for anyone whose name is drawn not to attend – and 
the invisible hand of the law of large numbers.  
According to most invisible hand theorists, sortition would make a good candidate 
for the design of a ‘descriptively’ representative legislative assembly, as the 
aggregated decisions of a deliberative microcosm would act as a proxy for the 
informed decisions of the larger political community. Maximum sample sizes are 
constrained by the ‘rational ignorance’ principle (Downs, 1957) – if the group is so 
large that individual votes will have a negligible effect then members of an 
assembly constituted by lot will not be motivated to focus sufficiently on the 
legislative debate in order to make a well-informed decision (they would more likely 
be playing games on their mobile phones). This sets up a tension between the 
need for a large enough sample to establish sufficiently fine-grained descriptive 
representation, but not so large as to exceed the rational ignorance threshold, 
leading to a typical compromise sample of no more than several hundred persons. 
The blind break and invisible hand approaches both focus on interests and 
structural factors – in the former case insulating the political system against 
corruption by ‘sinister interests’ (Bentham, 1999) and in the latter ensuring that the 
diverse interests of the citizen body are proportionately reflected in the composition 
of the legislative body. The approach to the political potential of sortition outlined in 
the next section differs on account of the consequentialist focus on epistemic 
outcomes (i.e. how to arrive at the ‘best’ decisions). 
                                            
17 Although the ‘peremptory’ challenge does not require the attorney to state a reason, 
nevertheless the challenge is based on unstated reasons, even if this is often little more 
than the attorney’s hunch that the juror in question might possess hidden biases. 
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A2.2.3  Democratic reason and the wisdom of crowds18 
A number of theorists working in the field of ‘deliberative’ democracy have argued 
that the best way to optimize epistemic outcomes is by increasing the ‘cognitive 
diversity’ of a decision-making body (Estlund, 2008; Landemore, 2010, 2013b; S. 
Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2004; Tetlock, 2005), and sortition is certainly a way of 
increasing cognitive diversity. These theorists share the observation of the invisible 
hand school that the election mechanism generates a legislative assembly from a 
narrow subset of citizens (the ‘political class’), that fails to accurately ‘describe’ the 
target population, but their concern is with the impoverished cognitive resources 
available, not the lack of statistical representativity. The case for cognitive diversity 
is grounded in a passage from Aristotle’s Politics (Arist., Pol, 3.1281a42-b10).19 
Aristotle’s focus is on the aggregate judgment of the group, likening the multitude 
to a single person with superhuman capabilities. James Surowiecki’s The Wisdom 
of Crowds opens with a modern-day example of Aristotle’s argument, when visitors 
to a country fair were invited to enter a competition to guess the weight of an ox. 
The mean of the group’s (787) guesses was 1,197 pounds and the actual weight 
was 1,198 pounds. According to Surowiecki the reason for the remarkable 
accuracy of the guesses is a combination of the law of large numbers (LLN) and 
the cognitive diversity of the participants (coming from a variety of backgrounds 
and possessing diverse interests).  
‘Epistemic’ democrats, including David Estlund, Hélène Landemore and Scott 
Page, focus more on the cognitive diversity of the individuals involved than the 
collectively-representative ‘wisdom’ generated by the LLN.20 Landemore’s 
monograph Democratic Reason (2013) is devoted to the application of cognitive 
diversity to political problem solving. One of the examples that she provides is 
                                            
18 This section is a highly abbreviated summary of Chapter 6, above. 
19 See p. 174, above. 
20 Deliberative democracy, of which epistemic democracy is a variant, is fundamentally a 
procedural programme, privileging fair-mindedness, dispassionate judgment and the rule 
of reason in the internal procedural rules of the deliberative forum, as opposed to relying 
on structural factors to ensure the proportionate representation of competing perspectives. 
Unanimity is the goal and majority decisions are generally considered second best. 
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when a group made up of citizen volunteers in the Wooster Square neighbourhood 
of New Haven managed to resolve a problem of recurring muggings that had 
proved intractable to both City Hall and the police department. The neighbourhood 
group came up with an effective solution, but the relevance of this example to 
sortition is not at all clear. The self-selected and highly-motivated participants had a 
strong personal interest in successfully resolving the problem (nobody wants to get 
mugged on their way home) and only three group members appear to have made 
an active contribution to the solution. There are better ways of generating cognitive 
diversity than sortition, such as crowd-sourcing, e-petitions, knowledge/information 
markets (Landemore, 2013, pp. 173-184), and prize-winning competitions (the 
motivation for John Harrison’s resolution of the longitude calculation problem). 
Landemore (2013) argues the case for sortition as follows: permanent legislative 
assemblies have to deal with a wide variety of political problems, many of which 
are entirely unforeseeable. As such there is no way of knowing in advance what 
cognitive skills might be required, so a large assembly constituted by sortition 
would be the best way of establishing the diverse cognitive pool necessary to 
ensure the availability of the skills as and when they might be required. This 
approach, however, overlooks the fact that most people selected at random would 
be unlikely to have the necessary ability, motivation, self-confidence and rhetorical 
skills to make any innovative policy proposals, so the value of sortition for policy 
innovation is unclear.  
A2.3  Entailments 
One of the merits of sortition is that all the functions mentioned above – equal 
opportunities, protection from ex-ante corruption and factionalism, descriptive 
representation and accessing the ‘wisdom of crowds’ – apply, irrespective of the 
reasons for introducing the lottery. Some people advocate sortition in order to 
implement social justice by undermining rich and powerful elites, whereas others 
just want to make sure the trains run on time. But the first two approaches to the 
political potential of sortition – the blind break and the invisible hand – have very 
different entailments for those involved in the constitutional design of democracies. 
The former focuses on the disinterested choice of persons, whereas the concern of 
the latter is the group level of the sample. Descriptive representation is not the 
concern of blind break theorists, and most of their work (e.g. Dowlen 2014) focuses 
335 
on the random selection of individual citizens to act as impartial monitors and 
facilitators for the scrutiny and oversight of existing election-based institutions. 
Their role is to guard against misconduct, so they are ‘tribunes’ and ‘citizen 
witnesses’, rather than representatives of the people. 
Advocates of the invisible hand approach, however, need to acknowledge that the 
descriptive representation that they champion applies only at the collective level, 
not the individuals selected: 
For the power does not reside in the juryman, or counsellor, or 
member of the assembly, but in the court, and the council, and the 
assembly, of which the aforesaid individuals – counsellor, 
assemblyman, juryman – are only parts or members. (Arist., Pol., 68: 
1282a34-41. 
Persons selected by lot are emphatically not the aleatory equivalent of elected 
representatives, selected by an alternative balloting method. This places severe 
constraints on the mandate of a sortition-based representative assembly and 
demonstrates the ongoing need for elections and/or direct democratic initiatives to 
fulfill the need for ‘active’ political representation (the role of persons as opposed to 
groups). In this respect I’m entirely in agreement with (Dowlen, 2014) that sortition 
should not be seen as an alternative to election.  
Epistemic and deliberative democrats seek to bridge the active/descriptive divide 
by combining sortition and small-group face-to-face deliberation. However they 
overlook the fact that jury-room deliberation breaches the representation mandate 
on account of both the small numbers involved and the biases introduced by 
imbalances in the speech acts of the participating individuals. Whilst that need not 
be a problem in a trial jury, where the task is an epistemic one – establishing the 
fact of the matter (beyond reasonably doubt) – political juries are required instead 
to indicate their informed preferences in a manner that ensures those preferences 
statistically represent those of the target population. This imposes severe 
constraints on the deliberative mandate – the derivation of the term deliberation 
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from the Latin liber (weight) suggests that the role of a political jury should be one 
of ‘weighing’ competing arguments.21 Indeed it is hard to see what ‘descriptive’ 
representatives could do other than register their preferences/beliefs via voting (all 
votes carrying exactly the same weight), as the differences in the ‘illocutionary 
force’ of the speech acts of individual members of such an assembly would destroy 
its aggregate representativity.  
Most of the invisible hand proposals for lot-based deliberative assemblies overlook 
this constraint, thereby conflating the entirely different functions of active 
(individual) and descriptive (group) representation. They also rely too heavily on 
the ability of the blind break to select political officials impartially, thereby 
overlooking the increased vulnerability to ex-post corruption for political functions 
other than indicating preferences via voting in secret. Epistemic and deliberative 
democrats are more concerned with the quality of the decision outcome and the 
procedural norms governing face-to-face deliberation, representativity not figuring 
very highly in their priorities. Although small groups constituted by sortition 
participating in face-to-face deliberation would appear to bridge the gap between 
the individual and the collective, the law of large numbers no longer applies, so it is 
hard to understand how the decision outcomes of such groups (which are likely to 
fluctuate wildly) could be said to represent the considered judgment of the whole 
citizen body, the sine qua non of large-scale representative democracy.  
A2.4  Conclusion 
The two leading theories on the political potential of sortition – the blind break and 
the invisible hand – have very little in common. The former deals with the 
indeterminate selection of individual persons for political office whereas the latter 
deals with the statistical sampling of a target population in order to establish a 
descriptively-representative microcosm. The blind break is a negative mechanism 
                                            
21 The competing derivation from the German deliberativstimme (deliberative voice) is the 
one privileged by Habermasian deliberative democrats, who have no intrinsic interest in 
sortition-based representative ‘minipublics’ (Sintomer, 2010a, p. 36). For detailed 
examination of the differences between the Latinate and Germanic deliberative traditions 
see Chapter 5.1, above. 
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(the elimination of causal links) whereas the invisible hand is positive (the 
distribution of qualities in the target population (stochastically) determining the 
distribution of those qualities in the microcosm).  
Blind Break Invisible Hand 
Indeterminate selection of persons Stochastically determinate microcosm 
Negative – arational elimination of causal links Positive – ratio of attributes between microcosm and 
target population 
Table A2.2: The Blind Break and the Invisible Hand 
A good case could be made for adopting separate terms for each of these two 
mechanism – ‘sortition’ in the former case and ‘lottocracy’ (Guerrero, 2014), 
‘statistical representation’, or ‘stochation’ in the latter. Perhaps only then will 
theorists in both camps stop talking past each other and/or seeking to subsume 
one paradigm within the other. Although it is true in principle that selection by lot 
will ensure both outcomes (descriptive representation and elimination of causal 
links) simultaneously, the differing practical entailments of the two approaches 
underwrites the argument for separate terms. 
The ‘third way’ provided by the epistemic school of deliberative democracy 
attempts to bridge the individual/group divide but fails to ensure ongoing statistical 
representativity. As such it’s hard to understand the relevance of the sortition 
principle as there are (arguably) better ways of establishing the cognitive diversity 
necessary for innovative policy proposals. The two factors distinguishing the blind 
break and the invisible hand – [in]determinacy and [a]rationality) – are orthogonal 
to the arguments put forward by epistemic democrats so, for this reason, the third 
option is not included in the table above. 
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Glossary	of	frequently	used	terms	
English 
Nomothesia: Lawmaking 
Rotation: The allocation of public offices by a selection procedure that allows (in 
principle) all citizens to rule and be ruled in turn. 
Sortition: Random selection by the drawing of lots. 
Stochation: (stəˈkeɪʃ(ə)n): a neologism coined by André Sauzeau for the 
establishment of a descriptively-representative microcosm of a target population by 
statistical sampling. The term derives from the Greek στόχος (stokhos) -- to ‘aim’, 
conjecture, or approximate. Such a body would have a random probability 
distribution that may be analysed statistically but may not be predicted precisely.  
Votation: A feature of Swiss democracy, whereby citizens choose from a list of 
direct-democratic proposals that have exceeded a minimum signature threshold. 
Greek22 
Ho boulomenos: ‘He who wishes’. In political contexts it denoted a citizen who 
took a political initiative. 
Isegoria: Equal right of speech. The right of every citizen to speak and move 
proposals in the political assemblies. 
Isonomia: The principle of political equality. Isonomia does not mean equality 
before the law, but the equal right of all citizens to exercise their political rights. 
Nomothetai: Legislative commission consisting of, for example, 1,000 citizens who 
had been selected by lot from the panel of 6,000 jurors.
                                            
22 Derived from (Hansen, 1999) 
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